Mr. LAWRENCE, of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, the subject of the compensation of members of Congress engaged the attention of the framers of the Constitution, and that instrument provides that “The Sens&Reps shall receiye a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the Treasury of States.” Article the U.S. 1, section 6. Whether this compensation shall be authorized in the form of an annual salary, payable at stated times, or as per diem wages, in either case with or without mileage, the duty of prescribing by law its amount is one of the most difficult and embarrassing. Any bill changing the compensation during an existing official term, or for the prospective sessions to which Sens&Reps in office may be reelected, of course calls upon them to decide a question affecting their own personal interests. This, I know, is the legitimate and indeed the necessary exercise of a power conferred by the Constitution, but in the performance of that duty I hope it may never be truly said that the Congress of the U.S. did not act with their accustomed dignity, or refused the consideration and hearing necessary to arrive at a just conclusion. (Annals of 15th congress, 1st session, January 7, F. 1818, page 588.) not insensible of the fact that any effort at reduction, either of compensation for Sens&Reps or of salaries of officers in other Depts is liable to be met with the “hue and cry” that the sole motive therefor is popular favor or approbation. For one, I choose rather to incur the hazard of this injustice than to shrink from an effort in this direction, which duty and the public judgment demand, and which sound policy requires. I recognize it as a solemn duty to conform our legislation to the matured will of an enlightened people. In the conflict of interest between those who bear the burdens of taxation and those who receive the emoluments of office, the public judgment is quite as impartial and just in its motive as any tribunal to which we can appeal; yet it is sometimes less powerful in. halls of legislation, because of the ever present, more zealous, and earnest efforts of official position. The atmosphere that surrounds us here is an official atmosphere, and while justice should be done to all who move in it, and to all who may be in office elswhere, let us not be unmindful of the millions who are the source, not only of all political power, but whose labor applied to the development of our natural resources is the main element in the production of wealth. When this Congress commenced its 1st session, on the 4th day of December, 1865, the compensation of its members as “ascertained by, law” was fixed at $3,000 per year, and mileage at 40 cents per mile. (Act of August 16, 1856; 11 U.S. Statutes at Large, 48.) By the 17th section of the miscella neous appropriation act, approved, July 28, 1866, this annual salary was increased to $5,000 per year, but the mileage was reduced to “ 20 cents per mile, to be estimated by the nearest route usually traveled in going to and returning from each regular session.” Lanesof 1865 66, age 323, Appendir to Congressional." 5,: joiofo."inth Congress, page 417. Upon this subject I have introduced 2 bills; one of them proposes to repeal so much of the act of July 28, 1866, as increases the an: nual salary to $5,000; the effect of which will be to revive and restore the annual salary of $3,000, but to leave the mileage at 20 cents per mile. The other bill proposes to reduce the mileage to ten cents per mile. These have been introduced in the form of separate and distinct propositions, so that one might not embarrass the other, if there shall be opposition to the one which may not exist. against the other, but in the hope that both may receive the consideration and sanction of the House and of Congress. The effect of these bills, if they shall become laws, may readily be ascertained by an official statement and estimate, which I now submit, as follows: He 3, Trf Ast RY DEPT, RegistER's Office, December 6, 1866, B. COLLY, Register. The accounts are made up at the Treasu Dept, not for each session, but for each Congress, the whole term of 2 years included. For that reason the estimate has not been presented for this 39th Congress. The increase of salary effected by the act of July last will for this Congress be about. $ from this the Treasury saves in redu of mileage by that act about.. 250,000 The increased expense, therefore, for the entire Congress is about.,000 Or for each year about. 375,000 If the mileage should be reduced to if per, cents mile it would save to the Treasury with our present number of Senators and Representativesannually about. $125,000 From this it will be seen the bills under consideration are measures of retrenchment and economy. This Congress is upon the record in favor of every just measure necessary to accomplish objects so desirable. Soon we are to have the report of “the joint select comRetrenchment, ” under the resolution of the 18th of July last, which directed an inquiry “into the expenditures in all the branches of service of the U.S. ” the with directions to “report whether any and what offices, ought to be abolished; whether any and what salaries or allowances ought to be reduced, ” &c. And the reasons for all this, as recited in the preamble, are that “The financial condition of the U.S. demands the exercise of a rigid economy in all depts of the Government, in order to sustain the credit of the U.S., and to relieve the people at the earliest possible day from the burdens of existing taxation.” This resolution and these reasons were aproved, I believe, by every member of ". the party in this Congress, and by the loyal people of the whole country. And