Mr. KASSON. Mr. Speaker, I do not desire to enter into a generabdiscussiop of this proposed amendment. I think there is no oc casion tolenter into that, so far at least as the general interests which I seek new to protect are concerned and I propose to confine my self to the reply to my remarks made by the Gentfrom Pennsylvania, [Mr. Kamam] touching the powers now ip the constitution without amendment. He introduced his remarks the other day by the following declaration: "Having intenupted the gentleman to invite his particular attention to the language of Mr. Madison I remised the gentleman hat I produce would fu or authority on the point. which I did not happen to have bymeat the time: and I trespass now foru brief moment upon the ntteption of the House that I may make good that promise and may show that James Madison himself, on the 9th of August. l787. on the floor of the Convention that framed constitution of the U.S., carefully and elaborately excluded the conclusion annougced by the Gentfrom Iowa and vindicated the doctrine which presented to the House and maintain.” “My Own statement was as follows: It is evident that by the word annor is something else: perhaps whether y ballot omr eoawnnt Door. by generalticket orby separate districts and all other things that comcproperlyunder the term man nMoard. "isoBnutoritby evthideefnratlmy ewrass never Intended by Mr. of the constitution, or by the people when they adopted it. that the Legislatures and conventions of the sev States m1 t bede pnved of the powerto say who would be the qualified qeuleacltifioersdoef ltehceto Srtsaotfe menbers of the Legislature oanngdroinss. directly, the I made certain citations from Mr. Madison to which the gentleman now brings a reply contuiningother declarations of Mr. Madison; and for that reply I desire especinll to thank him, for it sustains the position I took as opposed to my friends doctrine. I think that gentleman, and those who act with him in the proposed enterprise of depriving the States of their right to designate the qualifications of electors within their own jurisdictions and for their own Legislatures, should reface their speeches with this quotation, cite, I believe, from Wordsworth, advocating The iroodold rule, the simple plan, That they should take who have the power. (1 they should keep who can.” That seems to be the maxim of those who give such a wide and indefinite construction to the constitution of the U.S. Now, sir, Mr. Madison, who is so highly commended by my able friend, said in a letter to Edmund Pendlcton, which I find in the 1st volume of his writings: “If the Federal Government should loseits proper cauihbrlum wrtlun itself, I am persuaded that the c Iryem leatwt wilcl dpreopeaeretmd efrnotm. If the the encproposuscibllimlitcy nlaooff the encroachments on the part of the Executive or the Sonate were to be compared. I danger should pronounce the to lie rather in the latter than the former.” Thus you find that Madison himself has cautioned us against the danger of encroachment upon the equilibrium established bthe constitution, that exists in the very by y of congress itself. Upon this point at issue between us the Gentfrom Pennsylvania, [Mr. KELLER] who, so far as I know, stands alone in this House in his view of the constitution, rests substantially his whole argument upon that clause which be quoted from Elliots Debates, and which reads as follows: “Some States might reulate the elections on the principles ofequality. on other smight regulate them otherwise. This diversity would heobviously unjust. Elections are regnlated nowune ually in some States, particularly SCarolina, will: respect to Clioleston, which has a representationof 30 members. Should the peopleof any State by any means be deprived of the right of suffrage it was judged proper that tity should be remedied by the General Government. This you find stated as his opinion by the compiler of the debates. But in condensin from his notes, the last sentence is a nonsequitur. You get at the idea in the compilers mind, however, by observing the illustration of the inequality in respectto Charleston. Charles ton, with 10,000 inhabitants, might be authorized to elect one member of Congress, while 20 counties with 100,000 inhabitants, might have the right to elect only one member; and it was proper that the General Government should remedy such an inequality. The Legislature of the State might provide that the electors should all vote in harleston, or at any other point; or might cast their votes in the county seat only of each county, creating great inconvenience, and practically nullifying their right to vote by its excessive inconvenience. hey could also regulate the vote, whether mva vocc or by ballot, &c. All these things relate to the manner of holding elections. hen I Suggested, the other day, that probably Madison meant such questions as voting viva race, or by local or general ticket, and other like things connected with the “ manner of holding elections, ” the gentleman Was disposed rather to ridicule the idea, and said he evidently meant the electoral right itself. Now, he uts in Madisons mouth the identical words suggested as undoubtedly within Madisons meaning. Now, let me show that I stated it correctly. The following is the gentlemans Own quotation: m“igIthtwbaesmimadpeoosf stihbeledtioscfroerteiosenearaylpl otwheera. buses that Whether the electorsshould vote by ballot or vim som shculd ussbmblen tthis place or that place, should hedivided into districts or all meetat one place. should all voto for all the Representatives or all in u district vote for a number allotted to the district these and many other points would dependon the Legislatures, and might materially affect the appointments.” What language could be more sitive and precise as to what Madison meant I! the words “manner of holding elections?” othing can be stronger in support of the view I have taken of his meaning, and of the constitution, than the very language cited by the Gentfrom Pennsyvania, [Mr. KELLEY. It assumes that electors are already provide for, for he says, “whether the electors should vote;” not “what electors should vote, ” or “what qualifications shonld exist.” He shows that