Mr. FINCK. Mr. Speaker, this bill prooses to take from the executive branch of the government a power which has been uninter ruptedly exercised by that dept from the commencement of the administration of General Washington, and exPressly recognized and sanctioned by both the legislative and judicial depts of the Government since 1789, and ought not to receive the sanction of this House unless clearly warranted by the Constitution, and imperatively demanded by the true interests of the country. It is a question which should be considered and discussed free from all party bias, because it is a measure which proposes to reverse a long, well established, and uninterrupted practice of the Government, and to substitute in its place a new system, which is not only to affect the administration of the executive branch of this Government by the Present Chief Magis trate, but also the administrations of future Presidents. It is not my purpose, Mr. Speaker, to detain the House by an examination of the mere details of this bill, or enter upon a lengthy or elaborate discussion of the questions. in it, but will content myself by stating briefly some of the reasons why I oppose the passage of this measure. The material inquiry is, has the President, under the Constitution, the power to remove from office in such cases where the tenure is not fixed by the Constitution without the concurrence of the Senate, although the Senate was required to concur in the appointment? The provisions of the Constitution relating to appointments provide that “The President shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consentof the Senate shall appoint, embassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the U.S., whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be establishedby law; but the congressmay by law, west the appointment of such inferior officers, as theythink proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law or in the heads of Depts. The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen, during the recess of Senate, by granting commissions, the which shall expire at the end of their next session.” Now, it is claimed by the advocates of the bill under consideration, that the words “all vacancies that may happen” mean only such vacancies as may happen by accident or casu alty, without any agency of the President in bringing them about. such, sir, has never been the construction of these words by any dept of the Government. In the act of September 2, 1789, establishing the Treasury Dept, it was provided: “That whenever the Secretary shall be removed from officeby the POTUS, or in any other case of vacancy in the office, the asst shall act, ” &c. Thus early was a legislative construction given to the power of the President to make removals without the concurrence of the senate. It will be observed that the act of 1789 does not by exPress terms confer upon the President the power to remove the SecyTreasury, but recognizes the existence of such power in the President, and provides who shall act in case the President shall remove the Secretary from office. Chancellor Kent, referring to this act, says: Co“nTshtiistutaimono, untedto a legislative construction of the end it has over since been acquiesced in and acted upon as of decisive authority in the case. It applies equally to every. 9ther officer of Government appointed by the President and Sonate whoseterm of duration is not specially declared. It disinsautpepoofrftiecedrbsyinththeeweexiegchutytivreeadseopnatrhtma10th teousguhbtotro hold at the pleasure of the headof that dept, abuetchaoursiteyh, e is invested generally with the executive; and every participation in that authority the Senate wars, an exception to a general principle and ought to be taken strictly. The President is the great responsibleofficerfor the faithful execution of the law; and the power of removal was incidental to that duty, and might often be requisite to fulfill it.” Mr. Wirt, when AttyGen in 1823, in giving an opinion on the question of appointments and removals, commenting on the word “happen, ” used the following language: “h“aBpupetnt;h' e exPression used by the Constitution, is recessof thaellSevnaacaten.ciTehst, ehamt omstanyahtaupraplesnednusreionfgtthhies term is to chance’ to fall out to take place by accident. But the exPression seems not perfectly clear. It may moan oto take place; that is tooriginate;’ under which sense the President would have hthoefritghhetsteotwfilol istebnyshesisistetmo pboerparreyfceorrmemd?isTsihoen. f Constitution o;mtehmeossetcaocncdormdaonsttwaitchcothrdealnetttwerith of thites reason and spirit.” And he concludes: “The constructionwhich I prefer is perfectlyinno icmenptu.t.iIntg cannot possibly produce mischief without to the President, a degree of turpitude entirely inconsistentwith the character which his officeimplies, as well as with the high responsibility and eshtiomrteteitnuinrseuarnensetxoetdhteo public office, awchciolemaptlitshhe lmouesnltyof the object to which the constitution sosedu peace looks that the offices connected with their and safety be regularly filled.” I believe similar opinions were entertained by such men as Pinckney and Taney and Legare and Barrien and Cushing. but this power of removal without the concurrence of the Senate has also been recognized by the SCOTUS I refer to the learned opinion delivered in the case of exparte Duncan N. Hennen by Justice. Thompson, one of the ablest of the ". distinguished jurists who have adorned the bench of the Supreme Court, in which he says in 13 Peters, 259: “This power of