Mr. HOWARD. But I think the Senator will find that in the same decision the court recognized the principle that the State of Del aware could not obstruct the navigation of that creek by any structure that she might make. I do not remember particularly about that but I think the Senator will discover that his Black bird creek case has very little relation to the question now before us. In commenting upon the commercial power. Judge Story remarks in his Commentaries, se“ction 1063: The n ext inquiry is whether this poWer to regulate commerceis exclusiveof the same powerin the State or is concurrent with it. It has beensettled the mostsolemndeliberation that the power il exulusive in the Goverpmont of the U.S. The reasoning upon which thisdoctrine is founded in to the following effect: the power to regulate commerce is general and unlimited in its terms. The full power to regulate a particular subject implies the whole power and leaves no renduum. A grunt of the whole is incompatible With the existenceof a right in another to an part of it. A grant pfa power to regulate DQBBBship { excludes the uctipn of all others who would or orn ithe same operation on the samething. tion is designed to indicate the entire result apping to those parts which remainas they were. as we I as to thosewhich are altered. producesa uniform whole which is as much disturbed and deran byohangingwhatthe regulatingpower designsto have unbounded as that on which it has operated." Now, sir, if such be the character of the commercial power as conferred upon Congress by the Constitution, if it be in reality an exc usive power. as it has been decided to be by the Supreme Court in numerous instances, it was given to Congress for some beneficial purpose, and given with the intent that Congress, on all properoccasions, should exercise it. If it be given thus exclusively, and if the whole of it has been given, as Mr. Justice Story argues that it has dieen, I ask the honorable Senfrom Maryland, and the houorable Senfrom Maine, who takes the same ground in opposition to this bill, upon what principle is it that a State can legislate at all upon the subject of foreign commerce or commerce aine n the States. Where is the basis of any such legislation? The courts say the State is divested completely of its power over the subject matter known as commerce, in all its parts and that commerce is a unit, and pertains as such exclusively to Congress. Can a State, then, insert, as one of the conditions of its charter, that the company or the private person to whom the charter relates, or to whom the license may be given, shall not engage in the business of commerce among the various States? Can a charter be predicated upon such a condition 2 The condition itself is not one which it is competent for the State Legislature to impose. It rests upon an assumption of authority which has been taken away conceded away to the Congress by the will of the American people. I need not say to the honorable Senfrom Maryland that a condition inserted in any contract which in itself is unlawful, or which it is incompetent for the parties to it to agree to, is of itse ltvoid and ine erative, and if it affects the whole instrument, ii3 no part of the instrument can be carried out according to the intention of the parties without giving effect to this particular clause, the whole instrument falls to the ground; but if portions of the instrument can be maintained, and theinfected portion, which is void as against law or for want of authority, can be so arated from the rest, then courts of law upho d t“ agreement between the parties protanlo. Now. I insist, sir, that a State charter cannot impose conditions upon a company that shall prevent, burden, or obstruct commerce, because the power to regulate commerce is granted exclusively to Congress, and therefore such a condition is void. Sir, suppose a State should assume to incor crate a company and one of the conditions oi2 the charter should be that neither the company nor any stockholder of the company should he engaged in foreign commerce; that the company should not e engaged in commerce with Canada or with any portion of the British possessions, will the honorable Senfrom Maryland contend that such a condition would be valid; that any force could be given to it, or that it would receive any attention at the hands of a court of justice? I think he will not, because it is too obvious that in such a case the Legislature has passed the boundaries of its power, and the condition it has assumed to annex is a void condition. What is the NewJersey case, socalled? I shall spend little time upon it; I will merely allude to it. I understand that the charter of the Camden and Ambo Railroad Company, connecting the city of NewYork with the city of Philadelphia, those 2 points being the termini of the road, contains in it a clause to this sheet: "That it shall not be lawful at anytimeduring the said railroad charter to constructany otherrailroads in this State without the consent of the said compa niesThat means the companies constituting the whole line“ which shall be intendedor usedfor the transportation of passengersor merchandise between the cities of NewYork and Philadelphia or to competein businesswith the railroad authorized by the act to which this supplementis relative.” I That charter also contains, as one of its precious provisions, this most singular imosition upon the citizens of other States, thatt e company shall pay into the treasury of the State of NewJersey ten cents perca ita for every assen er who shall pass over the line between Yew ork and Philadelphia. If I misstate this provision of the charter I desire to be corrected.