Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Speaker, this House is sitting as a court of justice in the discharge of an unpleasant duty to itself and the country, growmg out of a personal difficulty between 2 of its members, and however much we may regret the occurrences which have called forth this investigation and now demands our action, we owe it to ourselves, to the country, and to posterity as well as to the'gentlemen arraigned, that we should free our minds of all possible bias, personal or partisan, and discuss and decide these questions with strict imartiality and according to our bestjndgment. ndinasmuch as the questions involved are of a judicial nature, (l propose to discuss them as if they were pending in a court of justiee, and for this purpose I adopt the majority report of the committee so far as the statement of facts is concerned, and viewing them from the impar tial position or stand point which my personal and political relations toward the gentlemen more immediately involved warrant me in claiming, I proceed at once to state some of the reasons which have led me to conclusions different from those of the committee. The admission of the honorable chairman of the committee that the paragraph in the report which refers to Colonel Pennybaker, Colonel Grigsby, and Dr. McGrew, as having been present at the assault and battery “ as friends of General Roussmu should not be held to mean being present with loaded pistols. that they were there by any previous arrangement 0 that gentleman, relieves the case of much difficulty; and be having also admitted that the testimony warrants ii.correction of that part of the report which allirins that Mr. GRIN xrnn. was not actuated by malice or personal feelingtowurd Mr. ROUSSEAU, another ugly feat ure in the report falls to the ground, and with it must also fall the censure that is directed toward Colonel Grigsby and Dr. McGrew for For if they were not there as friends of General Rousseau by previous arrangement, it will be difficult to hold them, and much more difficult and unrea sonable to hold him responsible for their presence upon that occasion, and inasmuch as no use was attempted or previously intended to be made of those weapons, the fact of their existence there at the time can have nothing to do with the case except to embarrass it. Stripped, therefore. of all cumulative matter, the case stands briefly as follows: Mr. GRIN Nnm. feeling himselfinsulted at some allusion which General Rousseau made to him at a mass meeting in NewYork, in which he was referred to as “one Grinnell, ” and also at some allusions which were made to'him in this House, which all agree were parliamentary, took occasion to obtain unanimous consent to make a personal explanation and in the course of that explanation used language which was not only unparliamentary, but of a character the most olTensive that it is possible to conceive; language which, if believed, must transmit the name of General ROUSSEAU to posterity with everlasting infamy. Called to order, he resumed his seat, and up to this hour. although his attention has been called to this matter by the raising of the committee, by the investigation before that committee, by the report of the committee, and by the debate on this floor, yet he has maintained a most sullen silence, and has not even suggested or allowed any suggestion to be made that he is willing to offer any apology to the House for this violation of its order, decorum, and dignity; much less has he shown any disosition to apologize to General Rousseau for his assault upon him, nor has he signified his willingness to retract the imputation of cowardice which he has made toward a gallant and brave officer of the Army, although the united voice of the whole country, the sentiment of this House and all the matters relating to this investigation concur in denoun ciu 1' his statement as having no foundation in truih, but made without any personsl knowl edge of his own, and upon in ormation which, to say the least of it, is false. Yet, sir, by the majority report we are called upon to excl the one and to say that we disapprove o the course of the other. This I cannot do. I had doubt of our authority to disapprove because of the technical objection that the words were not specifically objected to and by re uest taken down in writing at the time, but now agree with The SPEAKER that they were objected to, and inasmuch as our corps of most efficient and faithful reporters did in this case, and always do, put in writing all words 5 ioken in debate or otherwise upon the floor, they were taken down,not by any special request, but under the general regulation substantially according to the facts; so I have no longer any difficulty on that score. The language havin been used while occupying the floor of the house, and being clearly unpni liamentary and highly offensive, I have no hesitation in entering my unqualified disap proval of it, nor have I any doubt of our authority to do so under the‘rules of this House. This disposed of, we come to the proposition to expel the Gentfrom Kentucky, [Mr. ROUSSEAU, ] and very naturally we ask the nestion, why expel the one and not the ot er? Before I can vote to expel one who holds his seatb the same right that I hold mine, and thus eprive an American constituency of its rightful and chosen representative on this floor, I must be well satisfie of its forfeiture and of my right to renounce it. So far as General Rousseau and his acts are asst concerned, it matters not.a single pin that there were any persons present at the castiexcepting that the act, being committe in so public a manner, is more flagrant. His offense consists in having committed an assault and battery upon a member of Congress for words spoken upon the floor of the House. It is not and it cannot be maintained that this was done in violation of the good order and decorum of this House as an organized body, and therefore the facts that it was done upon the east portico of the main Capitol, about midway between the 2 Houses of Congress and about 150 yards from this Hall, at a time when this House was not in session, do not in any material way change the character of the offense. It is not an offense against the order of this House; the committee do not so contend, and for such an offense the facts give this House no jurisdiction. The committee, however, affirm that the offense is a personal indignity to a member of this House and was so intended, and that is certainly true; but they have not undertaken to show that we have any authority to punish a member of this House for inflicting an indignity upon the person of one who is