Mr. HOWARD. Mr. President, I shall take the liberty of detaining the Senate a few minutes in the consideration of this bill, and but a few, for I see about me a disposition to come to a final vote upon it as soon as practicable. The bill provides That every railroad company in the U.S. whose road is operated by stemn. itssuccessorsand assigns, be and is hereby, authorized to carry upon and over its road. connections. boats. bridges and ferries. all passes cis. troops. Government supplies. mails. freig it. on property on their way from any State to another State and to receive compensation therefor and to connect with roads of other States so as to form continuous lines for the transportation of the same to the place of destipution: resided. That this act shall not uffeetany stipulation between the Government of the U.S and any railroad company for transportation or fares without compensation.nor impair or change the conditions imposed by the terms of any act granting lands to any such company to aid in the construction of it: I0 I thought, Mr. President, when I 1st read this bill. that its provisions were so plain and so evidently within the scope of the constitutional powers of Congress that it would be dilficult for any gentleman, howeveringenious, to raise a doubt as to its constitutionality; but like many other bills which we have had under consideration during the present Congress, as well as in former Congresses. this has en countered a very earnest and obstinate resistance, founded upon the idea that it is prohibited by the Constitution; and the honorable Senfrom Maryland 51th. Joussoy] in very depre eatery tones, an almost in accents of despair at the respect of its passing the Senate, says to us that if we are thus to amend or endeavor to amend from time to time the Constitution of the U.S., that if one Congress after another may eneroach upon its provisions, we may as well have no Constitution. Undoubtedly, sir, the convictions of that honorable Senator of the unconstitutionalityof this measureare very dee and strong. I could wish for the sake of the bill and the country that we could have his full and free concurrence, for I know, and so does the country. that his opinion upon so grave a question is entitled to and receives very great respect. Still, air, after listening with much attention to his elo guent and ingenious argument against the bill, have failed to be convinced by it of the tin constitutionality of the measure. On the other hand. I hold it to be strictly within the constitutional power of Congress, and to be a very expedient and necessary not for us to pass at this time and I rerot. that so great a length of time has passe without such a Federal statute as this for the protection of the people of the different States of the Union in their commercial transactions. The honorable Senfrom Maryland in forms us that this is an attempt to alter, to modify, and even to enlarge a State charter, and he accuses us of an attempt to override the just and legitimate powers of the States in reference to the creation of corporations for commercial purposes. In order that I may do him no injustice in this respect, I will take the liberty of reading from the Globe a single passage which states more clearly than I am able to do his 1st ground of objection. He says: “ In the tint place. what the bill does is to enlarge a charter granted by a State: it is amendatory to a State charter. It assumes.as vested in Congrem. therefore.the power to take into its own hands the charters granted bylhe severalStutes and to modify them just as they think proper. not only by extending the authority which the charter may grant, but if. in the Judgment of Congress.at any time hereaf ter, or now. any of the restrictions in those charters are calculated to interfere with commercebetween the States or to impede the transportation of the mails. they have the authority to repeal. practically. any of the limitations in the charter or an of the powers conferred upon the companyby the charter." Now, sir, with great deference to that opinion, Iinsist that this bill does not assume to alter or amend in any legal respect any charter granted by a State. The honorable Senator observed further and he will pardon me for soing that I think in rather unguarded terms that in enacting a charter ofincorporatiion, it is the iight of every State to annex to that ewirter such terms and conditions as the State p cases to annex: and therefore it follows, according to him, that if for instance, the State of hewJersey shall enact a charter which prohibits the carrying on of “commerce among the States” by any person or by corporation within the limits of thit State, inasmuch as this is a condition annexed to the charter, Congress cannot interfere to relieve the people of the other States who are trading and tra the king through N am] ersey from the impediment thus created. This appears to be the essence of his argument: that a State has a right to annex any condition which it may see fit to its charters of incorporation, and that it is out of the power of Congress, by any act of theirs, to relieve the community from such condition. however severe and unjust it may be in its elfects upon the citizens ofother States. On that point I take issue with the honorable Senfrom Maryland. Sir, a charter ofincorporation for commercial purposes, granted byt e Legislature of a State to private persons, has ever been held by the SCOTUS to be a contract a contract inviclable on the part of the State. It is, then, like any other contract or compact between individuals; the State being the party of the 1st part, and the corporators, after having accepted the charter, the partiu of the 2nd part. In the present case, the question is whether a State, by its legislation, either in the form ofincorporating private companies or otherwise, can take into its hands and control a power which does not belong to the State. but which belongs exclusively to congress under the Constitution. I think the honorable Senator will concede that if the matter of commerce, either foreign or among the States, he one which belongs not to the States at all but exclusively to Congress under the Constitution; if a State charter as sumes in an way, whatever to control, to bur den, to hin er, or to prevent commerce among the States or commerce with a foreign country; if it annexes such a condition as t.s which I have described to its charter of incorporation, that condition is void in law, because the