Mr. EDMUNDS. One word. more. My friendfrom Maine says that there is no pro. vision in this section for a proceeding against goods, and therefone. there is no occasion for a provision regulating the rule of evidence in such cases; but there on ht to be a provision regulating the rule of evidence in atproceeding against the person, because such a proceeding is here contemplated. Now, I undertake to declare, without the fear of successful cantata! diction, that there is exactly the same provision for a proceeding against goods forfeited in. this section as there is against the person who has incurred the penalty exactly as much and no more. But it appears to me to be perfectl plain that there is no provision for a proceed? in, in. the propersense of the term, against either. The section is merely penal. As applied to goods, the necessary penalty must be forfeiture, because that is the only way you can punish the thing. As to the person, it is fine. lhe section, therefore, declares that goods brought in under the prohibited circumstances shall be forfeited, and that the person who brings them in shall suffer a fine. That is all. It does not organize the court which is to condemn the goods; it does not organize any admiralt or maritime or seizure court, and provide or libels and answers and claims and proofs and decrees. It does pot organize any common law court, with a jury, to hear, try, and determine an indictment against the de fendant for a violation of this law; but it simply, as applied to each class of the objects, provides for imposing a penalty. The penalty against goods is forfeiture necessarily; t to penalty against the person is fine. Now. then, as applied to good?. the committee thought it necessary to introduce an amendment to the original bill which declares a forfeiture of goods; and they have thought it necessary to introduce as against the person a clause which provides for a penalty. Then they thought it necessary as to both classes of cases, because, as the amendment originally stood, it applied to both, that the onus probandz should be upon the defendant whereprobable cause was shown. I thought it wise, upon the argument of my friendfrom Maryland, who demonstrated, as it appears to me, the propriety of such a rule in an ordinary criminal cause, to limit the application of that rule to those cases which were analo ous to the old limitation as applied to that (fescription of proceeding. That amendment has been agreed to, and I hope it will not be stricken out.