also a member; much less do they in any way pretend that for such personal indignity we have a right to deprive a constituency of its chosen Representative. If we can take cognizance of mere ficrsonal indignities offered to members of this house it will matter not where the are committed. whether near the Capitol or or from it, nor when committed, whether before the member is sworn in or after. such an authority can only be based upon the assumption that the person of a member of Congress becomes sacred by his election; and if another member is to be held responsible at the bar of this House for munching one' away from the Halls of this House, then any citizen can be so held, while a member may strike a citizen with impunity, so for as this House is concerned; and thus the member becomes a privileged character and members a privileged) class, to be recognized and defer re to by the people wherever they are. Surely, this doctrine does not harmonize with that perfect equality of all men upon which our Government is founded, fiifltfits that equality is simply an equality before the law, and then we must turn all such cases over to the courts oflaw where member and constituent, Congressman and citizen may be tried, not by an undefined and mixed tribunal like this House, but by courts of law and according to the law of the place where the offense is committed. The facts that the party assaulted is a member of Congress, that the object of the assault was to derade him, and thus lessen his usefulness as a cprescutative, are matters which a court of justicc may well consider, and if committed by a member it is expressly provided that he may be imprisoned and even dotained from the House while in actual session for any otfense amounting to a breach of the Beace. Then why not leave the courts of this district and city to bear and determine this case of assault and battery according to law? Their authority to do so is unquestioned and unuestidnable. but the committee say the offense is a breach of the privileges of this House, guarantied by the clause of the Constitution which declares that“They [members of Congress]shall in all cases. penxcnelepztetrdeason, felony, and breachpt' the peace, be from arrest during their attendanceat thesession of their respectiveHouses and in goin to and returning from thesame; and or an specc ordebate in either House they shall not equestioned in any other place." These are the privileges of members of congress. Not one word is here said about personal indignities. The arrest referred to is an arrest by process of law, and that process is not suspended exec t when the member is net equally attending to is official duty, and that not because of any sacredness that is supposed to have attached to his person, but because of the right. which his constituents have to his Ition, services, and the cause of arrest is for debt, libel, slander, or other tort not amounting to a breach of the peace. For these he is not to be arrested while attending to his oliicial duties, but may be arrested at any other time, and the arrest here referred to is very evidently an arrest by legal process. The latter clause declares that for any is eech or debate he shall not be questioned, 'c. What kind of questioning is here meant? Surely, it is not the right which his constituents have to call him to account for the manner in which he may discharge his duties. The 1st clause privileges the member from arrest going to, attending upon, and coming from the sessions, &c., and the 2nd privileges him from accounta bility for what he shall say in speech or debate. Is it not evident that in both of these cases the arrest and questioning mean the same, and have reference only to arrests by legal process and to legal accountability sounding in dam ages in on court of law? Could the framers of the Constitution have intended by this clause to protect members from assaults and batteries and personal violence? Are not all men equally protected from such interferences by the(law otpthe land, and were they not so protected at the time of the adoption of the Constitution? Does the constitution, as it stands, by its omission authorize a violent and unlawful arrest of a member when he is not going to, comin from, or at tending upon the session of his house, or had not the 2nd clause been inserted, could a member have been violently held responsible for what he said in speech or debate? If such clause was not necessary for such protection, why was it inserted? such being the case, why hold General Rousseau for a violation of the Constitution in doing what the Constitution was not intended to prevent? Violent arrests and assaults were then , as now, breaches of the peace and punishable by law throughout the whole country, and the clause in the constitution was never intended to take this right of trial by jury and according to law from the proper tribunals recognized and authorized under the Constitution. The fact that the constitution has provided no penalty for such arrests and such questionings)fOVGSthat it was not intended that Congress should execute the Constitution as the courts do the law. Where do the committee find authority for in dicating expulsion as the proper measure of punishment for a breach of privilege in this respect? There is no law fixing that punishment for any offense. They so. it is necessary as a means of protection; an that would be a very good argument in favor of the passage of a law to that effect except that expulsions and banishments are not according to our code. Fines and imprisonments are the penalties for crimes in this country that are not capital. If we have authority to fix a certain punishment, because that kind of punishment seems most necessary to prevent the recurrence of the evil, then we may select such as commends itself to the particular case and the party offending, and a majority might favor banishment or the guillotine. But, Mr. Speaker, we have authority to expel. Itisin the Constitution, article one, section live. It is as follows: "Each Housemaydeterminethe rules of its procoedings, punish its members for disorderlybehavior, ggpgnth the concurrence of 2/3rds, expel a meni Here, then, is your authority to exel a member use.measure of punishment. when, therefore, we have made rules which prescribe expulsion as a punishment for disorderly behavior, and any member violates such rules we can expel him. Disorderly behavior is behavior in violation of good order, in the parliament ary sense, and may be found in what might be styled parliamentary common law, but ought to be found in the written order and previously adopted rules and regulations of the House. In