Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, in the discussion which I propose to give to the measurebefore the Senate, I need hardly say that I shall not be influenced by any party motive. The nestions which are before us are in part strict y legal questions, and in part questions of policy. The objections which the President mahes to the bill, and which have induced him to return it without his approval, relate as well to the expediency of the measure as to its alleged unconstitutionality. I do not understand that the chairman of the ComJudiciary denies that the 1st ground of objection is as good a one for the application of the presidential power of veto as the 2nd. The purpose of clothing the President with that power was 1st to guard his own Dept against eneroachments by the legislative Dept, to guard the States against the like eneroachinents, and to guard the individual citizen also; but in addition to that object, one of the purposes of the Convention was toguard against inexpedient and ill considered legislationQLooking to what had taken place in the Congress of the Confederacy, and to what had occurred in the several State governments, the members of the Convention of 1787 were sat isfied that it was almost as necessary to the public weal to protect the country against in expedient legislation as it was to protect it against unconstitutional legislation. It has heretofore, by some, been doubted whether the President is justified in usingl the power except upon constitutional roun. hat principle was, in art, urged y the leadin members of the big party, at the head of which stood Mr. Clay, when they became very much dissatisfied with, the exercise of that power by the then POTUS, General Jackson; and the fact being called to the attention of Mr. Madison, he expressed his opinion upon it in a letter, written with the aiiility which always marked his writings, dated on the 15th of October, 1834, in which he said: “Another novelty of great practical importance is the alleged limitation of the qualified veto of the President to constitutional objections. That it extends to casesofin expediency also. and wassounder stood and so vindicated. (seethe Federalist.) cannot be doubted. My veto to the bank was expresslyto the inexpediency of its plan and the validitv of the veto was never questioned." HadiaonI Writinpa, vol. 4, p. 369. The honorable member from Illinois seems to suppose that he finds a valid objection to the exercise of this power by the President, in this instance, in the fact that the bill itself was passed by more than 2/3rds of the mem pers of each House; and he cites, in support of that doctrine, a speech delivered by the Yresident when he wasa member of this body, in 1860, in which the Senate, perhaps, were induced by what the honorable member read from the part of the speech to which he called our attention, to believe that the President had stated the principle to be that a bill so passed could not constitutionally be subjected to the veto power. If he had read the latter part of the same sentence, he would have found that the Presidentintended no such thing. Let me read a passage that the honorable member omitted to read: "I am one of those who have always been the advocateof the veto power under the Constitution. Vhen bare majorities have passedbills it is a tary salu check to arrest what may be called hasty and intem crate legislation. I have advocated its exercise. t on by seldom and cautiously, in that view; but, sir w cu, acoordin to the spirit. if not according to the exactle tter. of the Constitution, a measure has beenpassedby n.2/3rds vote of bothHouses. after a discussionof 15 years.showing that it is not hasty or imrovident legislation I say, respect to the public in gment of the nation, respectto both Housesof Congress.shouldhave beenacreatinducement to the Executive to approve such a bill.” and of the soundness of that doctrine I suppose there will not be 2 opinions. Then, Mr. Johnson, when he was a member of this body, merely stated that the fact that a bill had been passed by a majority of that kind, a majority rendered necessary for the purpose of overruling a veto, was a reason why the President should ver cautiously apply the power for its defeat. Iintso far from its being the judgment of the Senate, as it certainly was not his, that a bills being passed by that majority took it out of the veto power, the honor able members answer to a question which I propounded to him at the close of his speech, shows that, in the judgment of the Senate, the veto power was properly exercised, for the bill which in that instance had been passed by more than 2/3rds of both branches did not become a law, as many of those who had voted in favor of the bill changed their votes under the influence of the Presidents veto message. Now, in order to see exactly whether it was properin the President to disapprove of this bill, it becomes necessa to ascertain with precision what the bill is. The honorable member from Illinois insists upon it that there is no section in it that is iiotcleariy consfilTItional. He maintains the constitutionality of, the 1st section upon the ground, 1st, that it i is merely declaratory of what the law is, and ( 2ndly, that if it is not declaratory, it is a law which Congress has a right to make, because, in his judgment, it is within the power of Congress by law to declare who shall be citizens of the U.S. The honorable member referred to the decision of Chief Justice Marshall in a case reported in 6 Peters for the purpose of showing that a citizen of the U.S. who has been naturalized and who resides in aSLate of the U.S. has a right to go into the courts of the U.S. The honorable member clearly, as I think, misdppmisidd the decision to which hereferred. The question before the court was, whether it appeared upon the