Mr. HISE. Not necessarily executive. He is the ministerial officer of a court; and I would not deny the authority of Congress to vest the appointment of marshals in the courts of which they are officers; not at all; because I look upon the marshal as a part of the auxiliary force of the judicial dept, necessary in order to carry out its judgments and decrees, It is true that the Congress of the U.S., by various acts, for taking the census, &c., has charged these marshals with executive functions, but improperly in my opinion. I hold that the marshal is a quasi judicial officer an officer connected with the administration of judicial functions. Now, what is to be the ooctrine? That the POTUS shall be held responsible for all maladministration in the executive branch of the Government, for all failure to execute the laws. He is the only officer known to the Constitution in whom is lodged the czecutive power of the Government. To none others is that power confided except as his auxiliaries, adjuncts, aiders, and assts. The executive head of the administration is responsible for his subordinates. He is responsible for the heads of the various Depts. He is responsible for the man agement of the business of those Depts. Being thus responsible, the President neces. sarily must have the power to remove these subordinates at pleasure. The Senate cannot appoint: the Senate cannot remove. To say that the President shall not remove a high of. ficer is to say that he shall not be removed at all. Thus we have the anomalous condition of things, that an officer of the executive dept resists and refuses to execute the commands of his constitutional superior charged with carrying out the laws of Congress; and there is no power of the superior to enforce the obedience of the inferior, or in case of obdurate disobedience to put in his place a faithful and obedient officer! Thus the subordinate is higher than the principal: the inferior sets at defiance his oil. By your bill the President is not allowed to remove from office, and by the Constitution the Senate cannot remove, except upon impeachment. Neither, then, alone can remove. We have an Executive elected for 4 years, and the subordinates appointed by him, unless there is an agreement to remove him or them between the President and Senate, will hold their offices during life, unless by law the term of office should be limited. The Senate alone cannot remove, and you deny that the President alone can do it. Then it depends on the agreement between the President and the senate whether a corrupt and incompetent official should be removed. Will they agree? They will never agree when the Senate is composed of a large majority of the political enemies of the Executive. The President cannot remove and the Senate cannot remove, and they cannot agree; what is to be the result of this state of things? subordinate officers will have paramount authority; they may stand out in defiance of the President, their superior officer. Not only is the Constitution against this condition of things, but it ought to be against it. The President is the man who is to select. He is supposed to be of high and illustrious character, who has been raised to exalted position by the judgment of the people. He is put into Presidential office, charged with all its powers and respon sibilities, including the power to remove corrupt and incompetent officers and the power to appoint those who are honest and compe tent. If you take it from him and give it to the Senate, what is the result? If you give it to him and the Senate conjointly, what is the result? The result will be a dead lock. If not that result then the executive dept will be domineered over and controlled in regard to appointments by the Senate, and the Senate will become the dispenser of all the Government patronage pertaining to the executive branch of the Government and which does and of right ought to be within the power and control of the executive head. I would not wrest this power from the President and place it in the Senate, because it would tend to destroy all subordination and unity of design and action so necessary to the independence and efficiency of the executive branch of the Government, and tend to the absorption and consoli dation of all the powers of Government by Congress, and thus diminish, if not destroy, the conservative elements in our political system, intended to protect from encroachment the right of the States and the liberty of the citizen. Under this bill the President will only have theright of suspension. He can suspend the officer for a short time while his case is to be Presented to the Senate for trial; and as thereare many 1000s of officers employed in all the various branches of the civil service of the Government, and consequently cases of corruption and incompetency constantly be:ing exhibited requiring removals and reap intments, then without the power of removal in the hands of the President, the public interest would be continually jeopardized; or otherwise, if the President's authority be limited to temporary suspension, until the Senate should try eachcase upon its own merits upon charges and proof of incompetency or official corruption. In such case that august body, the senate of the U.S., would resolve itself into a petty partisan court, and all its time be taken up in trying 100s, perhaps1,000s, of petty cases of joi delinquency of executive officers, and the POTUS, the chief executive head of a greatGovernment, would degenerate into a public prosecutor of 1000s of petty officers for petty offenses. Results such as these and othoers still more the hammer fell.)