Mri. WILSON, of Iowa. The motion does have that effect for the present. Mr. Speaker, I desire to bring this bill to a vote tomorrow after the morning hour, and I hope that the House will 2nd my endeavor to accomplish this object. As there are many other measures of great importance demanding the action of the House, I trust that we shall so conduct the discussion on this bill as to get it out of the way as speedily as possible, that we may proceed with the other business before us. Mr. Speaker, the importance of this bill, the magnitude of the questions involved in it the objects sought to e reached and secured by it, will insure for it the most deliberate consideration of this House. Few measures oi ver import have ever commanded the attention of Congress. it is a very positive bill, and I expqpt it to mectwith most sitive opposition, but I believe it will survive this an triumph. Some of the questions presented by this bill are not entirely free from difficulties. Precedents, both judicial and legislative, are found in shar conflict concerning them. The line which divides these precedents is generally found to be the same which separates the early from the later days of the Republic. The further the Government drifted from the old moorings of equality and human rights, the more numerous became judicial and legislative utter ances in conflict With some of the leading feat ures of this bill. The ComJudiciary bestowed onthls subject a degree of careful examination which we believe will enable us to maintain successfully our conclusions both as to the propriety and constitutionalit of this measure. The 1st section of the bill contains the following declaration concerning citizenship: That all persons born in the U.S and not subject to any foreign lower. excluding Indinns not taxed. are hereby declared to be citizens of the U.S. without distinction of color. This provision, I maintain, is merely declar ator of what the law now is. This, I presume, won d not be disputed if the language were qualified by the presence of the word " white." In the absence of this word, Iam sure that my proposition will be disputed by every member of this House who believes that this Government is exclusively a “white mans government." 1 think this question of sufficient importance to justify me in giving it something more than n more passing notice. Blackstone says: " The 1st and most obvious division of the people is into aliens and natural born subjects. Natural born suhicctsare such as are born within the dominions of the Crown of England; that is, within the finance, or asit is generally called, the allegiance of the king; a d aliens are such as are lt."Sharsicoos Blackslone, vol. I, p. 364. The principle here laid down applies to this country as well as to England. It makes a man a subyect in England, and a citizen here, and is, as Blackstone declares, “founded in reason and the nature of government.” The English law made no distinction on account of race or color in declaring that allpersons born within its jurisdiction are natural born subjects; nor does it do so in regard to naturalization. This law bound the colonies before the Revolution, and was not changed afterward. The Constitution of the U.S. rec opnizes the division of the people into the 2 classes named by Blackstone natural born and naturalized citizens. It speaks of “nut oral horn” citizens, and also provides for the establishment of “a uniform rule of naturalization" by Congress. Butinueither case does it apply race or color as a limitation on citizenship; and Congress, when it came to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, recognized by implication the citizenship of the native born negro by providing “that any alien, being afr ce white person, maybe admitted to become a citizen of the U.S., ” &c. Why use the word “ white" in this way if.a negro cannot be a citizen of the U.S.? If he is excluded from citizenship because of his race or color, though born within our jurisdiction and on our own soil, could conrcss make him a citizen by naturalization? f he could not be born a citizen could he be legislated into one? No one, I presume to say, Will assume the af firmative of this question. But unless some one will adirm this absurdity we have in the naturalization act of April 14, 1802, that which amounts to an unqualified declaration that a negro may be a citizen of the U.S.; forin the 1st section of that act it is provided: “Thatan alienwhowasrcsiding withiu the limits and undert ie jurisdietion of the U.S., before the 29thday of January. 