Mr. SHELLABARGER.Mr. Speaker, since I soughtthe floor, by requesting the Gentfrom Pennsylvania to yield to me, I do not know but that my entire motive for seeking the floor has been taken away by the fact that the remarks just made by my colleague [Mr. Senexex] present in effect preciseiy the same legal propositions I intende to suggest to the House; and, besides, the proposnion I designed to maintain seems now to be conceded on both sides of the House. What I designed to maintain was that the right and the duty of this House to execute its order of re rimand did not, in any degree, depend upon t ie question which has been so long deated today, whether the Gentfrom Kentucky is now anylongeramernber of thisbody. Mr.Speaker, that question really has nothing to o with the question of the power or the right of this House to execute its order of reprimand. A very little reflection upon the source and nature of this power and jurisdiction of the House will show this clearly. Whence does this House derive its power to punish this or another breach of its privileges? “ It is remar able, " says Justice Story, “that no power is conferred to punish for any contempts committed against either House.” (1 Story on Constitution, section 845.) Neither, sir, is there any act of Congress giving us power to inflict any punishment in this case. The jurisdiction in this case and in all others like it, is wholly a common law jurisdiction. The same learned author (Story) says: "By the common law the power to punish contempts of this nature belong}!iIncidentally to the courtsof justice and to each once of Parliament. No man over doubted or denied its existencenote our colonial Assemblies in general.whatever may have been thought as to particular OXUI‘CISUS'OflL NO! is the power to be viewed in an unfavorable ht. It is a privilege not of the membersof either house. but, like all other privdeges of Congress. mainly intendedal apriv1legeof the people and for their benefit." He adds: "A power in the supreme courts of iustice to Inp press such contuuipts&o., resultsfrom the 1st principles of ju'licial establishments, andmust be an in Ieparable attendant upon everysuperior tribunal." And the same reasoning has been applied with equal force by another learned commenta tor to legislative bodies. “ It would, " he says, “be inconsistent with the nature of such a body to deny it the power of protecting itself from injury or insult. If its deliberations are not rfeclly free its constituents are eventually injured. The legislative body is the proper and exclusive forum to decide when the contempt existed and when there was a breach of its privileges; and that the power to punish followed as a necessary incident of the power to take comizance of the offense." I have ailuded thus fully to the nature and source of this jurisdiction and power of congress to punish for breaches of its privileges as a preparatory statement to the proposition now state, to wit, that the right of this House to inflict upon any delinquent an punishment whatever does not at al depen upon I nor grow out of his being a member or an officer of this House; nor out of his being therefore or thereby made amenable to its jurisdiction; but the jurisdiction in every case of punishment, whether by reprimand or otherwise, comes from this incidental power of the House to punish every man, whether member, officer, or citizen, who has violated its privileges. When the Gentfrom Kentucky Mr. Roussium] called the member from owa [Mia GIUNXELL] to account for words a ok‘en in debate, this act made him amena bIe to the jurisdiction and punishment of this House; and it was not at all the fact that he was a member of Congress that so subjected him to ourjurisdiction and reprimand. Being a member, doubtless, is a circumstance to be considered in affixing the punishment; but it has nothing whatever to do with our right ori ginally to pronounce the order of censure which the House has pronounced, nor with our right now to execute it. That order and its execution are both alike directed against a man, a delinquent, one who has calleda member to accountfor words spoken in debate and is not directed against anybody because he is a member of Congress. What gives the jurisdiction is that the delinquent has come near enough to' this body to violate its privileges. He who does that, wherever he may be and whatever may be the act of violation, is near enough to tiis House to be subject to its arrest and punishment, and this, too, whether he be officer, member, or citizen; and the punishment which be is subject to, whether member or citizen, is that one which the House may affix in its discretion.Mr. Speaker. the reprimand is not a punishment confined either by its nature or by the practice of this House to those who are mom ers. Anybody who is a delinquent, subject to the punishment of the House, may be repri manded. So on have it laid down in the Manual of the tulcs of this House, page 155. This House has again and again reprimanded men who were not members. This was done in the 15th Congress in the case of one not a member of Congress.