Mr. MORRILL. The Senfrom Massachusetts has said, perha, in defense of this proposition all that nee be said, except that desire to call the attention of the Senate to the fact that this is not a new provision, and then it seems to me that on the question of the burden of proof it is not that departure which the Senfrom Maryland seems to think. It simply puts the burden of proof on the party only when the court shall say under the facts adduced that the burden of proof on ht to lie on him. That is all it says. How oes that differ in principle from the case of larceny? Where the goods are found in the possession of the party charged, the burden of proof is on him to explain.supposehe does not explain. The court would to lpthe jury undoubtedly in such a case that he having been in possession of the goods, it is his duty to explain the charge of having come wrongfully y them; they are lost; they are found on him; now if he fails to explain, the court would say to the jury in such a case as that the burden of proof is on him, he must explain to your satisfaction, and failing to do it, the implication is one of ilt. guN ow here this section sets out certain facts: “any person who shall fraudulently or knowingly import” &c., going on to state the facts under which certain things may be done, “knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law, ” &c., shall be subject to a penalty. The law provides that he may do that thing properly; he may do it 10 ally and properly; an ifhe is charged with oingit wrongful y, and the facts appear, the facts are presented to the court, so that in the judgment of the court the burden of proofought to be on him, then precisely in this case, as in the case where a man is charged with larceny, the court may say that the burden of proof is on him and they may instruct the jury against him. The burden of proof lies there under the authority of this statute, unless he vindicates himself. he only difference in the world is that we a ply it here to a transaction which of itself is egal under the statute except for the guilty intent; and when the facts, in the judgment of the court, authorize an inference of his guilt, then he is to stand precisely on the general principle in criminal proceedings. But this statute is not new; it has existed since 1799 substantially. I will read the provisions of the act from which I suppose this provision was taken. It is the act of 1799, chapter 22, 71st section. That section concludes as follows:, "But the onua robandi shall lie on the claimant onIy where probii le cause is shown for such prose cution. to be adjudgedof by the court beforewhom the prosecutionis held."