Mr. BLAINE. Since the beginning of the present session, Mr. Chairman, we have had kneel propositions to amend the Federal constitution with respect to the basis of representation in Congress. These propositions have differed somewhat in phrase, but they all embrace substantially the one idea of making suffrage instead of population the basis of a iportioning Representatives; or in other wor s, to give to the States in future a rercsentation proportioned to their voters instca of the inhabltants. The effect contemplated and intended by this change is perfectly well understood, and on all hands frankly avowed. It is to deprive the lately rebellious States of the unfair advantage of a large representation in this House, based on their colored population, so long as that population shall be denied political rights by the legislation of those States. The proposed constitutional amendment would simply say to those States, while you refuse to enfranc ise your black population you shall have no Representation based on their numbers; but admit them to civil and political rights and they shall at once be counted to your advantage in the apportionment of rercsentatives. The direct object t us aimed at, as it respects the rebellious States, has been so generally approved that little thought seems to have been given to the incidental evils which the proposed constitutional amendment would in ict on a large portion of the loyal Statesevils, in my judgment, so serious and alarming as to lead me to oppose the amendment in any form in which it has yet been presented. As an abstract proposition no one will deny that population ist e true basis of representation; for women, children, and other non-voting classes may have as vital an interest in the legislation of the country as those who actually deposit the ballot. Indeed the very amendment we are discussing implies that poulation is the true basis inasmuch as the axe usion of the black peopic of the South from political rights has suggested thisindirectly coercive mode of securing them those rights. Were the negroes to be enfranchised throughout the South today, no one would insit on the adoption of this amendm ent; and yet. if the amendment shall be in corporated in the Federal constitution its incidental evils will abide in the loyal States long after the direct evil which it aims to cure may have been eradicated in the southern States. If voters instead of population shall be made the basis of representation certain results will follow, not mi; appreciated perhaps by some who are now ur cut for the change. I will confine my examination of these results to the 19 free States whose statistics are presented in the census of 1860; and the very radical change which the new basis of representation won d produce among and between those States forms the ground ot my opposition to it. The ratio of voters to population differs very widely in different sections, varying in the States referred to from a minimum of 19%. to a maximum of 58%, and the changes which this fact would work in the relative representation of certain States would be monstrous. For example, California has a population of 358, 110, and Vermont 314, 869, and each has 3 Representatives on this floor today . But California has 207,000 voters and Vermont has 87,000. Assuming votersas the basis of aportionment, and allowing to Vermont 3 Representatives, California would be entitled to 8. The great State of Ohio, with nearly 7 times the population of California, would have but little more than 2 and a half times the number of Representatives; and NewYork, with quite 11 times the population of California, would have in the new style of a portionment less than 5 times as many members of this House. California it may be said presents an extreme case, but no more so than will continually recur for the next century under the stimulus to the emigration of oung voters from the older States to the invit in fields of the Mississippi valley and the pay ci e slope. But cases less extreme than California will present quite as clearly the injurious working of the proposed change. Take 2 States one I in the East and one in the West not greatly 1 differin in aggregate population, for example, i Massac usetts and Indiana the former with, 1, 221, 432 inhabitants, the latter with 1, 328, 710. Massachusetts has today ten Representatives on this floor and Indiana has 11, an exactly fair apportionment. But Massachusetts has only 227, 429 voters, while Indiana has 316, 824, and therefore on the new basis, if Massachusetts should retain her ten Representatives Indiana would be allowed about 15, and if Indiana should be confined to her 11 Massachusetts would be reduced to 7 and I might udduce many other instances showing the gross inequalities of representation to which the proposed amendment would subject the loyal States.