#### WELCOME

On behalf of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, we are pleased to welcome you in Rio de Janeiro on the occasion of the 16th SAET Conference.

We wish to express gratitude to the various institutions that made this conference possible: first and foremost, to Instituto Nacional de Matemática Pura e Aplicada (IMPA) for their wonderful hospitality, Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq), Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES), Fundação Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ), the University of Iowa, Itaú Bank and Bradesco Bank.

Many thanks to the people who generously contributed to the success of this event, in particular, the members of the local organizing committee, the session organizers, the program committee and the help team. Special thanks to Suely Lima, Ana Paula Rodrigues, Leticia Ribas, Jurandira Ribas, Marcelo Viana, Michele Leite, Paula Dugin, Pedro Faro and Sonia Alves for their invaluable help along the progress, your help has been invaluable.

We hope you enjoy the conference and we wish you a pleasant stay in Rio de Janeiro.

Aloisio Araujo, José Heleno Faro, Juan Pablo Gama Torres, Susan Schommer and Nicholas Yannelis, Organizing Committee

#### **Executive Committee**

Bernard Cornet (President/Secretary)

Robert Townsend (Second Vice-President)

Nicholas Yannelis (Treasurer/Editor)

Aloisio Araujo (Past President)

David Levine (Member at Large)

Charles Plott (Member at Large)

Edward Prescott (Member at Large)

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Jose Heleno Faro - INSPER

Susan Schommer - UERJ

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Alvaro Sandroni (Kellogg, USA)

Chris Shannon (University of California-Berkeley, USA)

Anne Villamil (University of Iowa, USA)

## From behind the scene, our invaluable staff

Without these persons, organizing this conference would not have been possible.

From the Scientific Activities Division (DAC): Sônia Alves, Paula Dugin, Pedro Faro (head), Renata Maiato, Letícia Ribas, Jurandira Ribas, Ana Paula Rodrigues;

From the Scientiic Information Division (DDIC): Maria Celano (head);

IMPA Graphic designer: Sérgio R. Vaz

Suely Lima;

Michele Leite from MMX, for her tireless good will and negotiation skills.

#### **About SAET**

Our purpose is to advance knowledge in theoretical economics and to facilitate communication among researchers in economics, mathematics, game theory, or any other field which is potentially useful to economic theory.

## **Sponsors**











## **Overview of Events**

## **Group Pictures**

It will be taken some group photos among the congress (all days before lunch). Don't forget to be part of them, to help us immortalizing the 16th SAET Conference!

## **Social Program**

Friday July 8th: Gala dinner (not for students). The oficial 16th SAET dinner at Espaço Marimbas (Address: Praça Cel. Eugênio Franco, 2 - Copacabana, Rio de Janeiro - RJ, 22070-020) with a wonderful view of Copacabana beach)



Saturday 9th: Most part of this day will be in honor of Professor Aloisio Araujo with special lectures:

- Morning and afternoon: Special Plenaries of some Aloisio's co-authors and friends.
- Late afternoon: Special Plenaries of Aloisio current research.

Sunday 10th: Touristic tour among the Rio de Janeiro historical centre and lunch in one of the most well-known and traditional restaurant in the city.

## **Practical Information**

## Badge

Conference participants are required to carry the 16th SAET badge during the conference at IMPA.

#### **Bulletin board**

A message board will be set up in the conference hall; please check the announcements from time to time as we will communicate changes to the posted schedule, and other messages using this board.

#### **Practical matters**

We suggest that participants purchase a travel health insurance.

The voltage in the state of Rio de Janeiro is 110V. Electrical outlets are not universal, you can buy adaptors in Rio (or better bring them with you, of course).

We advise against drinking tap water – prefer bottled mineral water or iltered water.

## **Conference Venue**

IMPA is located in the South Zone of Rio de Janeiro, near the Tijuca Forest and the Botanical Gardens, 20 minutes from major hotels of Leblon and Ipanema. You can find our address and some practical information about how to get to the institution below.

#### Address

Estrada Dona Castorina, 110

Jardim Botânico Phone number: +55 21 2529-5000

Zip Code 22460-320 Fax:+55 21 2512-4115
Rio de Janeiro, RJ - Brazil e-mail: eventos@impa.br

#### How to get to IMPA

## From the airport

On leaving the airport we suggest that you take a taxi. There are several companies that have booths located inside the airport facilities, on the way out. A ride to South Zone costs around R\$120 to R\$150 and takes about 50 minutes. There are also special buses leaving from Terminals 1 and 2.

#### Buses

There are three bus lines running near the Institute:

508 - Horto - Botafogo (via Jardim Botânico)

416 - Tijuca - Horto (via Túnel Rebouças)

509 - Horto - Ipanema (via Leblon)

The passenger must pay as they enter, using the front door to get on the bus and the rear door to get off the bus. The bus fare is R\$ 3,80 and the maximum change given is for a R\$ 20,00 bill.

Should you prefer to use a taxi, we suggest the following companies:

JB Táxi Cootramo Coopertramo Easy Taxi (Free App)

### Wifi

For those who need, IMPA has a wifi connection accessible to all visitors throughout the whole building. The ESSID of the network is impa-wl and the password is impacastorina.

The participants can also use the computers on the Hall of the 2nd floor.

8:00-8:30	Registration			
8:30-9:15	Opening			
9:15-11:15	Location	Auditorium 1	Auditorium 2	Room 224
	Session	Firm Dynamics and	Social Choice and	Matching markets
	Session	the Macroeconomy	Cooperative Game Theory	and Insurance
	Organizer/Chair	Timothy Kehoe	Youngsub Chun	Andrés Carvajal & Eduardo Azevedo
	Chair			
11:15-11:30	Coffee Break			-
11:30-12:30	Special Lecture in h	nonor of Aloisio Araujo:	Yves Balasko (York Un	iversity)
	Chair:			
12:30-12:45	Chair: Coffee Break			
12:30-12:45 12:45-13:30	Coffee Break	nonor of Aloisio Araujo:	Paulo Klinger Monteir	o (FGV-EPGE)
	Coffee Break	nonor of Aloisio Araujo:	Paulo Klinger Monteir	o (FGV-EPGE)
	Coffee Break Special Lecture in h	nonor of Aloisio Araujo:	Paulo Klinger Monteir	o (FGV-EPGE)
12:45-13:30	Coffee Break  Special Lecture in h  Chair:	nonor of Aloisio Araujo:	Paulo Klinger Monteir Auditorium 2	ro (FGV-EPGE)
12:45-13:30 13:30-14:45	Coffee Break  Special Lecture in h  Chair:  Lunch Break  Location	Auditorium 1	Auditorium 2	Room 224
12:45-13:30 13:30-14:45	Coffee Break  Special Lecture in h  Chair:  Lunch Break	Auditorium 1		Room 224
12:45-13:30 13:30-14:45	Coffee Break  Special Lecture in h  Chair:  Lunch Break  Location	Auditorium 1  Household Behavior	Auditorium 2	Room 224 Repo and
12:45-13:30 13:30-14:45	Coffee Break  Special Lecture in h  Chair:  Lunch Break  Location	Auditorium 1  Household Behavior and the	Auditorium 2	Room 224 Repo and
12:45-13:30 13:30-14:45	Coffee Break  Special Lecture in h  Chair:  Lunch Break  Location	Auditorium 1  Household Behavior and the	Auditorium 2	Room 224  Repo and Intermediation
12:45-13:30 13:30-14:45	Coffee Break  Special Lecture in h  Chair:  Lunch Break  Location  Session	Auditorium 1  Household Behavior and the Macroeconomy	Auditorium 2  Topics Game Theory  Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao	Room 224  Repo and Intermediation
12:45-13:30 13:30-14:45	Coffee Break  Special Lecture in h  Chair:  Lunch Break  Location  Session  Organizer/Chair	Auditorium 1  Household Behavior and the Macroeconomy	Auditorium 2  Topics Game Theory  Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao	Room 224  Repo and Intermediation
12:45-13:30 13:30-14:45 14:45-16:45	Coffee Break  Special Lecture in h  Chair:  Lunch Break  Location  Session  Organizer/Chair  Chair	Auditorium 1  Household Behavior and the Macroeconomy	Auditorium 2  Topics Game Theory  Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao	Room 224  Repo and Intermediation
12:45-13:30 13:30-14:45 14:45-16:45	Coffee Break  Special Lecture in h  Chair:  Lunch Break  Location  Session  Organizer/Chair  Chair  Coffee Break	Auditorium 1  Household Behavior and the Macroeconomy  Timothy Kehoe	Auditorium 2  Topics Game Theory  Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao Luo	Room 224  Repo and Intermediation  Piero Gottardi
12:45-13:30 13:30-14:45 14:45-16:45	Coffee Break  Special Lecture in h  Chair:  Lunch Break  Location  Session  Organizer/Chair  Chair  Coffee Break  Location	Auditorium 1  Household Behavior and the Macroeconomy  Timothy Kehoe  Auditorium 1  Information, Aggregation and	Auditorium 2  Topics Game Theory  Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao Luo  Auditorium 2	Room 224  Repo and Intermediation  Piero Gottardi  Room 224  Dynamic Games with Incomplete
12:45-13:30 13:30-14:45 14:45-16:45	Coffee Break  Special Lecture in h  Chair:  Lunch Break  Location  Session  Organizer/Chair  Chair  Coffee Break  Location	Auditorium 1  Household Behavior and the Macroeconomy  Timothy Kehoe  Auditorium 1  Information,	Auditorium 2  Topics Game Theory  Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao Luo  Auditorium 2  Monetary	Room 224  Repo and Intermediation  Piero Gottardi  Room 224  Dynamic Games