face of the pleadings that the party going into the court below ada right to go into that court as a court of the U.S. Under the Constitution of the U.S.; and the act of 1789, which was passed to carry outits provisions, the jurisdiction of the courts of the U.S., where it was made to depend upon the character of the parties, was given only in cases where the party plaintiff and the party defendant were citizens of different States; and the question before the court was whether it appeared upon the face of the declaration in the particular case that the party plaintiff was a citizen of a State and, as such, entitled to go into the courts of the U.S. The language of the declaration was that he was a naturalized citizen of the U.S. residingin the State of Louisiana. The court came to the conclusion that that aver ment was equivalent to an averment that he was a citizen of the State of Louisiana. in the absence of anything to the contrary. But that is not the question which this bill presents. He became a citizen under the naturalization laws of the U.S., and the authority of congress to pass such laws could not be doubted? The effect of the exercise of that authority was merely to rid the particular party of the disabilities arising from alienage and to give him the capacity of becomin a citizen of the U.S. When the eclaration, therefore, averred that the original disability of aliens e was removed in that instance by the party ecoming a citizen under the naturaization laws, the only other question upon which the case before the court turned was, whether he had sufficiently averred in his declaration that he was a citizen of a different State from the State in which the other party resided; and the court decided that an averment of a residence in a State of one who was alleged to bea citizen of the U.S. was equiva lent to an averment that he was a citizen of the State; and I suppose no one could well have doubted before, or will now doubt, that the decision was able itimate one. But that is not this case. This bill, in its 1st section, makes all who were born in the U.S. at any time, and who are now living, citizens of the U.S., and, as such, citizens of the States in which they may respectivelyJcside, and confers upon them all the rights belonrring to those who have here tofore been considered citizens of the States in which they may reside. Now, Mr. President, you are not to be told that the only express authority conferred upon the Congress of the U.S. in relation to citizenship, that is to say in relation to the power of converting one who is not a citizen into a citizen, is the authority to be found in the delegation to Congress of the power of easing uniform laws on the subject. of naturalization. There is not a single word in the Constitution which gives to this Dept of the Government, or to any other dept of the Government, any power to decide who shall be a citizen of the U.S. What is the effect of the exercise of the power to pass uniform laws on the subject of naturalization? What was the design of the power? What is the operation of the power when it is exerted? The csign of the power is to remove the disabilities arising from the fact of alienage, and nothing else. The operation of the power is to place the party, whose disability arising from alienage is removed by virtue of the naturalization laws, in the same condition with anybody else; but whether he is to be considere as a citizen of a State of the U.S. by virtue of the removal of the disabilities consequent upon his taking advantage of the naturalization laws, presents an entirely different inquiry. Perhaps I can inakc the view which I should otherwise present in my own language more apparent to the Senate and to the country by reading from an opinion in the Dred Scott case not that opinion ronounced by the majority of the court, wthei has been so often. as I think, shamelessly perverted to the dispar agcinent, not only of the majority who sanctioned that opinion, but of the very admirable lawyer by whom the opinion was pronounced; but the opinion of Mr. Justice Curtis, in which he differed from that of the majority an opinion full of learning and as able as any opinion ever pronounced by any judge of. that or any other tribunal. The question which, in that. part of the opinion that I am about to quote, e was discussing, was, whether Dred Scott was a citizen entitled to sue in the courts of the U.S. The majority of the court decided that in consequence of the blood which was supposed to run in his veins, and was alleged to run in his veins by the plea. that is, the Africun blood, he being dese ended from an African ancestor who came to the U.S. as a slave, he could not become a citizen of the U.S.R. Justice Curtis held that the Constitution of the U.S. assumes that citizenship may be acquired by nativity. That is the common law, that is the law of the civilized world, that he who is born in a country and not made a slave at the moment he is born by any municipal regulation, becomes, by virtue of his birth, a citizen; but he by no means held that his being a citizen of the U.S. by virtue of his birth made him a citizen of any State of the U.S. Let me read a sentence or 2 from his opinion. That part of the opinion to which I refer will be found in 19 Howard, age 577 and onward. After having stated, an no doubt stated correctly, that at the adoption of the Coustitution of the U.S. there were 5 States in which persons of color were entitled to the right of suffrage, and in which, therefore, they iiticipated in the deliberations of the States y whom the Convention was authorized, and afterward in the conventions of the several States by which the Constitution itselfwas sanetioned. he came to this conclusion: "And niy opinion is. that under the Constitution of the U.S. every free personborn on the soil of a