Mr. POLAND. I voted for the amendment to this bill, and for the bill itself, with real. hesitation, and with the design, if I could not become better satisfied with it, to move to have it reconsidered. Subsequent reflection satisfied me that the amendment ought not to be adopted, and I therefore made the motion to reconsider. The amendment prosed by the Senfrom Illinois to this billois very general and comprehensive in its terms, and denies any payment of salarpor compensation to officers appointed by the resident before confirmation by the Senate, unless appointed to fill vacancies haspening during the recess of the senate by eath, resignation, expiration of term, or removal for oficial misconduct. It is said that one of the mise hiefs which this amendment is designed to prevent is the filling of vacancies which exist while the Senate is in session, and where there is an opportunity to submit nominations for their advice and consent, and this is omitted, or the nomi nation is rejected by the Senate, and the same freen reappointed after the Senate adjourns. the amendment went no further than this I could very cheerfully support it, for the language of the Constitution is clear that the residents power of appointment without the advice and consent of the Senate is confined to vacancies that happen during the recess of the Senate. But the amendment has a scope and meaning far beyond this. The power of the President to fill all vacancies that happen durig the recess of the Senate is not denied. But this amendment declares that unless the vacancies happen in a particular way, the person appointed shall receive no salary or compensation until confirmed by the Senate. I have not examined or considered whether the exceptions cover every possible occasion of vacancy which can occur, except. removals for other reasons than for misconduet or malfeasance in office. This is the class of cases which the amendment is designed to reach, and I think its distinguished mover will not deny that the main object and purpose of the amendment is to declare that if the President makes removals from office for more political reasons, and thus causes vacancies during the recess of the senate. the persons he appoints to fill them shall receive no payment tor their services in office until confirmed by the Senate. In such cases the real question is not on the power of the President to filla vacancy, but as to his power to thus make a vacancy. This brings up the old question of the power of the President to remove from ofice persons to whose original appointment the a vice and consent of the Senate was necessary. The Senfrom Missouri, [Mr. Husban son] with his usual struightforwardness and frankness. boldly avows that in his judgment the Presidents power of removal in such cases is commensurate only with his power of appointment; and that the consent of the Senate is as necessary to the removal as to the appointment. The able and learned argument of the Senator ivent far toward convincing inc thatif the question could now be considered an open one, that was the true construction of the constitution. The Senfrom Maine [Mr. Fassnxnns] declared his willingness to support the amendment, except for the clause requiring the cause of removal to be reported to the Senate; but he admitted the power of the President under the Constitution to make removals without the consent of the Senate. In urging the necessity of the amendment, however, he dwelt wholly upon the abuse of the appointing power, by making appointments after the adjournment of the Senate, which might have been made and submitted to the Senate while in session. I should be doing that Senator great injustice to suppose that he did not fully understand that the matter aimed at was altogether a different and broader one. Other Senators have fought shy upon thisquestion, and have argued in tuvor of teamendment, not exactly denying the power of removal, but under protestation, as a special pleader would say, at they do not admit it. They have said, conceding that he has the power of removal, we havethe power to say whether his new appointees shall receive the salaries and compensations provided by law for those holding the offices: So we have the power to refuse an appropriations to pay the sa ury of the Presi cut, or to carry on any and ever Dept of the Government, and thus destroy it. Although we may have such power, it is one which can only be justified in use in the last resort, to prevent usurpation or the destruction of the liberties of the people. But if we believe that the President has not the legal and constitutional wer of removal. why not say so directly I It we are prepared to ndoptthe doctrine of the Senfrom missouri, wh not do it. in as open and manlyaway as he dec ares it? After a uniform exercise of the power by every Administration since the formation of the Constitution, to some extent although for a considerable time doubted and questioned, and after at least 30 years of undoubted and unquestioned use, by a sweeping change of politicul appointinents, with every political change of administration, and by hot political parties, if we design now to declare a different rule, and change the whole action of the Government in this respect, does it behoove us to do it in the indirect and sinister way this amendment proposes? I have asked if that was the design, to deny to the President the power to remove, why not declare so, and make the needful and properlegislation on the subject, and I have been told that we could not pass such a law. Why not, let me ask? It must be, I an pose because a majority of this body, or of 0th houses, do not believe in the principle. If that be so, is it exactly open and honest dealing to undertake to bolster u this amendment by affecting to believe the President transe ends his power by making such removals and new appointments? I must be allowed to say that it is a mode of accomplishing a purpose that does not commend itself to me. But notwithstanding the argument in support of the amendment has been mainly that such political changes were beyond the legal and constitutional