The Clerk read the message of the President, as follows: To the Senate of the U.S.: I regret that the bill which has passed both Houses of Congress, entitled “An act to retect all persons in the U.S. in their civil rights, and furnish the means for their vindication, ” contains provisions which I cannot approve, consistent] with my sense of duty to the whole people antimy obligations to the Constitution of the U.S. I am therefore constrained to return it to the Senate, the House in which it originated, with my objections to its becoming a law. By the 1st section of the bill, all persons born in the U.S., and not an ject to any foreign Power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the U.S. n. This provision comprehends the Chinese of the Pacific States, Indians subject to taxation, the people called Gypsies, as well as the entire race designated as blacks, people of color, negoes, mulattoes, and persons of Africanblood. very individual of those races, born in the U.S., is by the bill made a citizen of the U.S. It does not purport to declare or confer any other right of citizenship than Federal citizenship. It does not purport to give these classes of persons an status as citizens of States, except that which may result from their status as citizens of the U.S. The power to confer the right of State citizeni ship is justasexclusively with the several States as the power to confer the right of Federal citizenship is with Congress. The right of Federal citizenship thus to be conferred on the several excepted races be forementioned is now, for the 1st time, proposed to be given by law. If, as is claimed many, all persons who are native born, a ready are, by virtue of the Constitution, citizens of the U.S., the passage of the pending bill cannot be necessary to make them such. If. on the other hand, such persons are not citizens, as may be assumed from the proposed legislation to make them such, the very question presents itself, whether, when e even of the 36 States are unrepresented in. Congress, at this time it is se und polic to make our entire colored population an all other excepted classes citizens of the U.S.? 4 millionsof them have just emerged from slavery into freedom. Can it be reason ably supposed that they possess the requisite qualifications to entitle them to all the privileges and immunities ofcitizens of the U.S.? Have the people of the several States expressed such a conviction? It may also be asked whether it is necessary that they should be declared citizens in order that they may be secured in the enjoyment of civil rights 7 Those rights proposed to be conferred by the bill are by federa as well as State laws secured to all domiciled aliens and foreigners even before the completion of the process of naturalization, and it may safely be assumed that the same enactments are sufficient to give like protection and benefits to those for whom this bill provides special legislation. Besides, the policy of the government, from its origin to the present time, seems to have been that persons who are strangers to and unfamiliar with our institutions and our laws should pass through a certain probation, at the end of which, before attaining. the coveted prize, they must. give evidence of their fitness to receive and to exercise the rights of citizens as contemplated by the Constitution of the U.S. The bill, in effect, proposes a discrimination against large numbers of intelligent, worthy, and patriotic foreigners, and in favor of the negro, to whom, after long years of bondage, the avenues to freedom and intelligence have now been suddenly opened. He must, of necessity, from his previous unfortunate condition of servitude, 2 less informed as to the nature and character of our institutions than he who, coming from abroad, has to some extent at least, familiarized himself with the principles of a Government. to which he voluntarily intrusts “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Yet it is now proposed by a sing e legislative enactment to confer the rights of citizens upon all persons of African ese ent, born within the extended limits of the U.S., while persons of foreign birth, who make our land, their home, must undergo a probation of 5 years, and can only then become citizens upon proof that they are of “good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the U.S., and well disposed to the good order and hap piness of the same." The 1st section of the bill also contains an enumeration of the rights to be enjoyed by these classes, so made citizens, “in every State and Territory in the U.S. ” These rights are, “ To make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and lgive evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, se, hold, and convey real and personal property, ”aud to have“fullaudequal finefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.” So, too, they are m e subject to the same punishment, pains, and pen alties in common with white citizens, and to none others. Thus a perfect equality of the white and black races is attempted to be fixed by Federal law, in every State of the Union, over the vast field of State jurisdiction covered by these enumerated rights. In no one of these can any State ever exercise any power of discrimination between the different races. In the exercise of State policy over matters exclusively affecting the people of each State, it has frequently been thought expedientto discrimiuate between the 2 races. By the stat utes of some of the States, northern as well as southern, it is enacted, for instance, that no white person shall intermarry with a negro or mulatto. Chancellor Kent says, speaking of the blacks, that “marriages between them and the whites are forbidden in some of the States where slavery does not exist, and they are prohibited in all the sluveholding States, and when not absolutely contrary to law, they are revolting, and regarded as an offense against public decorum.” I do not say this bill repeals State laws on the subject of marriage between the 2 races, for as the whites are forbidden to intermar with the blacks, the blacks can only make such contracts as the whites themselves are allowed to make, and therefore cannot, under this bill, enter into the marriage contract with the whites. I cite this discrimination, however, as an in stance of the State policy as to discrimination, and to inquire whet er, if Congress can abro gate all State laws of discrimination between the 2 races in the matter of real estate, of suits, and of contracts generally, Congress may not also repeal the State laws as to the contract of marriage between the 2 races? Hitherto every subject embraced in the enumeration of rights contained in this bill has been considered as exclusively beloning to the States. The all relate to themterna policy and econom ot the respective States. 