IMPA, Rio de Janeiro, July 6 - 9, 2016

Wednesday, July 6th, 2016 Location: Ricardo Mañé Auditorium Room 232 Room 236 Room 228 Room 347 Room 349 Finance and Default, Bankruptcy Asymmetric Macroeconomics Decision and Collateral Information Alain Chateauneuf & Mauricio Villalba Carolina Parra Andres Neumeyer **Bernard Cornet** Location: Ricardo Mañé Auditorium Location: Ricardo Mañé Auditorium Room 228 Room 232 Room 236 Room 347 Room 349 Search and **Economic Theory II** The Industrial Sequential-Service Organization of Frictions in Models **Financial Service** of Money and Providers in **Banking** Developing Cauntriac

Room 228	Room 232	Room 236	Room 347	Room 349
Topics in Economic	Quantitative	Dynamic	Contests and	
Growth and	Macroeconomics I	Programming	Applications	
Development				
Tiago Cavalcante	Selahattin Imrohoroglu	Juan Pablo Rincón-	Brian Roberson	
		Zapatero		
			Dan Kovenock	

Robert Townsend

Ricardo Cavalcanti

Jean-Marc Bonnisseau

9:00-9:30	Registration						
9:30-11:30	Location	Auditorium 1	Auditorium 2	Room 224			
	Session	International Capital Flows	Coalition and Network Formation	Decision under Uncertainty			
	Organizer/Chair	Timothy Kehoe	Armando Gomes	Simone Cerreia- Vioglio			
	Chair						
11:30-12:00	Coffee Break						
12:00-13:00		Sir John Hicks Lecture: Timothy Kehoe (Univ. of Minnesota & Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis)					
	Chair:						
13:00-14:30	Lunch Break						
14:30-16:30	Location	Auditorium 1	Auditorium 2	Room 224			
	Session	Financial and monetary equilibria contributions by former IMPA	Economics of learning and information	Monotone Methods			
	Organizer/Chair	students Mario Pascoa	Hu, Tai-Wei	Tarun Sabarwal			
	Chair		<u> </u>				
16:30-17:00	Coffee Break		1				
17:00-19:00	Location	Auditorium 1	Auditorium 2	Room 224			
	Session	International Trade	Asset Bubbles and Economic Growth	Coordinstion Games			
	Organizer/Chair	Timothy Kehoe	Cuong Le Van	Jack Stecher			
	Chair						

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			Thurs	day, July 7th, 2
D 220	D 222	D	D 247	D 240
Room 228	Room 232	Room 236	Room 347	Room 349
Temporal Preferences	Political Economy I	Topics in Economic Theory		
Jean-Pierre Drugeon	Alejandro Saporiti	Tom Krebs		
	l			
	Location: Ricardo Ma	ane Auditorium		
Room 228	Room 232	Room 236	Room 347	Room 349
Room 228  Development/Envir	Room 232  Macro Perspectives	Room 236  Quantitative	Room 347 Security Design and	Room 349  Multiple Priors
Development/Envir onment Dynamics		Quantitative	Security Design and Derivative Pricing	Multiple Priors
Development/Envir onment Dynamics and Unemployment	Macro Perspectives	Quantitative Macroeconomics II	Security Design and Derivative Pricing	Multiple Priors Models
Development/Envir onment Dynamics and Unemployment Takashi Kamihigashi	Macro Perspectives  Kyle Herkenhoff	Quantitative Macroeconomics II  Selahattin Imrohoroglu	Security Design and Derivative Pricing José Fajardo	Multiple Priors Models José Heleno Faro
Development/Envir onment Dynamics and Unemployment	Macro Perspectives	Quantitative Macroeconomics II	Security Design and Derivative Pricing	Multiple Priors Models
Development/Envir onment Dynamics and Unemployment Takashi Kamihigashi	Macro Perspectives  Kyle Herkenhoff	Quantitative Macroeconomics II  Selahattin Imrohoroglu	Security Design and Derivative Pricing José Fajardo	Multiple Priors Models José Heleno Faro
Development/Envir onment Dynamics and Unemployment Takashi Kamihigashi	Macro Perspectives  Kyle Herkenhoff  Room 232	Quantitative Macroeconomics II  Selahattin Imrohoroglu  Room 236	Security Design and Derivative Pricing  José Fajardo  Room 347  Information and Decisions	Multiple Priors Models José Heleno Faro
Development/Environment Dynamics and Unemployment  Takashi Kamihigashi  Room 228  Expectations and	Macro Perspectives  Kyle Herkenhoff  Room 232  New Methods for	Quantitative Macroeconomics II  Selahattin Imrohoroglu  Room 236  Topics in Economic	Security Design and Derivative Pricing  José Fajardo  Room 347  Information and	Multiple Priors Models José Heleno Faro

3:30-9:00	Registration					
9:00-11:00	Location	Auditorium 1	Auditorium 2	Room 224		
	Session	Debt and Default: Fluctuations and Trends	Decision Theory	Dynamic Games		
	Organizer/Chair	Igor Livshits	Jack Stecher	Johannes Horner		
	Chair					
11:00-11:30	Coffee Break					
11:30-13:30	Location	Auditorium 1	Auditorium 2	Room 224		
	Session	Contest I	Topics on economic growth and development	Economic Theory I		
	Organizer/Chair	Dan Kovenock	Tiago Cavalcanti	Nicholas Yannelis		
	Chair	+				
13:30-14:30	Lunch Break		-			
14:30-15:30	David Cass Lecture: Robert E. Lucas, JR (University of Chicago)					
	Chair:					
15:30-16:00	Coffee Break					
16:00-18:00	Location	Auditorium 1	Auditorium 2	Room 224		
	Session	In honor of Aloisio Araujo: Theoretical and empirical assessments to assist the Central	Contest II	Strategic behavior in Markets and Auctions		
	Organizer/Chair	Ricardo Santos	Dan Kovenock	Marean Rostek		
	Chair					
19:00-22:00	Conference Dinner					

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Room 228 <b>General Equilibrium</b>	Room 232	Room 236	Room 347	
General Equilibrium			1100111 3 17	Room 349
	New Methods for Dynamic Economies	Nash Program and Implementation		
/ves Balasko	Kevin Reffet & Lucasz Wozny	Walter Trockel		
Room 228	Room 232	Room 236	Room 347	Room 349
Public Economics and Networks	Networks	Economic Dynamics	Econometric Methods	
Nizar Allouch	Francis Bloch	Wilfredo Maldonado & Alberto Pinto	Sergio Pinheiro Firpo	
	Location: Ricardo Ma	iñé Auditorium		
Room 228	Room 232	Room 236	Room 347	Room 349
ndustrial Organization	Stochastic Choice and Behavioral Optimization	ТВА	Topics in Market with Adverse Selection	
Steffen Lippert	Paulo Natenzon	Hugo Hopenhayn	Humberto Moreira	

