Mr. SHERMAN. I do not desire to enter into any debate on the general question of the power of Congress to regulate the tenure of office. I have already shown by my votes that I am of the opinion that Congress has the power to regulate the tenure of office and legislate in regard to removals from office. The Constitution does not in exPress terms confer upon anyone the power of removal from office. The President has power to appoint to office, and the Senate has power to advise and consent to his appointments; but no exPress power is given to the President to remove persons from office. This power must necessarily exist in some dept of the Government, and it was very natural at the beginning of the government that the power should be exercised by the President, ic that that should be acquiesced in from time to time. All that can be said about it is that the different depts of the Government have acquiesced in the exercise of the power by the President; but I think it has never been successfully denied that Congress may regulate the power of removal, as it may very many other functions of the Executive. As this bill is based upon the right of Congress to legislate in controlling and regulating the power of removal, I have no doubt of the constitutional power of Congress to pass such a bill as this. Nor have I any doubt that Congress may include within the provisions of this bill the Cabinet officers. It is, therefore, with me, not a question of constitutional law, but a question. propriety; and the question resolves itself into this: will Congress by law prevent the President from having a Cabinet of his own choice? If this amendment be made and the bill passes in that shape, the result will be that when a President goes out of office, the Cabinet officers of his predecessor will be continued; the incoming President will be compelled to go on with the same Cabinet officers unless the senate concur with him in their removal. suppose that by a violent change of public opinion, as may often occur in this country, a POTUS is elected who represents the great body of the people, and the Senate remain of the old opinions, the Senate being a very conservative body, very seldom changing, or changing only by slow degrees. Suppose the Senate should refuse to obey the voice of the people and allow a President selected by the people to have a Cabinet of his own choice through whom and by whom alone he could perform the functions of his office. Suppose that some Cabinet minister under the old Administration should hang on to his office. It is hardly a probable supposition, I admit, because I do not see how any gentlemen could do it, or how any man could hold an office of that kind against the will and wish of his chief; but yet if we adopt the amendment of the House, and pass the bill in that shape, we compel the President to retain in office a man who is required to perform executive functions, under him against his will, simply because the law forbids him from removing such an officer, and because the incumbent has not courtesy enough or has not sufficient deference to the public will to retire from his office. In other words, we are called upon to legislate to continue a man in office against the will of the people and against the will of his own chief. Mr. President, I am not prepared to cast such a vote. I have no i.i. whatever that the Cabinet officers ought to retire with the President, and the Cabinet officers ought to have harmonious relations, personal and political, with the POTUS The executive office is a unit, and must neces. sarily be so. All the heads of Depts must conform to the wishes of the President in a great measure. He must have power and control over them. It is impossible to divide the executive authority. The same reasoning does not apply to the mine r officers, because they are merely subordinate agents, and whether they agree with the President in political opinion or not is a matter of perfect indifference. In England when a change of administration occurs every member of the Cabinet, as a matter of course, tenders his resignation; new combinations and formations are made; but all the mine r officers are retained. When there is a change of Cabinet ministry in England the subordinate offices are not affected. If this bill is intended to prevent a whole sale removal of officers for political opinions I think it a wise measure and it ought to be. it ought to be voted for regardless of the political divisions that now separate the Senate from the President. It is a wise measurefor all time. It ought to have been passed, and probably would have been passed long ago, if a similar condition of affairs had existed before. But when you propose to extend that principle to Cabinet offices a very different state of facts arises and different considerations apply to the subject. Now, I say that if a Cabinet officer should attempt to hold his office for a moment beyond the time when he retains the entire confidence of the President I would not vote to retain him, nor would I compel a President to have about him in these high positions a man in whom he did not entirely trust, both personally and politically. It would be unwise to require him to administer the Government without agents of his own choosing. It seems to me, therefore, that it would be unwise for the Senate toingraft in this bill a provision that would enable a Cabinet officer to old on to his office in violation of the will of his