Mr. SUMNER. It seems to me that the Senfrom Maryland exuggerates the character of this proposition. NOone knows better than that very experienced lawyer, that questions of what are called the weight of evidence or the onus probandi are ordinary questions of law, that is, there is acertain rule oflaw which determines that under certain circumstances the onus probandi is on the one party or the other. I take it that that is only what is called common learning; on find it in all the books: that the court must determine in advance where the onus probandi is. Now, if I understand it, this statute undertakes to determine in advance, in certain cases, where the onus prov b and t shall be. It lays down a rule in that respect. I admit that the rule may seem to be somewhat stringent. I admit, also, thatitmay be a departure from the common practice. But the question in my mind is, whether when we are dealing with cases like those of smuggling, we are not justified in making the rule more stringent and in departing from what may be the common practice. 1 therefore bring the question right to that point, and I ask the experienced Senfrom Maryland whether in dealing with smuggling, from all our expe rience, from our knowledge of such cases, from the known habit of smugglers to evade all existin laws and regulations, we are not justified in flirining, if possible, an increased strin ncy of ru e to bear upon them. I must say I think we are. It seems to me that is what this statute precisely does. It makes the rule more stringent against smugglers. The question is whether in making it more strin out against smug ling there is a departure roin principle. 1 have already suggested that it is a most common practice to determine in what cases the onus probandi shall be one way or the other. Then we come to the next question here: under what circumstances shall the onus probandi be upon the defendant? It is where probable cause is shown for such prosecution. presume that I do not err when I say that it is not a phrase of the common law. Probable cause is not strictly a phrase of the common law. It is a phrase of the ancient Roman Jurisprudence, and derived from the ancient man jurisrudence.