10:00-10:45	Special Lecture: Alain Chateauneuf (IPAG Business School and PSE-Université de Paris I)						
	Chair:						
10:45-11:30	Special Lecture: Ma	ario Pascoa (University o	of Surrey)				
	Chair:						
11:30-11:45	Coffee Break						
11:45-12:45	Lionel Mckenkie Le	ecture: Nancy Stokey (U	niversity of Chicago	)			
	Chair:	Chair:					
12:45-13:45	Lunch Break						
13:45-15:45	Location	Auditorium 1	Auditorium 2	Room 224			
	Session	International Trade	Government, Institutions and Public Policy	Economic Theory and Applications			
	Organizer/Chair	Giovanni Facchini	Cecilia Testa	Luis Braido			
	Chair						
15:45-16:00	Coffee Break						
16:00-17:00	Special Lecture: Michael Woodford (Columbia University)						
	Chair:	Chair:					
17:00-17:15	Coffee Break						
17:15-18:15	Special Lecture: Felix Kubler (University of Zurich and Swiss Finance Institute)						
	Chair:						
18:15-19:15	Special Lecture: Alc	oisio Araujo (IMPA and I	FGV-EPGE)				
	Chair:						
	Chair:						

IMPA, Rio de Janeiro, July 6 - 9, 2016

			Satur	day, July 9th, 2016
	Location: Ricardo Ma	añé Auditorium		
		~ / 4		
	Location: Ricardo Ma	ane Auditorium		
	Location: Ricardo Ma	añé Auditorium		
Room 228	Room 232	Room 236	Room 347	Room 349
Applied Economics	Political Economy II	Revealed Preference and	Games and Decision	Topics in Economic Theory & Industrial
		Monotone		Organization
		Comparative Statics		
Alvaro Riascos	Alejandro Saporiti	John Quah	Juan Dubra	Marta Faias & Juan Pablo Torres-
				Martínez
	Location: Ricardo Ma	añé Auditorium		
	Location: Ricardo Ma	añé Auditorium		
	Location: Ricardo Ma	ane Auditorium		

## **Sir John Hicks Lecture**

Timothy J. Kehoe (University of Minnesota, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis & National Bureau of Economic Research) (with Jose Asturias, School of Foreign Service in Qatar, Georgetown University, Sewon Hur, University of Pittsburgh, and Kim J. Ruhl, Pennsylvania State University)

July 7<sup>th</sup>, 2016 / 12:00 - 13:00

Firm Entry and Exit and Aggregate Growth

Using plant-level data from Chile and Korea, we find that, during episodes of rapid growth, most of the aggregate productivity growth is due to the entry and exit of firms while, during episodes of slower growth, it is mostly due to growth within and across existing firms. Studies for other countries suggest that this is an empirical regularity. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model based on Hopenhayn (1992) which incorporates the theory of economic growth proposed by Parente and Prescott (1994) and Kehoe and Prescott (2002). In this model, new firms enter every period with productivities drawn from a distribution whose mean grows over time. After entering, a firm's productivity grows, but not as rapidly as new firms' productivity distribution. In a version of the model calibrated to U.S. plant-level data, we simulate two sets of reforms: a decrease in new firms' costs of entry and a reduction in the barriers to technology adoption for new firms. The model reproduces the regularity that we observe in the data, and confirm that entry and exit of firms is crucial for reforms to generate rapid growth.

#### **David Cass Lecture**

Robert E. Lucas, JR (University of Chicago) What Was the Industrial Revolution? July 8<sup>th</sup>, 2016 / 14:30 - 15:30

### **Lionel Mckenkie Lecture**

Nancy Stokey (University of Chicago) July 9<sup>th</sup>, 2016 / 11:45 - 12:45

The Race Between Technology and Human Capital

This paper develops a model in which heterogeneous firms invest in R&D to improve technology, and heterogeneous workers invest in human capital to increase their earnings. Technology and human capital are complements in production, so continued investment in technology is profitable only because human capital is growing, and continued investment in human capital is worthwhile only because technology is growing. Both investment technologies have stochastic components, and the balanced growth path has stationary, nondegenerate distributions of technology and human capital. Wage differentials across workers arise partly from differences in the technologies they work with, and profit differentials across firms arise partly from differences in the skill of the workers they employ.

## **Special Lectures**

Yves Balasko (University of York, UK) Stability of equilibrium and market segmentation July  $6^{th}$ , 2016 / 11:30 - 12:30

Markets are segmented into submarkets that are assumed to reach their own partial equilibrium almost instantaneously. Starting from an arbitrary global market price system, the various submarkets determine a collection of partial equilibrium prices that define a new and generally different global price system. Substituting that new value to the old market price system defines a dynamical system that reflects the dynamic impact of market segmentation on prices. Under the assumptions of the paper, the fixed points of that dynamical system are the Walrasian equilibria. Nevertheless, this dynamical system is different from Walras tatonnement. Stable equilibria for that dynamics are then characterized. It is shown in particular that the equilibria whose Jacobian matrix of aggregate demand satisfies a form of diagonal dominance remain stable for any segmentation of the global market.

Alain Chateauneuf (PSE-University of Paris I) About delay aversion July 9<sup>th</sup>, 2016 / 10:00 - 10:45

In this paper, we study the behaviour of decision makers who show preferences for advancing the timing of future satisfaction. We give two definitions that are representative of this kind of attitude and investigate their implications in (an intertemporal version of) three popular models used in decision theory: the Expected Utility, the Choquet Expected Utility and the MaxMin Expected Utility models. The first definition reveals interesting links with the theory studying the impossibility of aggregating infinite streams of income, while keeping both strong monotonicity and equality among all generations. Our second definition turns out to be a behavioural characterization of what Irving Fisher called impatience. Finally, we make a connection with the notion of domination of one stream of income over another, for all interest rates.

Felix Kubler (University of Zürich, Switzerland) Simple equilibria in OLG models with boundedly rational agents and collateral constraints July  $9^{th}$ , 2016 / 17:15 - 18:15

In this paper we analyze overlapping generations (OLG) economies with aggregate uncertainty, incomplete financial markets and a continuum of agents who face uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks. Agents are boundedly rational and only use current prices and a truncated history of exogenous shock to form beliefs over the joint distribution of future prices and shocks. They choose the best forecast from a finite dimensional class of 'simple' forecasting functions. We show that for any  $\epsilon>0$  and any compact set of continuous forecasting rules there exists a temporary equilibrium where agents choose forecasts that minimize deviations averaged on the ergodic distributions and make a mistake in choices that is smaller than  $\epsilon$ . We provide a tractable algorithm to compute these equilibria. In these equilibria there is strategic as well as accidental default and we give examples of endogenous collateral constraints.

Paulo Klinger Monteiro (EPGE-FGV) Unifying bank-run theories and the trap of financial integration July  $6^{\rm th}$ , 2016 - 16:00 - 16:45

When a banking model is extended to feature multiple queues, with risk sharing restricted by a sequential-service constraint analogous to that proposed by Wallace (1988), we Önd that direct mechanisms de- Öned by solutions of the larger plannerís problem can also implement bank runs. The result survives the disclosure of positions considered by Green and Lin (2003) and thus complements previous analysis by Allen and Gale (xxxx), and Peck and Shell (2003). It however o§ers the novel implication, not considered by Diamond and Dybvig (1988) seminal paper, that access to a lender of last resort can increase the provision of liquidity to the point of creating stronger conditions for formation of bank panic.

Mario Pascoa (University of Surrey)
Equilibrium in FX swap markets: analogy with repo, funding pressures and the cross currency basis
July 9<sup>th</sup>, 2016 / 10:45 - 11:30

Departure from Covered Interest Parity (CIP) exacerbated during the 2008 great financial crisis and has not gone way ever since, even for major currencies pairs. To understand this new normality, we turn the CIP logic on its head and look at the FX swap market as the very market where limited funding abilities in different currencies are exchanged. By analogy with repo for securities, we introduce a possession value for currencies. Cross currency basis is driven by the relative possession values in a currency pair. The holder of the scarcer currency earns higher interest when agreeing to swap it. Underlying this possession value are currency funding pressures in balance sheets of international reach. We show this by modelling banks' funding constraints and leverage requirements. We analyze in this context the role of central banks' FX swaps lines.

