Mr. WOODBRIDGE. Mr. Speaker, I would not rise for the purpose of discussing this bill, and should occupy no time of the House in such discussion were it not highly probable that owing to circumstances beyond my control, unless the vote is taken this afternoon I shall not be able to be in my seat when the yeas&nays are called. Mr. Speaker, I am decidedly in favor of the bill as it came from the Senate; and I am as decidedly opposed to the amendment proposed by the Gentfrom Pennsylvania, "[Mr. WILLIAMs] I oppose the amendment not so much upon constitutional grounds, despite the a.uthority of Madison, as upon the grounds of and policy; on the ground of expediency, because I believe that if the amendment is inserted the measure will be lost. As has been said on the floor of this House over and over again, the 3 depts of the Government are independent of each other the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. The legislative dept is independent of the executive, except so far as the veto may control their action. The executive dept is independent of the legislative dept, except so far as the action of the Senate upon appointments is concerned. Now, these exceptions, which like all exceptions must be construed strictly, were placed in the Constitution by our fathers for wise and wholesome purposes; and I believe they should in no in stance be departed from. In the one instance they prevent hasty, improvident, and unconstitutional legislation. In the other they prevent the appointment of weak or dishonest men to office. In all other respects the coor dinate branches of Government are independent of each other. Now, sir, in regard to the power of removal, the Constitution is silent upon the question. It does not say that it shall be given to the President or to the President and the Senate. It merely says that all appointments shall be made by the President by and with the approval of the Senate. I admit, with my friendfrom Pennsylvania, [Mr. WILLIAMS,) that as a general proposition the power of removal is incident to the power of appointment. But I deny that it necessarily follows that the power of removal is restricted to the appointing power. I have no doubt that Congress has the supreme power to control the entire subject of removai. When the proposition was 1st before the House in the Presented by my friend [Mr. WILLIAMs] the other day, at 1st it met with my approval. I then deemed it to be necessary for the safety of the Government, and even for the Preservation of the principles of liberty, that the heads of the Executive depts should only be removed by and with the approval and consent of the Senate. I looked upon it without any reference to the Present condition of the country, without an reference to any party. I have tried to loo upon it in no partisan spirit, but so far as I could as a statesman, ”after giving it very mature reflection, (and I have devoted to the subject the best power of my mind,) I now believe that it is safer for the Government, and more in accordance with our theory of an independent executive, to allow the President alone to remove the heads of the Depts, instead of calling upon the Senate for its consent. Sir, the POTUS is the executive head of the nation. The acts of the Executive and of the heads of the Depts are the acts of the President, and his only; for those acts he alone is responsible to the country. The heads of Depts are the confidential agents of the President, or, if gentlemen prefer the nomenclature of John andolph, they are his chief clerks. The the ory of the Constitution is that the President, being the executive head of the nation, controls and manages personally all the affairs of his dept. But that has become practi cally impossible. The President cannot with his own hands perform all the duties incident to his dept. He cannot with his own eyes overlook all the details of our foreign and domestic relations, and it became necessary to systematize and subdivide, and hence the various Depts were established. And for more efficiency each was provided with a head called a Secretary. To whom, sir, are those heads of Depts responsible? To Congress or the people primarily? No, sir; to the President, and the President alone. They exercise the duties of their Depts under the direction, will, and control of the President, and their acts are the acts of the President. They are, as was well said in the debate of 1798, the “extra eyes and the extra arms of the President, ” and they are responsibleto him alone. They have by custom come to be called his “constitutional advisers;” but there is nothing in the Constitution that makes them such; there is nothing in the law that makes them such. But usually, being men of great ability, and in intimate communication and confidential relations with the President, they, by reason of their knowledge of the duties of their respective Depts, become, so to speak, his advisers. But he is not obliged to call upon them: he may consult with whom he pleases. Now, Mr. Speaker, it has been said, and said with a great deal of feeling, that in consequence of permitting the President to select and dismiss at his pleasure the members of his Cabi net, as they are called, or the heads of the Depts, the Secretaries become merely the tools of the President, exercising no manl judgment upon the affairs of the nation. Wit a bad or weak man it may possibly be s;o but it is by no means probable; and I believe that an able and wicked Secretary would have greater power to gratify an unhallowed ambition and to injure the country by making the consent of the Senate necessary for his removal. If such consent be required, it will, in my judgment, be dangerous to the country, because it will weaken. divide the Administration; it will divide the power charged with the execution of the laws. Look, for instance, at the recent rebellion. Suppose that during the late conflict the SecyWar had entertained the idea that secession mightbo proper, and in stead of managing his affairs of his Dept in such an able manner as to gain for himself the affection of our whole loyal people and the plaudits of the civilized world, had Preserved a masterly inactivity, doing nothing treasonable, but being simply inefficient, nothing but disaster and ruin would have resulted to the country. Sir in a case like that, where the “confidentia adviser” or agent of the President is found not to be executing his will under the law ought not the President to have the power to displace him? Does not the safety.F. country demand that the President should possess such power? Gentlemen here seem to proceed upon the ground that everybody is E. that human nature is necessarily corrupt; and that when a man gets into official position he will degrade himself by the commission of mean and dishonest acts. Sir, I believe that human nature artakes in some measure of the essence of ivinity; that man into whom God breathed the breath of life has still about him something of the imPress of God. I believe that, whether in high or low position, there is something of honesty left in the world. I know that men often are bad; but I cannot admit that because a man is in power he is necessarily corrupt. My position in relation to the Present administration is well known. It is well known that the views of the Executive do not agree with my views; and I utter these sentiments merely jasothe.honest and earnest conviction of my looking to the good of the country. look upon the question in a broader than a partisan light. I regard it as a question not merely for the Present day, but for the great future, when this country shall be covered by 100 million people. Backed as we now are by a triumphant majority of the people, right as we are in the great body of measures that we are taking to carry out the exPressed will of the people, I warn gentlemen not to be too hasty. Let us not legislate in a spirit of partisanship. Let us not legislate for today alone, when we are flushed with victory and more or less disturbed by passion; but in the exercise of a pure, clear judgment, befit ting statesmen, a judgment that rises above the passions of the hour and the wants of the moment, let us legislate for the great future. I believe, sir, that as a matter of policy this amendment should not prevail. Its constitutionality I admit; but its expediency and propriety I deny.