chief. No harm can result from leaving out such a clause, because if the President appoints an unfit man, sends his name to the Senate, the Senate can reject it. Suppose the personal relations between a Cabinet officer and the President become unpleasant so that they can have no social intercourse. The Senfrom Wisconsin says in such a case as t.hat the Cabinet officer would resign; but sup he would not resign, suppose he should old on to his power and to position, what then? There is nobody to remove him, no power to remove him; the President cannot remove him, and yet he can have no intercourse with him. Would you compel such a state of affairs? It seems to me that it would be unwise to do so. There is no public exigency requiring such a rule. What is a Cabinet officer after all? The President's mere clerk, because, although these cabinet officers are considered as high officers of the Government, they are the mere clerks or recording agents of the President, having scarcely any power except that which is given to them as a part of the executive authority. It seems to me that when there is any unpleasant relation, any unpleasant differences arising between the President and anyone of these officers he ought to have the power to discharge him. I would as soon think of imposing upon the President a Private Secretary with whom he had no kindly relations, personal and political, as to impose upon him a Cabinet minister with whom his relations were not kind. If, however, he sees proper to remove any of these officers and undertakes to appoint an unfit man the Senate have ample power over the subject. If the name of a person is sent here that is not entirely acceptable to the Senate we have the power to reject him and the President cannot fill the office until we are with him, so that there is no exigency that can arise for the passage of such a bill as this would be with the House amendment. Therefore, while I am willing to regulate the tenure of office to prevent if possible the whole. sale removal of officers at every change of the executive dept, while I am willing by some strict law to keep in office men who have had experience and shown their fidelity, until they are removed for cause, I am not willing to extend that to the Cabinet ministers, from the very nature of whose office the power over them must be absolute. The power to separate the relations between them and the President must exist. Any gentleman fit to be a Cabinet minister, who receives an intimation from his chief that his longer continuance in that office is unpleasant to him, would necessarily resign. If he did not resign it would show that he was unfit to be there. I cannot imagine a case where a Cabinet officer would hold on to his place in defiance and against the wishes of his chief; and if such a case should occur I certainly would not by any extraordinary or or dinary legislation protect him in that office and enable him to hold on to the office in defiance of what would be regarded in every constitutional Government as the proper rule, namely, to retire when he separates or differs in opinion from his chief. My friendfrom Missouri [Mr. HeNDERson] suggests to me a case: suppose the southern men had not gone out at the beginning of the war; they itheir party would have had a majority in the Senate of the U.S. Suppose Mr. Lincoln could not have removed the Cabinet ministers who were then around him, that they could hold their offices in spite of him, that there was no power in him to remove them. That is precisely the case that is here provided for. It is a case which might have actually occurred in that instance. But for the withdrawal of the southern members from their seats in the Senate Chamber the Senate under the operation of a bill like this could have compelled the new President, Mr. Lincoln, to administer this Government with the agents his predecessor had around him, some of whom not very long before had act ually been conspiring against the Government they were sworn to support. This is a pretty strong statement, but it is a case that might have arisen. Take the case that may arise at the end of the Present Administration. Suppose the President at the end of his term should go out of office and the people of the U.S. should, as we hope they will, elect some man in whom they have entire confidence; would you by this law enable the Senate of the U.S. to keep in office all the Present heads of Depts? My friendfrom Wisconsin will say oh! no; that is not a supposable case because the Senate is all right. sir, we are legislating for the future. It will not do for us to legislate merely for the condition of affairs that now surrounds us. The case may be different when all the States are represented and are back here, as they probably will be before the next Presidential election, when they are all rePresented on this floor by 2 Senators from each State. Suppose then, under the operations of this law, the voice of the people should not be heard then, and the Present Cabinet should be kept in power, Senators would feel that this law did not operate very well then. There is no public exigency requiring an exercise of power like this; nor do I believe, although perhaps it is going out of the rec ord, that subject was so fully considered in the HoRep as to give to the small vote that concurred in the passage of this amendment the force that I am always willing to give to the judgment of a coordinate branch of the Government.