1795m be admitted to become a citizen on due proo may O to some oneof the courts aforesaid: that he hasresidedtwoyonrsat least within and under the jurisdictiun of the U.S and one yenr atleast immediately preceding his application within the State or Territory where such court is at the time held." NOone can doubt that an alien Afric could be naturalized under this art of the no of 1802, who was residin in the U.S. prior to the 29th tin of anuary, 1795. Well,if Africans naturaized under this law should have had children born to them, will any person say that such children would be less citizens than their parents? the parents beingcitizens of the U.S. by naturalization, would it not follow that children born to them would be citizens by birth? I apprehend that it will not be claimed by anyonet at the children of naturalized citizens of the U.S. do not partake of the citizenship of their parents. The act of February 28, 1803, provides that: “ No master or captain ofany ship or vessel or any otherlperson shall import or bring, or causeto n importe or bronght. nnyncirro.mulatto, or 0th person of color. not being a native.acitizen. orroiristered seamenof the U.S or seamen natives of countries beyond the Cu eot Good Hope. into any port or place of the U.S. which ort orplace shall besituated in any State which by law has prohibited, or shall prohibit, the admission or importation of such negro. mulatto. or, other person of color.”BrtohllusDive“, p. 487. This is a very direct admission by the lawmaking power of the Government that a negro may be a citizen of the U.S. Ship masters are prohibited from brining into any State describedin the section of the act quoted any 111.r.owho is not either a native or a citizen of the U.S. If no negro could be a citizen, why use this long? Why use the term citizen as a descriptive unit the persons described cannot be citizens of the U.S. I Let him answer who can. born out of Section ten of the act of September 4, 1841, says: “That from and after the passage of this not. every person being the head of a fiiinily, or widow or single man. over the use of 21 years and being a citizen of the U.S., or having filed his intention to become a citizen, as lffulltxl by the naturalization laws, who sincethe 1sti ay of duno. A.D.1840. has made or shall hereatler makon settlement in person on the public lands to which the Indian title adbeenat the timeof such settlement extiiiizuished and which has been or shall have been surveyed prior thereto and who shall inhabit and improve thosnmc: and who has or shall erect a dwelling thereon shall be and is hereby authorized teen torwith the regis tor of the land o cc of tho district in which such land may lie. by legal subdivisions. any number of acres not exceeding 160. oraqunrter section of land, toinclude the residence of such claimant. upon pains to the U.S. the minimum rico of sue land." &e.U.S. Statutes al oe.vol. 5. p. 455. Under this section a colored man made application to preempt land in the State of I] i nois. The SecyTreasury, Hon. John C. Spencer, submitted to the AttyGen of the U.S., for his opinion, the question, can a free man of color be admitted to the privileges of a preemptioner under the act of 4th September, 1841? On March 15, 1843, Mr. H. S. Legare, the then AttyGen, gave his opinion in writing, from which 1 quote the following: “I have delayed giving an opinion on the subject. because I was desirous of bestowing upon it very deliberate consideration. The result is, that I amof opinion that a free man of color, a native of this country. may be admitted to the privileges of s. reemptioner under the 10th section of the act O 4th 4Sepitgizber. lS41." opimoin of AttorneysGeneral, vol. i PI am aware that the AttyGen tried to soften this opinion down by speaking of deniacns.”. but the statute says citizens. The law officer of the Government tells usthat his opinion was given after “very deliberate consideration}: and the law shows us that the limitation of citizenship was acting upon his deliberation. He gave in his opinion what. ever man must admit to be true, that a negro can e a citizen of the U.S., and as such enjoy the privileges of a preemtioner under the act of 841. Besides this, Mr. Legare was well aware that “A denizen is an alien born who has obtained ea donations leqisletters patent. to mnkohim on English subject, and that in the U.S. there is nosuch civ l condition."Bmsore Lois ry, vol. 1. title Denileu and further, that "Citizens. under our Constitution and laws. mean free inhabitants. born within the U.S or naturalized under the lawof Congress." Kents Commentaries.vol. 2. p. 278.note. Hence the free negro upon whose case the opinion was given became a redmptioner because he was a native born citizenof the U.S. On this question of citizenship, Mr. Marcy while he was SecyState, in anote date March 6, 1854, expressed himself as follows: “Although in general it isnot the duty of the Sec rebrof Stateto express opinions oflaw, and doubts may O entertaiped of the expediencyof making an answer to your inquiries an exception to this rule, ct I am under the iinpression thnti very personborn in the U.S. must be considered a citizen of the U.S. motwithstnnding oneor both of his parents may have beenalien at the timeof bishirth." I quote this not to claim that it. was written concerning a colored rsou, but for the ur plose of showmg how road the rule is which Mr. Marcy affirmed. Every ersou born in the U.S. must inclu e negroes, for they are persons and are born in the U.S.; and I submit that, under the rule thus laid down, all such persons “must be considered citizens of the U.S. ” I know, Mr. Speaker, that Mr. Marcy subsequently modified this opinion, at least a letter written by his Assmtant Secretar, Mr. Thomas, to Mr. Rice, of NewYork, of ate November 4, 1856, substantially