Mr. BROOMALL. Mr. Speaker, it was with extreme reluctance that I voted against the bill under consideration on Friday last, not so much on account of any merit I could see in the bill, itself, as because it was looked upon by the counjtry and urged upon the House by its advocates gas the commencement of the contraction ofour currency. The views of the SecyTreasury on this subject. known and approved by the country at the time of his appointment, set forth in his speech at Fort Wayne and inbis recent report, justified the people in looking for a return to specie payments at no distant day. The indorseinent of those views by the HoRep at an early period of the seasion by a vote lacking only 6 of being unanimous. strengthened the hopes of the people and was received with rejoicing by all classes exccpt speculators and gamblers in the public funds who thrive upon inflation. instability of rices, and uncertainty about public polic. It was therefore a thing by no means to be desired that Congress should even seem to have backed down from its position, to have repudiated its incforsement oi the Secretary, and undertaken to thwart him in his efforts to put the country upbn the road toward specie payments. But by thus defeatin the 1st measure of the Dept presented iere through the appropriate committee for the avowed purpose of commencing the policy which has received the indorsement of this body and of the country. I do not believe that the majority of this House intended to repudiate that policy. I rather believe that those who voted with me against the bill did so for the same reason which governed me: from a conse ientious opposition to the details of the bill, and the extent of the powers conferred by it, and not hostility to the " avowed object of it and it is with the view of getting a bill giving all the necessary pow ers, without containing the objectionable feat ures of this one. that I now advocate the reconsideration, which I wonld have moved if the Gentfrom Ohio [Mr. GARFIELD] had not anticipated me. The discussion which has taken place, and the several votes by which this bill was defeated, must have shown the ComWays&Means that while they cannot get this legislation, unless as a Democratic measure, they can obtain from the Union majority of this body all the powers which oueht to be conferred upon the SecyTreasury in the premises at this time. Itherefore entreat the committee to consent to a recommitment of the bill, with or without instructions. as they may elect. Personally I owe the Secretary no more than good will, if that much. I entertain a profound islike of his political opinions, as far as I understand them, and I have, if possible, still less confidence in his knowledge of human nature. But I believe him to be quite as competent for the difficult and embarrassing situation he holds as any other financier in the country and I am anxious to give him all the power he thinks necessary to carry out his policy, subject to all the safeguards we believe to be required for the good of the country. Is there an doubt about the neccssity of legislation? 3 there any question about the currency being redundant? One might think so from some of the arguments presented here within the last few days. If it were worth while to debate such a question, I would ask, why otherwise are prices generally inflated? currency, like everything else transferable, is subject to the law of supply and demand. Its rice is measured in all other commodities just as the prices of all other commodities are measured in it. Now, when thus measured, where Currency is apparently cheap and evgry thing else is apparent] dear, and when the question arises which of these appearances h tereality, it is natural to look at the point where the smallest or slightest cause will produce the effect. It is natural to suspect that the single article. currenc, has fallen in actual value rather than that all te 1,000s of other things have simultaneously risen. But we are not left to this inference alone. When a commodity becomes too chea corn pared with all others, it is because it as be cometoo lentiful; becausethesupplyis renter than the (lbmand. There is no other regu or and permanent cause of a fall of price in a single article than an over suppl of it. Before 1860 the currency of the U.S., including the precious metals, never exceeded S300.000,000; now it exceeds $900,000,000. Formerly 8 dollars percapita of the population answered the purposes of the country; now we have 30 dollars. This would look very much lik. an over an ply of the article, and would quite significant y suggest the idea of depreciatmn. “ I do not look upon this enormous increase, however, as positive proof of redundancy. Nothing but the experiment will solve the problem, how much currency any given people require. So much depends upon the labits of the people, whether tradin or otherwrse, whether inclining to mutual confidence or otherwise, whetheringenious in substitutes for currency or otherwise, that all estimates and all calculations are at fault. As a rule asarse population requires less currency than a ense one of the same numbers. It is true the intter is moreingenious in contriving modes of dealing without currency, and therefore 18en abled to make the same number and amount of exchanges with less currency, yet contiguity so largely increases the number and amount of exchanges as to counterbalance this many times over. Strong as these inferences are of a redun dancy of the currency, the problem is not, left to rest solely upon them. There is one fact that has the merit of affording positive proof of that proposition. The currency is not worth its nomina value when measured by the stand ardof the commercial world, and therefore