Mr. ALLEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose the amendment. I had not proposed to say anything upon this question; but having introduced the resolution on the 18th of December so frequently alluded to, which received the almost unanimous vote of this House, and which pledged this House to cooperative action with the SecyTreasury in trying to effect an early resumption of specie payment, I will say a word in explanation of my purpose in introducing that resolution. The circulation of such vast amounts of irredeemable papermoney during the war had stimulated business and enhance prices to such a degree as to en rich almost everybody engaged in any speculation or business pursuit to any extent; and the consequence was that everybody expected to part With a very considerable portion of their nominal ains as soon as the war should cease. Accoringly, as soon as the rebellion was crushed, everybody looked for the commencement of a policy of liquidation and contraction orithe part of the Government, and greparations for such a state of things imme iately commenced. Gold declined, property and merchandise of all kinds were compeled to submit to serious reduction in prices, until it was discovered that the Government could not, if it would, contract the currency until it was further out of the woods and so far from contraction and depreciation following the close of the war, they found that a slight expansion and consequent increase of values was the result. Trade was stimulated, speculation ensued, old advanced materiall, and a worse state of things, so far as speculation and high prices were concerned, seemed to he promised than existed during the war. Itwas under this state of things that the Fort Wayne speech of the SecyTreasury was ma. which produced such a profound sensation throu bout the country. It was wel corned as the arbingeiof better days by all those who desired a sound currency, a stable business, and who believed that the only real wealth of a country was in its productive industry and not in irredeemable promises to pay. But it produced consternation and dismay in the ranks of speculators and advocates l of high prices. That speech was soon followed l by the Secretarys able report to Congress: and then the inquiry arose, will Congress sanction his views and cooperate with him in effecting, as speedily as possible consistent with the true interests of the country, a restoration of the currency to a sound basis? If it will, then, said the speculator, my vocation is gone; and the manufacturer, I must be content with less exorbitant profits; and the merchant, I must be more prudent in my operations. Now, it was with a view of determining how far Congress coincided with the Secretary in his views of financial policy, that the country might understand what to expect, that I introduced the resolution alluded to, and I confess the vote surprised me; but the discussions and action of the House recently have convinced me that they did not complflllClld so well as the country did the import of that resolution. E Now all or nearly all, are agreed that it is mportant that we should come back to a sound currency as speedily as possible consistent with the true interests of tocountry. Now. the question arises, how can thisbest be done? and Iwill so right here, that if you give the Secretary althe power he desires, and cooperate with him as earnestly and fullyasyou may, and commence the work of contraction tomorrow, such are his wants, and the Governments eeds, that it is impossible to accomplish the desired result for 2 or 3 years at best; but every day you defer the commencement of this policy. the harder and more difficult the recess. Contraction 8 months ago could have been commenced With much less shock to the business interests of the country than it can today and much better today than 8 months hence. Why? Because at the conclusion of the war everybody was comparatively well off; labor was scarce; merchandise was scarce, and nothing plenty but papermoney, and individual inde tedness was small; consequently a contraction of the currency at that time would not have seriousl atfected the price of labor or merchandise, antlwould only have served as a wholesome check to speculation and that over production in some kind of manufactures which was superinduced by fabulous profits. Commence today and labor is not so lenty, nor our surplus products so great, or individual indebtedness so large as to occasion any serious reaction, such as must inevitably arise if we defer it a year or 2 longer. Defer fthis attempt to contract the currency a year or ltwo longer, and whoever hopes to avert wide Ispread disaster, desolation, and ruin to all the business interests of the country, knows noth In in my opinion of the laws of trade, and the firefation which currency bears to those laws. We can no more get back to a specie basis than England could after 20 years suspension, without a shock to our monetary and commercial system of greater or less magnitude, in proportion to the length of time it shall be de ferred. At the close of the continental wars, after the battle of Waterloo, in June, 1815, a great impetus was given to trade in England for a year or 2, just as with us for the last few months, which was followed by a corre sponding depression and stagnation to an extent which reduced values of all kinds to less than 40 cents on the dollar of what they were for a year or 2 receding, extending to real as well as persona property. The same result must inevitably follow ere, unless we manage our financial matters with great skill and prudence; and this can only be done by giving the SecyTreasury the power to do every thing needful to bring us to specie payments as speedily as practicable; in otherwords, to make him “master of the situation." Just so long as {we remain