as it was once enjoined that repentance “should be preached among all nations beginning at Jeru salem, ” (Luke xxiv, 27,) so should this congress, in obedience to the manifest popular will, provide for all necessary and proper retrenchment in every dept, beginning at Washington. Before considering the question as to what is the just measure of compensation, I may say in general terms there are reasons of an imperative character in favor of the most moderate amount compatible with justice and safety. The legislative dept determines by law the amount of the salaries or fees of all officers of the Government. To some extent the compensation in the legislative dept is regarded as a standard in determining that of.depts or officers. With profuse liberality in legislative compensation, Congress cannot by any rule of equality demand even moderate, much less “rigid economy, ” in the amount of pay allowed to other depts. Nor can the vast army of officers now necessary to administer the Government ever hope to successfully demand exorbitant salaries from a legislative body limiting itself to moderate compensation. One of the most eminent jurists of this or any age, of whom our nation is justly proud, Mr. Justice Story, that solid legal philosopher, adding as he did to his other attainments a matured judgment upon political ethics, political economy, and social science, in discussing this subject of legislative compensation, has given us another view in the interest of philanthropy in favor of the position I am endeavoring to main tain. He says: “There is no dangerthat the want of compensation would deter men of suitable talents and virtues” "from becoming members.” “And if in a few cases it otherwise, should be it should not be forgotten that one of the most wholesome, lessons to be taught in republics is that men should learn suitable economy and prudence intion, their private affairs.” 1 Story on Constitusection 855: Huger's Speech, March 7, 1816;An mals of Congress, 1817 18, 1st session, page 1165; Desha's Speech, January 6, 1818;Annals, 1817 18f, irst session, page571. The example of other nations admonishes us that enormous salaries are followed by extrav agant and luxurious modes of living, incompatible with republican simplicity if not with private virtue. The evil, once inaugurated, like a pestilent contagion contaminates the body. politic, subverts the social and domestic relations, introduces ‘ and licentiousness destructive of republican institutions and Christian civilization. It divides society into classes by building up one at the expense of another, inconsistent with the whole theory of our institutions. To preserve the purity of Government, the unscrupulous onot be encouraged by extravagant salaries to embark in corrupt scrambles for office, which, when attained, may supply the means of perpetuating power in bad hands and of destroying the purity of the ballot for such ignoble purposes. I do not pretend that we have yet embarked upon that dangerous system of building up official aristocratic classes so patiently submitted to in other nations of the past and present, but every step tending in the slightest degree in that direction should be watched with a jealous eye. There is another extreme which justice and sound policy require us to avoid. An inade quate compensation to any officer of the government, is alike unreasonable and unjust. “The laborer is worthy of his hire.” If no compensation, or an inadequate one, be paid to members of the legislative dept, those in indigent circumstances but with surpassing merits and talents will be practically excluded from becoming candidates for congressional honors and duties. The Constitution has wisely settled this by providing that “The Sens&Reps shall receive a compensation for their services to by be ascertained law.” This would seem to be imperative, perhaps to avoid theo of distinctions among members, and it was designed to abrogate the H. in England; in considering which, Rawle has very justly said; "In respect to the members of [Congress, Jour practicecorrespondswthiteh tLheagtisolaf tsuorme, e though not all the nations of Europe. In one, to which we are apt more frequently to look than any other, [England,) the ancient usagehas melted away, and the members of Parliament now receive no com: pensation for their attendance. The consequenceis, that only men of fortune can take seats in the House of Commons. This is inconsistent with the equality that ought to be found in a republic.” Ratcle on the Constitution, 170; 1 Story on Constitution, section 852; 1 Blackstone'sCommentaries1, 74. I am not unmindful of the fact that many plausible reasons have been urged in favor of liberal or large compensation. It was long ago said in the debates in congress in favor of an increase of salaries, that “This addition of paywould lessenthe anxiety and necessityfor executive favorsand appointments, and that executive influence and control in and over that body would be thereby diminished.” Annals of Congress1815–16f, irst session, page 1165. No such consideration was urged in favor of the act of July last, and fortunately our experience demonstrates that American Sens&Reps are not readily bought by executive influence, and if any are they are of a class not worthy of being saved by large salaries, if that were possible. It has been frequently urged, too, that liberal salaries were essential to preserve the purity of Congress and to remove the temptations to and dangers of corruption. The true corrective for these dangers, if they could exist, will be found in the lessons of economy inspired by just salaries, and still more in the intelligence and purity of the voters, and the restraining penalties which