affirms that no roes “are not citizens of the U.S. ” his change of opinion mu not be without a solution. The 1st letted is ated March 6, 1854, the 2nd November 4, 1856; between these 2 dates an important iolitical event occurred. The Kansas Nebras a bill passed congress in May, 1854, receiving the approval of President Pierce on i the 30th day of that month. This set was full of trouble to the Democratic party; and the l leaders of that organization became very anxions to have the question of slavery, so far asit related to the Territories and the status of negroes, adjudged and “ settled” by the Supreme gourt of the U.S. The case of Dred Scott vs. Sanford found its way to the docket of that court, and was argued the 1st time at the December term, 1855, and ordered to be, reargued at the December term, 1856. It. was not safe to cast the monstrosities of that de cision into the presidential campaign of 1856. The Democratic party had all it could. carry without the abominations which the end of that case was destined to disclose. The case was held over, Buchanan was elected, and then the leaders of the party were ready to let slip the pestilent doctrines of the Dred Scott case. No one now doubts that the leaders of the Democratic party knew what was to come out of that case in the form of aid and comfort to them. Buchanan doubtless knew what it would be, for in his inaugural address, delivered March 4, 1857, in speaking of the slavery question, he says: "This is, hagpili, n m atte r of but little practical importance. csi cs. it is aiudiciiil question which legitimately belongs to the SCOTUS beforewhom it is now pending; and will, it is understood, be speedily and flnlll settled. To their decision, in common with all go citizens. I shall cheerfully submit." SenaleJournal, 1856 57, P. 3l8. The opinion of the court was soon after given to the country, but instead of becoming a triumphant platform for the Democratic party, it proved to be the scaffold on whichthe party was executed. These facts, taken in their properrelation to each other, may explain the change which transpired in the Dept of State between the 6th day of March 1854, and the 4th day of November, 1856. The 1st opinionwas an honest and true statement of tolaw, the latter a mere partisan subterfuge. The ablest and most exhaustive opinion ever ven on the subject of negro citizenship by any law officer of the Government is that of AttyGen Bates, of date N ovember 29, 1862. This opinion was called for by the SecyTreasury, Hon. S. P. Chase, by a letter from which the following extract is ta en: “The schooner Elisabeth and Margaret, of NewBrunswick is detained by the revenuocutler Tiger at South Amboy, NewJersey. Because commanded by n colored man and so by a person not a citizen of the U.S.: as colored mastersare numerous in our coasting trade. I submit for your opinion the question suggested by Captain Martin of the Tiger: are colored men citizens of the U.S and therefore competent to command American vessels!" No ship or vessel can be deemed a ship or vessel of the U.S. unless wholly owned by a citizen or by citizens of the U.S., norunless commanded by a citizen of the U.S., and no American registr can be granted to any ship or vessel until after the filing with the proper officerof the Government atiidavits stating that the entire ownership vests in a citizen or citizens of the U.S and that the commander is a citizen. (Act of December 31, 1792; Brightlys Digest, page 823.) From this statement of the law it will be seen that the question proiounded by Socce tary Chase to the AttyGen was of the highest importance to the shipping and commercial interests of the country. Many vessels engaged in the coasting trade were coin manded y colored men; many vessels were owned in whole or in part by colored men, and all such would forfeit their American registry and character if the colored mcu interested as owners or commanders were not citizens of the U.S.; for the 1st section of the pet of 1792 expressly provides that they shall not continue to enjoy the benefits and privileges of ships and vessels of the U.S. “lon r than they shall continue to be wholly owne and to be commanded by a citizen or citizens of the said States." and the 4th sectiOn of said act provides as a penalty for a false statement of the facts to be set out in the oath required by said section, among which. facts so required is the citizenship of the owner and commander, “a forfeiture of the ab“ or vessel," Under this law it was hel in the case of the Venus “ that if 2 part owners own jointly a commercial house in NewYork and one of them obtains an American register for a ship by swearing that he, together. with his partner, of the city of NewYork, are the only owners of the vessel for which the register is obtained, when in fact his partner is domiciled in England, the vessel is liable to forfeiture, ” and itwas forfeited. (8 Crunch 1L, page 253.), AttyGen Bates fully appreciated the importance of the question submitted to him for his opinion by teSecyTreas ur, and devoted to itamost careful and pains tuing examination. This is amply evidenced by the elaborateness of the opinion and by the ability manifested