removal from officewasa subject mopuinchion disputed and upon which a great diversity of was entertained in the early history of this of the President itso rreelamteodve, ho office evresra, ptopotihneted with the concurrenceof the Senate; and the great question was whether the removal was to be by the President alone or with the concurrence of the Senate, dbeonthied cotnhsetpitouwtienrgofth the President and Senate Njoo.ine tnlye tboyremoye wherethe tenure of the office was not fixed the tphre in Constitution, the wphoicwhewr oafs raefmulolvrael cwoagsninitcioidneonft to the power of appointment. But it was very early adoptedas the practical construction of the Constitution that the Fo. was vested in the President laelgoinsela.t.iAvned such would appear to have been the construction of the Constitution, for in tShteatoer, gWaanriz,ation of the 3 great deptsof and Treasury in the year 1789provision is madefor the appointment of a subordinateofficer the head of the Deptswho should have pthaepecrhsaargpepearntdaincuinsgtotdoytohfetohfeficreecwohredns, tbhoeohkesa, danodf theo e POTUS m. (1thSetooryff, ic5e, 31, 47.)When the Navy Dept wasestablished, in theyear 1798(, 1Story, 498,) provision was made for tdhoecucmhaerngtesoafntdhecu Dsetopdayrtomfetnhteinbocoakses, of records, and Yoon'; in the office of Secretary by removal or otherwise. it is wnoitthhere respect tboytrheemhoevaadls of the President p, aasrtims deonntse, and yet there can be nodoubt that he holds his office by the same tenure as the other Secretaries, and is roegmy oavroasbelepbroybtahbel Pyrfersoimdenitts. having habnegceoomf pehthraesseeotl tled and well understood construction of the Constitution that the power, of removal was vestedin the President alonein such cases, although the appointment of the officer wasby the President aniSonate.” But gentlemen say that there is no exPress power conferred upon the President to make removals. I answer, neither is there any exPress power conferred by the Constitution for removals by the concurrent action of the President and the Senate; but no one denies that the power of removal does exist where the ten ure of the office is not fixed by the Constitution. Whence is the power derived? I answer, not simply as an incident to the appointing power, but that it belongs to and is an incident of the executive power, which is vested in the President, who is charged with the execution of the laws, and in the performance of which duty he is obliged to appoint agents as the in struments through which he may be enabled to discharge properly, the grave responsibilities imposed upon him by his office; and being responsible for the faithful discharge of the duties incumbent upon the executive branch of the Government, he must, as an incident of the powers of the Executive, have the right of removal in the cases already mentioned. But it is said that abuses have grown up under the exercise of this power by the Executive. It is quite probable. Indeed, it would be very strange if such were not the fact; but is it more likely that these abuses would be less frequent and fess serious to the public interests if the responsibility was divided and the Senate should. authorized to act upon such removals, and its assent be necessary before they could be made? It is our imperative duty, wherever we can do so by the exercise of legitimate power, to prevent abuses and provide remedies against them, but with the greatest vigilance they can: not be entirely prevented. They grow out of the imperfections which have always existed and will always exist, even in the most perfect forms of civil governments; and while would be unwilling to sanction the exercise of any powers in the Executive which does not belong to him, I am at the same time unwilling to sanction any attempt to invade the just rights of that dept of the Government or take from that officer the exercise of a power which has been recognized as belonging to him from the foundation of the government. Mr. Madison, in a letter written to Edward Coles, in 1834, referring to the claim made that the Senate had a right to act upon the removals made by the President, says: “You are at a lossfor the innovating doctrines to which I alluded. Permit me to specify the following: ‘The claim on constitutional groundsto ashare in the removals as well as in the appointinent of officersis in direct opposition to the uniform practice of the Governmentfrom its commencement. It is clear that the innovation would not only vary essentiallythe existing balanceof power, but expose the Executive occasionally to a total inaction, and at all times to delays fatal to the due execution of the Slaewns a.teAcnlaoitmhesr foinrnothveatiLoengbisrloautugrhet?forowardsin t.he regulation of the tenure of offices. This alsowould vary the relation of the depts. to eachother, and leave a wide field for legislative abuses. The oewfiexreodfbryemthoevCalo, nliskteituthtiaotno, faanpdpboointhtm, lieknet, the g right of suffrage and appointment of RePresentatives, to be not dependent on the legislative will. In republican Governments the organization of the executive will always be found the most difficult and delicate, particularly in regard to the appoint ment, and mostof all to the removal of officers. It may well deserve consideration how far the Present immopdriofiveeadtion of thosepowerscan be constitutionally Certainly the Present distinguished AttyGen may feel himself fortified and sustained by these high authorities; althoug the learned Gentfrom Pennsylvania, [Mr. WILLIAMs, in alluding to his opinion on this subject, has