Mr. MAYNARD. I will answer both branches of the gentleman‘s question. As to the precise form of the oath known as the “confederate" oath the oath to support the constitution of the confederate States, or the “secesh” oath, or the “rebel" oath or whatever term was used by our people I am unable to speak with that definiteness and precision with which on an occasion of this kind I ought to speak, because I never, so far as I atthis moment remember, saw a copy of the oath in writing. I have a general impression that it was simply an oath in the usual form to support the constitution of the “confederate” Slates instead of the U.S. Now, sir, let me say, in reply to another branch of the question, that this JtResolution does not propose to relieve Judge Patter son from any supposed disqualification arising from the taking of that oath. It is accepting the office that constitutes the supposed disqualification. If there is anything in his having taken the oath that disqualifies him it will remain after this JtResolution shall be passed, just as now. I was proceeding, however, to state that Judge Patterson’s holding the office was not done in “hostility to the Government of the U.S., ” but was an act of known, understood, and recognized hos‘ tility to the southern confederacy. So, then, it seems to me that the oath could have been taken with a safe conscience, even without any legislation of this sort. The Senate, as I understand, are almost unanimously of the opinion that nothing which has occurred during the last 5 'ears disqualifies Judge Patter son from be]ing the office of Senator of the U.S. to which he has been elected. He is willing and offers to take the oath as it stands, believing he can do so with a safe conscience. Still they have thought it better, more expedient, wiser, to relieve him from the ordinary requirement of taking that portion of the oath, that the law is better maintained in this way than by permitting him to take the oath in its present form and thus be subject to criticism arising from an opposite construction of the terms ofit. It seems to me that as a matter of comity we should concur in the decision at which the Senate have arrived. The matter is one peculiarly their own. They have examined it, decided it, and very unanimously. Their decision requires a change in the law as applied to this particular case, not that they propose to abrogate the law so as to impair its force; but on the contrary, they would magnify it and make it more honorable by formally and solemnly relatingit in favor of a case to which it was never meant to apply. That Judge Patterson has been loyal, not mercl passively loyal, but actively, a deter mine and loyal citizen of the U.S. from the beginnin all through the war, isa fact which I do notIiesi to here most solemnly to declare and affirm. know there are very few men in the U.S. as little inclined to resist the law or any provision of it to favor persons who have been engaged in this rebellion at any time or in any way as I am. I am not speaking in defense of one who has been engagedin rebellion. I am not speakingin behalf of treason or traitors. I am speaking in behalf of a man whom I know to have been as loyal to this Government as I am, however we may have differed upon many questions which have arisen heretofore and are now before the country, or however we may differ in regard to questions likely to arise hereafter. I am speaking in vindication of a loyal, honest man, and not in defense of a disloyal and dishonest traitor.Mr. Speaker, we cannot fully trust ourjndgment to make an expostfacto decision of what would have been expedient or Wise or right, all things considered, under the cruel and horrible surroundings of the rebellion. Men environed by rebel bayonets in the hands of a power that recognized no such thing asjustice or injustice, no standard of right and wrong a power made up of irresponsible and terrible despots are not in the best frame of mind to judge what is in allrespects exedient or wise.