Mr. MORRILL. I have been arguing since I got up that that commerce which was among the States was within the power of Congress; but I am combating the doctrine that by force of the power to regulate commerce among the States you can enter a State and take possession of its roads. The proposition of tiis bill is to authorize a road constructed by NewJersey, entirel within its limits and jurisdiction. to exten itself beyond the limits of its charter, and outside of the limits and jurisdiction of NewJersey. On that question I maintain the authorities are all the other way; and the authority which I am reading recognizes the doctrine of commerce among the States and commerce in the States and pure y of the States, over which Congress has no power whatever, and the commentator specifies turnpike roads and ferries as among the roads over which Congress has no control. But further he says: “The court construed the word regulnto to imply full powdr over the thing to be regulated and to exclude the actions of all others that would perform the sameoperation on the samething." Further, and bearing on the same point, I read from the same authority: w”, “Inspectionlaws, quarantine laws, and hcalthlawl. aswell as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, are comonent parts of the immensemass of residuary State ogislation, and over which congresshasnodirect power.though it may becontrolled when itndirectly interferes with their acknowledged powers. Thus I think, Mr. President, I am maintained by this authority in raising the distinction which I have stated. I acknowledge the right of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and commerce among the States; but when it comes to the jurisdiction of the States and undertakes to make a railroad in a State or control those which have been constructed within the limits and jurisdiction of the State, and by its authority, its jurisdiction ceases. Sir, this is not an open question. If there is anything concluded, this question is concluded. Not only has it been concluded by the general teachin of those who made the Constitution of the U.S.; not only has it been concluded by 50 years of legislation on this subject, denying all the powers which are now claimed to be exercised, but it has been expressly adjudicated by the courts and specific ally determined by the courts, that the congress of the U.S. has no such power. In referred the honorable Senator, the other day, to the case of the Blackbird creek. I suppose he has become very familiar with the report of that case before this time. That is in the same direction. I have now to add an authority which was not at hand on that occasion, which is explicit and specific on this very question of, the right to make railways in the several States. I read from the case. Veazie 0itil. vs. Moor. in 14 Howard. page 678. which was a case arising on the internal waters of the State of Maine, where precisely this question was raised. The river enobse ot is a navigable river up to a certain point, and there the navigation which was open to the sea was obstructed by the falls of the river. Above that for many miles it was still navigable, an imperfect navigation. The Legislature of the State of Maine granted the exclusive right to navigate the river above those falls to A. B, and C for a term of years. Those who maintained the doctrine of the honorable Senfrom Michigan contended that the right of Congress to regulate navigation upon that river was exclusive, that the State could not interfere, and that its legislation therefore was unconstitutional. The court of my State decided that, although that river was navigable above the falls, the navigation to the sea having been interrupted by the falls, it became internalnavigation and the commerce upon it internal. Those who entertained different opinions, oiinions in harmony with those of the honorii Ie Senator apparently. brought the case here. The SCOTUS sustained the opinion of the court of my State, saying that that navigation was internal and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State; that the Government of the U.S. had no control and no authority over it by virtue of that provision of the Constitution. In set thng that case, in limitation of the authority of the General Government over this question, they touch upon this precise point ofinterfering With the railways of the several States. They say: “Commercewith foreign nationsmustsignify commerce which i n some sensejs necessarilyconnected with thesenations. transactions whicheither imme diately or uts ome stage of their progress must be extraterritorial. The phrase can never be applied to transactions wholly internal betweencitizens of the same community or to a polity and laws whose ends and purposes and o cratinns are restrictedto the territo and soilan jurisdiction of such community or can it be properly concluded. that because the products of domestic enterprisein agriculture or manufacturcs, mm the arts, mayultimately become the subjects of foreign commerce. that the control of the means or the oncourazements by which enterprise is fostered and protected, is legitimately owritfhmiiirly the import of the phraseforeign commerce. implied in any investiture of the power to regulate such commerce. A pretension asfar roach iuii as this would extend to contracts between citizen and ClllZClloftho same State. wouldeontrol the pursuits of the planter. the grainer, the manufacturer, the mechanic.the immense operationsof the collicr, ics and mines and furnaccsp the countr; for there is not one of these evocations.tho resu is of which may not becomethe subjects of foreign commerce, and be borne either by turnpikcs. canals or railroads. from point to oint Within the several States toward an ultimate estination like the one abovementioned. such a pretensionwould effectuallyprevent or paralyze internal improvement by the severalStates; for it cannot besupposed that the States would exhaust their capital and their credit in the construction of turnpikcs, canals, and railroads. the remuneration derivable fromwhich, and all control over which. might be immediately wrcsh d from them because such public works would be facilities for a commerce which. While nvniling iatlstehlofouig those facilities. wasunquestionably i nterniil. intermediately or ultimately it might become foreign." Here, Mr. President, you find that in set thng this question the Supreme Court, by way of illustrating the importance of the principle, and by way of combating the very doctrine contended iOl.lll that case, say explicitly that it would be ruine us and an unauthorized application of the principle to say that because the products carriedoyer the roads might ultimately reach an adjoming State or a portion of the country, therefore the Government of the U.S. might interpose for the construction or regulation of railways within the several States. The court continue, and I beg the honorable Senators attention to this language: “ The rule hero givenwith respect othercizulation of foreign commerce equally excludes from the regulation of commerce between the States and the Indian tribes the control over tumpikcs. canals or rail reoxaedluss.oivretly charm and deepening of watercourses within to States or the managinent of the transportation upon and by means of such improvements.” I ask the honorable Senfrom Wisconsin whether he recognizes the soundness of that doctrine. I understood him to say on a former occasion that he had not any doubt of the power of the General Government to construct railroads through the several States, and also to regulate the rates of fares and freights upon those railways; but the court in this case explicitly say that the power to regulate commerce among the States does not admit of an interference with turnpikes, canals, or railroads in the several States.