as we are, and until we resume specie payments, all our vast business interests are in the hands of and at the mercy of the SecyTreasury. l His action may. if he chooses, affect values of 1 currency, merchandise, or gold every day in the year. His power now is gigantic, his rel sponsibility immense, and our peril, in consoquence of the necessity of placing so much power in a single persons and s, mostter rific. Nothing connected with the Government troubles me so much, and nothingI would make such sacrifices to avoid; and the only remedy to be found is in aresumption of specie payments. Resumcspecic:iyments, and thatpower and that control over t ie currency and business interests of the country cease in a great degree. Now, while he has so much power for evil I would clothe him with all the necessary power for good that we possess, and put upon him the responsibility of using it properly. I am aware that it is no argument that the present incumbent is all right financially. We should legislate not only for probable but possible contingencies. In the present crisis we have no alternative. We must take the fearful risk; but it is a great satisfaction to know that our present Secretary is a prudent, careful finan cier, of incorruptible integrity. I wish he was as sound politically is he is financially, but I think he is far from it. He was not the candidate of my choice. I urged upon Mr. Lincoln somewhat earnestly the appointment of another distinguished citizen. iie evening he sent a message that he wished to see me. I called upon him, and he told me that he had quite as exalted an opinion of the person urged by me as I had myself, but for certain reasons he could not nominate him; and he asked me what I thought of Mr. McCulloch. I told him I thought he was one of the wisest men. financially, had met in Washington. “Well, ” said he, “it seems to me he is; and understands that matter thoroughly, if he does not an thing else and I have confidence that he Will put our finances through, and I am going to appoint him SecyTreasury." I thought then and I think now, Mr. Lincolns estimate of imwas right; and while this power must rest in some mans hands, I think the country is fortunate in having its finances in the hands of Mr. McCulloch. The country is looking with intense anxiety and interest to Congress for some action in this matter; and however unwilling Congress may be to give the subject prominent consideration, let me tell the gentlemen of the House, this question in the future is going to absorb all other questions; and mightier contests and fiercer political struggles over these questions are in store for us than were those which distinguished the period which immediately preceded the rent financial revulsion of 1837. Today an immense majority of the sound and substantial business men of the country are in favor of a reasonable contraction of the currency and an early resumption of specie payments. Wait a few months, even, before you begin to look in that direction, and you will find the business interests of the country then all against you if you attempt contraction. just as they were a unit almost in 1836 in favor of inflation and expansion. If no check is given now expansion is sure to follow, until the business men of the country will find themselves holding large stocks, with an extended credit system which will make it. impossible to contract the currency and reduceprices without overwhelming a large portion oft O most enterprising business men in the country in irretrievable ruin. It is to avert such a calamity that I now plead for action in the rightdirection by this Government. But, after a l, the great interest to be protected, cherished, and encouraged, is in or. We cannot produce wealth without labor; and the only way for Government to protect and give to labor its highest reward is to prevent asmuch as possible fluctuations in the currency, and protect home industry against foreign competition. With almost any kind of financial management, if we could induce our people to forego the consumption of useless foreign fabrics, we should soon have our our rency sound, and instead of a fictitious we should have a real prosperity unexampled in the history of the world. It is the professed, and I hope it may be the real mission of our Government, to protect, elevate, and improve the masses. We see the lobbies of Congress filled by the advocates of a policy adverse to any contraction of the currency. They are those, mostly, whose personal interest will be greatly injured, they think, by a contraction of the currency, and undoubtedly they are right. Every large importer, and every heavy manufacturer must sutier, temporarily at least, tre mendously by any policy we may adopt looking to contraction and ) consequent fall in prices. But where you injure one such and generall they are the ones that can afford to be injured}: for they have reaped immense gains from inflation you benefit toiling 1,000s. I am an importer and manufacturer, and am subjected, is they are, to heavy losses, by contraction and fall of gold, but we must find our consolation in the tact that what is our loss is the countrys in. such are my opinions, which I submit with some distrust, I confess, for this subject of finance is so abstruse and difficult to comprehend that there are but few persons whose opinionspossess much value with me upon this subject. Although a matter which has engaged at earnest thou" 1tand attention for a quarter otya century, and with a practical experience in the management of financial affairs not very limited. yet when I find those who have given the subject more thought and attention than I have. with a longer and larger experience and in whose judgment I have great confidence, differing from me, I cannot but feel great diffidence in thus expressing my convictions.