the right of entire e is one thing and the mode of suffrage is another thing. Listen fora moment to the language of Madison in the letter nd dressed to John Brown of Kentucky, in the year 1795, found in the same volume: 1. “Whether is a representationnce prdiu" to numbers or iroperty or in Mvint DIOPO mO"milifilbJho most a2 0m a moi –escalation by counties able to a more suitablo modethat will be difllcult to adjust? Under this question may be considerod, hrst. the right of suffrage;2nd, the mode of suffrage; 3rd, the plan of representation.” A palpable, pointed distinction by Madison just cfore the adoption of the constitution distinguishing between the right of suffrage and the mode Of5iiffrage and I presume my friend will admit that there is no greater synonym in the English language than “mode and “ manner.” If he doubts, I refer him to Websters Dictionary. Further, Mr. Madison says, pursuing the same distinction: “As to the 1st, I think the extent which ought to be given to this right. a matter of great delicacy and of critical importance. To restrain it to crswill in time exclude too great a proptohreti olnan of citizens without regard to property or even to all who ssessa pittance. may throw too much power into hands which will either abuse it themselves or sell it to the rich who will abuseit. I have thought it might be a good middle course to narrow this rightin the choice of the least popular and to enlarge it in that of the more pular branch of the legislature. There is an example of this distinction in NCarolina. if in noneof the other States.” “ In a general view, I seeno reason wh the rights of propert. which chiefly bears the by up of Government. an is so much an object of legislation. should not be respected as well as personal rights in the choice of rulers.” Thus we see that great statesman, so far from going for universal suffrage, so far from confusing the“ manner of holding elections” with the right of voting at an election, made this distinction pointedly, and asserted the necessity of balancing the representation of one interest by the representation of another., "Then he says: 2nd. as to the mode of sumaire. I lean strongly to that of the ballot. notwlthstanding the objections which lie against it. It appears to me to be the only radical cure for those arts of electioueer in which poison the Very fountain of liberty. The votes in which the ballot hns been the standing mode are the only instances in which elections are tolerably chaste on those arts in disgrace. If it should be thought improper to fix this iuode by the constitution, should think it at least necessary to avoid any constitutional or to a future adoption of it.” There is a specific illustration showing what Mr. Madison did mean by the words “ mode of suffrage.” It was simply the way in which the qualified electors should make their willknown, and not to declare who should be qualified clcet ors. Mr. Madison stood upon the explicit dee laration which I cited from the Federalist the other day, that that clause which left the question of qualification to the States “must be satisfactory to every State, because it is conformable to the standard already established or which may be established by the State itsel.” and again, in that other citation which I made from his declaration written long after the adoption of the constitution: “Statescan. Through emu of the conditional elect ioe provisions, control the General Government. This [the General Government) Imam agency in electi State governments and can on ucontml them through! Imctionaries particularly the judieiary, of the Genera Government. NOw, I have cited enough to show that there was a distinction broad and clear made by Mr. Madison between the “ right of suffrage” and the “mode of suffrage, ” that that distinction runs all through his writings, and all through his debates; and further that Mr. Madison was exceedingly scrupulous touching the right of ending; itself as to the extent to which it should be carried in View of the safety of the country and I all its great interests. submit, then, in view of these citations, and of the declarations of Mr. Madison quoted by the gentleman himself, and which I read a few moments ago, that it is a little remarkable that my distinished friendfrom Pennsylvania should close is observations with the declaration that he had now redeemed his promise to establish beyond questicn his view o Mr. Madisons declarations touching the construction of this clause of the constitution. While I agree with the gentleman that we have a right to control the times, places, and manner of voting for members o Congress, the gentleman goes further, and maintains that we have a right to control the electoral qualifications in local State elections, thus absorbing the most important element of our municipal liberties and domestic rights. Now. Mr. Speaker, that is all I have to say upon that subject. I only wish to add generally touching amendments to the constitution, this and all others, that I am firm in the conviction that no amendment to that great instrument ought to be adopted by this House or submitted to the country, except those which look to the great future of the country and the safety of all parts of this country, rather than to the mere embarrassment and incumbrance of a particular portion of it. It may bear upon the South to u as we want itto bear; it my next car, or a few years hence, bear upon us at the Igorth as we should be most reluctant to have it bear. Immigration flows in tides to and fro; manufacturing, commercial, and agricultural interests moveto and fro in different sections of this Union; majorities change from year to year; the opinions of men change; and I think it the duty of all statesmen to do what Mr. Madison said was the object of a mbre conservative Senate, that is, to resist the “occasional impetuosities, ” as he styled them of the more numerous branch of the Legislature. that the t permanent principles that. underlie this government may have themselves a permanency which is far better than a fluctuating fundamental law, changed to meet some immediate or tempera occasion. Better submit to some ills that we now than rush into others that we know not of.