Michael Woodford (Columbia University)
Rational Inattention with Sequential Information Sampling
July  $9^{th}$ , 2016 / 16:00 - 17:00

We generalize the rationalize inattention framework proposed by Sims (2010) to allow for cost functions other than Shannon's mutual information. Unlike other general treatments of the problem, our particular concern is with the additional structure that results when a large number of successive samples of information about the decision situation (each only minimally informative by itself) can be taken before a decision must be made. We assume that the cost required for each individual increment to information satisfies standard assumptions about continuity, differentiability, and convexity, and monotonicity with respect to the Blackwell ordering of experiments, but need not correspond to mutual information. We give particular attention to the case in which the cost function for an individual increment to information satisfies the additional condition of priorinvariance, so that it depends only on the way in which the probabilities of different observations depend on the state of the world, and not on the prior probabilities of different states. In a continuous-time limit of this "sequentially prior-invariant" case, the quantitative implications of rational inattention depend only on a finite number of parameters, which measure the degree of difficulty in distinguishing different states of the world. We characterize optimal information sampling in this case, and show how the resulting theory of rationally inattentive choice differs from both static and dynamic versions of a theory based on mutual information.

## **Session Details**

## **Applied Economics**

Alvaro Riascos (Universidad de los Andes) - Session Organizer

- Breno (FGV)

TBA

- Renato Soeiro (University of Porto)

The Formation of Societies with Linear Utilities

Alvaro Riascos (Universidad de los Andes)
 A Structural Model to Evaluate the Transition from Self-Commitment to
 Centralized Unit Commitment

- Ricardo Paes de Barros (Insper)

TBA

#### Asset bubbles and Economic Growth

Cuong Le Van (University of Paris I) - Session Organizer

- Ngoc-Sang Pham (University of Lille 3) (with Cuong Le Van, University of Paris I) Assets with negative dividends
- Thai Ha-Huy (UERJ) (with Cuong Le Van, University of Paris I)

  No arbitrage condition and asset market equilibrium in exchange economies with risk-averse utilities and a continuum number of states
- Matthieu Boullot (University of Newcastle)
   Secular Stagnation, Liquidity Trap and Rational Asset Price Bubbles
- Thomas Seegmuller (AMSE CNRS)
   (with Xavier Raurich, University of Barcelona)
   Growth, productive bubbles and population dynamics

## **Asymmetric Information**

Carolina Parra (IMPA) - Session Organizer

- Luciano De Castro (University of Iowa) Nash Equilibrium in Games with Quasi-Monotonic Best-Responses
- Pedro Hemsley (UERJ)

  Dynamic Moral Hazard with Self-Enforceable Incentive Payments
- Sergei Vieira (Imbec) TBA
- Carolina Parra (IMPA)
   (with E. Malin, Université de Rennes I)
   Signaling in Digital Music Industry

# Central Bank Session in honor of Aloisio Araujo: Theoretical and empirical assessments to assist the CB decisions

Rafael Chaves Santos (Banco Central do Brasil) - Session Organizer

- Jose Valentim Machado Vicente (BCB)
   (with Gustavo Silva Araujo, BCB)
   What does the tail of the distribution of current stock prices tell us about future economic activity?
- Rafael Santos (BCB)
   (with Aloisio Araujo, IMPA & Tiago Berriel, PUC-Rio)
   Inflation Targeting with Imperfect Information
- Ricardo Schechtman (with Tony Takeda, BCB)
   Are capital (and earnings) incentives effective for loans loss provisions?

- Marta Areosa (BCB) (with Waldyr Areosa, BCB & Vinicius Carrasco, PUC-Rio) Optimal Informational Interest Rate Rule

#### **Coalition and Network Formation**

Armando Gomes (Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis, USA) - Session Organizer

- Joao Ramos (USC Marshall School of Business)
   (with Bernand Herskovic)
   Acquiring Information Through Peers
- Francis Bloch (Ecole Polytechnique, France)
   (with Anne van den Nouweland)
   Farsighted coalition formation when players have different expectations
- -Armando Gomes (Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis, USA)

  Coalitional Bargaining Games: A New Concept of Value and Coalition Formation

## **Contests and Applications**

Dan Kovenock (Chapman University, USA) - Session Organizer

- Alan Gelder (Chapman University)
   (with Dan Kovenock, Chapman University & Brian Roberson, Purdue University)
   Experiments on Generalized Colonel Blotto Games
- Sergio O. Parreiras (University of North Carolina)

(with Fei Li, University of North Carolina)

Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions

- Alberto Vesperoni (University of Siegen)
   (with Irem Bozbay, University of Surrey)
   A contest success function for networks
- Dan Kovenock (Chapman University, USA) (with Brian Roberson, Purdue University)
   The N-Player Colonel Blotto Game

#### Contests I

Dan Kovenock (Chapman University, USA) - Session Organizer

- Blake A. Allison (Emory University)
   (with Jason J. Lepore, Cal Poly-San Luis Obispo)
   Contests with Interdependent Valuations
- Christian Ewerhart (University of Zurich)
   Computing Equilibria in All-Pay Contests
- Philipp Denter (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
   (with John Morgan, University of California & Dana Sisak,
   Erasmus University Rotterdam)
   Showing Off
- Kai A. Konrad (Max Planck Inst. for Tax Law and Public Finance) (with Samuel Haefner, University of Basel)
   Eternal Peace in the Tug-of-War

#### Contests II

Dan Kovenock (Chapman University, USA) - Session Organizer

- Jun Xiao (University of Melbourne)Whether to Hire a Superstar?
- Cedric Wasser (University of Bonn) (with Andreas Kleiner, University of Bonn) Contest Design when Only the Highest Effort Matters
- Lucas Rentschler (Universidad Francisco Marroquin)
   (with Theodore L. Turocy, University of East Anglia)
   Tu mihi soli places: An experiment on the competitiveness of all-pay auctions with private information
- Dan Kovenock (Chapman University, USA) (with Subhasish M. Chowdhury, University of East Anglia; David Rojo Arjona, University of Leicester & Nat Wilcox, Chapman University)

  Focality and Asymmetry in Multi-Battle Contests

#### **Coordination Games**

Jack Stecher (Carnegie Mellon University) - Session Organizer

- Camilo Botia (Carnegie Mellon University)
  Ban Runs and Risk-Shifting in the Presence of Information Disclosure Lags
- Jack Stecher (Carnegie Mellon University)
   Do Mandatory Liquidity Disclosures Foster or Forestall Coordination Failures?
- Andrei Gomberg (ITAM), Diego Aycinena (Universidad Francisco Marroquín), Alexander Elbittar (CIDE) & Lucas Rentschler (Universidad Francisco Marroquín)
   When Should the Jurors Talk?

## **Decision Theory**

Jack Stecher (Carnegie Mellon University) - Session Organizer

- In-Koo Cho ( University of Illinois) & Anna Rubinchik (University of Haifa) Contemplation vs. Intuition. A Reinforcement Learning Perspective
- Patricia Rich (University of Bristol)

  Coherence and Correspondence Decision Criteria: How to Evaluate Processes
- Tommaso Denti (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Endogenous Information Smallness
- Elif Incekara-Hafalir (Carnegie Mellon University) & Jack Stecher (Carnegie Mellon University)

A Zero Effect Explains Deviations from Expected Utility in Allais-type Tasks

## **Decision under Uncertainty**

Simone Cerreia-Vioglio (Università Bocconi, Italy) - Session Organizer

- Andrew Ellis (LSE)
  On Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Games
- Jay Lu (UCLA)
   A Bayesian Theory of State-Dependent Utilities
- Li Jian (McGill University) TBA
- Simone Cerreia-Vioglio (Università Bocconi, Italy)
   (with F. Maccheroni and M. Marinacci)
   Absolute Uncertainty Aversion: A Preferential Approach

## Default, Bankruptcy and Collateral

Mauricio Villalba (IMPA) - Session Organizer

- Mauricio Villalba (IMPA)

Bankruptcy Equilibrium: Efficiency and contagion

Susan Schommer (IMPA)
 (with Aloisio Araujo & Michael Woodford)
 Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy with Endogenous
 Collateral Constraints and Labor-Market Frictions

Liev Ferreira Maribondo (IMPA)
 Prudential Regulation in a General Equilibrium Model

- V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha (FGV - EESP)
 (with Yiannis Vailakis, U. of Glasgow)
 Characterization of self-enforcing debt under the risk of default