may be imposed by Congress or by the laws. (An nals 14th Congress, 1st session, 1815–16, page 1166, and 15th Congress, 1st session, 1817–18, page 571; Desha's Speech.) But in practice it is safe to assert that congressional purity which rests upon no better safeguard than liberal salaries will inevitably give way at the 1st convenient. An argument often presented in favor of high salaries in every dept of the national and State governments is that they are necessary to secure the services of adequate talent, and particularly to call out men from lucrative employments or professions. (Annals 15th congress, 1st session, 1817–18, pages 572, 585.. but experience has demonstrated the reverse of this. Motives of duty, of patriotism, of distinction, are higher and holier than mere [. reward. He who would not serve is country for these with moderate compensation, would not honorably or faithfully serve it when actuated by the more sordid motive of n. policy should rather be to make the general welfare the leading motive for enterin the public service, and then a “reverentia regard” will be 5 inspired for patriotic labors. not introduced these bills regulating compensation in the form which I believed to. Con::sar “e wo in the the set of the tose s, nasa or if toState, . o 8. s at arr, oNnoes. 44. “soforsc:, be the best, but in that which I suppose most likely to succeed. There are well grounded objections to compensation in the form of a salary. The mode of compensation by a per diem allowance is more just, equitable, and in accordance with the analogies in the State Legislatures, where it has always been adopted. And this opinion has prevailed in Congress during the larger part of our history. (Annals of Congress, 1st session, 14th Congress, 1815–16, page 190; Annals of Congress, 2nd session, 14th Congress, 1816–17, page 314.) The act of Congress of September 22, 1789, fixed the compensation to March 4, 1795, by giving a per diem of 6 dollars, with mileage at 20 cents per mile. (1 U.S. Statutes at Large, 70) The act of March 10, 1796, provided the same compensation. (1 U.S. Statutes, 448.) The act of March 19, 1816, for the 1st time provided an annual salary of $1,500, leaving the mileage unchanged. (3 U.S. Stat utes, 257; Annals of Congress, 1815–16, 1st session, 14th Congress, page 458.) This act was so indignantly disapproved by the people, that of af those who'voted for it only 3 were returned to the next Congress, and it was repealed by the act of February 6, 1817, to take effect from the close of that session of Congress, with a provision against reviving the refocoa feu? sp that the next Congress was left to fix the salary. (3 U.S. Statutes, 345.) The act o;22, 1818, fixed the compensation from March 3, 1816, at 8 dollars per day, and mileage at 40 cents per mile. (3 U.S. Statutes, 404.). This act remained in force until repealed by the act of August 16, 1866, which left the mile age unchanged, but provided an annual salary of $3,000. (11 U.S. Statutes, 48.) The practice of the nation, except during a period of about 12 years, has been in favor of the per diem compensation rather than a salary. Rawle, in his work on the Constitution, declares that “The compensationought to bear asexact a proportion as possible to the time employed. An act of Congresswas passeda few years ago (March 19, 1816) in whicn a gross sum was allotted for an entire ses seiaornly. rTehpeeald.”issatisfaction it occasioned produced an I know it has been urged that the tendency of a per diem compensation is to lengthen the sessions of Congress. I cannot conceive it probable that such effect would follow; butifmembers could beinfluenced by such motive then with a salary the desire to avoid the personal expenses of a long session would be a motive to immaturely hasten or omit to act on at least some necessary business, and this is a vastly greater evil than long sessions or much speaking. Long ses signs are not generally an evil. The presence of the Legislature is necessary to arrest executive usurpation, to correct abuses as they arise, and to prevent their occurrence. (Fed eralist, No. 53.) The stupendous usurpation of AndrewJohnson in exercising unauthorized legislative power in the reorganization of illegal State governments in the rebel States would never have been attempted or tolerated if he had performed his duty by calling Congress together early in 1865 to settle the whole subject of reconstruction. Even in the States where biennial legislative sessions have been authorized, the experiment has been found disastrous. In Ohio, where the constitution of 1851 authorized biennial sessions, the Legislature has held annual sessions by adjournment over during all the time except in one year, that of 1855. If a per diem allowance should lengthen the sessions, public measures would be better may tured; and if thereby Congress should to some extent become a logocracy, its much speaking would have the advantages which always flow from mature discussion. This mode of compensation is more just, too, because it pays for time employed, and not like a salary for time whether employed or not. The law cannot fix the length of all the sessions; the business to be performed alone can do so, yet a salary unjustly assumes that equal compensation should be made for all sessions long or short, with much or little business. But the pending bills have not attempted a change so great as sound policy would sanction, for they only seek to restore the salary as it existed before the increase made by the act of July last. And now we are met with the question, is the salary of $3,000 per year adequate and just? It was once said in debate that “The object of giving a per diem to memberseither of the