in every one of its 27 pages. I might with profit draw largely from topages of this opinion in support of the position I maintain, but the time allotted me y the rules of the House constrains me to confine myself to quoting the conclusion arrived at by the author of this able paper. It is in these words: fAlnd now. upon the whole matter. I give it as my opinion that the free man of colormentioned in your letter, if born in the U.S., is ncitizen of the U.S., and if otherwise qualified, is compe tont according to the actsof congress, to be master of a vessel engaged in the COMUDUIAIB. " Here I might let this branch of the case rest, for it is known to every member of this House that every Dept of the Government is now followmg the lead of the doctrine supported by the authorities I have cited; but, sir, feel unwdhng to omit some others that I have examined. It is in vain we look into the Constitution of the U.S. for a definition of the term speaks of citizens, but in no express terms defines what it means by it. We must do end on the general law relating to sub. jects an citizens recognized by all nations for a definition, and that mnstlead us to the conclusion that every person horniii the U.S. is a natural born citizen of such States, except it may be that children born on our soil to temporary sojourners or representatives of foreign Governments, are native born citizens of the U.S. Thus it is expressed by a writer on the Constitution of the U.S.: Every person born within the U.S. its Territories or districts, whether the parents are citizens or aliens, is a natural born citizen in the sense of the Constitution, and entitled to all the rights and privileges appertaining to that capacity."{awlcon the Gnulilidion, p. 80 and this writer continues, as if he intended a refutation o t the position assumed by some persons at this time, that a negro is neither a citizen nor an alien, buta mere person With no definable national character, and adds: “ It is an error tosuppose, ussomohave done, that a child is born a citizen of no country, and subect of no Government and that lie so continues till t. ic tuzo of discrction, whenheisiit liberty to puthimself undel what Government he pleases." Paau BO, 81. No nation, I believe, ever did recognize this absurd doctrine; and the only force it ever had in this country, was that given it by the Democratic party which used a negro as a that ball for partisan games. The growing importance of the colored race in the U.S., now that the entire race in free, will soon cause even the Democratic party to abandon the in defensible position it occupies on this questiou. t we have 6 million persons in tiis government subject to its laws, and liable to r form all the duties and support all the obigations of citizens, and yet who are neither citizens nor aliens, is an absurdity which cannot survive long in the hght of these days of progressive civilization. It will not be denied by up one, I presume, that the English doctrine which. claims as a subject every person born within the jni isdiction of the Crown, made negroes born in the colonies out, of which the original 13 States were created, British subjects; nor will it be contended that they were not citizens of the States after the States throw off their allegiance to the mother country, and buing citizens of the Suites that they became, on the establishment of the Government of the U.S., citizens of the U.S. A very clear teinent of. this doctrine occurs in the case of 10State as. Manuel, 3 Devereaux dz Battles N. (J. lt., page 26, in these words: “The term citizon as understood in our law is urcly analogousto the term subject in the common aw, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted froui the change of government. The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective bud of the people, and he who beforewas a subicct of a king is now a.citizen of the Stato." This position is maintained by Rawle on the Constitution, page 80; Kents Commentaries, volume 2, lecture 25; Lawrences appendix to whcaton on International Law. I might multiply authorities, but I have referred I to enough for my purpose. By our law colored 1 persons are citizens of the U.S. Of this there can be no reasonable doubt; and we have been too tciiacionsly devoted to the doctrine “ once it citizen always acitizen" to strike out of our column of citizens 6 millionpersons in obedience to any such political irrationality as lies buried in the Dred Scott case. But, sir, suppose I should admit for the sake of an orment that negroes are not citizens, would that be an objection to the power of conrcss to enact the revision of this bill to which I have called e attention of the House? If they are not citizens may we not. naturalize them? If this can be done, then in either view of the case the provision of the bill which I am now discussing is proper, and is not obnoxious to the objection that we do not possess the power to pass it. The Constitution, in article 1, section e“ight, provides that Congress shall have power to establish anniforin rule of naturalization.” This does not mean that the power of congress exhausts itself by being once used, nor that there can be