Mr.VOORHEES. Mr. Speaker, in one sense I do not blame the chairman of the committee for wanting to kee this matter to himself, and inside the 4 walls of the committee room; nor do Icomplain of his distinguished colleague, [Mr. BANKS] who comes to his assistance in accomplishing that object. If I had been a willing party to such conduct I would, no doubt, be capable of acting precisely in the same way and would desire the affair to remain secret and undisclosed. That is all I have to say on that point. But, leaving this branch of the committees claims to indorsement and honorablemention in the history of these strange times, I up roach the discussion of the case itself. I shal proceed to show that versatility and rapidly s ifting views of duty are not the only accomplishmentspossessed bythiselasticcommittee. ndia rubber has not only the principle of liability but it likewise possesses very powerfu erasive properties. the committee, too, has that use ul quality, and has found no difficulty in crasing from their proceedings the plainest and most familiar principles of the laws of the land. 1st. According to law—plain law as decided by the highest tribunals in the Gokernment— there is no evidence at all in this case, and none was ever taken. Can anyone testify who is not under oath, and can anyone administer an oath except he is especially empowered by law to do so? I here state that not one witness who appears in these proceedings, contesting my seat, was ever sworn by an officer authorized to ads minister oaths. y the act of Congress regulatin the mode of contesting an election to this %ouse it is provided, after enumerating other officers, that depositions may be taken before any mayor of a town or city who resides in the congressional district wherein the contest originates. Here, then is an official persons e designated to set. A mayor is to take the cpositions. Who and what is a mayor? Is he anything except whatthe law makes him? Is he not simply an artificial person created by statute with no existence whatever except such as has been specifically conferred upon him? He is merely the creature of State law, and by that law, and by it alone, he possesses all his powers. Congress might have created a new Officer and given him authority to take these depositions, but it did not. The Federal Government to accomplish a Federal object adopts a State officer as an agent because he has authority under the laws of the State to do what the federal Government wishes done in the premises. This is no new doctrine. On the contrary, it is a very old one. It is embraced in the decision of the celebrated case of Prigg vs. The commonwealth of Pennsylvania, rendered by the SCOTUS a quarter of a century ago. It was there held that the Federal Government, in order to execute a Federal law, might call upon State Officers for their aid, and that such State officers might render the required aid by virtue of the power vested in them by State laws; but that at the same time they might refuse to act in the rem ises at all, being entirely independent O federal authority. In other words, that to re vent the multiplicity of Federal officers the vernment may adopt as agents for certain purposes persons who have authority by State law to do the required duties of the Federal Government and when Congress said that a mayor might take depositions in proceedingslike this, did it by so doing make some other kind of an officer out of the mayor, who saw fit to act? Did it enlar e his powers? If so, it would not have use the term mayor, for a mayor can only be the creature of the State enactment. He is an officer utterly unknown to Federal legislation. In support of this view of the question, allow me to cite the case of the U.S. vs. Baily, in 9 Peters, age 251. The facts in that case were as follows: a law of Congress conferred upon the SecyTreasury the power to make rules an regulations in accordance with which claims against the Treasury Dept should be presented and proven. By virtue of that law teSecre tary, among other things, established a rule that affidavits in support of claims might be made before any justice of the peace. a the rose cution of a claim, Baily made an affidavit before one Josiah Reed, a justice of the peace in the county of Bath, an State of Kentucky. His affidavit was alleged to be false, and he was indicted for perjuryin the Federal court. From there it was carried to the SCOTUS, and the question there fully discussed and decided as to the power of the said Reed to administer the oath in question, and if he had the power, whence it was derived. Pause a moment and consider how exactly the question now before us was there presented for decision. There the Federal Government desired a certain duty performed. Here the same. There an officer created by the laws of the State of Kentucky was designated by the authority of the Federal Government as one capable of acting for it in the premises. Here an Officer created by the laws O Indiana is desirnated by Congress as one who may take these depositions. lhen we are immediately upon the point. What was the language of Justice Story in delivering the opinion of the court? It is as follows: " It will be accordingly certifiedto the circuit court that the said Josiah Reed. named in the certificate of division of the judges of the circuit court. beings justice of the peace of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. authorized b the lawsof that Stateto administer oaths,had authority and jurisdiction to administer the oath and take the affidavit in the said certificate of division mentioned; and that if the facts stated therein were falsely sworn to, the case is within the act of Congress of the 1st of More 1823.referred to in the same cortificnte." —Uml Slam vs. Bailey, vol. 9, p. 756,Pelerr: Supremeand Reports. This decision plainly establishes the principle for which I am contending, that where the lederal Government fixes upon a State officer to assist in carrying out its purposes, that officer does not thereby become a Federal oliiccr, but acts by virtue of the powers wherewiih he has been clothed by the State which has given him his official character. In the case just cited the oath administered by the justice of the peace in Kentucky was valid, because the laws of that State gave him authority to administer it. N ow, let us apply this plain principle of law to the case under discussion. The facts here are as follows: Albert Lange is the mayor of the city of Terre Haute, and before him every deposition on file was taken. 2 of the depositions were taken in the county of Sullivan, one in the county of Putnam, and one in Riley Township, Vigo county, and all outside of the corporation of the city of Terre Haute. But by what authority can a mayor of a town or city in Indiana administer an oath at all? Here is the law and the only law on the subject: " no.1. Be it enactedby the General Assemblyof (he ale (if "dumm That justices of the eacein their respectivecounties, nptariqs pubhcJu gesof courts in their respective jurisdictions. mayorsof townsand cities in their respective towns and cities, and clerks of cii cuiatnd commonplease carts and master commissioners in their respective counties. be hereby authorized to administer oaths generally, pertaining to all matterswhere an path is reguired: and county auditors in their respective counties shall be authored to administer to road reviewers and township trustees and to instices of the peacemaking returns if finsoge"—Gaomand [lords Slatutu of Indians, vol. p. I.