Mr. FINCK. Mr. Speaker, the scene which has transpired in this. during its late session, occupying nearly 20 continuous hours, exhibits to the country and to the members of the House the fact that it is unwise for the majority to be illiberal or domineering to the minority in all legislative assemblies. If the gentleman in charge of this bill had been liberal enough to have allowed to this side of the House a reasonable time for discussion on yesterday, the scenes which we have witnessed during the night and morning, would not have been enacted in this Hall. This bill would have been disposed of. We should have had our usual sleep last night, and come here fresh this morning to discharge our duties. Mr. Speaker, what is this bill? It is a bill introduced from the ComJudiciary, one of a series of measures intended to invade the just jurisdiction of the SCOTUS and to subvert its just powers. This bill has not been printed; it was brought for the 1st time to the attention of the House on yesterday. From the moment of its introduction almost up to this time we have been employed in giving our attention to the session of this House, and so much so that I have been prevented by the labors of the session from making the preparation which is necessary in order to enable me to present my objections against this bill in such manner as I would desire. This bill in my judgment seeks to avoid and set aside the decision of the SCOTUS respecting the test oath as applied to attorneys and counselors of law in the courts of the U.S. It seeks to do that indirectly which by the decision of the Supreme Court cannot be done directly. It seeks to deprive men who are now in the exercise and enjoyment of the right to practice in the courts of the U.S. from the exercise of that right. This bill, if it shall be enacted into a law, will be expostfacto in its operations. What are the provisions of this bill? It provides that no person shall be permitted to act as attorney or counselor in any court of the U.S. who has been guilty of treason, bribery, murder, or other felony, or who has been engaged in rebellion against the Government of the U.S., or who has given aid, comfort, or encouragement to the enemies of the U.S. in armed hostility thereto. The provisions of this bill relating to “brib ery, murder, or other felony” are inserted for the purpose of covering the real intent and object of the bill. Its real purpose is doubt less to prevent men who have in any way encouraged the rebellion against the Government of the U.S., or held office in the civil or military service of the socalled confederate States, or given it aid and comfort in any manner, from practicing in the courts of the U.S. Now, in my opinion, you cannot in this way prevent a man who has been admitted to practice in the courts of the U.S. from the exercise and enjoyment of the rights of his profession in these courts. Take the case of exparte Garland, where the direct question was presented. Mr. Garland had held some office in the confederate States and could not therefore take the test oath. He had before that time been admitted as an attorney in the SCOTUS After the termination of the rebellion, or perhaps during its existence, he had been pardoned by the POTUS from any crime of which he may have been guilty in aiding the rebellion. He presented himself before the Supreme Court and asked to be allowed to practice in that court without taking the oath referred to. He was met by this oath provided by the law of 1865, the “test oath" as it is called, as applied to attorneys in U.S. courts. He and his counsel argued that that act was unconstitutional; that it sought to deprive him of the exercise of a right to which he was entitled by reason of having prior to that time been admitted to practice in the courts of the U.S.; and the court, on full argument and careful consideration, held, very properly, I think, that that oath was unconstitutional, that it was expostfacto in its operation, and sought to deprive a man of the enjoyment of the fruits of his profession as an attorney in that court. Mr. Speaker, this is not an act proposing to operate only in the future; but it operates upon persons who already are practitioners in that court; and it seeks to deprive them of the exercise of a right which belongs to the profession. The position of attorney or counselor is, it is true, considered as an officer of the court, but it is not such a political office as our laws recognize. Attorneys and counselors of law are officers designated by the courts to aid them in the administration of justice. They are the agents of the clients whose interests are brought into these courts, for the purpose of properly presenting them for adjudication. The Gentfrom Massachusetts, [Mr. Bottwei L] in adverting to the SCOTUS, said that if there were 5 judges in the highest tribunal of the land who had not sufficient self respect to enact rules and enforce regulations that would protect themselves from the foul contamination of conspirators and traitors, it was the duty of the legislative branch of the Government to do it for them. Now, with all deference to the Gentfrom Massachusetts, I think the Supreine Court is just as competent to protect itself and, maintain its self respect, as is the Gentfrom Massachusetts or the members of this body. Let me here advert to a consideration which I may not be able to take up so appropriately under any other branch of the argument. Political offenses have never boon regarded in the same light as