Mr. THAYER. I move to strike out the last line of the amendment, simply for the purpose of saying a few words. It seems to me that the proposition which is now made by the Gentfrom the ComJudiciary, [Mr. WILLIAMs, and which I understand to be in substance the precise proposition which the House voted down on yesterday, is called for by no public exigency, and is only fraught with future embarrassment and inconvenience. If the law with regard to the appointing power is so arranged and so bound up that the power shall be controlled by the Senate and the President as regards all the subordinate officers of the Government, I see no possible necessity for trammeling the President in regard to his confidential advisers; or as John Randolph was wont to say, “ his head clerks.” It seems to me that it will lead to embarrassment in this way: if a Cabinet officer dissents from the opinions of the Executive, the Executive j'possess the power of removing that Cabinet officer; otherwise your plan leads to this result, as was.]by the Gentfrom Iowa, [Mr. KAssoN,) that you transfer the executive office from the Executive of the U.S. to his Cabinet council. And in transferring it you make a new executive consisting of many heads instead of one; because if those officers are not removable from office at the will of the President, they may remain in office and outvote the President; they may take such a course with regard to the administration of the executive office as by a majority of their number they may determine. And what is that but the substitution of a new executive in place of the constitutional Executive 2 I think the future would reveal the impolicy of the great and fundamental change contemplated by this amendment. It seems to me to be fraught with future evil; to be, indeed, as was said by the Gentfrom Iowa, Mr. KAssoN, ] a radical revolution in one dept of the Government. I hope, therefore, that the House will adhere to its position of yesterday. Now, while I am willing to go as far as any man upon this floor is willing to go in order to fetter the appointing power, to assert the constitutional power of the Senate in controlling public appointments, and to restrain usurpations of executive power upon that subject, such usurpations as we have witnessed within the last 6 months; while I am willing to go as far as any man in that direction with regard to all subordinate appointments under the government, which is all that is necessary for the protection of the appointing power, I am unal terably opposed to such a change as the one contemplated by the amendment now before the House. I now withdraw my amendment to the amendment.