Mr. KASSON. With the consent of the Gentfrom Pennsylvania, [Mr. WILLIAMs, I as the amendment proposed by me the other day is in order as printed, I will explain the object to be accomplished by it. observe in the 1st section there is no kimitation of the power of removal by the provisions of the bill to the civil service of the U.S. It covers by its terms the Army and Navy. Removals from both those branches of the service are effected frequently as the results of courts of inquiry and courts martial. Therefore, I trust the gentleman will consent to insert after the words “U.S. ” the words “in the civil service;” so that it will read, “That no officer of the U.S. in the civil service, appointed on the nomination of the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall be removable, ” &c. I then propose in the 5th and 6th lines to strike out the words “the same agencies which concurred in his appointment, ” which seem to be a little indefinite, and to insert the words “impeachment and conviction, or by the President, with the consent of the Senate;” so that removals may not seem to be prohibited by the law as the result of impeachment. I then propose in the oline, before the word “office, ” to insert, in conformity with what I have already said, the word “civil.” I also propose in the 12th line, with the of the Gentfrom Pennsylvania, [Mr. WILLIAMs,) to strike out the words “AttyGen” and insert the words “head of that Dept under whose juris diction such officer may be.” It is evident that it will otherwise be a mere matter of rou tine. The misconduct must be 1st known to the head of the Dept, and on his representation the action of the President must be taken rather than on referring it to the AttyGen, who is himself obliged to depend upon the head of the Dept for his information. Then, at the conclusion of the section I pro. to add a proviso which may or may not e agreeable to the Gentfrom Pennsylvania, to except from the operation of the section the heads of the several Depts and their 1st assts, who are their confidential officers. As I stated the other day, I hardly suppose it to be the opinion of either the com. mittee or the House that a newly elected Pres. ident should not have the liberty when he is borne into office or in the course of his subsequent public action, if he shall find it expedient, to change his confidential advisers. It seems to me to be the theory of our Government that the President is the party who is held responsiblefor the administration of the executive branch of the Government, and that these officers are but his Secretaries. They are named as such, and in order to hold him responsible for their conduct, we must give him the power under this act of selecting these officers." And having that power and that responsibility, he should also have the right to remove them when they seem, in his judgment, to violate their duty. I may also add that in the confidential relations that they bear to the President in our foreign as well as domestic relations, it seems to me of the 1st consequence that the President should be at liberty to remove these advisers and appoint others, even in the vacation, without awaiting the consent of the Senate, on charges of misconduct which might render them liable to impeachment. s it is in that case, so is it in the Depts themselves. My experience in the Executive Depts teaches me the importance of having confidential relations between the 1st officer of the Secretary and the Secretary himself. I do not think that in these 2 particulars we ought to interfere with what has been the uniform practice of the Government. With these remarks I will now recur to the proposed amendments in their order, and inquire of Wojmy friendfrom Pennsylvania [Mr. whether they suit him. And 1st as to the limitation to the civil service.