the supply is in excess of the demand. Gold being used for the same purpose by all nations, flowing freely like water from places of accidental superabundance to fill places of accidental displacement, keeps a more uniform actual value than any other commodity. It is therefore the best measure of value, and where ever it is driven out of use, it is because the people have found something cheaper. something that will measure their commodities to better advantage, just as the 3foot yard stick would give place to one 2 feet and a half long if the vendors of fabric were left to their choice. It is argued in certain quarters that there is no superabundance of currency because there is at certain times and in certain places an actual scarcity of it, not enough to answer the purposes of the community. TQow, the alleged act may be admitted, but the inference attempted to be drawn from it is by no meansa logical one. When it is said that a currency is redundant. it is not meant that there is too much of it at the price at which it passes. That would be impossible. It is the quantity compared with the demand for it that fixes that rice. If the quantity was less, the price would O higher; ift e quantity was greater, the price would be lower, always supposing the demand to remain constant. What is meant by a redundant currency is that there is too much of it to pass at its nomi nalvalue. In our case there is too much to pass at a higher rate than about 70 cents to the dollar, but just enough to pass at that rate. When a currency has once had its propervalue assigned to it under the operation of the laws of supply and demand, a temporary or local scarcity may occur just as readily when that rice is ten cents to the dollar as when it is 100. Nobody pretends. that there is too much currency for the wants of the community. The proposition is that there is too much of it to pass at par, and that therefore the price has gone down until it has reached a point at which there is no longer too much for the purposes of the communit. It is this depreciation, with the long train of evrl consequences arisin out of it, that is proposed to be remedied. No one ought to doubt the necessity of legislation; but what shall that legislation be? It is proposed by some to de base the coin, to cut the dollar down to about 70 cents, and thus to jump at once to specie payments. This is an old remedy, and asure one. It is cutting the Gordian knot with a vengeance. But it may be greatly questioned whether the remedy is not worse than the disease, like amputating the leg to cure corns. Are we rea y to repudiate t irty cents to the dollar of the ublic debt? Why not, then, repudiate the whole of it? If we are to incurthe scorn and condemnation of the civilized world, let us not do it for the mere “ 30 pieces." lfwc must come out with loss of character, let us at least come out clear of debt. It may he said that repudiating our debt is no worse than breaking our faith so often pledged to the loyal men of the South. This may be true; but both would be worse than either alone; and if we must desert our allies and sacrifice our friends, let us at least be as good as common gamblers, peeuniarily honest. Will it be said that this proposed debzsement of the coin shall not atfect the public debt, but only transactions between individuals? I will never consent that the widows dower and the orphans portion shall be cut down 1/3rd, while the public creditor shall be maidin full in gold, even though his bond cost iim in gold but 40 cents to the dollar. I will never consent that the national banks shall receive full payment from the Government, and yet shall pay their own depositors but 70 cents to the dollar. But the day fordehasing the coin has gone by some centuries, and Americans are jealous enough of their national honor to prevent the practice being revived in our country. It is proposed by some that the currency ishould remain at its present volume, and that;the country should he suffered to grow up toit. ilhis would require about 34 years, if we suppose that the amount of currency percapita needed before the war should become and continue that required after the disturbing causes arising out of the rebellion shall have ceased to operate. But by increasing. the population will become more 11.58, and therefore, as l have already said, will require more our rencyper capita. Taking everything into consideration, it may be estimated with some probable npproach toward accuracy, that in 1800 the population of the U.S. will need the present amount of currency at the gold stan ard, that is to say, $900,000,000. At 1st view this remedy would seem to be an easy one. But it must be borne in mind that during all these long years we will be laboring under all the ctieds of a gradual contraction of the currency. the healthy performauce of all the functions of society, of nlFthe operations of business, requires that the volume of currency and there is no difference in effect between a constant currency with an increasing population, and a decreasing currency with a constant population. All the evils of a return to specie payment will have to be borne whether the curreucy shall be reduced to suit the community, or the community row up to suitthe currency. The difference is that in the latter case the evils will be extended over a greater criod of time. Some men might refer that the process of tooth drawing should be protracted throughout the entire day that the pain maybe less intense at any given moment. Let no man delude himself with the belief ithat the road toward specic payments is an easy lone. Upon that roa every one who under takes to pay money will have to pay in effect more than he bargained for. Every one who buys