been pleased to say of him that it would "Be asking perhaps too much to expect that an officerwho holds his life at the pleasure of the President should be found standing in the way of the prerogative in times like these.” It is unnecessary for me to enter upon any defense of the AttyGen. He stands. the front rank of the profession which he has adorned, not only by his eminent abilities as a lawyer, but by his character as an upright and patriotic citizen. But why should I detain the House longer by a reference to the opinions of these eminent men? Are not the statesmen of today who control the legislation of this nation wiser than the fathers? It is true that Chancellor Kent has deliberately said that the power of the President to remove in the class of cases already named “May now be considered as firmly and definitely settled, and there is good senseand practical utility in the construction.’ And that Mr. Madison, in speaking of the claim made on behalf of the Senate in cases of removal, as already quoted, has declared “The claim on constitutional ground to a share in the removal as well as appointment of officersis in direct opposition to the uniform practice of the governmentfrom its commencement.” Or what difference does it make that Justice Thompson has solemnly announced, in the opinion in 13 Peters, that it had “Become the settled and well understood construction of the Constitution that the power of removal wasvested in the President alone in such cases, al tPhreosuigdhent the an appointment of the officers was by the Has not the Gentfrom Pennsylvania, in his speech in support of this bill, referring to what had been said in support of the construction heretofore placed upon the power of removal by the President, told us that it was “Something in the way of argumentthat not cyeri the deservedly great reputation of Mr. Madison him sperelfsceanntdcaoym?m” end to the disciplined logician of the Mr. Speaker, the disciplined logicians of whom the gentleman speaks must be those men who have advanced too far (and I say it without the least intentional disrespect to any Een.tleman of this House) to be hampered in construction of the Constitution by the opinions of such men as Washington, and Jef. ferson, and Adams, and Madison, and Pinckney, and Wirt, and Jackson, and Taney, or by the uniform construction of every dept of the Government on this question since the adoption of the Constitution. Sir, I trust I have a due appreciation of the statesmanship of the gentlemen whose opinions control the legislation of this Congress; but I prefer to follow the fathers, and leave this power of removal just where the framers of the Constitution and every Congress which has assembled since 1789 have left it. And I hope that gentlemen who in the recent cam paign have had so much to say in disparagement of what they styled the “bread and butter brigade” will so act on this question as not to excite any well grounded suspicion in the public mind that they are now really themselves ambitious to have control of that much abused class of men. Sir, this is an attempt to deprive the Present Executive of the exercise of a power which has been exercised by all of his predecessors. And why is this to be done? Is it because the President has exercised this power to a greater extent than his predecessors during the last 30 years? No one who is at all acquainted with our history will make such a charge. Why, what is the extent of this great power of executive patronage which disturbs gentlemen so much? One would think, from the clamor and abuse which we have heard uttered against President Johnson on this floor, that his removals were to be counted by the 1,000; but there could be no greater mistake. In the discussion of this question in the Senate it was developed that the whole number of Presidential appointments in the civil service of the U.S. was only 2,000434, distributed as follows: in the Dept of State, 340; in the Treasury Dept, 973; in the interior Dept, 2ten; in the Post .Dept, 709; and in the office of the AttyGen, 2two. And how many removals do you suppose the President has made up to the middle of January? Why, sir, 4 o: and 46, as follows: in the State Dept, ten; Treasury Dept, 199; Dept of the interior, 21; in the postoffice Dept, 197; and in the office of the AttyGen, 19. Can it be possible that because of these 446 removals we are called upon to pass this measure? No, sir; this is but one of a series of attacks which have been made and are likely to be continued against the President, because he has dared to go straight forward in the faithful discharge of the grave responsibilities of his high office; because he does not believe with the gentlemen who control this Congress that ten of the States of this Union have been reduced to mere territories; because he insists that they are States in the Union, equal in their rights and dignity with the other States, and constitutionally entitled to be rePresented in this House and in the Senate, and to participate in the election of President and VEEP. Yes, he stands by the Union of the States under the Constitution, and for this he is assailed; for this his Administration is to be singled out, and the office which he administers is to be stripped of the exercise of a power which every dept of the Government since its organization has said belonged to it. Legislation like this, Mr. Speaker, when it comes to be examined by that calm and deliberate public opinion which will sooner or later consider all these questions, will not, I trust, be sanctioned by the American people.