Mr. JOHNSON. What I suggested was and I submit that there is some degree of force in the objection that it is very desirable that we should cease to consider fora moment that, in relation to citizenship and rights, there is, as far as the constitution of the U.S. is concerned, any difference on account of color. The honorable member admits that the omission of the words which I have suggested should be stricken out will leave the provision precisely the same. His objection to striking them out is, that there may be persons in the U.S. who will hold that the provision, if it is so changed, would not comprehend the negro. It is impossible to provide against every possibledou tt –hat may be suggested by anyone man or an dozen men in the U.S. There are a sorts of notions, having no foundation in fact or in law, broached ffo time to time by individuals or classes of individuals; but I suppose that if the constitution declared that all persons born in the U.S. should be citizens, nobody would be able to raise a reasonable doubt that it included the black man. The idea to which the honorable Senator alluded, which has operated upon the mind of my friendfrom Kentucky, and operated upon the minds of the Supreme Court, as a reason why the general phraseology to be found in the declaration of rights was not comprehensive of the negro, was founded upon what was supposed to have been the condition of the U.S. at the time, with reference to the black race. They were all then slaves. In the judgment of man, being slaves, they were nother sons Within the meaning of the phrase use in the declaration of rights; and am sure the honorable member will recollect that the Chief Justice, in giving the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case to which reference has been frequent] made, concedes that if the words that are foundv in the DeclarIndep were used now, orlf at the time they were used there was no such thing as the slavery of Africans, and the same number of Africans had been in the U.S., theywould have been included within the general phraseology of persons entitled to certain inalienable rights;, and I suppose no man in his senses could doubt that the use of those words would comprehend black as well as white, provided black as well as white were free men. It is idle to deny that a negro is not a man. It is idle to deny, therefore, that a negro is. not a person. They are endowed certainly with some of the qualities of the white man. Whether they are endowed with all the intellectual capacit of the white man isa question about which itIerences of opinion have prevailed and may continue to prevail; but they have the same faculties, are subject to the same diseases, cured by the same medicines, endowed with the same affections. Nobody that knows the race can doubt that. Whether they are in all cases as keen in their affections as the white man may depend upon their cultivation, intellectually and morally; but that they are capable of a cultivation, intellectual and moral, that will make them regard the marriage relations just as absolutely and as affectionate] as the white man, and regard their children with 1 the same affection that the white man regards his children, I suppose nobody will doubt. Subject to the same complaints, cured by the same medicines, sustained by the same food, who could deny for a moment that the black man is a man and a human being; and if he be a man and a human being, who can doubt for a moment that he is a “ person “I” I conclude, therefore, with what I said in the beginnin, that it seems to me very desirable that we should upon the very 1st occasion that arises, and upon every occasion, if any future occasion should arise, say at once, virtuall, by ceasing to use the term " distinction of coior, ” that in the judflment of the American Senate and of the people of the U.S. there is no such distinction. If the Senator objects to the amendment that I suggest, I do not insist upon it.