## **Debt and Default: Fluctuations and Trends**

Igor Livshits (University of Western Ontario, Canada) - Session Organizer

- Igor Livshits (University of Western Ontario, Canada)
   (with D. Fieldhouse & J. MacGee)
   Aggregate Fluctuation, Consumer Credit and Bankruptcy
- Jacob Short (University of Western Ontario)
   (with with A. Glover)
   Bankruptcy, Incorporation and the Nature of Entrepreneurial Risk
- Kyle Herkenhoff (University of Minnesota)
  The Impact of Consumer Credit Access on Employment, Earnings and Entrepreneurship

## **Development/Environment Dynamics and Unemployment**

Takashi Kamihigashi (Kobe University) - Session Organizer

- Evangelos V. Dioikitopoulos (King's College London)
   with Ken Tabata (Kwansei Gakuin University)
   The Elimination of Common Rights and Comparative Economic Development
   in a Malthusian World
- Adriana Piazza (Adolfo Ibáñez University)
   with Santanu Roy (Southern Methodist University)
   Irreversibility in deforestation and optimal forest conservation
- Takashi Kamihigashi (Kobe University) with Cagri Saglam (Bilent University) & Hamide Turan (Bilkent University) Optimal cycles in the Dechert-Nishimura model with time to build
- Katsufumi Fukuda (Hiroshima University)
   with Takashi Kamihigashi (Kobe University)
   Immigration and unemployment

## **Dynamic Games**

Johannes Horner (Yale University, USA) - Session Organizer

- Joyee Deb (Yale SOM)
   Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring
- Helios Herrera (Warwick)
   The Marginal Voter's Curse
- Oscar Volij (Ben Gurion Israel)
  The Value of a Draw in Quasi-Binary Matches

Anna Sanktjohanser (Oxford)
 Endogenous Monitoring in a Partnership Game

## Dynamic games with incomplete information

Richard P. McLean (Rutgers University) - Session Organizer

- Aniko Oery (Yale SOM)
   (with Yuhta Ishii, ITAM & Adrien Vigier, Oxford)
   Hiring Trainees: Bargaining with Learning and Competition
- Dongkyu Chang (City University of Hong Kong Department of Economics and Finance)
   Delay in Bargaining with Outside Options
- Braz Ministerio de Camargo (São Paulo School of Economics FGV) Efficiency in Decentralized Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty
- Richard P. McLean (Rutgers University) (with A. Postlewaite)
   A Dynamic Non-direct Implementation Mechanism for Interdependent Value
   Problems

## **Dynamic Programming**

Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain) - Session Organizer

- Martin Dumav (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
   Continuous-time contracting with ambiguous perceptions
- Kenji Sato (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University)
   (with V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, Sao Paulo School of Economics–FGV & Yiannis Vailakis, University of Glasgow)
   Differentiability of the policy function in models with equilibrium growth

-Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain) Stability of the policy function in recursive utility models

#### **Econometric Methods**

Sergio Pinheiro Firpo (Insper, Brazil) - Session Organizer

- Klenio Barbosa (EESP-FGV)

  Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing
- -Alessandro Casalecchi (EESP-FGV)
  Testing for Selection on Unobservables in Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity
  Designs
- -Tong Li (Vanderbilt University)
  A Partial Identification Subnetwork Approach to Discrete Games in Large
  Networks: An Application to Quantifying Peer Effects
- Art Shneyerov (Concordia University)
  Inference for First-Price Auctions with Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong's estimator

## **Economic Dynamics**

Wilfredo Maldonado (Universidade Católica de Brasília) & Alberto Pinto (Universidade do Porto) - Session Organizers

- Alberto Pinto (Universidade do Porto) (with João P. Almeida & Telmo Parreira) Hotelling Model in a Network with Uncertainty in Costs of Production
- Elvio Accinelli (Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí) (with Enrique Covarrubias)
   Evolution and jump in a Walrasian framework

- Andrei Barbos (University of South Florida)
   Dynamic Contracts with Random Monitoring
- Filipe Martins (Universidade de Porto)
   Impact of Nash and Social Equilibria in an International Trade Model

## **Economic Theory**

Nicholas Yannelis (University of Iowa) - Session Organizer

- Myrna Wodders (Vanderbilt University) (with P. Chander) The Subgame Perfect Core
- Konrad Podczeck (University of Vienna)
   (with Michael Greinecker, University of Innsbruck)
   Core equivalence with differentiated commodities
- Patrick Beissner (Australian National University)
   A Theory of Value for Information
- Andrew Clausen (University of Edinburgh)
   Extreme Incentives

## **Economic Theory & Applications**

Luis Braido (FGV) - Session Organizer

- Paulo K. Monteiro (FGV)

**TBA** 

- Carlos da Costa (FGV)

**TBA** 

- Luis Braido (FGV)

TBA

## **Economics of learning and information**

Tai-Wei Hu (Northwestern University, USA) - Session Organizer

- Rabee Tourky (Australian National University)
   A theory of robust experiments for choice under uncertainty
- Sander Heinsalu (University of Queensland)
   PageRank vs Bayes´ rule
- Henrique de Oliveira (Princeton University)
   Blackwell's inforativeness theorem using category theory
- Tai-Wei Hu (Northwestern University, USA)
   Self-confirming equilibrium with bounded memories

## **Expectations and learning**

Roger Guesnerie (Collège de France and Paris School of Economics) - Session Organizer

- Alexandra Belova (Université Paris 1) (with Philippe Gagnepain & Stéphane Gauthier, Paris School of Economics) Eductive Stability in the Airline Industry: Theory and Structural Estimation
- Elliott Aurissergues (Université Paris 1) The limits of learning
- Wilfredo Maldonado (Universidade Católica de Brasília) (with Aloisio Araujo, Mohamad Choubdar, Diogo Pinheiro & Alberto Pinto)
   Refinement of Dynamic Equilibrium using Small Random Perturbations
- Roger Guesnerie (Collège de France and Paris School of Economics) Expectational coordination in macroeconomics, the "eductive" viewpoint, an overview

#### Finance and decision

Alain Chateauneuf (PSE-Université de Paris I, France) & Bernard Cornet (PSE-University of Paris I & University of Kansas, France & USA) - Session Organizers

- Xiangyu QU (Université de Paris II)
   Uncertainty Averse Mean Variance Utility
- Alain Chateauneuf (PSE-University of Paris I, France) (with Lorenzo Bastianello)
   About delay aversion
- Bernard Cornet (PSE-University of Paris I & University of Kansas, France & USA)
   (with Alain Chateauneuf)
- On Choquet pricing for financial markets with frictions
- Philippe Bich (Université de Paris I)
   Strategic uncertainty: a new refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept in discontinuous games

# Financial and monetary equilibria contributions by former IMPA students Mario Pascoa (University of Surrey) - Session Organizer

- Rodrigo Novinski (IBMEC) TBA
- Juan Pablo Gama (IMPA) (with Aloisio Araujo & Mario Pascoa) Crashing of efficient stochastic bubbles with long-lived agents
- Jaime Orrillo (U. Catolica de Brasilia)
   (with Miguel León-Ledesma)
   Production and Endogenous Bankruptcy under Collateral Constraints

## Firm Dynamics and the Macroeconomy

Timothy J. Kehoe (Univ. of Minnesota / Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, USA) - Session Organizer

- Jack Rossbach (University at Albany-SUNY)
   (with Manuel Garcia-Santana, Universitat Pompeu Fabra & Jose Asturias, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service)
   Productivity dispersion and misallocation with multiple production technologies
- David Pérez Reyna (Universidad de los Andes)
   (with Fernando Perez Cervantes, Banco de México & Bernabe Lopez-Martin, Banco de México)
   The full weight of the law: The impact of contract enforcement on firm dynamics and development
- Pedro Bento (Texas A&M University)
   Competition, innovation, and the number of firms
- Timothy J. Kehoe (Univ. of Minnesota / Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, USA) (with Jose Asturias, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; Sewon Hur, University of Pittsburgh & Kim J. Ruhl, Pennsylvania State University)
  Firm entry and exit and aggregate growth

#### **Games & Decision**

Juan Dubra (Universidad de Montevideo) - Session Organizer

- Beth Allen (University of Minnesota, USA) TBA
- Pierre Chiappori (Columbia University) TBA