the absence of such law we cannot now make a rule, a resolution, or an order to take effect after the offense is committed, for that would be exposlfacto and is specially prohib ited. The SPEAKER is the organ of the House upon all questions of order. He looks to his rules for(iiis authority to preserve order. His navel we are all bound to respect, and hearing its sound we are supposed to be silent. Suppose the honorable Speaker had been present at this castigation, whlat course would e have taken to reveut it or restore order? By disorderly be avior, in the sense of the Constitution, is meant behavior disorderly as to the rules which the House is authorized to determine, not that kind of behavior which is disorderly as to the public peace and general good order of society. Would he have called the Gentfrom Kentucky to order? If he were expected to do that he would have to carry his gavel with him wherever he goes, and our Sergeant at Arms, with his mace, would have to accompany him to enforce his orders. Supose he had been present, and some one, ha called the Gentfrom Kentucky to order, and having stated his point of order that the gentleman was violating the Constitu‘tion, would not The SPEAKER have answered, as he always does, and very properly, that he can only enforce rules of order, and not the constitution? But, Mr. Speaker, I will pass to another clause of the section held to have been violated, and inquire, what is meant by s eech or debate, as the words are used in the ‘onstitution? I contend that these words mean legit imate debate, such speech or debate as is tol erated under the rules of the House. Can it be said that because a member obtains the floor and, not being called to order, proceeds to indulge in what may be called more blackguard ism, that the Constitution was intended to protect him because he calls it. debate? I use the word hlackguardism, not in its offensive sense, but as indicatingthat kind of offensive language that has no relation to any matter before the House and is personal in its character. I admit that he cannot be sued in a court of justicc for what is said upon the floor of the House, although it be the purest blackguardism, for the reason that no court of justice can decide a question of order in this House. Courts are bound to presume that what is permitted to he said on the floor of Congress is said in order and legitimately, and hence it is that even in blackguardism the member is protected without holding that the Constitution intended to go further and authorize us to protecthim from assault away from the Hall of the House. general Rousseau is guilty of a crime; he has violated the law, and being a member of Congress he is uilty of a very bad example, and is liable to c punished according to law. The prov ocation was reat, but does not justify the rem edy he has 0 osen. Were this crime a felony or of such infamous character as to render him unworthy to be as sociated with gentlemen upon this floor, then we could excl him, no matter where it was committed. Kud having expelled for such reason we might refuse him a seat for the same reason if reelected, and so an offense warrant ing expulsion should also warrant rejection as a isqualitication to occupy a seat. He is not only guilty 0 a crime, but, in my judgment, he is ilty of a great folly. Had e known how little regard was paid to these aspersions of his character, he would, perhaps, have taken no notice of them, but he did not know this. The iron went to his heart. The foul slander was written upon the records of this House and must go down to osterity. He could make no rely, for he could not descend to the same level) on which he was assailed. Parliamentary language would take no effect upon his assailant. 'lhe charge of cowardice which it is easy to make and easy tOJlfOVO I true, yet cannot so easily be disprove though never so false. He could not ask an investigation and his assailant would not. The world read the charge and heard.of no denial. The verdict of the country is With him now that the attention of the people is called to his character. The committee have said all that they could to refute the libel so far as mere declarations go. But they ask us to expel him for violating the privileges of debate, and thus dignity the slander by calling it debate. To this I say no, I will not do it. I will not be a party to this slander in any way, and in going out of my way to find authority to expel him I betray ray willingness to become a party to the slander. Had he violated the rules of the House I would say so. Were I ajndge on the bench, and were the case before me, I would execute the law, but I will not be a volunteer to hunt up some sort of a punishment for a brave man who has done no more to vindicate his honor than he has done. Under all the circumstances it is well that this investigation has taken place. The truth has been developed, history is set right, and the honor of a gallant soldier stands vindicated before his countrymen. Here I would prefer to stop and ladly vote to lay the whole subject upon the table. If anybo y wants a further vindication of the law let him go into the courts and get it, for, thank God, they are again open, open to all, the hi best and the lowest, the citizen sovereign an the servant Congressman. Before this tribunal the offender will be punished according to his olfcnse and the establilshed law relating to it. He will not be there arraigned as he seems to be here. There the counsel for the prosecution will not be permitted to wander back to transactions several months a o, as the Gentfrom Iowa [Mr. Winsos'] has done, to weigh and balance accounts between the parties to the end that it may be ascertained whose quarrel was then most just. Surely this is far fetched, but not any further than much of the debate upon this question, especially that part of the argument of the Gentfrom Iowa, that the Gentfrom Kentucky had violated his oath to support the Constitution when he struck his colleagne with a rattan. If that argument is true, then the Gentfrom Kentuckyis guilty of. treason. Yes, sir, treason against the Constitution, proved by an overt act. Of the same character is the argumentrelating to the threat to shoot an officer of the Freedmen’s Bureau. All these have really nothing to do with thr question before the House, an would be ruled out in a court of justice. Hence the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution in leaving all these matters to be determined in courts of justice according to the established and recognized law of the land. With their decision and determination, with power to appeal, all men ought to be satisfied.