Mr. WILLIAMS. I prepared the original bill in this case, which contains in different words the exception contained in the amendment reported by the committee. I do not regard the exception as of any great practical consequence, because I suppose if the President and any head of a Dept should disagree so as to make their relations unpleasant, and the President should signify a desire that that head of Dept should retire from the Cabinet, that would follow without any positive act of removal on the part of the Pres: ident. I do not think that in many cases which have occurred the President has peremptorily removed any member of the Cabinet; but I understand the usual practice is, if the Presi.dent desires to dispense with any head of a Dept and to substitute another for him, to signify in some way his desire that there should be a vacancy in the office, and the office, when it becomes vacant by resignation, is filled by the President according to his own wishes and views. The power under this amendment of the com: mittee is preserved in the Senate, as it exists at this time. During the recess of the Senate under this amendment the President may remove one of the heads of the Depts and he may temporarily appoint some person to fill the vacancy; but I understand that at the next session of the Senate he is bound to make an appointment, as he now is,ard that such appointment must be made by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, so that this simply empowers the President, in case he should esteem it necessary to remove a Cabinet officer, to fill the vacancy which is in that way effected juring the recess of the Senate. The heads of the Depts are a part of the executive power of the country. According to the theory of the Constitution the executive power is vested in the POTUS, and these heads of Depts are subordinate officers of the President, immediately under his super vision. They are persons under his immediate direction, except so far as their specific duties may be prescribed by law. But the President consults with these heads of Depts as to all measures of his administration. They are regarded as his confidential advisers; and certainly the law which creates that relation between the President and the heads of those Depts contemplates that there shall be a state of harmony between all of them; that there shall not be a state of war in the executive dept of the Government; that it shall not be divided against itself; but that the subordinates or the heads of the different Depts shall be in harmony or practical agreement with the President by whom they are appointed. The chief reason that influenced me to make the exception was, that I thought something was due to the POTUS to that office. This bill undertakes to reverse what has heretofore been the admitted practice of the Government; and it seemed to me that it was due to the exalted office of the POTUS, the Chief Magistrate of the nation, that he should exercise this power; that he should be left to chose his own Cabinet, and that he should be held responsible, as he will be, to the country for whatever acts that Cabinet may perform. It is well understood that these heads of Depts are not held directly responsible for the acts of the Administration; but the President is made responsible, because in regard to any and every act which they do that is not prescribed by law he is considered as the person who controls the act. It is under his direction; he is the man who exercises the will. They cannot act, as I understand, contrary to his will without empowering him at this time to remove them from office and place some other person in their office who will act in accordance with his views of public policy. I know that there is room for disagreement of opinion; but it seemed to me that if we revolutionize the practice of the Government in all other respects, we might let this power remain in the hands of the POTUS; that we ought not to strip him of this power, which is one that it seems to me it is necessary and reasonable that he should exercise.