State who is a citizen of that State by force at its constitution or laws is also a citizen of the U.S. " 1 Mark the notification. It isnot nativity that imparts the c aracter of citizeuship alone. There must be added to the fact of nativity, the other fact, that at the time of his birth he is, by the laws of the State in which he is born, a citizen; and the 2 things occurring, birth and citizenship, by the laws of the State, he becomes, by virtue of the 2, a citizen of the U.S. If there could be any doubt that I correctly interret thatpart ofhis opinion, thatdoubt seems to e removed by subsequent portions of it, to which I will now call the attention of the Sea ate. He says: “The 1st sectionof the 2ndarticle of tble constitution uses the language. a natural born citmen. gt tllius assumesthat citizenship may be acquired by in and then he goes on to state that thatis the rule everywhere, and proceeds: “The Constitution having recoenized the rule that personsborn Within the several Statesare citizensof the U.S., one of 4 things must be true." I beg the attention of my friendfrom Illinois to this. I do not know that he has seen the opinion with reference to this question. The Constitution assumingthat there maybe citizenship by virtue of birth where the law of the State in which the birth occurred confers upon the party born the character of citizen, and “Tho Constitption having reeoiznized the rnlethat personsborn Within the several States are citizensof the U.S. one of 4 things must be true." What are they? “ 1. That the Constitution itself has describedwhat native born persons shall or shall not be citizens of the U.S.; or That it has empowered congressto do so; or “3. That. all free persons.born within the several States are citizens of the U.S.: or "4. That it is left to eachState to determinewhat free persons. born within its limits shall becitizensof such State and thereby“ What I emphasize is italicized by the judge “ becitizens of the U.S. " I will not read everything that he says in relation to the alternatives, but only portions: " If there be such a thing as citizenship of the U.S. acquired by birth within the States. which the Constitution expresslyrecognizes and no one denies.then thesefour alternatives embracethe entire subject and it only remains to selectthat one which is “ true. That the Constitution itse lf has defined citizenship of the U.S. by declaring what persons.born within the several States, shall or shall not be citizens of the U.S. will not bepretended. It contains no such declaration. l u may dismiss the 1st alternative as Without doubt unfounded." That is to say, the Constitution has not stated, or, to use the language of his question, the Constitution has not prescribed what native born persons shall or shall not be citizens of the U.S. The proposition, to use his own language a ain, may e dismissed as a proposition whol y unfounded. If that is untrue, then is the other proposition true? If it does not of itself declare who are to be citizens of the States, and thereby citizens of the U.S., is there anything in the Constitution which confers upon Congress the power to do the same thin"? Let us see what he says about that: "Has it empowered Congressto enact what free persons.born Within the severalStates, shallor shall not hecitizens of the U.S.? “Before exainiuinir the various provisions of the Constitution which may relate to this question. it is importniit to LOiiSl(l flfo ra moment the substantial nature of this inquiry. It is. in effect.whether the Constitution hasempowered congressto createpriv ilcced classeswithin the States.who alone can be entitled to the franchise and powersofoitizenship of the U.S. If it be admitted that thoConstitution has enabled congressto declare what free persons.born within the several States, shall be citizens of the U.S., it must at the sametime be admitted that it is an unlimited power. If this subject is within the contrulef Congress, it must dependwholly on its discretion." Then he proceeds immediately after to state in very clear and forcible language that the Constitution confers no such power upon congress. I will read a part of what he says: “ Among the powersexpresslygranted to Congress is the pOWQtIo establisha uniform rule of naturalization. It is not doubtedthat this is a powerto prescribe a rule for the removal of the disabilities consequenton foreign birth." "It appears. then that the only power expressly granted to Congressto legislate concerning citizenship is conhned to the removal of the disabilities of foreign birth." Leaving the inquiry whether there is in the Constitution any express authority conferred upon Congress to legislate at all in relation to F the status of citizenship, he proceeds to inquire i whether there exists any implied power to accomplish the same end, and examines all the clauses: "Whether therebs anything in the Constitution from which a broader power may be llnpllttl, will bestbeseenwhen wecometo examine the 2 other alternatives.which are.whetherall free persons born on the soil of the severalStates, or only such of them as may by o citizens of each State. respectively. are thereby citizens of the U.S. the last of these alternatives, in my Judgment, contains the truth." That is to say. there is no power, express or implied, which confers upon Congress any authority to declare what free persons are to be considered as citizens because of their birth within a State except such, or, to use again his own language, that it is true only of such as may be citizens of each State, and because they are citizens of each State by virtue of their birth under the constitution and laws of, the State of their birth they become citizens of the U.S. That, and that alone, contains the truth. “Undoulitedly. as has already been said. it is a principle of public law. recognizedby the