but one rule, nor that the rule established must provide that the nathralization shall be by action upon single or individual cases, nor yet that only foreigners can be thus made citizens. The practice of the government is against all these positions. The rule must be uniform in its operation upon the class affected by it, and must not be confined in terms in its operation to any particular State or district of country, except when it operates only on a particular class of persons who may be occupying a limited district of country. Several statutes, establishing as many different rules, each uniform in itself, have been enacted on this subject. Most of these rules provide for the naturalization by individual cases: “But a collective naturalization may also take place, of a class of porsons, natives of the country or otherwise, and who, without any act on the part of the individuals may bomado Citilens."Lawrencea {kl/p midi: to Wlieritonon International Opinion I AttorneyGrneral Cashing, in Opinion: AttyGen, vol. 7, p. 746. The powm thus to naturalize collectively has been exercised in several instances by the government. The most strikin case is that which is found in the act of March 3, 1843, in which it is provided that the “Stockbridge tribe of Indiana, and eachand every of them shall be deemed to be and from that time declaredto be. citizens of the U.S. " Mr. Speaker, these authorities are snflicient n on this point, and I will leave the question of citizens ip as presented in the 1st art of this section, and call the attention of the case, to the next proposition of the section as prosed to be amended by the committee. this in these words: There shall be uol disoriminution ln civil right or immunities among citizen of the U.S. in any State or Territory of the U.S. on account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery; and such citizensof everyracc and color, without regard to any previous condition of rlaveryor involuntary servi tude. exco t as a punishment for crime whereof the party shal have been duly convicted, shall have the sameright to make and enforcec ontracts, to sue. be parties and give evidence.to inherit. purchase.lease sell, hold, and conveyreal and personal property nm to full and equal benefit of all laws an proceedings for the security of personand property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, oidinanco. r contrary ottomor custom, to the notwithstandinl. This part of the bill will probably excite more opposition niid elicit more dimlflrlofl than any other; and yet to m mind it seems perfectly defensible. It provides for the equality of citizens of the U.S. in the enjoyment of “ civil rights and immunities.” hat do these terms mean? Do they mean that in all thin 5 civil, social, political, all citizens, without distinction of race orcolor, shall be e on]? By no means can they be so construe. Do they mean that all citizens shall vote in the several States? No; for sntfrage is apolitical right which has been left under the control of this several States, subject to the action of Congress only when it becomes necessary to enforce the guarantee of a RFG. Nor do they mean that all citizens shall sit on the juries or that their children shall attend the some schools. These are not civil rights or immunities. Well, what is the mean I What are civil rights? I. understand civil rights to be simply ie absolute rights of individuals, such as “The right of personal security, the right of personal liberty an thought to acquire and enjoy property." “Right itsclt, in civil society is that which any man is enijtled to have or todo or tor uireti oin others, within the limits of prescribed law. Kuilo, (hmmenlaml, vol. 1, p. 1. To use the language of AttyGen Bates, in the opinion already cited, “ The word rights is generic, common, embracing whatever may be lawfully claimed.” The definition given to the term “civil rights” in Bouvier’s law Dictionary is very concise, and is supported by the best authority. It is this: “ Civil rights are those which have no relation to the establishment, support, or management of government." & From this it is easy to gather an understanding that civil rights are the natural rights (if man; and these are the rights which this bill proposes to protect every citizen in the enjoyment of throughout the entire dominion of the Republic. Butwhat of the term "immunities?" What is an immunity? Simply “ freedom or exemption from obligation;” an immunity is “ a r t of exemption only, ” as “an exemption from serving in an Office, or performing duties which the law generally requires other citizens to perform.” Thisis allt at isintended by the word. immunities” as used in this bill. Itmercly secures to citizens of the U.S. equally in the exemptions of the law. A colored citizen shall not, because he is coloyed, be subjected to obligations, duties, pains, and penalties from which other citizens are exern ted. Whatever exemptions there may be she apply to all citizens alike. One race shall not c more favored in this respect than another. One class shall not be required to support alone the burdens which should rest on all classes alike. This is the spirit and scope of the bill, and