property will find it depreciating in price upon is hands. The manufacturer will often sell his goods for less than the raw material cost him, and the poor laborer will find his wages cut down to the point at which the most fortunate of his class can barely live. But the Broad must be traveled. The evils must be borne. We may protract them throughout a greater period of time, and thereby soften the intensity, but we cannot ese ape them. I know it is said that we have been traveling upon this road for a considerable time, and have actually proessed from the poiutat which gold commande a premium of 185%. to that at which it commands only 30. It is argued that as we have gone this distance without serious inconven ience, the rest of the way may be looked upon as a very small matter. This is plausible, but unfortunately it is exceedingly unsound. Gold is not the sole and should increase with the increase of population;. absolute measure of value. It is only the best one. Like all other commodities, it is subject to fluctuations wholly independent of the value of the instrument by which it is measured. It never was 286 by reason of the depreciation of the currency alone, and it is very doubtful whether the low price at which it sells new is not the result of mere ose illation. Let us examine this. Every commodity is subject to fluctuation in value on account of an over or under supply. Now, if we could combine the measured value of a sufficient number of commodities to balance these fluctuations, and exterminate the errors arising from them, we could thereby obtain a measure of value more certain than gold itself, a measure by which the fluctuations in value of even gold might be tested. In order to approximate to this measure of value and apply it, I have taken 20 commodities in most common use, embracing those least likely to be affected by the extraordinar demands ofwar wheat, flour, corn, oats, bee, pork, mackerel, tea, coffee, sugar, molasses, raisins, cheese, salt, tallow, wool, hops, soap, iron, leather, and coal. I have taken 3 periods of time and combined and averaged the riccs of those commodities at each of them. [he 1stperiod extends from 1806 to 1860, when gold was at par; the 2nd is July 1, 1864; and the 3rd. February 15, 1866. From the 1st period to the 2nd the prices of those commodities had risen 1025., while gold had risen 185. From the 2nd period to the 3rd these prices had fallen to 57%., while gold had fallen to 39. he inference is strong. though not irresistible, that gold at 285 was higher than the volume of the currency would warrant, and that it is now lower. If it should be asked why gold rose in price so much more than other commodities, the an swer is easy. There was an extraordinary de mand at that time from 2 classes of people, one those who desired to get their property out of the country by reason of their doubts about the stability of our institutions, and the other the merchants who desired to be readyto pay future duties and who feared that the contest between Congress and the gold gamblers, which was then lively, would soon render it impossible to obtain the commodity at any price. 01 course the gamblers operated upon both these doubts, and thereby inflated the price still higher than it would otherwise have been. This view is strengthened by the fact that one month previously the premium on gold was only eigity nine, and in 3 months subsequently it had again fallen to the same figures, while the vol ume of currency and the prices of other commodities remained about the same during that period of 4 months. From this criterion alone we would infer that. we had traveled upon the road toward specie payment from 102 to 57. But. it will not do to assume even this. All the commodities from which I have deduced the measure of value had risen in price at the 2nd of these periods by reason of the extraor dinary demand arising from the war to a point above what they would have stood at but for the war; a d that demand having ceased, all those commo ities fell in price to a point below what they would have stood at but for the war. Now how much of the difference between the 2ndand 3rd periods is owin to this? I think all of it. In other words, Itink ifno othercause operated upon the price of gold than the redundancy of the currency, it would be quite as high now as ever it has been. 1 believe we havenot yet even started a on the road toward specie payments. More than this, I believe we are not yet at the height of the inflation unless speedy measures are taken to reduce the volume of currency, and therefore it is thatI am unwilling to adopt the policy of keepin up the present volume of the currency anfsuffering the communit to grow “P to it. If there is yet time to avoi ID!" or evil consequences of the inflation, why not do so? Why not cut 03 the top of the mountain which we would otherwise have to climb over? This is an important consideration. If we have notyet reached the height of the inflation nobody will doubt the propriety of reducing the currency at once in order to prevent further evil consequences. Let us therefore look at this question. There is no principle plainer or better settled than that doubling the currency of a community will double prices in the absence of any counteracting element. This resultwill not be produced at once. It requires time for the new standard of value to enter into the prices of all commodities. It may require years. The 1st effect is to stimulate trade unnaturally. This for the time employs part of the excess of currency and prevents it entering into the prices of commo ities. The ease with which debts may be paid off with the new currency also gives temporary employment to the excess. But these and other