power of the President, the amendment upon its face concedes it, and provides that those appointed to fill vacancies caused by removals for misconduct in office shall be excepted from this prohibition of payment. It cannot be said that he has the power of removal for one cause, and has not for another. If by the Constitution he has the power of removal at all, of necessity he must be the sole and exclusive judge of the cause and necessity of removal. The validity or legality of the appointment of the Officer appointed to fill such a vacancy could not be inquired into by going back to inquire for what cause his prede cessor was removed. In the exhaustive discussions which this subject received from the eminent statesmen of the early days of the government, it was never suggested but that the President was the only judge of the cause of removal. if he possessed the power in any case. This amendment virtuall brooches a wholly new doctrine. It concedes the power of removal by the President, but assumes that we may go back behind that, and inquire into the reasons, for the purpose of deterniining whether the new appointee shall have pay. It is certainly an anomaly that a man may legally fill and perform the duties of an Office, but his right to compensation shall depend upon the reasons that influenced the appointing power in making the appointment. The last contest on this subject of the Presidents power of removal was during President Jacksons administration, and the great. Whig leaders of that day made a powerful effort to bringtbe Government back to what they claimed was the true construction of the Constitution, and deny the President the power of removal. But they did not. succeed, and all parties have acted without question since upon the other theory. But it seems not to have occurred to those eminent statesmen that though the president. could legally remove Officers and fill their places with other persons, that they could make it a barren honor by depriving the holders of all compensation. It has been reserved for this financial generation to discover this new mode of curing either a defect in the Constitution or a wrongful interpretation of it. To me, the idea is strange and monstrous that a man who legally holds an Office, and reperly performs its duties. should not be pai because the reasons for his appointment were politically unsat isfactory. believe such a position to be wholly indefensible; wrong in (principle; one upon which no party can stun. In offering the motion to reconsider the vote passing this bill, I happened to say that such a doctrine seemed to me to be almost revolutionary. I have since learned that a radical Unionist has no right to use that word, that it belongs wholly to persons and papers of opposite political roclivities. I therefore to to leave to with row the word. What is the real purpose and object of this amendment? I suppose we may as well ispeak of things as they exist and as we all kiiowt em to be, as to pretend to be thinking and talking of something else. A difference has arisen between the President and the Congress in relation to the properpol icy to be pursued in relation to the States lately in rebellion, who separated from us and formed themselves into a separate government, and between whom and us a fierce war raged for 4 years before we succeeded in conquering them. The Psesident insists that, as the rebellion is put down and new State governments have been set up in those States, they are now entitled to be represented in the 2 Houses of Congress (if the members sent are loyal) and to participate in all respects in the administration of the General Government as if the had not rebelled. Congress, on the otherhan, claim that all the legal relations between these States and the General Government having by the rebellion and war consequent upon it been severed, it rests with Congress as the lawmaking Dept of the Government to restore them again, and that, indoing so, it is their right and their duty to exact such assurances and guarantees as will protect the loyal part of the nation against all danger from those who have shown such a determination to destroy it. Neither the President nor Congress as yet show any disposition to yield to the views and policy of the other, and apparently the question must be determined by an apeal to the pee la in the election of the next on ss. the President, and the majority in both Houses of Congress, were elected by the some political party, the great Union party of the country, which carried us so gloriously through the great rebellion; and the Federal offices of the country are generally filled by members of the same party, who were up eluted by the President, or his predecessor, vr. Lincoln. I suppose it to be true that the great majority of those persons now holding office, as well as the great mass of the Union party, concur with Congress in the proper policy to be pursued in the restoration of these rebel States. I suppose it is feared that in this contest before the people, as to which of these respective pol icies shall prevail, the President will attempt to strengthen his position by the use of his patronage, that is, that he will displace men who believe in and advocate the congressional policy, and fill the positions with either Union men, or Democrats who will advocate the pol icy of the President and I do not know but it is feared that men now holdin office, who really believe with Congress, wil, for fear of losing their offices, profess to believe and act with the President. Now, I have no knowl edge that the President designs any such course of action; he may or may not. I do know that the Democratic press and politicians of the country are urging this course upon him with great zeal, and with great promise of political profit to him and his policy. I cannot help believing that they have their own profit and advantage much more at heart than his, or that of his policy, in iving this disinterested advice. Now, I shouldas dee ly regret to have any good Union man remove from office, and especially one that fully sympathized with congress