Mr. KERR. Mr. Speaker, when this discussion commenced, it was not my purpose to take any part in it at all, and I do not now desireto be heard at length n on the main question now before the House; gut. sir, there have been involved in this discussion some questions inciden tally connected with the main question which, in my judgment, present considerations of importance quite equal, if not superior, to that of the main question itself, and it is mainly upon one or 2 of those questions that I desire, for a short time, the attention of the House. I hold, Mr. Speaker, that some of the greatest dangers that surround free institutions, and some of the greatest dangers that lie in the path way of the prosperity and happiness, the development and glory of our country, do not come in the shape of direct and tangible propositions; they do not come in direct and clear attacks, with uncovered hand and uncovered purpose, upon the policy or institutions of the country; but they come under the specious covering of construction, of constitutional interpretation; they come under the guise of attempts on the part of those administering the Government to give to the constitution anew meaning or interpretation. Now, Mr. Speaker, it is to one of those attempts, in my judgment the most insidious, dangerous, and subversive that has been suggested during this session of congress that I shall mainly invite the attention of the House. The point to which I refer is based upon a suggestion that, several days ago, fell from the lips of the honorable Gentfrom Pennsylvania, Mr. KELLEY] whom I am sorry not to see in is seat. It amounts, using his own language, to this preposition, that Congress has the power, under the constitution of the U.S. as it now stands, to “so regulate the suffrage as to give the right of suffrage to every male citizen of the country of 21 years of age, whether a citizen by birth or naturalization.” In view of the facts connected with the history of our constitution and its formation, it does apearto me that this proposition is one of the most dangerous and starth ng that has yet been suggested in connection with our national policy, and if adopted, it cannot fail, sooner or later, to subvert the most beneficent principles of our system of government. Before I proceed, I call attention to the fact that the honorable gentleman invites a direct issue with the presient of the U.S. upon this subject. Now, I may here remark that, so far as the President is concerned in connection with this and every other question, either now or hereafter, demanding t action at the hands of this Congress, if anything that shall fall from my lips shall seem to be a defense of him, it must be taken as tending in that direction simply and solely because in my judgment it is right, and not because he is my resident in any partisan sense or I his champion. I am here to do in duty to the extent of my humble ability, and am resolved at least to be at one with my own conscience and my own judment. The President has said in his an nuifi message that “ it is not competent the General Government to extend the elective franchise in the several States.” The honorable Gentfrom Pennsylvania replies that that question “was settled by the express language of the constitution right the other wa; and then, in a spirit more of satire than of indness or respect, he adds: “It is evident that the absorbing duties in which he was engagedwhile military governorof Tennessee and of the Iiigh Office to which hewas sosuddenl and unexpectedly called have preventedPresident Johnson from examining that question historically.” I propose now, for a few moments, to examine this question with a somewhat extensive reference to the history of the constitution in this connection, and if possible to arrive at a conclusion whether the honorable Gentfrom Pennsylvania has given eater attention to the history of this question than the President, and whether the conclusion which he has reached is a safer one for the country or more in bar mony with the history and true intent of the constitution than that of the President. At the time this provision in the constitution on the subject of the qualificatibns of electors in the different States was under the consideration of the constitutional Convention, we all know that there existed in the States a very great diversity of provisions and regulations upon this subject of suffrage. They differed both in extent and principle. In some of the States thesuffrage was extended upon principles of great liberality to almost all men of come tent age;while in other States it was extendbd upon principles of less liberality, and in some States it was limited by lingering principles of the feudal system, which still prevailed in the laws. of descent and the transmission of propertly in some of the States. twas in view of these diversities that the constitutional Convention approached the consideration of this question and we are told by Mr. Story, in his excellent Commentaries on that sacred charter of our liberty, that for obvious reasons it would have been improper to leave that subject open for the occasional regulation of Congress, even as to the qualification of electors for Representatives to its own body; and therefore it was settled in the constitution itself, and placed forever beyond the control of Congress. (Storys Commentaries on the constitution, sec. 583. The