it goes not one step beyond. Mr. Speaker, I think I may safely affirm that this bill, so far as it declares the equality of all citizens in the enjoyment of civil rights and immunities, merel arms existing law. We are following the Constitutiou. ll e are reducing to statute form the spirit of the Constitution. We are establishin no new right declaring no new principle. this not the object of this bill to establish new rights, but to protect and enforce those which already belong to every citizen. I am aware, sir, that this doctrine is denied in many of the States; but this only proves the necessity for the enactment of the remedial and protective features of this bill. If the States would all observe the rights of our citizens, there would be no need of this bill. If the States would all practice the constitutional declaration, that "The citizens of eachState shall be entitled to all privilcires and immunities of citizens in the several. tntes." (Article 4,reclion 2, Ciamlitiuimoif the U.S.) and enforcoit, as meaning that the citizen has "The right of protection by the Government, the enjoymentoflito and libertv, with the right to acqulro and possess property ofevory kind and to pursiio and otain happiness and safety; to clnlm "10 benefit of the writ ot hflbeal comm.to institute and MItain actions of any kind in the courts of the 3"“: to take. hold and disposeof property, real or personal: to be exemptfrom higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the Slate." (Corfivldvs. Cbrue, 4 Wackinytons Circuit (hurt Kcportl. p. 350) we might ver well refrain from the enactment of this bill into a law. If they would recognize that “general citizenship" (Sto on the Constitution, volume 2, page 604) which under this clause entitles every citizen to security and protection of personal rights, (Campbell vs. Morris, 8 Harris 8: McHen, 535) we might safely withhold action. An if above all, Mr. Speaker, the States should admit, and practice the admission that a citizen does not surrender these rights because he may he pen to be a citizen of the State which won] de prive him of them, we might, without doing violence to the duty devolved upon us, leave the whole subject to the several States. air, the practice of the States leaves us no avenue of escape, and we must do our duty by supplying the protection which the States deny. Mr. Speaker, if all our citizens were of one race and one color we would be relieved of most of the difficulties which surround us. This bill would be almost, if not entirely, unneces. sary, and if the States, seeing that we have citizens of different races and colors, would but shut their eyes to these differences and legislate, so far at least as regards civil rights and immunities, as though all citizens were of one race and color, our troubles as a nation would be well nigh over. But such is not the case, and we must do as best we can to protect our citizens, from the highest to the lowest, from the whitest to the blackest, in the enjoyment of the great fundamental rights which belong to all men. " It will be observed that the entire structure of this bill rests on the discrimination relative to civil rights and immunities made by the States on “ account ofirace, color, or previous condition of slavery.” That these things should not be is no answer to the fact of their existence. That the result of the recent war, and the enactment of the measures to which the events of the war naturally led us, have intensified the hate of the controlling class in the insurgent States toward our colored citizens is a fact against which we can neither shut our ears nor close our eyes. Laws barbaric and treatment inhuman are the rewards meted out by our white enemies to our colored friends. WI“. should put a stop to this at once and forever and yet I would not. do this in a way which would deprive a white man ofu single right to which he is entitled. I would merely enforce justice for all men; and tibia is lawful, it is right, and it is our bounden duty. In order to accomplish this end it is necessary to fortify the declaratory portions of this bill with such sanctions as will render iteffect ive. The 1st of these is found in the 2nd section, and in these words: Sec. 2. Abife: That any person who, under color of any law, statute.ordinance. reulation or custom shall subject, or causeto beso jected, any inhabitant of anyStateor Territor to the deprivation of any right securedor protected by this not or to different punishment.pains, or penalties ou account of such personhaving at any time boonheld in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, exceptas a punishment forcrime whereof the party shall have conduly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is roscrihed for the punishment of ivhite persons, shal be deemedguilty of n.misde meanor, and on conviction shall bepunishedby afine not oxcoedinu $1.41” or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both. in the discretion of the court. Now, sir, unless I am mistaken in all that I have said up to this point, our power to enact this section cannot be questioned. If citizens of the U.S., as such, are entitled to possess and enjoy the great