in their difference with the President, as any Senator in this Chamber, or any Union man in the land. I like to have my political friends hold the offices, not onlyfor their own advan tage and profit, but because I am very apt to think they are the best men, and that 1the public service is more honestly attended to than it would be by men of the opposite political behcfi Now, if this amendment is adopted, will it have the effect to prevent the President from making changesiu office ferpolitical causes? If he has no such purpose or intention, then there is certainly no need of such an extraordinary provision being attached to this bill and I may )8 allowed to say that I am not preared to believe that he designs to do any such foolish thing. But assuming that he has such a wish and purpose, will the adoption of such an amendment as this be likely to prevent him from accomplishing it? On the other hand; “all it not look like daring and defyin him to do it, and be very likely to produce Lghe very result we desire to avoid? It is very reason able to suppose that the President would feel great reluctance to remove men of his own party, appointed either by himself or his mar tyred predecessor, even if they did not believe in or advocate his policy. If we attempt. to prevent it by the use of such questionable, if not unwarrantable legislation, as this amendment proposes, is there not danger, not only that he will accept the challenge, but that this very amendment will be accepted by the people as a sufficient justification for that course, and furnish a ground for saying that Congress was the aggressive party? Situated as we are, it seems to me that the adoption of this ameudment will be more likely to produce than to prevent what we all hope to avoid. But suppose that I am mistaken in my views, and in consequence of a failure to adopt this amendment the President undertakes to help his case before the people by turning good Union men who believe with Congress out of Office, and fills their places with men, either republicans or Democrats, who believe in his po icy, is there any such ground of alarm in this as should frighten us out of our propriety, and drive us to doubtful and desperate expedients? The whole thing is founded in a mistaken lack of faith in the people. This has been a common error of politicians and public men always, but the mistake is greater now than ever before, and especially in regarding any past experience of the effect and power of political patronage as applicable to the present condition of things. In former times, when the people regarded polities merel as a trade by which certain men obtained a living; when the issues between the parties were about internal improvements, the public lands, banks, tariffs, and the like, subjects the real merits of which the masses of the people reall knew but little about, and cared Tess; when they had no real belief that the success or defeat of either party would make a far things difference with them or the cOuntry, then a body of stirrin, active office holders, to circulate documents, iarangue the people, and get out the voters, could produce a very important influence upon an election. But this state of things has no existence now, and no reliance can be placed now upon the experience of those days. For 4 Ong years we were engaged in a most desperate and bloody war, which periled the very existence of the nation itself. The attention of the whole country was roused and was kept most painfully intent upon the causes and course of the war till it ended in the overthrow of the rebellion. Almost every family throughout the loyal North was represented in the Army of the Union by some father or brother or son, and mourning and sorrow were carried into almost every northern home by the death of some dear relative in the Army by disease or on the battle field, or the still more cruel mode of starvation in prison. In this way the people have come to comprehend everything pertaining to the subject as fully and completely as the 1st statesmen in the land. Nor have they, since the close of the war, lost any of their interest in it, and will not until the whole matter is put at rest. I have heard it said here, I have read in the public press, that the great anxiety of the people was to have the matter settled, and get all the States once more into the Union together. The people are anxious to have the Union restoretfand all not again together, but that is not their great anxiety. What they fear, and about which they are earnestly anxious, is that they should not again be admitted until it is made perfectly certain that they are not again to come under southern domination, and that not even by combination with their old allies in the North can they again control the Government. The Union people of the North are not revengeful or malignant, but they cannot for get their martyred brothers and sons, or their own anxieties and sorrows; they cannot forget the immense burden of public debt imposed upon them; and they are too often reminded l of it by the tax gatherer, all of which has been brought upon them by the conduct of the people oft ese States, to feel Over anxious for their return to participate in ruling the nation without the best and strongest assurances that they are safe in doing so. Another reason which keeps them watchful and careful is that almost every Union man in the whole North, who has any considerable property, is the holder of the bonds of the Government, which they feel would be put in peril if the southern men, even with northern help, could ever again hold the control of this Government. lt is not. true, sir, that the Union people of the North are dissatisfied with the po cy or the action of Congress on this subject. What they do fear is that we shall not stand firm to the end; they fear the effect Of patronage op us, and they have far more reason to than we have to fear for them. Now, Mr. President, what luck do you suppose some postmaster, or marshal, or assessor, made by the President out of a copperhead, or liming Republican, would haVe among these people arguing for