constitution declares that “Tho HoRepshall be composed of members cliosen Very 2ndyear by the people of the several States and the electors in eachState shall have the qualiiicatim is requisite for electors of the most numerous brunch of the State Legislature.”Gmotituhoii, art. 1. sec. 2, clause 1. Now, who determines those qualifications in the respective States? I say that the people of the several States themselves determine those qualifications, and no other power on earth is authorized to interfere. The language of the constitution is clear and emphatic. It is too plain to require interpretation. It establishes a rule which i, in the uatiire of our Government, cannot be uniform. It is to be fixed by each State for itself and upon this point I desire to invite attention for a moment to a few authorities, and they are authorities of great weight and distinction in the constitutional history of our count; authorities entitled to the very highest consideration at the hands of their posterity and firs; Alexander Hamdton, one of the earliest and greatest and purest expounders of our Federal constitution, who may be ranked as standing at the head of our great statesmen of the earlier school. What dots he say? In No. 52 of the Federalist he uses this language:.” To have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one uniform ru o would probably have been as dissatisfaclory to someof the States as it would have been difficult to the Convention. The provision made by the Convention appears, therefore. to be the best that lay within their option. 1!mm! be satisfactory to every Stair, because it is ormab to the standard already established or which may be “enabliahed by the Stole InclI. It will be safe to the U.S., because, being fixed by the State constitutions. it is not altorablo by the State governments: and it cannot be feared that the people of the States will alter this part of their constitutions in such manner as to abridge tho rights secured to them by the Federal constitution.” and in this connection I beg leave to invite the attention of the House to a fact, perhaps for otten by some, that this number of the Federalist may be quoted with equal propriety as expressing the deliberate opinion and judgment of Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Madison; because in every list of the numbers of that work ever furnished by Mr. Madison himself he claimed that he, and not Mr. Hamilton, was the author of No. 52; and Mr. Hamilton, in some of his lists, claimed that he was its author, and not Mr. Madison. But the claim that is made by both of those distinguished statesmen for the paternity of this number of the Federalist is enough to establish the fact that both of the m approved, indorsed, and adoptedas his own the opinions expressed in it. therefore quote it now as expressing the equally deliberate judgment of Mr. Madison himself upon this subject and in this connection I will briefly invite attention to another authority. I quote now from the History of the constitution, by Mr. Curtis. I read it for the purpose of showing what were the intentions, as he understands them of the framers of this particular part of the constitution. He says: “The committee of dotail, after a review of all these considerations, presented a scheme that was well adapted to meet the difficulties of the case. They proposed that the some persons who by the laws of the several States were admitted to vote for mcmbers of the most numerous branch of their own Legislatures, should have the right to vote for thq Represgntatives of Congress. The adoption of this principle avoided the necessity of disfranchising any portion of the people of a State by a system of qualifications Juund known to their laws. As the Stateswere the best people oift twhaese cirecrutamins ltyanbeeesst and tempe rof their own support of to mom rate them to the It was posstihbelen, ie nwdeseodn, bstuittuntiootnv beyrythpisrocboanbelession that they might admit foreigners to the right of votin with ontthe previous qualification of citisenship. t was possible t. oo. that they ought establish universal suffrage in its most unrestnc sense. But against all these evils there existed one great security, namely that the mischiefs of an absolutely free suffrage would be felt most severely by themselves in their own domestic concerns, and against the special danger to be faoprperigenheernsded from the indiscriminate admission of to the right of voting, another feature of the proposed Ian gave the national Legislature power to with old from persons, of foreign birth the privileges of general citizenship, although a State might confer upon them the power of voting without previous naturalization. ”. who may 9100i“)!, I will read. no more of that authority, but simply add that in a somewhat lengthy review of this subject Mr. Curtis fully sustains the expressed opinions of Mr. Madison and Mr. Hamilton, an the present Executive of the U.S. I think it will be generally conceded by most men in this country that if this great which is claimed by the honorable gentfrom from Pennsylvania [Mr. KELLEY] exists at all, it cannot be found to rest upon this provision of the constitution, but must find its abiding place in another clause of the constitution, which I Will now read to the House. It is as follows: “The times places and manner of holding elections for Sens&Reps shall be proscribed in each State by the Legislature thereof: but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except asto the places of choosing Senators. "Omalituiou, art. 1, see. 4, clause 1. Now, I invite attention to the obvious fact that this provision of the constitution is limited by its own terms to certain objects. “hat are they? 1st, to the “times.” Times of what “I The times of holding the elections. 