Mr. Rnn. the word thotr was struck out and reiziilations in such cases inserted 3 91MB of plrovigmnsconqcrninl them. the clause l P“ readmsr"but mutilation! in eachof the fore going "so; may, at anytime, by made or altered by l theLegislatur of the U.S. This wasmeant to give the “11 lill Legi.latiirca power not only to alter the provisions of the States.but to make regulationsin case the States should fail or refuse altogether. “Article 6. section one. us than amended. was agreedto, hem.con.” An alternative was before the Convention. It was this: the power of deciding who should vote for members of Congress, President and VEEP, and With it the power to determine who should vote for members of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature, must either be given to the Legislature of each State or contided to Congress. Gentlemen have doubtless observed that adison saw this, and said: " It seemsas improperin principle. though itiuight be less inconvenient in practice. to give to theState Legislatures this great authority over the election of the representativesof the coploin the general Legiolaturc. as it would be to give to thalatteralikc power over the election of their representatives in theState Legislature." and Mr. King pointedly repudiated the idea of confiding this vital power to the States, when he said: “ Although this scheme of erecting the General Government the authority of the State Legislaturea has bee to] to the Federal establishment.it would seem as if many gentlemen still foster the dangerousidea." What had brou lit the Confederacy, then expiring, to its deal 3? It was the fact that it rested upon the Legislatures of the States; and the members of the Convention framing an instrument which should make a“ more perfect Union, ” placed this vital power where it should be. where it would be used for the maintenance of the Union; and did not confide itto the States which had just used it for the destruction of the Confederacy. Sir, I wish to project upon this House no new view. I desire to invoke no new rules of construction, but I am willing to be bound by those which prevail in all our courts, and in the courts of the land from which we derive our laws. They are most briefly and explicitly expressed by Blackstone, and from his pages I take my rules of construction: "The fairest and most rntional method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his lntentions at the time when the law was made. by signs most natural and probable and these signs are either the words.the context. subject matter, the edects and consequence, or the spirit and reasonof them all." Again: "There are 3 points to be considered in all remedial statutes" The Constitution, adopted as it was to cure the defects of the Articles of Confederation. may be regarded as a remedial statute. The old Constitution, the Articles of Confederation, had failed utterl to accomplish its purpose. new one was to e made to remedy its defects. “There are 3 points to be considered in th construction of all remedial statutes the old law. the mischief and the remedy; that is. how the common law stood at the making of the act.what the mischief was for which the common law did not provide and what remedy the Parliament had provided to cure this mischief." Binding myself by these rules of construction, I undertake to make good the doctrine that they who framed and adopted the Constitution of the U.S. did it to remedy the evil ofa. General Government depending upon the judgment caprice, or prejudices of the people ofeach oi the several States. The Confederacy had crumbled from its false foundation upward to its cap stone, and their object was to make a more perfect Union, one that would secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity till the last syllable of recorded time. Their purpose wasto escape from chaos and to create and perpetuate order. The Union for which they provided was to rest on the entire es of free men each the equal of others be ore the law, and was to be indivisible and indestructible. Next, sir, let me point you to the context. The Constitution provides that “the U.S shall guaranty to every State in this Union a RFG and the section to which I am referring gives congress the power to enforce the guarantee. If the ultimate power to regulate the suffrage for Representatives in Congress, and members of the most numerous branch of the bod that was to elect Senators had been left to each State to determine for itself, Congress could not have enforced this guaranty or prevented the estalr lishment of aristocracics or oligarchies. The members of that Convention had suffered for the want of an adequate and eflicient General Government. They had endeavored to administer the Government of the Confederation, and had found it utterly incapable of mainten once. Government for which they were providing with power to enforce every right, privilege, and immunity accorded to the people, and to guaranty a RFG to each State. Another duty which they laid upon the General Government springs from the provision that "The citizenspf each State shall be gntitled to all ggalscgm and immunities of citizens in the several In this connection, on a former occasion. I illustrated the necessitv of congress possessing the control over the suffrage in The States to the extentI have indicated, which does not involve the question of electors of State, county, or municipal officers, by pointing to a bill then and now pending before the Legislature of “ recou structed” Virginia, which proposes that the privileges of citizenship shall be accorded to the citizen of any northern State only after a continuous residence of 5 years; and I said then, and repeat now, that it a State can disfranchise the citizens of other States who may settle within its limits for 5 years, it can disfranchise them for ten or 50 years, or any other term within the ordinary limits of the natural life of man. The disfronchised citizens of a democratic republican State would not be in the full enjoyment of “ all privileges and immunities of citizens." The framers of the Constitution provided against such possibilities by contiding to Congress control of the “manner of holding elections." The evils they sought to remedy required precisely the power which I assert was imported to Congress by the 4th section of the rst article of the Constitution. But I am not willing to let the question go to the country on my assertion, or the meager arm of authorities I have hitherto produced. "0 prove that the proposed amendment will but reinvigorate a primitive and essential power of the Constitution, I pass, sir, to an examination of the de bates in the several State conventions to which the draft of the Constitution was submitted for ratification. They exhibit most amply the broad construction which was given to the section to which I have referred by both the advocates and the opponents of the Constitution. They, in my judgment, establish be readquestion the fact that the members of the ed eral Convention, the members of each of the State conventions, and the enlightened people of the whole country knew that the power to determine the question as to who