Constitution itself. that, birth on the soil of a country both creates the duties and confers the rights of citizenship." That is the doctrine relied upon by my friendfrom Illinois; but the judge says: " But. it must be rememberedthat thoughthe constitution wasto form a Government and under it the U.S.A were to beone united sovereign nation. to which loyalty and obedience on the one Side and from which protection and privileges on the other would be due. yet the several sovereign Statrs. whose people were then citizens. were not only to continue in existence. but with powersunim piiired. except so far:is they were granted by the people to the national Government. mousthepuWers unquestionably possessed by the several Stateswas that Of determining what persons should and what personsshould not be citizens." and having come to the conclusion that that power was not delegated by the Constitution of the U.S., he came necessarily to the other conclusion consequent upon that, that it remains as it stood before that, a power exclusively belonging to the States respectively. What is the consequence of that doctrine if it be true, and I think I may chal lenge my friendfrom Illinois to disprove it? The authority over citizenship under the constitution of the U.S. is not delerrated to Congress except in one particular, and that not one which was intendedJ to make the party in whose favor the power might be exercised a citizen of a State, but merely for the purpose of removing the disability which alone the Government of the whole could remove consequent upon his foreign birth and his foreign allegiance. That was a question in which the whole were interested; it was a matter of General moment; it related to the common objects for which the Constitution itself was adopted; foreign nations were to be considered; and because no one State had the power of legislating upon any subject in which a foreign nation or a foreign citizen might be concerned, it was deemed advisable to vest a power which might otherwise create difficulties to the injury of the whole in the Government to which were submitted the interest and safety of the whole. But the removal of the disabilities under the naturalization laws did not create the party a citizen of anyone State. That power, in the words of Mr. Justice Curtis, remained as it stood before the Constitution was adopted, exclusively belonging to the States themselves. Now, what does this bill do? It says that every man born within the U.S., whether born as a slave or not for it is not prospective, operating only upon those who may be born subse uciit to the abolition of slavery in the U.S. but whoever was born at any time, though born in slavery, is to be considered a citizen by reason of the fact of his being born alone. The States where slavery existed declared, at the time of the birth, if he was born of a slave mother that he was a slave. The constitution and laws of the States, undisputed, declared I mean the States in which slavery existed that no dese endant of a colored: whether she was free or not, was to be 6, {lacitizen by virtue of birth; and yet ecumm Illinois, and the Congress of re! States in passing this bill, have that those who were born in a state who were never citizens as long as that condition existed, who were prevented frOm becoming citizens by the constitution of the State in which they resided, which has never been changed, shall, by force of this enactment, be considered as citizens of the U.S., and of course for all purposes. If it be true that whether birth is to give citizenship of the U.S. depends upon the fact whether the party born by the laws of the State in which he is born becomes a citizen of thatState, then I should like to know where is the authority in Congress to interfere with what the State has done in the past, or may be doing in the present, or may do in the future, unless it can be accomplished under the constitutional amendment, to which I shall advert by and by. The honorable member from Illinois disposes of the Presidents objection to the 1st section of this bill by saying that it is merely declaratory, I know it is competent for any legislative body, on a question where differences of opinion exist in relation to any legal reposition, to remove them by declaratorylegis Ihtion; but that is not the purpose of this bill. It professes to be passed in the exercise of a positive and absolute powerto change the law not to declare what the law was in order to remove doubts, but to make the law. It as sumes, or otherwise there would be no occasion for it that birth alone does not confer citizens ip; and assuming that no citizenship would exist in consequence of birth alone, it declares that birth alone, in 5 its of State constitution and State laws, shal confer citizenship. Now, with all deference to the opinion of the honorable chairman of the ComJudiciaryar, that seems to me to be a proposition as c early erroneous as any position can bein relation to cpnstitutiona prlaowp. The States were sovereign it before the Constitution was adopted; an the Constitution not only, according to its very terms, does not profess to confer uponthe Government of the U.S. all governmental power, but as fiar as Congress is concerned professes to confer upon that Dept of the Government only the particular delegated powers there enumeratedbut so anxious were the fraifiers "of that instrument and the great men of that day, to whom the subsequent organization of this Government was le, that although they had no doubt as to the principle that only the delegated powers were granted, (and the de bates in the Convention itself as well as the debates in the conventions of the several States when the Constitution was before them for adoption or rejection all went upon the theory that no powers were conferred except such as were expressl granted