- Leandro Gorno (FGV/EPGE)
   Revealed preference and identification
- Juan Dubra (Universidad de Montevideo)
   A Theory of Rational Attitude Polarization

## General Equilibrium

Yves Balasko (University of York, UK) - Session Organizer

- Yves Balasko (University of York, UK)
   Sunspot equilibria with general demand functions
- Rafael Rossi Silveira (University of York)
   Auction Theory meets General Equilibrium Effects Solving a Vickrey Auction
   Embedded in an Exchange Economy
- Octavio Tourinho (UERJ)
   Factor proportionality in multiple households closed CGE models: Further evidence
- Mich Tvede (Newcastle University)
   Ambiguity and voting

## **Government, Institutions and Public Policy**

Cecilia Testa (University of Nottingham) - Session Organizer

- Jiahua Che (Fudan)
 (with Masahiko Aoki & Masaki Nakabayashi, Tokyo University)
 A Three-Party Game of Institutional Resilience versus Transition: A Model and Comparative History of China-Japan Revisited

- Bernardo Guimarães (São Paulo School of Economics, FGV) (with Kevin D., London School of Economics) Political Specialization
- Cecilia Testa (University of Nottingham)
   (with Giovanni Facchini, University of Nottingham)
   The rhetoric of closed borders: quotas, lax enforcement and illegal migration

## Household Behavior and the Macroeconomy

Timothy J. Kehoe (Univ. of Minnesota / Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, USA) - Session Organizer

- S. Nuray Akin (Özyeğin University) The Chinese household saving rate
- Richard Condor (University of Minnesota)
  Housing, business cycles, and macroprudential policies
- Ana Luisa Pessoa de Araujo (University of Minnesota)
   Wage inequality and job stability

# **Industrial Organization**

Steffen Lippert (University of Auckland, New Zealand) - Session Organizer

- Guillem Roig (Universidad del Rosario, Bogota)
   (with Nisvan Erkal, University of Melbourne)
   Research Paths, Strategic Disclosure and Exit
- Rogerio Mazali (Catholic University of Brasília)
   (with Jose A. Rodrigues-Neto, Australian National University, Canberra)
   Social Status, Reputation, Financing and Commitment

- Jose A. Rodrigues-Neto (Australian National University, Canberra)
   (with Rogerio Mazali, Catholic University of Brasília)
   Franchising
- Sherif Nasser (Cornell University)
   (with Danko Turcic, Washington University in St. Louis)
   Temporary Price Discount to a Retailer with a Private Demand Forecast

# Information Aggregation and Welfare

Xavier Vives (IESE Business School, Spain) - Session Organizer

- Erik Eyster (LSE Economics)
   (with Matthew Rabin, Harvard University & Dimitri Vayanos, LSE Finance)
   Financial Markets where Traders Neglect the Informational Content of Prices
- Vladimir Asriyan (Barcelona GSE)
   (with William Fuchs, University of California Berkeley & Brett Green, University of California Berkeley)
   Information Spillovers in Asset Markets with Correlated Values
- Tibor Heumann (Yale University)
   Trading with Multidimensional Signals
- Carolina Manzano (Universitat Rovira i Virgili)
   (with Xavier Vives, IESE Business School)
   Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions

# **Information and Decisions**

José Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto (Australian National University) - Session Organizer

- Simona Fabrizi (University of Auckland)
   (with Addison Pan, Massey University)
   A Generalisation of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998): Voting Under Ambiguity
- James Taylor (Australian National University)
   (with Jose A. Rodrigues-Neto, Australian National University)
   Common Knowledge for Behavioral and Rational Agents
- Ruitian Lang (Australian National University)

  Try before you buy: optimal pricing with continuous information collection
- Nejat Anbarci (Deakin University)
   (with Saptarshi P. Ghosh, Shiv Nadar University & Jaideep Roy, Deakin University)
   Horses for Courses: controlling information to elicit talent

# **International Capital Flows**

Timothy J. Kehoe (Univ. of Minnesota / Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, USA) - Session Organizer

- Laura Sunder-Plassmann (University of Copenhagen) (with David Wiczer, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) Reschedule, write-off, delay: The various dimensions of sovereign debt restructuring

- João Ayres (University of Minnesota) Knowledge flow and international recessions
- Maria Jose Rodriguez Garcia (University of Minnesota) Investment for the demographic window in Latin America
- Timothy L. Uy (University of Cambridge)
  (with Giancarlo Corsetti, University of Cambridge & Aitor Erce, European Stability Mechanism)
  Debt sustainability with IMF vs. EFSF-ESM bailout packages

#### International Trade

Giovanni Facchini (University of Nottingham, UK) - Session Organizer

- Emanuel Ornelas (Sao Paulo School of Economics, FGV, Brazil) Preferential Trade Agreements and Global Sourcing
- Eric Bond (Vanderbilt University, USA)
   Safeguards
- Peri A. Silva (Kansas State University, USA)
   (with Marcelo Olarreaga, University of Geneva, Switzerland & Alessandro Nicita, UNCTAD, Switzerland)
   Cooperation in WTO's Tariff Waters
- Giovanni Facchini (University of Nottingham, UK) (with Peri A. Silva, Kansas State University, USA & Gerald Willmann, University of Bielefeld, Germany) The Political Economy of Preferential Trade Arrangements: An Empirical Investigation

#### International Trade

Timothy J. Kehoe (Univ. of Minnesota / Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, USA) - Session Organizer

- Illenin Kondo (Federal Reserve Board)
  Trade liberalization, income risk, and optimal taxation
- Daniela Costa (University of Minnesota)
  Primary commodity exports and terms of trade shocks
- Andrea Waddle (University of Richmond)
  Trade, technological change, and wage inequality: The case of Mexico

#### **Macroeconomics**

Pablo Andrés Neumeyer (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella) - Session Organizer

- Felipe S. Iachan (FGV/EPGE)TBA
- TBA
- Pablo Andrés Neumeyer (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella) TBA

# **Macro Perspectives**

Kyle Herkenhoff (University of Minnesota, USA) - Session Organizer

- Leland Crane (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) Sorting, Firm Size, and Search

- Pedro Silos (Temple University)
   (with German Cubas, University of Houston)
   Progressive Taxation and Risky Career Choices
- Joao Ramos (New York University)
   (with Bernard Herskovic, University of California)
   Promoting Educational Opportunities: long-run implications of affirmative action in college admissions

#### Matching markets and Insurance

Eduardo Azevedo (Wharton School, USA) & Andrés Carvajal (EPGE-FGV, Brazil) - Session Organizers

- Braz Camargo (EESP-FGV) (with Paula Onuchic)
  The Risk-Incentive Trade-off in Competitive Search
- Joao Thereze-Ferreira (EPGE-FGV)
   (with Andres Carvajal)
   Insurance Contracts and Financial Markets
- Cecilia Machado (EPGE-FGV) with Christiane Szerman The Effects of a Centralized College Admission Mechanism on Migration and College Enrollment: Evidence from Brazil
- Daniel Monte (EESP-FGV)
   Dynamic Matching Markets and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism

### **Monetary Economics**

Daniela Puzzello (Indiana University, USA) - Session Organizer

- Luis Araujo (Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Sao Paulo)
   Credit Relationships in a Monetary Economy
- Fabrizio Mattesini (Universitá di Roma, Tor Vergata)
   Money and Collateral
- Vincent Bignon (Banque de France)
   Monetary Union with a Single Currency and Imperfect Credit Market
   Integrations
- Régis Breton (Banque de France)
   Monetary Policy Before Central Banking: Willingness to Pay Seigniorage, the
   Quality of Money and the Debasement Puzzle

#### **Monotone Methods**

Tarun Sabarwal (University of Kansas, USA) - Session Organizer

- Eric Hoffmann (West Texas A&M University)
   Global Games Selection in Games with Strategic Substitutes or Complements
- Rodrigo Harrison (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile) Global Games with Strategic Substitutes
- Anders Laugesen (Aarhus University)
   Monotone Comparative Statics for the Industry Composition
- Tarun Sabarwal (University of Kansas, USA) Directional Monotone Comparative Statics

# Nash program and implementation

Walter Trockel (Universität Bielefeld) - Session Organizer

- Yuan Ju (University of York) (with Jiawen Li, University of York)