1 ey are matters which in each State concern the domestic condition of its people, varying in each according to its own peculiar circumstances, and the safety and well einglof its own citizens. I do not mean to say that upon all these subjects there are not Federal restraints, as for instance, in the State power of legislation over contracts, there is a federal limitation that no State shall pass a law impairing the obligations of contracts; and as to crimes, that no State shall pass an expostfacto law; and as to money, that no State shall make an hin but gold and silver a legal tender. at where can we find a Federal prohibition against the power of any State to discriminate, as do most of them, between aliens and citizens, between artificial persons called corporations and natural persons, in the right to hold real estate? If it be granted that Congress can repeal all State laws discriminating between whites and blacks in the subjects covered by this bill, why, it may be asked. may not Congress repeal in the same way all State laws discriminating between the 2 races on the subjects of suffrage and office? IfCongress can declare by law who shall hold lauds, who shall testify, who shall have capacity to make a contract in a State, then Congress can by law also declare who, without regard to color or race, shall have the right to sit as a juror or as a judge, to hold any O cc, and, finally. to vote “ in every State and Territory of the U.S. " As respects the Territories, they come within the power of Congress, for as to them, the lawmaking power is the Federalpower; but as to the States no similar provisions exist, vestin in Congress the power “to make rules an regulations” for them. The object of the 2nd section of the bill is to afford discriminating protection to colored persons in the full enjoyment of all the rights secured to them by the preceding section. It declares “that any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person having at one time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntaryservitude, except as a wishment of crime whereof the party slml have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribe for the punishment of white persons, shall be deeme guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $1,000, or impris: onment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court.” This section seems to be designed to appl to some existing or future law of a State or erritory which may conflict with the provisions of the bill now under consideration. It provides for counteractin such forbidden legisation byimposing fine and imprisonment upon the legislators who may pass such conflicting laws, or upon the officers or agents who shall put, or attempt to at. them into execution. It means an officia otlense, not a common crime committed against law upon the persons or property of the by ack race. such an act may deprive the black man of his wperty, but not of the right to hold property. tmeans a deprivation of the right itself, either by the State judiciary or the State Legislature. It is therefore assumed that under this section members of State Legislatures who should vote for laws conflicting with the provisions of the bill; that judges of the State courts who should renderjrudgments in anta ouism with its terms; and that marshals and sheriffs who should, as ministerial Officers, execute processes, sauctioned by State laws and issued by State judges, in execution bf their judgments, could be brought before other tribunals and there subjected to fine and imprisonment for the perforlnunce of the duties which such State laws might impose. he legislation thus propoeed invades the judicial power of the State. It says to every State court or judge, ifyou decide that this act is unconstitutional, if you refuse, under the prohibition of a State law, to allow a negro to testify, if you hold that over such a subject matter the State law is paramount, and “under color” of a State lawrefuse the exercise of the right to the negro, your error of judgment, however conse ientious, shall subject you to fine and imrisonment. I do not apprehend that the conicting legislation which the bill seems to contemplate is so likely to occur as to render it. necessary at this time to adopt a measure of such doubtful constitutionality. In the next place, this provision of the bill seems to be unnecessary, as adequate judicial remedies could be adopted to secure the de sired end without invadmg the immunities of legislators, always important to be preserved in the interest of public liberty; without. assailing the independence of the judiciary, always essential to the preservation ofindividual rights; and without imairing the efficiency of ministerial Officers, a ways necessary for the maintenance of public peace and order. The remedy proposed by this section seems to be, in this respect, not only anomalous, but unconstitutional; for the Constitution guaranties nothing with certainty, if it does not insure to the several States the right of making and executing laws in regard to almatters arising within their jurisdiction, subject only to the restriction that in cases of conict with the Constitution and constitutional laws of the U.S. the latter should be held to be the supreme law of the land. The 3rd section gives the district courts of the U.S. exclusive “cognizance of all crimes and offenses committed against the provisions of this act, " and concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts of the U.S. of all civil and criminal cases “ affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State