Mr. SHERMAN. I hope my friend will not interrupt me further, because it is too hot fora conversational colloquy, and I do not think it is necessary. I want to meet directly and without equivocation the question that is made. I say the only question is, whether a tax on cot ton isa direct tax. If it is not a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution then the argument of the Senator falls. All the argument that he bases upon the extraordinary power of Congress to break down one State or one interest by improor taxes is inherent in the nature of things. havingthe fulland broad power of levingtaxcs, that includes the power of levying a heavier tax upon the productions or consumption ofone community andless upon those of another. That has been done since the foundation of the Government. The only question with us is whether a cotton tax is a direct tax. My own impression is, though that is a question which has not been decided by the Supreme Court, that a tax on cotton comes within the expressmcaning of “excise, ” within the technical meaning of the word “excise” under the English law. I find in a very good law book, Webster’s Dictionary. [laughter] this definition of “excise, ” and I think that as this is a legal technical term, the definition is legally and technically given: “The word ‘excise' includesany inland tax or impost laid on an article produced and consumedin a country, and also on licensesto deal in certain commoditics.” The word “customs” or “duties” has now a much more contracted signification than when the Constitution was framed. Under the English law the word “duties” is almost as broad as the word “taxes.” The word “taxes” is a broader term, covering all spe cies of levies u “ on the pen le, and the word duties" inclu cs nearly all: although in common parlance now we generally apply that word to duties on imported goo s, but. those are really “ imposts.’ The proper definition of the word “unpost” is a duty on imported goods; but we have by common use a plied the word “duties” to revenues collecte from imported goods, and the word “excises” or Htaxes" to inland revenue. When the constitution was framed the legal meaning of the word “duty” would include all excises and all taxes except a “ tux on land. The definition of dutyH given in Webster’s Dictionary is "that which u.person owes to another; that which a person is bound by any natural, moral, or legal obligation to pay, do, or perform; and further, “in the technical sense it is anything that is prescribed by law or by morals.’ Thatis the broad meaning of the word “ duty, ” and when applied to taxes it is any dut that is imposed by law, any legal duty. I think that the framers of the Constitution have used werds which cover this case. I think the word “ excise" will do; I think the word “duty” will do. The Supreme Court, however, declined to give a specific meaning to these words, stating that the word “ tax” certainlyincluded everything. You may say there was simply tautology in the use of words. Now, the question again recurs, whether a tax on cotton is a direct tax, and upon that point the SCOTUS have made as plain and palpable a decision as I think they have eVer made upon any question whatever. There were but 4 judges, it is true, upon the bench at the time, the Chief Justice not yet having taken his seat, but those four judges all concurred in the opinion. I do not wish now to read the whole of the decision. The substance of it is, that they regard the power of Congress to be plenary and absolute, with but the single exception I have named of adnty on exports. They then go on and define what is meant by the term “ direct tax." They draw a distinction between a direct tax and an indirect tax. They say that under the Constitution an indirect tax of any kind, shape, form, or manner that is not included within the words “imposts, duties, and excises" may be levied in any way that Congress may provide for; that whatever may be levied under the name of “duties, ” “iiiiposts, ” or “excises” must be levied by uniformity. but an indirect tax that is not included within those 3 words may be levied in any mode provided for by act of Congress. They then proceed to discuss what is a direct tax. In that case the question was about a tax on a carriage. If I were to say that anything in the world was a direct tax, I should be inclined to say that a direct tax was a tax upon accumulated property, that which a man had on hand. That would be our ordinary definition of the term "direct tax” a tax on a matter on hand, on personal property, on a horse, on carriages, on cotton, on all the various products which are on hand a completed fixed article of property. The ordinary meaning of the term “direct tax” would be a tax upon any kind of personal property; but the Supreme Court go on to show here that that was not the meaning of the framers of the Constitution. The meaning of the framers o“f the Constitution was to apply the term direct tax” simply to a poll tax and to a tax on land; and the only doubt, upon which my friendfrom Missouri hangs the whole of his argument, was a doubt which, fairly construed. works against him, and that is a doubt exressed b one of the judges, Judge Patterson, in giving is opinion. Judge Chase said, in the case alluded to, Hilton vs. The U.S., 3 “DIallas, 171: am inclined to think, but of this I do not give ajudieial opinion. that the dircettaxcs contemplated by the Constitution are only two. to wit. a capitation or poll tax simply. without regard to property, rofcssion or anyother circumstance; and a.tax on and I doubt whether a tax by a general assessment of personalproperty within the U.S. is included within the termdirect tax." And then he goes on and shows the effect of such a construction, that it would be unequal and unjust, and excludes it from the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution. Judge Patterson, in giving his opinion, says th"is: The Constitution declares that n capitation tax is a direct tax; and both in theory and practice, a tax on land is deemedto be a direct tax. In this way. the terms 'direct taxes' and ’canitation or other direct tax' are satisfied. It is not necessary to determinewhether a tax on the product of land he a direct or indirect tax. Perhaps the immediate productofland. in its original and crudestate.ought to beconsideredas the lend itself; it it; makes part of or elsethe provision madeagainst taxing exports would be easilyeluded. Land, independently of its produce is of no value." And upon this remark the honorable senator bases his whole argument. But the judge go"es on and says further: When the produce is converted into a manufacture it assumes a new shape; its nature is altered; itsoriginalstate ischanged; it hecomesquiteanother subject, and will bedifferentlyconsidered.” If I were disposed to s lit hairs on a question of this kin, Imight sliow that cotton, the article of commerce, is an article of manufacture, and that the process of ginning cotton makes a greater change in it than the process of converting wheat into flour makes in wheat. Flourwas taxed under our excise laws without objection, but it was a tax that was very soon repealed. I have no doubt. that where an agricultural article or any other article is changed in getting it ready for consumption, it becomes. then a manufacture; but aside from that, in i an agricultural country like ours, we cannot find any provision in the Constitution which " exempt s agricultural products from the same tax that may be levied upon manufacturing products. I represent an agricultural State, and yet I can find in the Constitution no principle favoring the productions of my people i mere than the products of any other people. I If any other articles of personal property may be assessed under the form of an excise tax, so may the articles produced by my people. The distinction made by the framers of the Constitution is palpable. A tax on land or a tax on people is a direct tax; all other taxes are indirect taxes, taxes on personal property, carriages, yachts, cotton, wheat, die. I have nota doubt thatwe maylevya tax upon wheat; but I do not fear that Congress will do it. When you come to the question argued by the Senator in the closing part of his elabo rate speech, I quite agree with him; I think a tax on cotton is indefensible in principle, and I do not believe it will last more than this current year. It was levied during the war at 2 cents a pound. I have no doubt of our power to levy it. The tax is proosed to be continued this year because all the people who have planted theircotton I give my own reason for it have planted it under the expectation of paying this tax. The great bulk of this tax will be paid by the consumerabroad, and therefore we are justified, under the present circumstances of the country, in putting an exceptional tax on this agricultural product; but after this year I do not suppose the cotton tax will be continued forany length of time. The very moment cotton produced in other parts of the world competes with our own production, then, as a matter of course, we shall have to abandon the cotton tax Or we shall have to give a drawback upon the exportation of cot ton, which will amount to the same thing; but at present we.can levy this tax, I think, without an injury to any portion of our people. As said before, I am not prepared to enter into a further and more elaborate examination of this subject. I look upon it as settled by the debate 2 years ago, w men it was discussed at some length. I consider it as settled by the decision of the Supreme Court. I do not think, therefore, it is worth while to continue the discussion.