fundamental civil rights which it is the true office of Government to protect, and to equality in the exemptions of the law, we must of necessity be clothed with the power to insure to each and every citizen these things which belong to him as a constitquent member of the great national famil. But itmay be urged that we can exercise on y such powers as are delegated by express provision of the Constitution or arise by implication from its express provisions and following this may come the demand for the express or implie But, powers to support this and the subsequent sections of this bill. Well. sir, is to those citizens who may be danger of bein subjected to slavery or involuntary servitu e. I answer that the express power supporting this measure may be found in the followmg provision of the Constitution: “SIC I. Neither slave nor involunta servitude, except as punishment of crime whereo the party shall have been duly convicted shall exist in the U.S or in any place subject to their jurisdiction. Sec. 2. Congress shall have power to enforcethis article by appropriate legislation." Here, certainly, is an express delegation of power. How shall it be exercised I Who shall select the means through which the office of this power shall effect the end designed by the cop e when they placed this provision in the constitution? Happily, sir, we are not without lighton these questions from the Supreme Court. In the celebrated case of McCulloch vs. The State of Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court, says: “ We admit, as all must admit, that the powersof the Government are limited and that its limits are not to botranscended. But we think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national Legislature that discretion with respectto the meansby which the powers it confers are to be car ried into execution. which will enable that body to perform the his duties assigned to it in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the Ontlhc legitimato. lot it be within the scopeof the Constitution and nll moans which nro appropriate mhicliare plainly adapted to that end. which are not prohibited. but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. are constitutional."4 WauReports, p. 420. Who will say that the means provided by this 2nd section of the bill are not appropriate for the enforcement of the power delegated to Congress by the 2nd section of the amendment abolishing slavery, which I have quoted? The end is legitimate, because it is defined by the Constitution itself. The end is the maintenance of freedom to the citizen. Whatmeans more appropriate could be selected than that which punishes a man by common] inflicted punishments through the ordinary c annels of the law and the courts for depriving the citizen of those rights which, while he enjoys them, are his sure defense against efforts to reduce him to slavery“? A man who enjoys the civil rightsmentioned in this bill cannot be reduce to slavery. Anything which protects him in the possession of these rights insures him against reduction to slavery. This settles the appropriateness of this measure, and that settles its constitutionality. Of the necessity of the measure Congiess is the sole judge. [his is clearly announced in the case just cited, and in this language: “Where the law is not prohibited and is really calculated to effeotany oft O objectsintrusted to the Government, to undertake hero to inquire into the degreeof its necessitywould beto pass the line which circumscribes the Judicial depnment and to tread on legislative ground." Poac. If this bill shall pass both Houses and become a law, that fact of itseltdetermines the question of necessity, and from this decision there is no appeal except to another Congress. This is the doctrine of the Constitution, as declared by the highest udicial tribunal known to our laws. Mr. Speaker, I have endeavored to show that this bill provides means for the execution oi the power delegated to us. appropriate to the end designed by the Constitution. I may not have succeeded in convincing all that my position is correct, and some may claim that this particular mode of enforcing the power is in some way excepted from the broad field of our choice of means. Sir, the establishment of this exception must be the work of those who suggest it. No r do I make this assertion without iigh authority for it. In the same case from which I have quoted the court said: “The Government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of performingJthat act, must. accordingto the dictates of reason. a allowed to select the means; and those who contend that it may not select any appropriate means, that one pnrticular modeofetfectin theobject is excepted. tnkc upon themselves the bar enoi establishing that onception." Page409. Here, sir, I may safely rest this branch of my justification of this bill. Let those who may claim thatthis mode of enforcing the power granted to us for eliecting the object the people had in view when they placed the abolition amendment in the Constitution, is excepted from our grand range of choice, assume their burden and establish the exception. I am content to leave that branch of the work to