Mr. WILLIAMS. I desire to state very briefly to the House the facts in this case, as they have come to my knowledge in a somewhat authentic way. It is but a day or 2 since I was called upon by some gentlemen from the district of }. Mr. Culver, representing him not only as constituents, but in an official capacity, who presented the whole case to me as they allege it to stand upon the record. Upon their statements, so far as regards the question of privilege, it struck me at once as a very clear one, so clear that, in my judgment, the House would be constrained to act as soon as the facts were brought to its knowledge. It seems that an action of assumpsit (as it is termed by lawyers) upon a parole contract for the payment of money was instituted against Mr. CULVER, upon a claim amounting to some 60 or 70,000 dollars. By the law as it stands in Pennsylvania the act, I think, of 1842 abolishing imprisonment for debt it is provided that in case the plaintiff in any civil suit shall make an affidavit to the effect that the contract had its origin in fraud or was made upon false and fraudulent representations, the defendant shall not be allowed the [. ”. of exemption from imprisonment. but shall be required to enter into bonds to answer to the case, and if not able to pay the money to take the benefit of the insolvent law. Gentlemen of the profession here who are conversant with this law will bear me out in the remark that this provision, which was an exceptional one, was only intended as a substitute for the old remedy by capias, which resulted in the exaction of special bail. On an affidavit of this sort, asserting, as I feel authorized to say from the information I have received, no more than a mere breach of romise or of a contract, a bench warrant was issued in the month of June and during the last session of Congress, upon which Mr. CULVER was arrested, and upon a hearing required to enter into the necessary bond. He jto do so, or was perhaps unable, for the reason that the sum involved was a very large one. The decision rested on the ground that the circumstances shown constituted a sufficient primafacie case to warrant the exaction of this security under the acto An application was thereupon made by Mr. CULVER to the judge of an adjoining district for a writ of habeas co, which was accordingly issued. On the hearing of that case, this judge arrived by some means or other at the very sage and very extraordinary conclusion that, inasmuch as fraud was an indictable offense at the common law, the case fell within the constitutional exceptions and was to be considered as a “breach of the peace” within the meaning of that instrument, and therefore refused to grant the discharge. The House will recollect, of course, that the provision referred to is to the effect that Sens&Reps “shall in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same.” The judge in this case holds, as I understand and have already said, that the imputation of fraud involves substantially or by construction of law a criminal offense, although the whole proceeding was nothing more than a civil action for the recovery of a debt, and that Mr. CUIver is not therefore entitled to his discharge upon the ground of privilege; and he is accordingly still held under duress and disabled from attending here to discharge the duties devolved on him by his commission as a representative.