or as were reasonably to be implie as necessar to carry out the powers expressly granted) y the 10th amendment adapted recently after the Constitution went into operation, and recommended by the men many of whom were the framers of the Constitution itself, that the powers not dele gated by the Constitution and not denied to the States by the same instrument were to be considered as reserved to the States respectively or to the people. Standing, therefore, as well upon the nature of the Gpvernment itself, as a Government of enumerated powers specially delegated, as upon the express provision that everything not ranted was to be considered as remaining with t. e States unless the Constitution contained some particular prohibition of any power before belonging to the States, what doubt can there be that ifa State possessed the power to declare who should be or citizens before the Constitution was adopted that power remains now as absolute and as conclusive as it was when the Constitution was adopted? The bill, therefore, changes the whole theory of the Government. The esident, then, I think, is right. I o further than he does: he expresses a doubt whether Congress has the power; I affirm, with all deference to the better judment of the majority of the Senate who vote for the bill, and to that of the honorable chairman of the ComJudiciary, that it is perfectly clear that no such power exnsts in Congress as the one attempted to be exercised by the 1st section. I he d, with Mr. Justice Curtis and his opinion to this day has never been questioned that citizenship of the U.S. consequent upon birth in a State is to depend upon the fact whether the constitution and laws the State make the party so born a citizen of the State. What is the remaining provision of the 1st section I Not satisfied with assuming that they had the power to declare that all persons not subject to any foreign Power born in the U.S. are to be considered hereafter as citizens of the U.S., and leaving the rights of such persons to depend upon the fact of their being citizens, the section goes on to provide what rights shall belong to them. Vhat is that for? Is that declaratory, too? Citizenship, says the honorable member, car ries with it certain rights. What rights? He read to the Senate yesterday from the 1st and 2nd volumes of Kents Commentaries, and particularly, I think, from 1 Kent, page 46, a passage which he will rdon me for saying has noting in the worldmto do with the articulnr question before us. The passage which he read merely states that every nation is bound to protect its own citizense eRainly where it has the power under its form of government. The Government of the U.S. has the authority and is bound to protect the rights of any citizen of the U.S. when invaded by anyother nation. Why? Becausethe States have no jurisdiction extra territorial, because with reference to foreign nations the States have no place at all. hat relation subsists, and can only subsist, as between the foreign nation and the General Government; and because that relation can only in that way subsist, it is the duty of the U.S., as it is the duty of every nation, to protect its own citizens. But how does that even tend to prove that a citizen of the U.S. who is entitled to demand protection when abroad from the Government of the U.S. is to be considered a citizen of anyone State? But what are these rights? The section converts him into a citizen by virtue of his birth, whieh I have endeavored to show the Senate cannot be done unless the constitution or law of the State where he is born makes him a citizen of that State, and it goes further, and says that “such citizens” that is, by force of this congressional legislation “ ofcvery race and color without regard to any previous condition of slavery, ” in, “shall have the same right in every State and Territory in the U.S. to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all oursa nd proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.” If there be apything that may be considered as true in the past in constitutional law, it is that over every one of these rights, or to speak more correctly, over every one of the subjects to which these rights are made to attach, the jurisdiction of the States was exclusive. The onorable member from Illinois seems to for get, as I think, what is the real character of our institutions. This bill, in opinion, strikes at all the reserved rights of the States. Youifiay looli in the statute book ifi vain, sir, and nobody knows it better than you do, (Mr. HARRIS in the chair) and I am sure the honorable member from Illinois will agree that such is the fact you may look in the statutes of the U.S and in the Journals of Congress in vain for the purpose of finding that at any time, from 1789 u to the breakin out of this rebellion, anybo y ever propose in Congress by legislation to regulate, by securing or otherwise, the rights which are referred i to in the latter part of this section. What are they? The declaring who may be authorized to make contracts and who may be authorized to enforce contracts, who may be authorized to sue, to be parties, and give evidence, inherit purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real andersonal estate. If congress can legislate in relation to theserihts in behalf of the black, why cannot they egislnte in relation of the same rights in behalf of the white? and T they can legislate in relation to hot), the States are abolished; because, if the firther provisionin this bill follows (as perhaps ltdoes flow legitimately upon the assumption of the constitutionality of the provisions of the 1st section to which I have adverted)t.lat congress has the authority to constitute its own tribunals for the purpose of granting relief for the enforcement oft ese rights, then the State courts may be closed