Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, since the discussion last night I have given this matter a limited examination, and I am thoroughly satisfied from the history of the clause in the Constitution on this subject, as disclosed by the debates, that it was intended to secure a uniform distribution of the assets of the bankrupt; that that is all that was intended by a uniform system of bankruptcy. The evil complained of, and which was intended to be remedied by the constitutional provision, was an unfair distribution of the assets of the bankrupt; that one State would provide that the assets should go 1st in order, giving priority to the residents of that State and excluding non-residents from fair participation. The difficulty consisted in the distribution of the assets of the bankrupt, and that, it seems to me, is what they intended to have uniform laws upon, and not in regard to what the assets of the bankrupt were. I think that the assets of the bankrupt must depend upon the laws of the State under which he holds his assets. If, in order to have a uniform law on the subject of bankruptcy, it is necessary to exercise a power which will in effect make the laws for the collection of debts uniform, then the right of a State to pass laws for the collection of debts is substantially taken away under this clause; but nobody had ever anticipated that a State might not make exemptions; might not make its various regulations for the collection of debts; and those regulations, take them as a body, interfere with the assets to be distributed on all occasions. For instance, one State gives a judg ment creditor a lien upon the property, and that becomes a vested right in one State: in another State not. That is one of the laws for the collection of debts. Now, you say it is not uniform because the State law steps in and gives a lien to some individual in the State; gives him a preference; and consequently it does not operate uniformly. There are 1000instances of want of uniformity that will exist and which Congress must remedy if you mean by uniform laws to reach the property of every debtor to the same extent and distribute it; but if you simply mean that whatever assets he has subject to execution under the law of the State where he lives shall be equally distributed between the creditors residing in that State and those residing out of it for the convenience of commerce, leaving the State to make its own laws for the collection of debt, then the 2 systems are in harmony. If you carry this idea of uniformity clear out it goes too far; and by the same course of reasoning it would deny the States the power to pass any laws for the collection of debt which may not be permitted under the power of Congress to pass bankrupt laws to make a uniform system. Consequently I am clear that the law as it now stands is within the power of Congress, and it is certain we cannot practically have a bankrupt law unless we exercise this power in subordination to the power exercised by the States for the collec ection of debt. We must allow the State exemption laws, which have grown up during the last 75 years and become established, to remain. Rights exist under them. The people understand and appreciate and are attached to them. We had better not exercise the power of Congress in this matter if we are to interfere with all these domestic arrangements of the States. I do not believe that was anticipated. I believe the meaning of the Constitution was that there should be a fair and equal distribution to persons living anywhere within the U.S. of the bankrupt's assets, whatever was liable to execution under the local law. In that view both systems are consistent, and can be harmonized and operate together. The theory of absolute uniformity requires you in effect to abrogate the power of the States to pass laws regulating executions, which could not have been contemplated.