  Devide and Choose: A non-cooperative approach to the Talmud solution for bankruptcy problems
- Pablo Amoros (Universidad de Malaga, Spain)
   Conditions on the jury for the natural implementation of the deserving winner of a competition
- Walter Trockel (Universität Bielefeld) (with Papatya Duman, Istanbul Bilgi University) On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein's Game
- Nora Wegner (Bank of England)
   (with Peter Eccles, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
   Generalised Weighted Raiffa Solutions

#### Networks

Francis Bloch (Ecole Polytechnique, France) - Session Organizer

- Sebastian Bervoets (Aix-Marseille School of Economics) Best-response dynamics in network games with substitutes
- Francis Bloch (Université Paris 1)
   (with Bhaskar Dutta, University of Warwick; Stephane Robin, French National Centre for Scientific Research & Min Zhou, Huazhong University of Science and Technology Wuhan)

The formation of partnerships in social networks

- Vladimir Matveenko (St.Petersburg School of Economics and Management) (with Alexei Korolev, National Research University Higher School of Economics & Anastasia Alfimova, National Research University Higher School of Economics)

On dynamic stability of equilibrium in network game with production and externalities

- Luca Paolo Merlino (Universitè Paris 1)
 (with Nicole Tabasso, University of Surrey)
 Debunking rumors in networks

## New Methods for Dynamic Economies I

Kevin Reffett (Arizona State University, USA) & Łukasz Woźny (Warsaw School of Economics, Poland) - Session Organizers

- John Stachurski (Australian National University)
 (with Jaroslav Boravicka, New York University & Thomas Sargent, New York University)

Dynamic Forward Looking Equilibria: An Operator-Theoretic Approach

Serguei Maliar (Santa Clara University)
 (with Lilia Maliar, Standford University; John B. Taylor, Stanford University - NBER & Inna Tsener, University of Alicante)
 A Tractable Framework for Analyzing a Class of Nonstationary Markov Models

 Rodrigo Raad (Federal University of Minas Gerais)
 Approximate Lipschitz Recursive Equilibrium with a Minimal State Space in the Ramsey Model Kevin Reffett (Arizona State University)
 (with Manjira Datta, Arizona State University & Łukasz Woźny, Warsaw School of Economics).

Minimal State Space Recursive Equilibrium in Economies with No-Income Preferences and Indeterminacy

# **New Methods for Dynamic Economies II**

Kevin Reffett (Arizona State University, USA) & Łukasz Woźny (Warsaw School of Economics, Poland) - Session Organizers

- Jean-Pierre Drugeon (Paris School of Economics)
   (with Bertrand Wigniolle, Paris School of Economics / University of Paris 1
   Panthéon-Sorbonne)
   On a Simple Equilibrium with Heterogenous Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
   Agents and Linear Decision Rules
- Urmee Khan (University of California, Riverside)
   (with Maxwell Stinchcombe, University of Texas)
   Planning For the Long Run: Programming with Patient, Pareto Responsive
   Preferences
- Mitri Kitti (University of Turku)
   Equilibrium Payoffs for Pure Strategies in Repeated Game
   Łukasz Woźny (Warsaw School of Economics)

Repeated Moral Hazard With Costly Self-Control

#### **Political Economics I**

Alejandro Saporiti (University of Manchester) - Session Organizer

- Torrens, Gustavo Federico (Indiana University)
The Political Economy of Trade and Labor Mobility in a Ricardian World

- Zudenkova, Galina (University of Mannheim)
   Electoral Accountability and Inter-District Externalities
- Nicolaas J. Vriend (Queen Mary, University of London)
   (with Nobuyuki Hanaki, Université Nice & Emily Tanimura, Université Paris 1)
   The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited: Return of the Median
   Voter
- Alejandro Saporiti (University of Manchester) (with Dario Debowicz, Swansea University & Yizhi Wang, University of Manchester)
   Redistributive Politics, Power Sharing and Fairness

#### Political Economics II

Alejandro Saporiti (University of Manchester) - Session Organizer

- Alvaro Forteza (Universidad de la República Uruguay)
   (with C. Noboa, Universidad de la República Uruguay)
   Tolerance of Tax Evasion
- Andrei Gomberg, (ITAM) TBA
- Anke Kessle (Simon Fraser University)
   The Ideology Trap
- Jorge M. Streb (Universidad del CEMA)
   Credible signals: A refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibria

#### **Public Economics and Networks**

Nizar Allouch (Queen Mary, University of London, UK) - Session Organizer

- Nizar Allouch (Queen Mary, University of London, UK) Aggregation in Networks
- Timo Hiller (Bristol University) TBA
- Liuchun Deng (John Hopkins University)
   Criminal Network Formation and Optimal Detection Policy: The Role of Cascade of Detection

#### Quantitative Macroeconomics I

Selahattin Imrohoroglu (University of Southern California, USA) - Session Organizer

- Pavel Brendler (European University Institute, Department of Economics)
   Lifetime Earnings Inequality and Income Redistribution through Social
   Security
- Gary Hansen (UCLA, Department of Economics)
   (with Selo Imrohoroglu and Nao Sudo)
   Replacing Income Taxation with Consumption Taxation in Japan
- Serena Rhee (University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics)(with Soojin Kim)
   Measuring the Effects of Employment Protection for the Disabled: Theory and Evidence from the Americans with Disabilities Act
- Selo Imrohoroglu (USC, Marshall School of Business)
   (with Sagiri Kitao and Tomoaki Yamada)
   Can Guest Workers Solve Japan's Fiscal Problems?

#### **Quantitative Macroeconomics II**

Selahattin Imrohoroglu (University of Southern California, USA) - Session Organizer

- Julio Garin(University of Georgia, Terry College of Business) (with Robert Lester)
   The Opportunity Cost of Employment and Search Intensity
- Oksana Leukhina (University of Washington, Department of Economics)(with Lutz Hendricks)
   How Risky is College Investment?
- Gonzalo Paz Pardo (University College London)
   (with Maria Cristina De Nardi and Giulio Fella)
   The Implications of Richer Earnings Dynamics for Consumption, Wealth, and Welfare
- Nuray Akin (Ozyegin University, Graduate School of Business) An Equilibrium Search Model of Fire Sales

# Repo and Intermediation

Piero Gottardi (European University Institute, Italy) - Session Organizer

- Cyril Monnet (Bern, Switzerland)
   (with P. Gottardi & V. Maurin)
   A Theory of Repurchase Agreements, Collateral Re-Use and Repo
   Intermediation
- Mario Pascoa (University of Surrey, UK)
   (with J.M. Bottazzi, Capula & J. Luque, U.Wisconsin Madison)
   Turning the CIP logic on its head: a funding pressures equilibrium approach to the FX swap market

Piero Gottardi (European University Institute, Italy)
 (with D. Gale)
 Equilibrium Theory of Banks' Capital Structure

## **Revealed Preference and Monotone Comparative Statics**

John Quah (Johns Hopkins University & National University of Singapore) - Session Organizer

- Gregorio Curello (University of Oxford)
  Comparative statics and informativeness under distributional constraints
- Xinxi Song (CUEB, Beijing)
   (with Andres Carvajal)
   Non-parametric tests for Pareto efficiency and competitive equilibrium in economies with public goods
- John Rehbeck (UC San Diego)
   Revealed Preference Analysis of Characteristics in Discrete Choice
- Pawel Dziewulski (University of Oxford)
   (with John K.-H. Quah)
   Supermodular correspondences

# Search and Sequential-Service Frictions in Models of Money and Banking

Ricardo Cavalcanti (FGV/EPGE, Brazil) - Session Organizer

- Jefferson Bertolai (University of São Paulo, FEARP)
 (with R. Cavalcanti & P. Monteiro)
 A Linear Programming Approach for Steady-State Optima in a Matching Model of Money

- Elton Dusha (University of Chile Department of Industrial Engineering) Reputational Concerns in Directed Search Markets with Adverse Selection
- Alexandre Janiak (Catholic University of Chile)
  On the Welfare Cost of Bank Concentration
- Ricardo Cavalcanti (FGV/EPGE, Brazil) (with J. Bertolai and P. Monteiro) Unifying bank-run theories and (the trap of) financial integration