up. If Congress can prescribe the rules of evidence, it is because with reference to that question this Government is a consolidated Government. I submit that nothing can be plairier than that; and yet it would have startled with surprise any member of the Convention of 1787, or any member of the Congress of the U.S. who passed the judiciary act of September, 1789, to have been told that there lurked somewhere in the Constitution of the U.S. an authority by which Congress could usurp to itself a right to enter in the limits of the several States and regulate the law of contract, the law of evidence, the law of devise, and the law of marria e. mi yet my friendfrom Illinois says that that provision is clearly constitutional; and why? Because, as I understand him, it is the business of every Government to protectits own citizens. T but is begging the entire question. It is the business of the General Government to protect citizens of the U.S. where that protection cannot be obtained through the instrumentality of the States; but where the rights of citizens of the U.S. are given by State laws over subjects intrnsted exclusively to State legislation, it is the exclusive business of the State to protect them. But that is not all. This 1st section has another provision. Not satisfied with making the parties citizens and clothing them with all the rights belonging to white citizens by the laws of the States, it says that they “shall be subject to like punishment, aims, and penal ties, and to none other.” hot invades the jurisdiction of the States over their criminal code. Congress assumes to define a crime, and defining a crime gives to its own courts exclusive jurisdiction over the crime and the party charged with its perpetration. It strikes at the criminal code of the States. The result, therefore, of the 3 provisions in this section is, that contrary to State constitutions and State laws, it converts aman that is not a citizen of a State into a citizen of the State; it gives him all the rights that belong to a citizen. of the State; and it provides that his unishment shall only be such as the State laws impose upon white citizens. Where is the authority todo that? If it exists, it is still more obvious that the result is an entire annihilation of the power of the States. It seems to be the fashion of the hour I do not know that my honorable friendfrom Illinois goes to that extent to hold to the doctrine that the sooner everything is vested in the Government of the U.S. the better for the country. It is a perilous delusion. If such apro ositiW been supposed to be found anyw ere e Constitution of the U.S., i never would have been adopted by the lo; and if it is assumed, or if it is consied as constitutional existing by virtue of some power not before mown, the Govern at will not last half a century. I have not une to read from the writings of Mr. Madison and Mr. Hamilton and the decisions of the Supreme Court on the question. But you, Mr. Presidedt, very well that consolidation of power in thement of the U.S. was looked upon as rain to republican institutions. In the 1st place, it would be sure to result in anarchy and in the 2nd place, in order to be saved from the horrors of anarch, we should be compelled to take refuge in cs otic power, and the days of constitutional liberty would soon be numbered. The doubt then was, and the doubt now should be more firmly settled in the public mind, that a country as extensive as that of the U.S. cannot exist except by means of divided sovereignties; one sovereignty having charge of all external matters, or matters between the States to which the powers of the States are inadequate; the other sovereignties having power over all internal matters to the management of which they are adequate. Despotism would soon be our fate, receded by anarchy; the military chieftain instead of being looked upon, as he should be by every republican, with alarm and concern, would be hailed as a savior in order to save us from the horrors of disorganization. But look at the 2nd section of this bill. It declares that any person who under color of any law shall subject or cause to be subjected any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by the bill, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties than those rescribed for white persons, shall be deeme guilty of a misde meanor, and on conviction shall be punished by fine or imprisonment or both. What says the President, and what, as I think, is he fully justified in saying? He has not said it as strongly as the eXigency would have justified. What is the meaning of the section? The right has been given to make and enforce contracts, &c.; an then the 2nd section says, in order to secure those rights, that he who shall interfere with them under color of law shall be considered a criminal. What is the effect of that? In the 1st place, it assumes what is true, that there is a statute, an ordinance, a regulation, or a custom inconsistent with the exercise of the rights secured by the 1st section, an existing law, organic or statutory. which declares who may sue, who may contract, who may testify, who may hold real and personal estate, who may inherit, who may marry; and if any judge, Sas the President says and as I say.) who is ca led upon to decide whether the State law is in force because this law is unconstitutional, shall hold it to be in force notwithstanding this law, is to be unished. The honorable member from Illinois told us that that is on] true where there is an intentional wrongful decision on the part of ajudge. That is not so, Mr. President. The intention is presumed from the offense. If the offense is clearly defined, an intention is made no bar to the offense; he who commits the offene is the criminal. Here it is clearly, spe cifically defined: “You, a judge of the State court who