or locality where they maybe any of the rights secured to them by the 1st section. ” The constuction which I have given to the 2nd section is strengthened by this 3rd section, for it makes clear what kin of denial or deprivation of the rights secured by the 1st section was in contemplation. It is a denial or deprivation of such rights “in the courts or judicial tribu nals of the State.” It stands, therefore, clear of doubt that the offense and the penalties provided in the 2nd section are intended for the State judge, who, in the clear exercise of his functions as a judge, not acting ministeriall, but judiciall, shall decide contrary to this Federal law. n other words, when a State judge, acting upon a question involving a conflict between a State law and a Federal law, and bound, according to his own judgment and responsi bility, to give an impartial decision between the 2, comes to the conclusion that the State law is valid and the Federal law is invalid, he must not follow the dictates of his own judgment at the peril of line and imrisonment. The legislative Dept of the government of the U.S. thus takes from the udicial Dept of the States the sacred an exclusive duty of judicial decision, and converts the State judge into a mere ministerial otheer, bound to ecide according to the will of congress. It is clear that in States which deny topersons whose rights are secured by the 1st section of the bill anyone of those rights, all criminal and civil cases affecting them, will, by the provisions of the 3rd section, come under the exclusive cognizance of the Federal tribunals. It follows that if, in any State which denies to a colored person anyone of all those rights, that person should commit a crime against the laws of the State, murder, arson, rape, or any other crime, all protection and punishment through the courts of the State are taken away, and he can only be tried and punished in the Federal courts. How is the criminal to be tried? If the offense is provided for and punished by Federal law, that aw, and not the t State law, is to govern. It is only when the offense does not ha on to be within the purview of the Federainiaw that the Federal courts are to try and punish him under any otherlaw. Then resort is to be had to “the common law, as modified and changed” by State legislation, “so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the U.S. ” So that Over this vast domain of criminal jurisprudence provided by each State for the protection of its own citizens, and for the punishment of all persons who violate its criminal laws, Federal haw, wherever it can he made to apply, displaces State law. The question here naturally arises, from what source Congress derives the power to transfer to Federal tribunals certain classes of cases embraced in this section? The Constitution exPressly declares that the judicial power of the U.S. “ shallextend to al cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the U.S., and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases ofadmiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the U.S shall be a party; to controversies between 2 or more States, between a State and citizens of another State, between citizens of different States, between citizens of the same State claiming land under grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects.” Here the judicial power of the U.S. is expressl set fort and defined; and the act (if September 24, 1789, establishing the judicial courts of the U.S., in conferring upon the Federal courts jurisdiction over cases Originating in State tribunals, is careful to confine them to the classes enumerated in the above recited clause of the Constitution. This section of the bill undoubtedly comprehends case and authorizes the exercise of powers that are not, by the Constitution, within the jurisdiction of the courts of the U.S. To transfer them to those courts would be an exercise of authority well calculated to excite distrust and alarm on the part of all the States; for the bill applies alike to all of them as well to those that have as to those that have not been engaged in rebellion. It may be assumed that this authority is incident to the power granted to Congress by the Constitution, as recently amended, to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the article dealer in t rat “neither slavery nor involuntary servi tu e, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the U.S., or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” It cannot, however, be justly claimed that, with a view to the enforcement of this article of the Constitution, there is at present any necessity for the exercise of all the powers which this bill confers. Slavery has been abolished, and at present nowhere exists within the jurisdiction of the U.S.; nor has there been, nor is it likely there will be any attempt to revive it, by the people of the States. If, however, any such attempt shall be made, it will then become the duty of the General Government to exercise any and all incidental powers necessary and proper to maintain inviolate this great constitutional law of freedom. The 4th section of the bill provides that officers and agents of the Freedmens Bureau shall be empowered to make arrests, and also that other Officers may be specially commissioned for that purpose by the POTUS It also authorizes circuit courts of the U.S and the sufferior courts of the Territories to a point, Without limitation, commissioners, w 10 are to be charged with the performance of quasi judicial duties. The 5th section cm powers the commissioners so to be selected y the courts to appoint in writing, under their hands, one or more suitable persons, from time to time, to execute warrants and other processes described by the bill. These numerous official agents are made to constitute a sort of police, in addition to the military, and are authorized to summon a posse comitatus, and even to call to their aid such portion of the land and naval forces of the U.S., or of the militia, “as may be necessary to the performauce of the duty with which they are c arged." This extraordinary power is to be conferred upon agents irresponsible to the Government