## Security Design and Derivative Pricing

José Fajardo (EBAPE/FGV, Rio de Janeiro) - Session Organizer

- Yuri Saporito (FGV/EMAp)
  Functional Ito Calculus, Path-dependence and the Computation of Greeks
- Ernesto Mordecki (Universidad de la República del Uruguay CMAT)
   (with Yuliya Mishura)
   Optimal stopping for Levy processes with one-sided solutions
- Gustavo Manso (University of California, Berkeley) Heterogeneous Innovation over the Business Cycle
- José Fajardo (EBAPE/FGV, Rio de Janeiro)
   Barrier and Power style Contracts under Lévy processes

# Social Choice and Cooperative Game Theory

Youngsub Chun (Seoul National University, Korea) - Session Organizer

- Sebastian Cea (Paris School of Economics, University of Paris 1) (with Michel Grabisch, Université Paris 1) Stochastic coalition formation processes with externalities

- Colin Rowat (University of Birmingham)
   (with Manfred Kerber, University of Birmingham & Naoki Yoshihara, Umass Amherst and Hitotsubashi University)
   Asymmetric three agent majority pillage games
- Nejat Anbarci (Deakin University)
   (with Kang Rong, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics & Jaideep Roy, Deakin University)
   Endogenous continuation with random arbitration in bargaining and the Nash solution

# Stochastic Choice & Behavioral Optimization

Paulo Natenzon (Washington University in St. Louis, USA) - Session Organizer

- Yusufcan Masatlioglu (Michigan)
- A Random Attention Model
- Junnan He (Washington University in St. Louis)
  Imperfect perception of attributes and contextual choice effects
- Victor Aguiar (Brown)Random Menu Satisficing

## Strategic Behavior in Markets and Auctions

Marzena Rostek (University of Wisconsin, USA) - Session Organizer

- Tommaso Denti (MIT)
   Games with Unrestricted Information Acquisition
- Tibor Heumann (Yale University)
   Ascending Auctions in Informationally Rich Environments

- Jeongmin (Mina) Lee (Washington University in St. Louis, Olin School of Business) (with Pete Kyle (University of Maryland)
  Information Aggregation with Symmetry
- Kyle Woodward (UNC, Chapel Hill) Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Auctions: Equilibrium Existence with Private Information

## Supermodular Games

Rabah Amir (Iowa) - Session Organizer

- Luciano De Castro (Iowa) (with R. Amir) Games with quasi-monotonic best replies
- Adriana Gama (El Colegio de México) (with R. Amir) Cournot oligopoly with firm-specific network effects
- Rabah Amir (Iowa) (with P. Erickson & J. Jin) On the micro-economic foundations of linear demand

# **Temporal Preferences**

Jean-Pierre Drugeon (Paris School of Economics and CNRS) - Session Organizer

- Asen Kochov (University of Rochester) (co-authored with Antoine Bommier and François Le Grand)
   Ambiguity and Correlation Aversion
- Carmen Camacho (Paris School of Economics and CNRS) On Time Perception

- Daniel Gottlieb (Washington University in St. Louis) (co-authored with Pietro Ortoleva and David Dillenberger)
On Time and Risk Preferences

- Jawwad Noor (Boston University) (co-authored with Norio Takeoka) Cognitive Foundations for Impatience

# The Industrial Organization of Financial Service Providers in Developing Countries

Robert Townsend (MIT) - Session Organizer

- Juliano Assunção (PUC- Rio) (with Sergey Mityakov & Robert M. Townsend) Ownership matters: the geographical dynamics of BAAC and commercial banks in Thailand
- Gustavo Joaquim (MIT)
   (with Robert M. Townsend & Victor V. Zhorin)
   Spatial Competition Among Financial Service Providers and Optimal Contract Design
- Gabriel de Abreu Madeira (University of São Paulo) (with Fernando Kuwer, University of São Paulo) Farmarked Credit and Misallocation
- Fabio Miessi Sanches (University of São Paulo) (with Daniel Silva Junior, LSE & Sorawoot Srisuma, University of Surrey) Bank Privatization and Market Structure of the Banking Industry: Evidence from a Dynamic Structural Model

## **Topics in Economic Theory**

Svetlana Boyarchenko (University of Texas at Austin) - Session Organizer

- Daria Khromenkova (University of Mannheim) Restless Strategic Experimentation
- Svetlana Boyarchenko (University of Texas at Austin)
  Exit Game with Information Externalities
- Johannes Horner (Yale University)
   (with Nicolas Lambert, Stanford University)
   Motivational Ratings
- Nicolas Klein (University of Montreal)
   (with Matthias Fahn, University of Munich)
   Relational Contracts with Private Information: The Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs

# **Topics in Economic Theory**

Tom Krebs (University of Mannheim, Germany) - Session Organizer

- Alexandre Belloni (Duke University, USA)
   (with Giuseppe Lopomo, Leslie Marx, and Roberto Steri)
   Budget-Constrained Procurement
- Felix Kubler (University of Zürich, Switzerland) (joint with Johannes Brumm and D. Krycka)

Existence of Recursive Equilibrium in Stochastic Production Economies

- Tom Krebs (University of Mannheim, Germany) (joint with Sebastian Findeisen and Dominik Sachs)

Optimal Taxation with Moral Hazard and Risky Human Capital

## **Topics in Economic Theory & Industrial Organization**

Marta Faias (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal) & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez (Universidad de Chile, Chile) - Session Organizers

- Damián Vergara Domínguez (Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Chile)

(with Marco Rojas Olivares, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Chile)

Ambiguity and Long-Run Cooperation

- Joana Resende (CEF.UP, Universidade do Porto, Portugal) (with Didier Laussel, Université of Aix-Marseille) Complementary Monopolies with Asymmetric Information
- Hagen Schwerin (Center for Economic Research at ETH Zurich (CER-ETH), Switzerland)

Swap Bonds or Stocks! A Game of Implicit Environmental Policy

- Marta Faias (Faculty of Sciences and Technology, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal) (with Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Chile)

Credit Market Segmentation, Essentiality of Commodities, and Supermodularity

# **Topics in Game Theory**

Yi-Chun Chen (National University of Singapore, Singapore) & Xiao Luo (National University of Singapore, Singapore) - Session Organizers

- Qiaoxi Zhang (California Institute of Technology, qzhang@hss.caltech.edu) Vagueness in Multi-Issue Proposals

- Effrosyni Diamantoui (Concordia University, diamantoudi@gmail.com)
   (with Sheridon Elliston, Concordia University)
   Monetary Unions Stability and Issue Linkage
- Yongchuan Qiao (National University of Singapore, qiaoyongchuan@gmail.com)
   (with Xiao Luo, National University of Singapore; Chih-Chun Yang (Academia Sinica, Taiwan)
   Bayesian Coalitional Rationalizability: An Epistemic Characterization
- Chenghu Ma (Fudan University, China, machenghu@fudan.edu.cn) Short Selling and Security Lending under few Large Security Lenders

## **Topics in Market with Adverse Selection**

Humberto Moreira (FGV/EPGE) - Session Organizer

- Vitor Farinha Luz (UBC)
   Robust Selling Mechanism
- Lucas Maestri (FGV/EPGE) Optimal Mirrleesian Taxation in Non-Competitive Labor Markets
- Vinicius Carrasco (PUC-Rio)
   Robust Decison Making
- Daniel Gottlieb (Olin Business School, Washington University) Perfect Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection

# Topics on economic growth and development

Tiago Cavalcanti (University of Cambridge & FGV-SP) - Session Organizer

- Julieta Caunedo (Cornell)
   (with Emircan Yurdagul)
   Who Quits Next? Firm Growth in Growing Economies
- Cezar Santos (FGV-RJ)
   (with Leandro de Magalhães, Ardina Hasanbasri & Raul Santaeulalia-Llopis)
   Marital Sorting, Resource Misallocation, and Agricultural Productivity
- Anne Villamil (University of Iowa) (with Zhigang Feng)
  How a Regressive Subsidy to Employment-Based Health Insurance Enhances
  Entrepreneurship and Improves Welfare
- Tiago Cavalcanti (University of Cambridge & FGV-SP ) (with Georgi Kocharkov & Cezar Santos)

Family Planning and Development: Aggregate Effects of Contraceptive Use

#### **TBA**

Hugo Hopenhayn (UCLA, USA) - Session Organizer

- Venky Venkateswaran (NYU, USA)
- **TBA**
- Juan Pablo Xandri (Princeton, USA)

**TBA** 

- Hugo Hopenhayn (UCLA, USA)

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