State or national Legislatures was not by way of compensation for their services, still less to remunerate them for sacrifices of pecuniary or personal adyantages of any kind. The real object was to enable individuals whose private means would not. enable them to attend the sessionsof the respective Legislatures, to expenses meet the moderate and reasonable to which they must necessarilybe subjected by their attendance on them, and to country might the end that the not be altogether deprived of the services of men in narrow circumstances, from their ina bility to suffice to this extra expense. Hence, and in the same spirit a moderate and reasonableallowance was made for traveling expenses, not at such a rate, however, as South, ” would be required by the nabob of the “who cannot getalong without his carriage and 2 horses and 2 black servants and 2 dogs.” Huger's Speech, March 7, 1866, Annals 1st session 14th Congress, page 1163; Harrison's Speech, January 6, 1818, Annals 1st session 15th Congress, pages278, 279, as to mile age. If this were true that members should only be paid “the moderate and reasonable expenses to which they must necessarily be subjected by their attendance” on Congress, a deci dedoy sweeping reduction should be made in the salary. But it is palpable that such was not the design of the Constitution, for it declares that members “shall receive a compensation for their services.” The spirit and purpose of this provision contemplate such reasonable and moderate compensation for services as the average talent employed would command in other occupations equally arduous and as nearly similar as may be. This would include not only “the moderate and reasonable expensesofattending Congress' but moderate and reasonable recompense besides, for all these are included in the idea of “compensation for services.” It cannot include compensation “to remunerate for sacrifices of pecuniary or personal advantages, ” for these are not proximate consequences of or necessary incidents to the position of a Senator or Representative, and could never be “ascertained by law” because they would differ with the condition and circumstances of each member. I am perfectly aware that no uniform compensation can do exact justice, and all that can be secured is an approximation to it. The same salary may not with equal and exact justice compensate some of the Representatives from California and the mining regions or from large cities, as it would those from the agricultural districts, for there is a wide disparity in rents, taxes, expenses of living, and rates of wages generally. I will not inquire whether it would be just to discriminate, but that is impracticable and the Constitution seems to contemplate a uniform rule, which should be made not for exceptional cases, but with a view to a general and just average. And now, in the light of these principles, a comparison of congressional compensation with the salaries paid to the highest judges of the State courts, which it is fair to presume are reasonable and just, will support the measures for which I am contending. In the National Almanac and Annual Record of 1864 I find the salaries of the highest judges and of the Governors stated for 24 States thus: Judges of Supreme Court. Gopernor. Pennsylvania. 1 Judges of gov SupremeCourt. Crnor. 11. California. Oregon. 2,000 1,500 13. Maine. 1, 800 1,5 14. NewHampshire 2. Vermont. 1, 800 1,000. 16. Massachusetts RhdIsland.. 1, 800 1,000 18. Connecticut. NewJersey. 2,000 3,000 20. Delaware. Maryland;.. 2, 500 3, 600 22. WestVirginia. 2,000 2,000 23. Kentucky. Michigan. 2, 500 1, The Territories of the U.S. generally: Governor, $2, 500and $3,000;judges, $1, 800and $2, 500. Judges since reduced to $2, 500.. f For chief justice a fee of $2 in in addition. each cascdocketed; Chancellor, $2, 500;chief justice, $2, 100. Chief justice, $1, 200. The average annual salary of these judges is $2, 433 each. Their expenses I know are less than would be incurred in attending the sessions of Congress, but the difference in salaries even before the act of July last leaves a margin for that. I might cite additional salaries, both official and unofficial, but they are sufficiently familiar and with rare exceptions prove by way of comparison the justice of the measures I am urging. The return of incomes under the internalrevenue law affords additional evidence. The ComrIntRev under date of December 14, 1866, says: “On the 5th ultimo I addressed a circular letter to the assessorsdirecting them to forward to this office the number of persons on the May annual assessment list of 1866, in each of the 3 following classes: “1. The number who returned a net income of $1,000 or less. “2. The number whose net income was over $1,0not over $5,000. “3. The number whosenetimeomewas over$5,000. “ 600 dollars exempted by law was to be included in each case, Returns have been received forom 207of the 240collection districts. The total so far returned in each of the classes is as ollows: 1st class 200, 231 2d class 179, 627 class 33, 812 The bills on this subject have been introduced with the more confidence because the provision sought to be repealed was agreed to by a meager vote in the House, and in opposition to its matured opinion, twice solemnly and almost unanimously expressed. It was agreed to on the report of a committee of conference in the hurry of the last morning of the session, under the previous question without an opportunity for discussion, by a vote of 51 for to 50 against, with 85 members absent. (Part V, Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st session, 1865–6, page 4288.) That final vote cannot, therefore, be the deliberate judgment of a majority of the whole House.