Mr. HOWE. My friend says he has not been confirmed yet. I had come to think of him as a real character, and to respect him very much as I respect all the rest of the office holders. The PostMGenl, I say, is no more aid to the President in executing the laws than is every deputy postmaster. And if it be necessary that the B.should have this power of summary removal to secure prompt obedience, then you ought to give him this power not merely over the principal officers, but you ought to give him this power over all the officers. You ought not to concur with the House in the amendment they have made; and you ought to rescind the j consider the vote which you have taken, and leave this power in the hands of the President over every one of these offices. But I stand here to deny that any such power is necessary. I stand here to deny that that power is ever exerted for any such purpose. No, I will not go so far as to deny that it is ever exerted for that purpose. Some men may have been removed, undoubtedly have been removed, from office for a neglect of duty; but while one officer has been removed for neglect of duty a,000 and 10,000 faithful men have been removed from office who had neglected no duty in the world. This power of summary removal is not employed for the purpose of regulating official conduct; it is employed and used the Senate, the American people, the world, God knows for the purpose of regulating official opinion. Mr. President, you do not clothe the general in the field with the power summarily to dismiss from his commission any subordinate of his. Is it not as essential to the success of the battle that the general should have prompt obedience on the part of every one of his subordinates as it is that the President should have thus prompt obedience on the part of his subordinates? No man will deny it. Why do you clothe the President with this most extraordiyou have enacted, renary and monstrous demoralizing power, and withhold it from the general intrusted with the fate of armies as well as of nations, and who needs it so much more? That is not the reason why the power is given to him. It is not the purpose for which it is employed. Mr. President, in many of the States, in the State in which I live, I believe that every officer of the State, with the exception of nota ries public, is elected by the people of the State or by the people of the locality, elected for a specified term, and during that term he cannot be dismissed from that employment except upon a sort of impeachment, not an impeachment before the Senate, but an impeachment before the Executive of the State, just such an impeachment, as your bill provides for leaving in the hands of the POTUS, and which is abundant for the purpose of securing official good conduct. It was intimated the other day, if not as serted, that this amendment of the HoRep was Pressed upon us, it was intimated that I Pressed it, because of the Present anomalous condition of affairs, and I was reminded that it might not always be so, that it was not reasonable to suppose that the Present POTUS would always be President. I said then, and I wish to repeat now, that my advocacy of this provision is not grounded at all upon the fact that I do not accord with the policy or the conduct of the Present POTUS Let who may be President, I should still say this was the true rule; I should still. you could not have the best and most efficient public service while political opinions instead oft public service is the criterion of fit;ness for office. Our Present position is indeed peculiar. The President is of one way of thinking, the Senate is of another way of thinking; but suppose that in 1868, as no doubt will be the case, the American people shall put into the Presidential chair a man in accord with you. The President then elected, although he will have in the statute the authority to remove summarily without the consent. the Senate, will never do it, and you know it. Practically he will not have the power; nominally he will. A President whose friends control the Senate will never undertake to remove an officer without the consent of the Senate. It never is done where the President and the Senate are in accord with each other. When, therefore, you get, as you will, a President in harmony with the American Congress, and in harmony with the American people, this statutory power, for which the Senfrom Vermont contends, will be of no practical use whatever, because it will not be exercised. But suppose, against all rational probabili ties, that at the election of 1868, 1872, or 1876 I think that it is best to postpone it a great while suppose that in the course of time the condition of parties should be reversed, and suppose it should happen that the Senfrom Vermont should find a Senate here opposed to him and a President in harmony with him. Then perhaps he thinks he would like to have a President for partisan purposes clothed with this power of summary removal. If he thinks so, I think he is mistaken.