the offenses of murder, bribery, &c., named in this bill. They have been recognized by every one as constituting a different class of offenses. Why, sir, it will be remem bered by you and by the members of this House that no is: than 12 or 13 years ago this Government sent across the ocean a vessel of the U.S., and was instrumental in procuring the release of Louis Kossuth from a rison in Turkey, brought him to . the U.S and made him the guest of the nation. What had Kossuth done?. He had tried to establish the independence of Hungary. He failed; and according to the laws of Austria he was liable to be arrested, tried, and convicted for treason. Yet he was received with the warmest demonstrations by the American people. But the majority of this House now seek to treat the people of the South, who are our countrymen, as public enemies, and deny to them the rights of citizens. Political offenses of the character referred to are not considered as affecting the moral character of the offender. Why, sir, let me put a case, and in referring to iIt trust I shall not be considered as departing from the legitimate line of debate. There is a distinguished gentleman of the State of Massachusetts, who has been elected to the 40th Congress as the successor of the gentleman [Mr. ALLEY] who is now the chairman of the comthe postoffice. This gentleman is a distinguished member of the bar, practicing in the SCOTUS ow, sir, I say that in my deliberate judgment 3/4ths of the lawyers of this country who have any distinction at the bar, and are looked upon as eminent in their professio, would prefer to appear in court as tshe porofessional associates of Alexander H. rather than with the gentleman to whom I refer. Sir, does the gentleman really desire to protect this great court from contamination? Why does he not go further? If he proposes to take under his control and supervision the character of this august tribunal, he might extend his benevolent and patriotic efforts somewhat further. I understand that at a public reception given in this city not more than a year ago by a man whose talents and energy, more perhaps than that of any other person, aided in bringing about the suppression of the rebellion I mean GenlGrant Alexander H. Stephens was an invited guest; and men on this floor, of both sides of the House, if I am not mistaken, were in attendance and took Mr. Stephens by the hand. Were these men contaminated? Was GenlGrant contaminated? Did he lose his position and standing as a patriotic and devoted citizen? No, sir; like a brave and gallant soldier he understands how noble it is to be generous and magnanimous to a defeated people who are a portion of our countrymen. A great and brave nation will always be generous to a fallen foe. Mr. Speaker, I do not make these compari sons for the purpose of exciting any bitter feeling. I merely advert to them for the purpose of showing that, in the estimation of the world and of Christian civilization, men who have been engaged in efforts to throw off the control of one Government and establish a new one, are not to be regarded in the same light with men who have been guilty of bribery, murder, or other high crimes. There always has been recognized a distinction between such crimes and political offenses. But why should not these men practice in the courts of the U.S.? The laws of the several States require the applicant to be a man of good moral character. You are not satisfied with such a rule as that. You propose to go much further. You now propose to pass a law the like of which we have never seen before, either in State or Federal legislation. The specification of bribery, mur der, or other felony embraced in this bill is only used for the purpose of covering up a design to prevent the citizens of the southern States from practicing in the courts of the U.S. You have shut the door against their representatives. You also propose to shut the door against those men in the South who may be elected to vote for President and VEEP. That is not fully up to the demands of aggressive radicalism, and we are to have this proposed loo and more in the same say that it is a part of that system of legislation so common here, which seems to have been conceived in a spirit of revenge and malignity. Mr. Speaker, the men who organized the rebellion no doubt have been guilty of a great crime. That, however, is a question which is to be determined by the courts in the method provided for in the Constitution. I have always denounced secession. I denounce it now. It was a great and fatal mistake on the part of the people of the States who went into the ji. It was a crime. But, sir, do you believe that 7 or 8 million people like ourselves, loving free government as we do, could have been inspired to take part in a common cause, to organize a government of their own unless they had confidence in the cause which they espoused? You say they were wrong. I know they were wrong. have always denounced the attempt to disrupt the union of these States. But Tsay that there was a belief existing in the minds of a great portion of the people of the southern States that a State ift a right to secede from the Union; and Isay, moreover, and charge it here without fear of contradiction, that leading men of the Republican party at the North encouraged this idea and encouraged the right of the southern States to withdraw from the Union. I suppose many of these people did really believe that they had a right to secede. You cannot look into the hearts of men