State has no authority whatever to annex such n condition to its charter. That portion of the char ter, therefore, which assumes to control commerce among the States or commerce with a foreign country is void in law for the want of authority on the part of the State to exercise it. It is simply an attempt to exercise a power and authority on the part of the State Legislature ultra sires not within the scope of its power, but beloning exclusively to the Congress of the U.S. What, then, is the character of commerce as defined by the Constitution, whether known as foreign commerce or commerce among the States, for in law there is no difference whatever? I assert that it has been held over and over strain by the highest judicial authorities of the fund that the power over commerce of either kind pertains exclusively to Congress, and does not belong at all to the States. The Senate will pardon me for refreshing their recollection by certain references to ad, judged cases. As the Senfrom Maryland as indulged rather freely in such references he certainly will pardon me for imitating his example. I call iis attention to certain passages which I will now read from what are known as the "passenger cases, ” decided by the SCOTUS in 1848. I read from the opinion given by Judge McLean in those cases in which he groups together previous opinions. On page 125 of 17 Curtiss Condensed Reports, Judge McLean quotes the Ianguage of Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons vs. O en, where he says: “The power over commerce with foreign nations and among the several States is vested in Congress as absolutclyns it would he in a single government having in its constitution the somerestrictions, ” dzc. Again, he quotes from the same opinion of Marshall: "Where thon. Each government exercises the power of taxation. neither is other; excreis in the power of the but when aState procee s to regulate commerce with foreign nations or among the several States. it is exercising the very power that is granted to Congress and is doing the very thing which congress is authorized to do.” Again, says Judge McLean: A nd Mr. Justice Johnson. who gave a separate opinion in the same case.observes: The power to regulate commercehero meant to be ranted. was the power to regulate commerce which i previously existed in the States and again: The power to renlnte commerceis necessarilyexclusive. n Brown on.The State of Maryland. 12Wheat. 446, the court say: It is not. Therefore matter of surprise that the grant of commercial powershould be as extensive as the mise hief and should comprehend all forei oomm reaend all commerce among the States! his question.the remark. was considered in the caseof Gibbons v. Ogden. in which it was de clared to be comlcte in itself and to acknowledge no lnnitations fl nd Mr.Justice Buldwin.in the case of Grovesm. Slaughter. 15 Peters. 511. says: That the power of Congressto regulate commerce among the several Statesis exclusive of any interferenceby the States. has buenJrimy opinion. conclusively settled by the solemnopinions of this court in the 2 cases a ove cited and be observes: If these decisions nrp not to betaken as the established construction of this clauseof the Constitution. I know of none which are not yet open to iloubt. "Mr. Justice Story. in the case of NewYork 0I. Milo. 11Pet. 15 8in. speakingof the doctrine of concurrent power in the Statesto regulate commerce, says. that in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden, it was de iberntcly examined and deemedinadmissible by the court. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall. with his accustomedaccuracy and fullnessof illustration, re vicwed at that time the whole groundof the controvers: and from that timeto the presentthe question has en considered.so for as I now. at rest. The power in Congress to ongrefilate commercewith 1. O States, has been deemedexclusive from the nature apd objectsof the power and the necessaryimplications growing out of Its excrcuo.” l. At page 147 of the same volume will be; found this passage from the opinion of Mr. Justice Wayne, in the passenger cases: "Keeping. than. in mind what commerceis and how lar a nation may legall limit her own commercial transactionswith anot or State. we cannot be at a loss to determine.from the subject matterof the clausein the Constitution. that the meaningof the terms usedin it ising toexcludethe Statesfrom regulat commercein any way, except their own nternal trade and to conflde its legislative regulation completely and entirely to Congress. When I say comletcly and entirely to Congress. I mean all that can e included in the term commerce umon the several States. subject. of course. to the right of the Statesto pass inspection laws in the mode prescribed by the Constitution. to the prohibition of any duty upon exports, either from one Stat to another State or to foreign countries, and to at commercial uniformity which the Constitution eii JOHIS respectingall that relates to the introduction of merchandise into the U.S and those who may bring it for sale whether they arecitizens or foreigners and all that concerns navigation. whether vesselsare employedin the transportation of passengersor freight or both: including also. all the regulationswhich the nocessitim and safetyof navigation may require.” I read, also. upon the subject of the exclusive character of the commercial power in the constitution, from the 2nd volume of Storys Commentaries, sections 1062 and 1063:. In short. in a practical view. it is impossible to seitvlratethe regulation of foreigncommerceand do mesticcommerceamong the States from eachother. The same inblicpolicy applies to each; and not a reasoncan is assignedfor confiding the power over the one which does not conduceto establishthe propriety of conceding the power over the other. lic next inquiry is whether this power to rggulatccommerce is exclusiveof the same power in the States or is concurrentWith it." Upon this subject I desire the attention of Senators. It is sometimes said that there is a commercial power in the States connected either with foreign commerce or with commerce among the States, which is to be regarded as concurrent with the power of the General Government over the same subject matter. I WlSll to make myself understood on this omt. The principle is, that the commercial power as granted in the Constitution is not even concurrent in any form or degree with the power of the States, but that it is absolutely excluswe in all cases.