and to the people, to whose number the discretion of the commissioners is the only limit, and in whose hands such authority might be made a terrible engine of wrong, oppression, and fraud. The general statutes regu ating the land and naval forces of the U.S., the militia, and the execution of the laws, are believed to be adequate for every emergency which can occur in time of peace. If it should prove otherwise, Congress can at any time amend those laws in such manner as, while subserving the public welfare, not to jeopard the rights, interests, and liberties of the people. The 7th section provides that a fee of ten dollars shall be aid to each commissioner in every case broug t before him, and a fee of 5 dollars to his deputy, or deputies “for each person he or they may arrest and take before any such commissioner, ” “with such other fees as may be deemed reasonable by such commissioner, ” “ in general for performing such other duties as may be required in the premises.” All these fees are to be “paid out of the Treasury of the U.S., " whether there is a conviction or not; but in case of conviction the are to be recoverable from the de fendant. t seems to me that under the influ euceof such temptations bad men mightconvert any law, however beneficent, into an instrument of persecution and fraud. By the 8th section of the bill, the U.S. courts, which sit only in one place for white citizens, must migrate, with the marshal and district attorney, (and necessarily with the clerk, although he is not nicutionet.) to any art of the district upon the order of the president, and there hold a court “ for the purpose of the more speedy arrest and trial of persons charged with a violation of this act;” and there the judge and the omcers of the court must remain, upon the order of the President, “for the time tierein designated.” The 9th section authorizes the President, or such person as he may empower for that purpose, “to employ such art of the land and naval forces of the U.S., or of the militia, as shall be necessaryto prevent the violation and enforce the due execution of this act.” This language seems to imply a permanent military force, that is to be always at hand, and whose only business is to be the enforcement of this measure overthe vast region where it is intended to operate. 1 do not propose to consider the policy of this bill. To me the details of the bill seem fraught with evil. The white race and the black race of the South have hitherto lived together under the relation of master and slave capital owning labor. Now, suddenly, that relation is changed, and as to the ownership, capital and labor are divorced. They stand now each master of itself. In this new relation, one being necessary to the other, there will be a new adjustment, which both are dee ly interested in making harmonious. Each as equal power in settling the terms, and if left to the laws that regulate capital and labor, it is confidently believed that they will satisfactorily work out the problem. Capital, it is true, has more intelligence but labor is never so ignorant as not to understand its own interests, not to know its own value, and not to seethat capital must pay that value. This bill frustrates this adustment. It intervenes between capital an labor, and attempts to settle questions of political economy through the agency of numerous officials, whose interest it will be to foment discord between the 2 races; for as the breach widens their em loment will continue, and when it is close the ir occupation will terminate. In all our history, in all our exerience as a people living under Federal and State law, nq such system as that contemplated by the details of this bill has ever before been proposed: or adopted. They establish, for the security of the colored race, safeguards which go infinitely beyond any that the General Government has ever provided for the white race. In fact, the distinction of race and color is, by the bill, made to operate in favor of the colored and against the white race. They interfere with the municipal legislation of the States, with the relations existing exclusively between a State and its citizens, or between inhabitants of the same State an absortion and assumption of pOWer by the General Government which, if acquiese ed in, must sap and destroy our fed erative system of limited powers, and break down the barriers which preserve the rights of the States. It is another step, or rather stride toward centralization and the concentration of all legislative power in the national Government. The tendency of the bill must be to resuse itate the spirit of rebellion, and to arrest the progress of those influences which are more clOsely drawing around the States the bonds of union and peace. My lamented predecessor, in his roclamation of the 1st of January, 1863, or ered and declared that all persons held as slaves within certain States and, parts of States therein desig nated, were and thenceforward should be free, and, further, that the Executive Government of the U.S., including the military and naval authorities thereof, would recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons. This guarantee has been rendered especiall oblig atory and sacred by the amendment of the constitution abolishing slavery throughout the U.S. I therefore fully recognize the obligation to protect and defend that class of our people whenever and wherever it shall become necessary, and to the full extent compat. ible with the Constitution of the U.S. Entertaining these sentiments, it only remains for me to say, that I will cheerfully cooperate with Congress in any measure that may be neceSsary for the protection of the civil rights of the freedmen, as well as those of all other classes of persons throughout the U.S., by judicial process under equal and impartial laws, in conformity with the provisions of the Federal Constitution. I now return the bill to the Senate, and regret that in considering the bills and JtResolutions 42 in number which have been thus far submitted for my a proval, I am compelled to withhold my assent ruin a 2nd measure that has received the sanction of both Houses of Congress.ANDREWJOHNSON. WASHINGTON, D. 0., March 27, 1866.