and ascertain their belief., Sir, if they did in good faith believe in the right of secession the very essence of crime is absent, namely, the intention to commit it. They have, however, violated the Constitution and laws of the U.S., but you do not propose to punish the entire people of the South., The most unbounded malignity would hardly be equal to that. Your legislation shows that during the war you passed an act sanctioning the executive use of the pardoning power. He has issued pardons to almost the entire people of the southern States. In this he has acted like a wise and patriotic Chief Magistrate. Now, what is the effect of these pardons? Not only to relieve the party from3.: not only, as the Gentfrom Pennsylvania said last year, to take away the penalty and punishment of the crime; but, in the language of the books and there is no conflict about it to restore the pardoned man to the same position that he would have occupied had he never committed the offense. This is the law as plainly shown in both the English and American authorities. Blackstone says: “A pardon may be pleaded in bar as at once destroying the end and purpose of the indictment, by remitting, the punishment which the prosecution is calculated to inflict. The effect of such a pardon by the king is to make the offender a new man; to acquit him of o all corporal punishment and forfeit annexed to that offensefor which he obtains his pardon. This power of pardoning by the President, as has very justly been decided by the SCOTUS, may be exercised before the trial and conviction or after such trial and conviction. The pardoning power is an executive power; it is a plenary power, restricted only by certain limitations fixed by the Constitution of the U.S. itself. But you seek by . legislation to utterly ignore the effect of these pardons. Take the case of a citizen of the State of NCarolina a citizen of that State, and a lawyer practicing his profession. He did not aid in originating the rebellion; but in the progress of the war he may have accepted some civil or military office of the socalled confederate States The rebellion was overthrown, and those States have again become entitled to have their practical relations with the Federal Government fully restored. Their citizens always were and today continue to be citizens of the U.S. Is that man who has been Eardo.neid,whose character is pure and unexcept that he may have held some office under one of the States of the socalled confederacy, to be deprived and his family deprived of his just earnings in the courts of the U.S.? Sir, I cannot dwell upon this point, for I do not desire to trespass long upon the attention of the House. But it seems to me that tthiliisty legislation was conceived in a spirit of hos to the people of the South. Who are these people of the South? They are the sons and daughters, and the children of the sons and daughters of the men who fought side by side with our fathers to achieve our independence and establish our Government. They are our brethren. You and I and our children who are to come after us for generations are to live with these people under a common government, and unite in fidelity and support to the Constitution of the U.S. Is it the part of wisdom for us to interpose obstacles to those friendly relations which ought to exist between all the citizens of the States? Mr. Speaker, one or 2 other words and I will have said all I intend to say on this subject. I do not say it out of any disrespect personally to any gentleman upon this floor, but I say it nevertherless as my deliberate judgment, that the principles of the party in power and controlling the legislative dept of the Government are not in conformity with the principles of our Constitution and frame of Government; and in order that they may successfully establish the principles for which they are contending today they are compelled to change our Constitution and to invade the just jurisdiction and prerogatives of the executive and judiciary. That is the reason why we find these measures trenching upon these different depts of the Government. Sir, a free government like this can only be maintained by maintaining the just powers of each dept of the Government. The great danger is to day, as it has always been, that this, the more popular branch of the Government, will invade and usurp the rights which belong to the other depts of the Government. You see these things already in the proposed measures in this House. That august tribunal to whom the people have always looked with reverence and respect and confidence; that tribunal which is to A. as the last resort the great controver sies growing out of our system of Government between the States and the people of the different States, and to construe and apply the great principles of our Government; that supreme tribunal is attacked, and why? Because it has been faithful while others have been faithless; because it has had the manhood and independence to rise above mere partisanship and to vindicate the great principles of the Constitution of our fathers. I trust that the Supreme Court will not be invaded by the proposed legislation of Congress. I trust it will be left as it was organized by our fathers, to exercise the jurisdiction and powers conferred upon it by the Constitution and laws of the U.S. I believe while that court does exercise and discharge these duties faithfully, if this bill be passed, it will hold, as it held in reference to the test oath, that it is unconstitutional.