disturbances will disappear sooner or later, and the doubled currency will have ultimately doubled prices, or, to speak more critically accurate, Will have depreciated to 1/2 its original value. So plain approposition needs no demonstration. Now, our currency has been increased 3 fold since 1860, while prices have as yet advanced only once and a half. Are there any other than temporary causes operating here to prevent the increase of currency from acting to Its full extent upon prices? Isee none. Some of the excess was employed in the business of war, which was to a arge extent a cash business. But this retarding element has disap peared. There was the usual unhealthy stim ulus to trade and speculation. There was also the rapid payment of old debts, both employing large quantities of the excess. But these are rapidly passing away. There was also a tem porary disuse of the ordinary expedients to deal without currency. But society is rapidly set thng down into its old habits. Already credit in its various sha es is taking the place of corrency, and in a s iort time there will be nothing to prevent the expansion from imposing its full measure upon prices. A year or so may elapse in the mean time, but when this process shall be fully completed, if the currency shall remain as it is, gold will sell at 250, and other commodities at corresponding prices. I ought to qualify this assertion by admitting the possibility of a panic in the mean timeI whiclli, ifsuiiiciently extensive, would crush half the trading community and bring gold to par. I know no means of foretelling when a mer cantile people will become so distrustful, so alarmed asto destroy one another in their efforts to ese ape some real or imaginary evil. All we I know is that panics follow inflations, and usu ] alli; terminate them., l y far the greatest proportion of the evils of contraction result from the panics that are caused by it. If these could be avoided the process of returning to specie payments would O no very serious matter; but I know no way to avoid them. An opinion is prevalent, and I believe is entertainedpby the SecyTreasury, that a contraction sufficiently gradual will cause no anic. I think this isamistake. Bringing prices own by retiring the currency is like pullinga heavy weight on the ground with a long elastic rope. No matter how slowly and gradually you pull, the weight comes at last with a jump and a jerk. In like manner a slow and gradual contraction of the currency has no effect whatever upon prices for a time. As it continues money slowly becomes scarcer, rates of interest go up, but still men pay those rates, hoping the stringency is temporary. Oc casionally a small dealer 005 by the board, out this alarms nobody. oney becomes still scarcer, rates of interest higher; but prices remain substantially the same until large dealers can stand no longer. Then the crash begins, each failure causing others. Then everybody wants everybody else to pay up; the demand for money becomes enormous. Prices come down with a run, because debtors to save themselves try to convert their commodities into cash at any price. Nobody trusts anybody else, and the community is in the midst of a panic just as disastrous as if the contraction adbeen sudden. I have said that I know no way to prevent this. Possibly ifthe community were informed from week to week of the amount of currency retired, and could be made to consider the ultimate result of it, the evilmight be ameliorated. If I am right in all this, wh not. commence the business of contraction 7 Vhy not prevent the evil from becoming still greater? I am not asking that the price of gold should be reduced below its present point (130) at once. I would be quite content to keep it there for a year to come; but the people have a right to require at the hands of the Government that the price be not enhanced. Iam willing to empower the SecyTreasury to sell bonds at not less than par, and with the proceeds to retire and cancel the intercstbearing legal tenders. This is substantially the proposition of the Gentfrom Massachusetts, [Mr. HoorER] a reposition which, I trust, will be adopted. the prohibition to sell bonds at lesstion par for the purpose is site a sufficient guard against undue contraction, because the 1st symptom ofundue contraction will be a stringency in the money market, and this will at once stay the proceeding by preventin the bonds from selling at par. Thus guar ed, the power ought to be sufficient to enable the Secretary to prevent a rise in the price of gold. If it should prove insufficient, I am quite willing to increase it. The mere fact of the passage of a bill looking toward specie payments will go far to prevent the future evil consequences of the eXpansion. Itwillmakemen cautionsaboutincurring liabilities. It will cause them to hesitate before embarking in doubtful and hazardous enter prisesfand thereby enable them the better to withstand the effect of a panic when that shall happen. If anything could make the road to ward specie payments easy it would be a general preparation beforehand, a full understanding of the nature of the road and complete conse iousness that we are upon it. To conclude, I voted with the friends of the bill with the hope of gettin that of the Genltlemanfrom Massachusetts fMr. Hoornn] substituted for it. if this sha l fail, I must vote against the bill. I am unwilling to confer pon any Dept of the Government the power contained in this bill. I look upon the power to control the currency of a country like ours as greater for evil or good than that of any European monarch. That power belongs to Congress, and that body would be false to every duty to the country in conferring it now without restrictions upon any other Dept.