think proper to enforce as against any of the parties ujudgment inconsistentwith the rights secured by the 1st section of this bill, in consequence of any law or regulation of a State, shall be liable to an indictment in the courts of the U.S., and punished by fine, or imprisonment, or both.” The 1st section usur s, as I think, what has heretofore been considjered as the exclusive authority of the States. The 2nd section goes astep further, and declares that the judge, whether he honestly or dishonestly decides that the State law is bindin irrespective of your statute, shall be punishe. This usurpsapower inconsistent with the independence and integ rltyof the State judiciary. The 1st section strikes at the legislative authority of the States; the next strikes at the judicial de artinent of the governments of the States, an the 2 lay them both down at the footstool of Federal power. But that is not all. Unwilling to trust the State courts with the authority to pass upon the defined crimes, itgives to the district courts of the U.S. within their districts, exclusive of the courts of the States, jurisdiction. Then it abolishes all the State courts, as far as relates to these offenses, and what are the cases in which this exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the cOurts of the U.S.? That the district courts of the U.S. within their respective districts shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offensese ommittedagainstthe revisions of this act and also, concurrently with the circuit courts of the U.S., of all causes, civil and criminal, affectingpersonsyrho aredenied or cannot enforce in the courts or Judicial tribunals of the State or locality where theymaybe. any of the rights securedto them by the 1st sectionof this not: and if anysuit or prosecution.civil or criminal. has beenor shall be commencedin any State court against any such person.forany causewhatsoever or againstany oficer. cm] ormilitary or other person.for any ar rest 0I: iieitprisonment. trespasse s or wrongs done or committ by virtue or under color of authority de rived from this actor the act establishing a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmanand Refugees, and all acts amendatorythereof. o rfor refusing to do any act upon the ground that it would be inconsistent with this act. such defendant shall have the right to removesuch causefor trial to the proper district or circuit court in the manner prescribed by the act relating to habeas carpi“ and regulatinzjudicialpro ccedinys in certain cocoa.approved March 8, 863, and all acts amandatorythereof. A black man bein made to believe by the provisions of this bi i that the rights secured to him by the bill are imropery interfered with by a State or by some State Officer, or one of the commissioners or sub commissioners or agents, for there are hosts of them provided for in subsequent parts of the bill, undertaking without authority or by the use of unnecessary harshness to arrest a white citizen of a State, is met with the independence of a free man who, in the exertion of his right of self defense, slays his assailant. He is to be tried in the courts of the U.S. Any such Officer Or any colored person who, in the assertion of the rights and ) authority which he supposes to be conferred upon either by this act, slays a white man, is not to be tried for murder in a State court, but must be tried in a court of the U.S. How my friendfrom Illinois can bring his mind to the belief that there exists any authority to give such jurisdiction to the courts of the U.S., passes my comprehension. I believe he at one time belonged to a party which held to a strict construction of the Constitution. Here, practi cally, the bill goes upon the theory that there is but one Government created by the Constitution, having all legislative power and all judicial power withint e limits of every State. The whole criminal code of the States. therefore, is hereby abolished. Murder, theft, robbery, are offenses which nobody, until this bill was prosed, ever dreamed, if committed within the imits of a State, could be tried in any other court than in the courts of the State. The honorable member referred to the act of 1790, but it relates entirely to different subjects, and all the statutes to which he adverted are statutes of the same description. What is the 26th section of the act of 1790 to which he referred? The preceding section provided that no one should sue a foreign minister, and the section to which my friend referred particularly, said that if a party did sue a foreign minister he should be liable to be punished. Certainly; but why? Because the Government of the U.S. was vested with the exclusive authority in all cases depending upon the law of nations; and the law of nations saving from responsibility ambassadors accredited to the U.S., for civil debts, he who attempted to interfere offended against the government, and he offended in relation to a subject exclusively committed to the General filovernment. The power, therefore, which Congress exerted in the particular legislation to which the honorable member reverted is just the power which they exert when they provide for this punishment ofany man who counterfeits the currency of the U.S., or forges its paper, or forges its bonds or interferes with the administration of the postoffice Dept. These are all powers incidental to the possession of the express power, and in the case to which he adverted the express power was one necessarily belongin to the Government, because it was a power belonging to and regulated by the law of nations, and not by any municipal regulation. l The honorable member from Illine us that these powers should be grant granted now; that the Presidents obthat there are 11 States not no“.c sented, is entitled to no considerati.vliat Fever. The honorablemember seems