should be electors of all ltederal officers was vested, by the express language of the Constitutionfin Congress. Patrick Henry, in the Virginia convention, June 17, 1788, said: “Congress is to have a discretionary control ovu the time. place, and manner of elections. The Representatives are to be oleoted oonsequently when and where they please. As to the time and place. gentle inen have attemptedto obviate the objection y saying that the time is to happen once in two years and that the place is tobo within a particular district or in the respective counties. But how will they obviate the den or of referring the mannerof election to Congress? lliose illumtned gonii may see that this may not endangerthe rights of the people; but in my unenlightened understanding it a can plain and cleart at it will impair the popu ar weight in the Government. Look at the Roman history. They had 2 ways or voting the one by tribes and the other by centuries, By the former. numbers prevailed: in the latter. riches preponderatod. According to the mode prescribed.Congressmay tell you that they have a riglhtto make the vote of one gentleman go as far as to votes of 100 poor men. the pmr over the manner fld nllll of the moat dangerous lalihuie. They may modify it (I! they please. thry mayr egulate the number qau votes by the lqeuthaanlt“ityof pnrperty withod They therefore took care to arm tha In the same convention, June 14, 6 days later "Mr. Mason animadvorted on the control of congress over the elections; and wasproceedingto prove that it was dangerous, when he was calle to order by Mr. Nicholas tor departing from the clause under consideration. A desultory conversation and Mr. Mason was permitted to proceed. He wasof opinion that the control over elections tendedto destroy the responsibility. Ile declared he had endeavored to discover whether this power was really necessary or what was the necessity of vesting it. in the Government; but he could find no good reason for giving it. That the retuons suggested were. were that in case the States should refuse or neglect to make regulations regulations set by heyreshboeullilodnbeo preinweanstieodnf, from mak then the General Government should interpese." u In the same convention, Mr. Madison, June 1 4, 1788, said: “With respect to the time. place and manner of {ICCHODLI cannot.think. notwithstandin the appropensions of the honorable gentleman. that there is anydangcr. orif abuseshould take place. that there is not sufficient security. I all the people of the U.S. should be 3 tonoto electin oneplace the membersof the Government would be exccrated for the infamous regulation. Mnny would {0 to trample them under foot for their conduct. an they would he succeeded by men who would remove it. They wouldnot dare to meetthe universal hatred and detestatinn oi the people and run therisk of the certain dreadful consequences. We mustkeep within the compassof human probability. If a possibility be the cause of obJcgtion. we must object to every government in America. But the honorable gentleman may say that better guards may be provided. Let us consider the ObJOCHOD.The power of regulating the time. place, and manner of elections must be vested somewhere: It could not be fixed in the Constitution without involving great inconveniences. They could then have no authority to adjust the regulations to the changes of circumstances. the ques llmi their(a.whetherit oughtto befired unallerabl in the Sale mum“, or subject to the control the General Government. Is it notoboioiu that the General Government would be destroyed without this control?” I turn from Virginia to Massachusetts. On 2 days of January, 16 and 17, 1788, the debate ran on this question. In its progress"Mr. Pierce after reading the 4th section.wished to know the opinion of the gentlemen on it. as contress appeared thereby to have a power to regulate the llllll, place, and mannerof holding elections. In respect to the mapper. said Mr. Picree suppoee the Legislature of this State shonld preserihc that the choice of the Federal Representatives should bein the name manner as that of Governor a majority of all the votes in the State being necessaryto make it such and Congress shoulddeemit an improperman M and should order that it be as practiced in several of the southern States.where the highest number of votes make a choice; have they not power by thi“s sectionto do so? Mr. Bishop roseand observed that by the 4th lgctcoiiCongresswould be enabled to control the clect on of [Representatives It has been shid. says he, but this pspverwas given in order that refractory totes muybemade to do their duty." j, The Gentfrom Iowa [Mr. KASSON] and other members made that response to my suggestion, and I beg them to observe how Mr. Bishop answered it to the members of the Massachusetts convention: "But if so. sir. why was it not somentioned? If that was the intention. he asked why the clause did not run thus: the timcs. places and mannerof holding elections for Sens&Reps shall he prescribedin each StatebytheLegis atnre thereof; but.fnnp Stateshall neglect or refuseso to do congressmay. he. This. he said. would admit of no prevarication. I am.sags Mr. Bishop. forgiving Co asmuch power to do good as possble. It has been said. Mr. President that the condu of RhdIsland in recalling its delegatesfrom Congress, has demon, ntrated the ccessityof such a power beinglodged in congress. hniebeeninformed by people belongin to R iodoIsland, sir. that that Stato never hasrecalled her delegatesfrom Congress. I do not believe it has and I call upon the gentleman whomentioned it to aut“henticate the fact. on. Mr. Kiniilrosc and assured the convention thnt the State of RhdIsland did. by a.solemn res datmn. some time since. recall its delegates from, Co"npIrocns.s.Mr. Gnrmnn confirmed what Mr. King had Ilid and added that during the sessionof the Federal Convention. when 7 States only were rep presented in Congress application was made by 2 companiesfor the purchaseof lands the sale of which Would have sunk 7 or 8 million dollars of the continental debt and the most pressing letters were senton to RhdIsland to sendon its delegates. but that State refused. The consequence was the contract could not then be made. “Mr. Bishop confessed himself convinced of the fact. He proceededto observe that if the States shall.refnse to do their dut, then let the power be given 009. real to obligate them to do it. Ba! (flheytlu their M, easyit not to have the power to muncontrollod rercsciitation.aa omits aqmmylorrree om and both ytgisuelauns. t a avmoltmfflcznedwoemgwitvwertr:o5dw bonahhollhertuaot the yooniaary of this conO l are at on cud. But be trusted theywould never it and he felt a consolation from the reflect cn. Mr. Bishops assault upon Congress reminds me of certain recent utterances ofo like character. I am, however, happy in the consciousness that the people understand that executive assaults upon congress are in derogatiOn of their own rights. They recognize in the popular branch of Congress their own immediate Representatives, and will sustain it in resisting all eneroachments on their rights by whatsoever menaces they maybe attempted to be enforced.