2nd, to the “places.” The places for what? The places for holding the elections. 3rd. to the “ mannerz” Now, I invite attention to the obvious meaning of that word taken in connection with the context. The manner of what? Is it the manner of determinin the qualifications of electors? Is it inten edto refer to the mode in which the persons who are to exercise this franchise sha I be determined? No, sir; it relates solely to the manner of holding elections, not the manner of determining who shall vote or who shall not vote. such is the construction placed upon this provision by Mr. Justice Story, whose examination of the history of the constitution was perhaps more thorough and exhaustive than that of another jurist or statesman in our country. e disposesof the monstrous idea that Congress may regulate elections in the States, or that such purpose was ever cherished by the framers of the constitution, in the followmg manner: “What would be said of a clause introduced into the national constitution to regulate the State elections of the members of the State Legislatures? It would be deemed a most unwarrauta)iO transfer of power, indicating a premeditated design to destroy the State governments, It would be doomedso flag rant a violation of principle as to require no comment.” on annotation, sec. 819. Then, confining the power of Congress, under the provision in question, to the mere regulation of the times, places, and manner of holding elections, he approves it as demanded by possible emergencies that may arise in the history of the Union, and adds: “There is no pretenseto say that the power in the national Government can be used so as to exclude any State from its share in the representation in congress. Noveanit bemid with correctness that(home can, in any way, alter the rights or Mllfifflliom of voters. The most that can be urged with any show of argument is, that the power might. in agiven case, be employedin such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite candidate or favorite class of men, in exclusion of others, by confining the places of election o particular districts, and rendering it impracticable or the citizens at large to partake in the ohoice. ”1bid. sec. 820. Mr. Hamilton is equally emphatic in his mode of disposing of the theory that. would tolerate the interference of Congress in the regulation of elections in the States for State officers. In No. 59 of the Federalist. he says: "Suppose an article had been introduced into the constitution, empowering the U.S. to regulate the elections for the particular States, would any man have hesitatedto condemn it, both as an unwarrantable transition of power, and as a premeditated engine or the destruction of the State governments,?" In the next number of the Federalist, speahing more at length (in the subject of the propriety of allowin Congress to regulate the times, places, an manner of holding elections for representatives in Congress, and of the alleged danger that Congress might so regulate them as to favor certain classes in the States, he further says: “The truth is, that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended thbut by m; scribing qualifications of property oi or for toese be elected. But thsjom no gmrt 1866. 455 of the pmm to be conferred upon the national Government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times. the places and the mannerof elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen. as has been remarked upon another woosion. are defined and fixed in the constitution; and areunalterable by the Legislature" [of the Union.] These views in reference to the history and just interpretation of that proVison are substantial! concurred in by Mr. Duer, in his Lectures on constitutional Jurisprudence, and by Mr. Curtis, in the work to which I have alrea y referred, the History of the constitution. Now, I desire very briefly to direct the attention of the House to some additional testimony on this subject derived from the proceedings of the Convention itself as reported by James Madison. I propoee from them to show that the interpretation for which I contend is the only true one, the only one of which the proVision is fairly susceptible, and the only one which ever for a single instant entered the minds or controlled the action of the framers of the constitution. I invite attention now to what is called the 5th volume of Elliotts Debates. It is really the debates of the constitutional Convention, prepared by Mr. Madison. While the subject was under discussion on the 24th day of July, 1787, the following proceedings were bad: “Mr. Gouvruiuzun Mourns movedto strike out the last memberof the section. beginning with the words qualifications of clecton. in order that someother provsion might be substituted which would restrain the right of suffrage to freeholders. Mr. Firzsiimoss 2nded the motion. “Mr. Wittuiisou was opposedto it.” He was followed by Mr. Wilson, afterward one of the justiccs of the Supreme Court, appointed by Vashington: “