to suppose that the Presidentadverted to the fact that t here were 11 States not represented as showing that Congress possessed no constitutional authority to legisliite upon the subject, supposing that they would have had the authorityif those States were represented. That is not the view taken by the President; it is an entire misap rehension of the doctrine of the President. e says no such thing, and he intimates no such thing. But assuming, what in another art of the message he denies, that the authority might be considered as existing, he submits as a question of policy whether it is right to change the whole domestic economy of those 11 States, in the absence of any representation upon this floor from them. My honor able friend asked whose fault it is that they are not represented; not for the adeaplandum appeal, for that, puarnpopsoeseo, fahiei is incapable of, as he auimadvelte upon it; when the President was imagined to have indulged in such a thing not in the spirit of the demagogue, which he never indulges in he asked, whose fault is it? Wh are they not here? He says theirhands are reeing with the blood of loyal men; that they are unable to take the oath which a statute that he assumes to be constitutional has provided; and he would have the country and the Senate to believe that that is the reason wh the are not here. Is that the fact,Mr. resi ent? These States are organized, and how organized? What have they done? They have abolished slavery by an astonishing unanimity; the have abolished nearly all the distinctions which antecedently existed between the 2 races. They have permitted the neg mes to sue; they have peimitted them to testify; they have not yet permitted them to vote. Some of them have elected to Congress men who have gone further than my honorable friendfrom Illinois in efforts to suppress this rebellion, men who have periled their ives upon many a battle field for that end, and who can take that oath just as conse ientiously as either of us; and yet they are not received. Why are theynot received 7 Because, in the judgment of the Senate, before the States can be considered as restored, congressional legislation on the subject is necessary. Whose fault is it that there has not been congressional legislation 1 Is it the fault of the 11 States? Certainly not; it is our own fault and why is it that we are in point of fact delaying their admission. whether it be considered as a fault or not? Because we want to inquire into the condition of these States. Why, in the name of Heaven, how long have we been here? We came here early in December, and this is the month of April; and here we may remain until July, or, as rumor hasit. until next December, and shall we be satisfied within that time that congressional legislation may be safely adopted? Angrare those States toblame? How are they to be judged? B the conduct of individual men? I can go, [have no doubt, intothe State so ably represented by my friendfrom Illinois and find men there by the hundred who arejust us disloyal as the same number of men who can be found in any of the States formerly in rebellion; that is to say, disloyal in the sense in which the term is used in modern times disloyal in not having confidence in the powers that be. Formerly it was want of condence in the President. Now, confidencein the President is evidence of disloyalty; now, disloyalty is want of confidence in Congress; and if any citizen of the South or anywhere else says, what he believes, that the course of the legislative Dept of the Government is calcu lated to continue the state of things which now exists, and continue to all practical purposes the war, he is considered as disloynl. How are those States now, to pursue the thought a step further? The executive branch of the Government recognizes them as in to all intents and purposes. The judicial Dept of the Government has done the same thing. I took occasion upon a previous day to advert to an order of the Supreme Court on that subject, which demonstrated that in the opinion of that tribunal the States were now in the Union, as far as that Dept of the Government is concerned. Since then, underan order passed by themselves some 4 weeks ago, they have been hearing cases from those States, and the last order announced by the Chief Justice on the last day of the courts sitting said that all the cases from the southern States would be called in their order at the beginning of the next term. Then, with reference to the other 2 Depts of the Government, these Statesare now in the enjoyment of all the rights which the Constitution of the U.S. can give them. lVe alone stand in the way of a complete restoration. The oath does not keep a I out. I have reason to believe that a great many men of the party to which my friendfrom Illinois belongs are of opinion that the oath should be modified; but if you adhere to the oath, the States can and will send representatives who can take it. But that will not do; there is some apprehension that if they are repiesented here, some mise hief may be the result. Mise hief of what kind? Mise hief of a party character? That shonldnot influence the deliberations of the Senate, and I have no reason to suppose it does. But irrespective of mise hief of a party character what possible inconvenience or disadvantage can result from the fact of their being represented on this floor? Do we not want them? There is not a member, I am sure, on the floor of the Senate that would not like to shake by the hand those who are now loyal in the southern States, forget the past, and regard the present and the future. But no; we keep them out, and the fact of their being kept out is relied upon by the honorable member from Illinois as justifying this legislation; if they were in, the concession seems to be that the legislation would be clearly unconstitutional.