them. The remaining sections of the bill are aids to what has gone before, and I will not spend time in discussing them. Suffice it to say that they are based on the act of September 18, 1850, commonly known as the “ fugitive slave law, " the constitutionality of which has been affirmed over and over again by the courts. ( Ville 6 McLean, Rep, 469; 2 Paine, C. C. 348; 16 Barbour, 268; 7 Cashing, Mass, 285.) and, sir, I am not willing that all of these precedents, legislative and judicial, which aided slavery so long, shall now be brushed into oblivion when freedom needs their assistance. Let them now work out a propermeasure of retrib utive justice by making freedom as secure as they once made slavery hateful. I cannot yield up the weapons which slavery has placed in our hands now that they may be wieled in the holy cause ofliberty and just government. We will turn the artillery of slavery upon itself. But, sir, this bill may have a broader application than that which would reach the cases of persons designed to be protected by the del egation of power contained in the amendment of the Constitution upon which I have commented. If it does reach beyond these cases, and in its enlarged operation step out of the bounds of this express delegation of power, upon what, in this more extcuded sphere, must it rely for support? I have alrea y said, “ If citizeus of the U.S., as such, are entitled to possess and enjoy the great fundamental civil rights which it is the true Office of Government to protect, and to canality in the exemptions of the law, we must of necessity be clothed with the power to insure to each and every citizen these things which belong to him as a constituent member of the gent national family.” Whatever these great ndamentalrihtsare, wcmustbeinvested with power to legislate for their protection or our Constitution fails in the 1st and most important othee of government. What are these rights? Certainly they must be as comprehensive as those which belong to Englishmen and what arethey? Blackstone classifies them under 3 articles, as follows: 1. The right of personal security; which, he says, "Consists in a persons legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life his limbs, his body, his health and is reputation." 2. The right of personal liberty; and this, he says, “ Consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving ones person to whatever place ones own inclination may direct. Without imprisonment or restraint, unlessby due courseof law." 8. The right of personal property; which he defines to be, “The free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution save on y by the laws of thaland." SharIwoodI Clack done, vol. 1. chap. 1. In his lecture on the absolute rights of persons, Chancellor Kent (Kents Commentaries, volume one, page 599) says: " The absolute rights of individuals may be resolved into the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property. These rights have beenjustly considered, and frequently declared. by the people of this country, to be natural. inherent and inalienable." Thus, sir, we havethe English and American doctrine harmonizing. The great fundamental rights are the inalienable possession of both Englishmen and Americans; and I will not admit that the British constitution excels the American Constitution in the amplitude of its provisions for the protection of these iights. Our Constitution is not a mockery; it is the never failing fountain of power from whence we may draw our justification for the page of this bill; for there is no right enumerated in it by general terms or by specific designation which is not definitely embodied in one of the rights I have mentioned, or results as an incident necessary to complete defense and enjoyment of the specilic right. Now, sir, reassert that the possession of these rights by the citizen raises by necessary implication the power in Congress to protect them. Ifa citizen of the U.S. should go abro id, and while within the jurisdiction of a foreign Power be despoiled of his rights of personal security, personal liberty, or personal property contrary to the due course of law of the nation inflicting the wrong, this Government would es House his cause and enforce redress even to the extremity of war. It may be said this case is provided for by the Constitution, when it declares that Congress shall have power “to declare war, ” and in a certain sense this is true. But it must be remeinbered that the Constitution does not provide in detail how the war when once declared shall be carried on. It leaves that to Congress as the lawmaking power and the President as the executive power of the Government. Through these redresses for wrongs suffered by our citizens at the hands of another nation may be enforced. Well. if all the terrible powers of war may be resorted to for the protection of the rights of ourcitizens when those rights are disregarded and trampled on beyond our jurisdiction, is it possible that our Constitution is so defective that we have no power under it to protect our citizens within our own jurisdiction through the peaceful means of statutes and courts? [Here the hammer fell] Mr. ROGERS obtained the floor.