Mr. HOWE. I understood the Senator correctly, I think. The power of removal, when not restricted by supreme law, he said, and I agree, is an incident to the power of appointment. The iower of appointment being unlim ited, the making of one appointment today is not of itself a reason why another should not be made tomorrow. It has not exhausted the power; that power still continues in the same tribunal; and if he make another tomorrow it is a vacation of the one made today, because 2 officers cannot occupy the same office any more than 2 bodies can occupy the same s ace. The right of the President and the Senate to remove does follow, in the estimation of the Senfrom Maryland, as in my own, as an incident to the pOWQIof appointment; but how does the resident get it? Where does he get the power to remove officers whom he does not appoint, whom he cannot appoint, but who can only be appointed by the concurrent act of the President and the senate? The Constitutionis silent; it does not follow as an incident of the appointing power, because he has not then pointfng power; it no more follows as an incident that the President can remove a man appointed by the President and Senate than it follows that he can remove an officer appointed by the Supreme Court here its clerk for instance.Where does it come from? Say, the Constitution is not absolutely silent upon the power of removal, for the Constitution does declare that “the President, VEEP, and all civil officers of the U.S shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” These terms cover every officer in the civil service of the U.S. There is a method by which they may be removed the power of impeachment. The idea that is urged here by the Senfrom Maryland, and has been urged by others, You must not tie up the hands of the President; if you mean to have an efficient and honest discharge of the public service, on must give him the right to remove faith can officers” this idea was not out of the minds of those men who made this Constitution; but they never thought of saying that the President might remove at will, and upon his own judgment, any man whom be deemed to be faith loss or whom be deemed to be unsatisfactory. No; they said, “Here is a trial; they may be removed for these offenses, upon trial and conviction before the Senate of the U.S., " that being the only tribunal that can try an impeachment. I am not about to say that this right of removal through the process of impeachment, inasmuch as it is cXpressly given is given to the exclusion of all other means; I do not mean to say that the lawmaking power cannot vest in the POTUS or elsewhere the right to make removals for causes which are not matters of impeachment; but I do say, just here, that in my jndgment, the men who made this Constitution understood an office to be something very different from what it has been treated in this debate, and ver different from what it has been understood to be in the estimation of American polities for at least the last 30 years. An office was understood by them to be an estate, to be conferred upon men only because they were worthy and capable of serving the public, and to be taken from men only because they ceased to be worthy and capable and the question whether they had so cease or not they nevery dreamed was to be determined by any mere political agency actuated by more political feeiing. Let me say a few words now upon the matter of authority, for this question is not a new one it has been debated over and over again. It came under debate, as we learn, in 1789 for the 1st time. The Senfrom Maryland objected tothis amendment because it covered all officers, including, as he says, members of the Cabinet as well as others, and because it never was, as I understood him to say, imagined by any statesman, in the early days of the republic, that a inembe of the Cabinet could old office a day or an hour against the will of the President; that he was intended to be the confidential friend and adviser of the President, to be in his confidence; that he must have his confidence, and nobodyimagined that one could hold that office who was not in every way entirely satisfactory to the President. In answer to that ideal have to remind the Senate that the very 1st debate which arose in the history of our Government upon this power of removal aroae in 1789, on the passage of an not creating an Executive De rtmeut, to be known as the Dept of "oreign Affairs.