the imme diate and unconditional admission of the rebel States? The idea is simply ridiculous. The truth is that the Union masses of the loyal States stand firmly with Congress in this matter and will do so to the end if we do not allow them to make issues against us by the adoption of untenable measures. Our p atform is firm and strong, and all the Union party will stand with and by us upon it, unless we by our own folly let in a weak timber or rotten plank to frighten them from it. In this particular matter of the political patronage of the president, if we do nothing that can be made an excuse or cover for it, if the President turns out good Union men because they sustain Congress and concur with the mass of their party, and puts in others because they agree with him, he will raise a storm of indignation against himself among Union men as has not been witnessed before. The truth is that the President, if he entertains any such desi n, cannot build up for himself against the nion party, a presidential party O any considerable numbers without having in it the men who opposed every measure for the putting down the rebellion, who discouraged enlistments, opposed the draft, voted the war a failure, and many other things of that character. This very fact will destroy his party if he endeavors to make one. Where these men go the people will not. The people look upon this thing now as they did during the war, not as an ordinary question of politics. but as a question ofloyalty or treason, and if the President abandons the great Union party to form one for himself, and his party is made up, as it must be in the main, by the men who opposed the war, they will soon be the only ones left in it. If the President is ambitions to have such a party as this, shall we deny him the benefit of a few hired mercenaries in the sha e of federal office holders if he desires? if e chooses to make changes so far as my own State is concerned he will have to make them from men who do not belong to the Union party, if he must have men who support his policy, for I have never yet heard of a nion man there who does not most cordially support Congress and I believe my State is not singular in this respect, but that the same will be found true of every loyal State. Let us then have faith in the people, stand firmly upon our principles, avoit all alse and doubtful expedients, leave to the President the full and free exercise of every constitutional right and prerogative, so that an action of his hostile to the party that electe him, if he he guilt of any, shall be without excuse. If we can ce from killing ourselves, I have no fear of the resident being able to do so, even if he entertains any such wicked purpose. Mr. President, I expect to be rebuked and lectured here and elsewhere for opposing this amendment. 1 know that one can hardly be allowed to question a measure here, however injudicious or unwise he may deem it, without incurring the charge of being a copperhcud or a conservative, or a Johnson man. I have seen in a leading Republican papera notice of my mtRtv this bill was passed, in which it was said that I had adopted the language of the copperhead press and the Senfrom Kentucky, [Mr. DAVIS.] My ideas on this subject may be odd and old fashioned, I admit, but they are such as have always obtained in Vermont. Mr. President, I do not know anybody who can sustain such accusations with less danger of injury to themselves than Vermont and her representatives. Vermont has always upheld freedom and law. The doctrines of equal rights and equality before the law have been there maintained since the days of Ethan Allen. Her legislation, her officers, and her courts have ever faithfully fulfilled her will in sustaining liberty and freedom according to the Constitution and laws. When the war of the rebellion came upon the nation no State in the Union contributed her proportion of men more promptly than Vermont. Her sons showed their patriotism and war age on many a bloody fiel, with equal credit at least to those of any other State. She paid as heavy a legacy of death, in proportion to her numbers, as any other. She bore her share in puttingdown the rebellion most cheerfully, and she did it. to preserve a Government of constitutional law. She does not desire to have her representatives here aid in frittering away what has cost us so dearly to maintain. She desires her representatives to stand firmly for her principles and their principles, but to make their fight clearly within the pale of constitutional law. The 2 great measures of this session of Congress which elicited the difference of views between congress and the President were the Freedmens arena and civil rights bills. I assisted in the preparation and perfecting of both those great measures in committee. I voted for both on their original passage in the Senate, and voted for the passage of both not withstanding the Iresidents veto. I voted for the JtResolution declaring that no State which had been in rebellion was entitled to representation or to share in the Government of the nation until both Houses of Congress should agree thereto. I think I may sately claim to be ranked as a supporter of the policy of congress. It might in reference to these measures e said of me as a political wag said of a leading Antimason in my State in the days of the rule of that party, “ that he was such a fool that he believed in his party principles.” I feel a firm and abiding confidence in the soundness ofour position, and of being able to maintain it before the people. Our party pros fesses to be based upon something higher and nobler than mere temporary political expediency, and to stand upon the great doctrines of liberty and justice. It seems to me especially important that our practice should corres mad with our professions; and that we should not undertake the acts of mere political adventur ers. In this if anywhere lies our danger. An open and manly stand upon our I principles, disdaining all political quackery, reying upon the intelligence and patriotism of the people, will carry us safel through to ultimate victory.