Mr. SHERMAN. Still the honorable Senator talked about a violation of the Constitution, about being on the brink of a precipice, about revolution, and so on. Now, sir, what has Congress done on this whole question of appointments? Nothing. We here, Senators elected by the Legislatures of the States, have seen men who voted for the present POTUS, who were responsible for his election, turned out of office, and persons who have been opposed to us during the whole war put in their places. Have we grumbled or whined about it all? I have not seen any evidence of that kind. We simply [.]". by this bill to protect men who have been legally appointed to office in the enjoyment of their offices until the concurrent powers demanded by the Constitution concur in the selection of some one else. That is all there is about it. The President, on the other hand, removes without our consent the officers of the Government who are now familiar with their duties, in utter disregard of the interests of the Government, puts in men totally inex perienced to administer your financial affairs, jeopardizing your financial interests and all the material interests of the Government. Now, because we seek to resist his appointments of men to office without the sanction of the Senate, we are threatened with a revolution and with being on the brink of a precipice, &c. I do not think we fear these things, nor do I think the American people fear them. On the contrary, I have no doubt that our constituents are far more determined, far more bitter, far more violent in their unyielding determination to resist these unconstitutional aggressions by the executive authority than cio of us can be or will be. Now, in regard to the pending amendment for this extraordinary speech of my friendfrom Pennsylvania has grown out of a simple amendment I can feel the force of the reasoning of the Senfrom Indiana, that where the Senate and the President fail to agreethere ought to be some way of filling the various offices in the Government that the mere political or personal disagreement between these 2 constitutional powers that must concur in making an officer ought not to leave the office vacant, because if the office was vacant perhaps the Government would suffer in various ways. It might be unrepresented at a foreign court; it might not have a collector or an assessor; it might not have officers who are indispensably necessary. I might put the case of a single officer, a vacancy in whose office would prevent the payment of any money from the Treasury of the U.S. No money can be paid from the Treasury without the concurrence of 2 or 3 officers, and if there was a vacancy in the office of Treasurer of the U.S. it would substantially suspend the whole financial operations of the Govern.ment. It is therefore obvious that we ought to be careful to guard against the possible contingency of a vacancy in office, and I have looked at this bill to see whether such a cononey could arise, but I cannot see that it will. By the 1st section of the bill, everybody now in office or who is appointed to an office for a fixed term is to hold his office until his successor shall be legally appointed and qualified. That is a principle contained in the constitutions of o the States, and usually in all the laws that we have any control over. To avoid the danger of a vacancy in an office we provide that the old officer shall continue in office until his successor is appointed. It is a provision in almost every act of incorporation. The president and directors of a railroad company continue in office until their successors are appointed, so that if the time fixed by law for the election of officers passes by without the election taking place there is a provision made for the continuance of the corporate franchise. The 1st section of this bill makes that very provision, that the persons now holding office shall continue to discharge the duties of the offices until their successors are appointed and qualified . The 3rd section attempts to provide for a vacancy made by death, resignation of term of office, or other lawful cause. In such case there ought to be some mode of filling the offices. The law in almost all cases designates some one who shall fill the office of collector, for example, which the Senfrom Indiana put, in case the collector himself dies or the office otherwise becomes vacant. The law des ignates which of the deputy collectors shall fill the offices, and so of assessors, and so of nearly all officers of the Government. It is so now in the case of the Treasurer and the Register. The law wisely provides in such cases for a vice officer to perform the duties of the office, as in the case of the POTUS; so that there is no practical difficulty. The only question with me is whether if we strike out this clause the President may not, in violation of the spirit of this law and in violation of the Constitution itself, continue to reap officers whom we have rejected or j. old from us his nominations. Take the case that we have now before us: during the last recess, according to some reports submitted and laid on our table, there were 2,000 removals, and perhaps more than that number. Of those 2,000 cases of new nominations I doubt whether 100 have been reported to the Senate. Although it is our duty to pass upon all these nominations, up to this hour probably not 100 of them have been sent to the Senate.. Why are they delayed? Why were not all of those nominations sent to us on the 1st day of the session or within a reasonable period of time Why is the consideration of all this multitude of nominations postponed to the closing hours of this short session when every Senator knows that his hands and his mind will be occupied? Is it the purpose of the President to withhold the nominations from the Senate and thus to defeat this plain constitutional provision, and then, after we have adjourned and gone to our homes, to reappoint again the same men? If so, it is a violation of the spirit of the Constitution, for which he or any other man who does it ought to be punished. It is to prevent that very state of affairs that this provision is inserted, that in case the President does not send a nomination to the Senate, or intion, case the Senate rejects his nomi the office shall be vacant unless the law itself provides that somebody else shall fill the office. In 99 cases out of 100 the law does provide for some one else to fill the office. It is so in almost all the offices that I now think of, so that no practical difficulty could grow up. The only exception to this rule that I now think of is in the case of postmasters, who are appointed for a definite period; but in regard to nearly all the officers of the Treasury Dept and other branches of the Government the law itself designates who shall fill the offices in case of vacancies. If this amendment of the Senfrom Indiana prevails the result will be that the President will not send to us the nominations at all, or at least he may do so. We may fairly argue from the facts we have before us that he probably will do so, or that they will be sent at so late a period of the session that we shall not have time to consider them, and thus he will continue within himself the exercise of the appointing power in utter disregard of the Senate. Besides that, we know that in several cases he has appointed men who have been deliber ately rejected by the Senate after full and ample consideration. In the case of the postmaster at StLouis, a person who was rejected by the Senate was reappointed by the Presi.dent and now holds the office. In the case of a collector in Philadelphia, a man who receives and disburses large sums of money, his nom 'ination was brought before us and deliberately considered, not on political but on other grounds I may say that much at any rate the case was before the Senate for months, was deliberately considered, and the nomination was rejected.