Mr. DOOLITTLE. I think so, nndmfbtedly. I think undoubtedly that where. an offense is committed by any person against the laws of the U.S., and the resident, in par suance of the Constitution and laws, grunts full pardon and amnesty to the offender, he is restored to his position as a citizen to all intents and Mrp. urpOosHeNs.SON. The honorable member perhaps might state it in thii way: one of the acts we have passed during the rebellion prol rides that for the offenses stated in that act l a person may be indicted and tried and punished, and it provided, as a pdrt of the punishment, for his exclusion from the right to hold l office. Now, I submit to my friendfrom Maine whether if one has been convicted under that act, and has been adjudged to suffer that punishment, and the President then should pardon him the pardon would not remove the disability consequent upon that judgment. The question in relation to the general effect of the pardoning power of the President has been discussed in this Supreme Court, so far as the exercise of that power concerns the obligation to take the oath which we have prescribed for permission to practice in the courts of the U.S. The Senate will remember that the same oath which we take here every lawyer is required to take before he can practice in the courts of the U.S. he validity of that act, as far as counsel is concerned, was one of the questions which were argued and reargued by direction of the court at the last term; and as the 2 gentlemen who a plied to practice without taking the oath ha been pardoned by the President, another question was argued, whether the effect of the pardon was not to exempt them from the obligation to take the oath, and upon that question, I have reason to believe, the Supreme Court was divided. Certainly, from all accounts, 4 of the judges thought that the pardon did operate as an exemption, and one doubted; and the question is now held 'iiiider advisement, to be settled the one way or the other when the Supreme Court meets; but the authoriticscited I have not them in my memory exactly went very far, as I thought, to prove that the operation of the pardon was to clear the party pardoned from the obligation to take that oath; and that upon the ground that the oath itself excluding a party from the privilege of practicing in the courts of the U.S. was in the nature of a penalty.