Mr. RAYMOND. In other portions of this precis Mr. Dana extends the consideration of the subject generally, and says that the court did not decide at all that these people were political enemies. It is claimed here that the rebel States have forfeited their rights under the constitution; and that on the ground offorfeiture they have ceased to have any rights under the constitution of the U.S. As I said the other day, that is a novel doctrine to me. I do not know how States can thus forfeit their rights unless they can discard their obligations also. They certainly cannot do it outside of the constitution, and there is no provision in the constitution under which the can do it. The have not done it by the law o nations. We have not been wagin a war of conquest ainstthem, and have not so ieved any such shijution as gives us such power or puts them absolutely at our mercy. As understand it, we have acquired no eater power over them by our victory ever terebellion than we had before the rebellion broke 488 January out. We put down the rebellion, we crushed the usurpation, we expelled or overpowered the usurpers, we cleare the rebel States of all authority and all force that resisted and remdered impossible the execution of the laws of the U.S. When that was done we were done, and the States remained as they were before. We certainly did not conquer them in any sense of subjugation to anything else than the constitution and law of the U.S. Moreover I find in the constitution no provision for the forfeiture of State rights. I find there no provision for punishing States. I find provision for punishing individuals for treason, but none for punishing States. I made in this connection a remark a few days ago, that the constitution generally dealt with individuals and not with States; that there were but few cases in which it dealt with States at all. The Gentfrom Ohio, [Mr. SHELLA nanonsfi in somewhat eager haste, I thought, to avail himself of what he might well enough have supposed to be a mere Iapsus on my part in the use oflanguage, paraded before the House an array of aboiit 50 cases in which the constitution does deal directly with States; and he asserted in broad terms that the “ability to read the Englishlanguage" oughtto have preserved me from making such a mistake as that. Well, sir, I did not ta ethat in ill part at all. Itwas a part of the gentlemans rhetoric. He had a perfect right to resort to it. It was not the only case in which he did so, though, perhaps, it was the only case in which he did it with so direct a personal application to myself. ut, sir, I repeat, with a full knowledge of the word as I used it then, that so far as inflicting punishment is concerned the constitution deals with individuals, and not with States. It does deny the right of States to do certain things to make treaties, issue letters of marque and eprisal, &c. but it provides no punishment or States, if they violate those injunctions except the simple penalty of rendering null and void eve thing that they thus do in violation of those proibitions. I knew, when I made that statement, that I was not originatin any new doctrine. I remembered that Danie Webster, in one of his able and strikiu relies to hit. Calhoun, took the same grouu that the Censtitution deals mainly with States and I knew that in that case he quoted from older and perhaps higher authorities, if there could behigher authority than his own upon that or any other point of constitutional aw. I remembered that Oliver Ellsworth, in urging upon Connecti cut the adoptionof the constitution, declared exlicilly that its eat peculiarity was that it dealt with individuals and not with States. I remembered that Mr. Samuel Johnson, the famous lawyer of the same State, made substantially the same statement and I remembered also that Daniel Webster quoted them both when he concurred in their opinion, and said that "The constitution was adoptedthat theremight be a Government which should act Vdircctl on individ uls without borrowing aid from the tale governmentnts.” I thought, sir, thatI should not be in very bad company when I propouuded so simple a proposition; and Itink today that i the ability to read the English language” should have protected me from falling into error, it should have protected them also.