Mr. SOHENCK. I move to amend that m“ otion by strikin out “ 15 ” and inserting ten;” and I will endeavor to assign my reasons for wishing a postponement of only ten minutes, instead of 15. Mr. Speaker, I have desired to say to this House t hit I think we have been engaged this morning in a very unprofitable discussion, not touching the merits of the question before us. I hold, sir, that no resignation, whether it be made to the Governor of a State or to this House, can in the slightest degree affect the question of the execution of the order of this house. I do believe that the resignation ought to be made to the Governor. I do believe that a resignation is capable of being stopped in transitu. I do believe that a member, having deosited his resignation in the postoffice, may at erward take it out if he thinks proper, though I acquit the Gentfrom Kentucky of any such design; I do not suspect him of any such purpose. But, if he were to do so, in what position should we find ourselves placed ‘2 If we considered that his resignation as a member had relieved him from the execution of our order, and if he should, after being thus relieved from the execution of the order, recall his resignation and reappear here, it would be a beautiful flanking of the House. Now, sir, supposing the resignation to have been made to t ie Governor of Kentucky; supposing the Governor tohave accepted it; supposing the proof of that acceptance to have come here; supposing a writ of election to have been issue and another member sent here: I hold that, in spite of all these circumstances, Loveu. H. oussmu would still be amenable to the execution of the order of this House. What is it that the House has done? It appointed, in the 1st place, a select committee of 5 to investigate an assault upon a member of this House “Aud to report the facts.with such resolutionsin referencetheretoas.in their judgment maybe proper and necessaryfor the vindication of the privilegesof the House and the protection of its members, and that said committeehave powerto send for persons and papers and to examinewitnesseson out." The question is not whether a particular man is or is not a member of this House. The question is whether anybody iiieinber or private citizen, official, high or low, or no official at all has interfered with the freedom of discussion in attacking a member of this House for words spoken in debate. After a report by the committee and due consideration of the question in this House, we have adopted a resolution"That Hon. Lovsu. H. Rousseau"With no description as to what or who he is"be summonedto thobar of the House and be there publicly reprimanded by the Speaker for the violation of the rights and privilegesof the House. of which he wasguilt in the personalassaulteom mitted by him upon on. J. B. Gainsnti. for words spokenin debate." Now, air, if the resolution had described General ROUSSEAU as “ a member of this House from the State of Kentucky, ” that language would simply have been, as the lawers say, descriptio persona. I hold that even if he be now stripped of his official functions, that fact can have no effect whatever upon the execution of the order which this House has made in his case. If this were not so, itwould be, as I have already remarked, within the power of a member to evade the execution of the order of the House by a resignation, which he might subsequently recall, and then he might reappear iere. et we illustrate the principle in another way. Here are 3 personsrivate citizens, persons holding no officia character, whom we have directed to be called before this House. Suppose that one of these persons on being brought up here shouldp cad as a bar to your authority that after the order of the House directing him to be brought be fore'it he had been elected a member of congress. “Your proceeding, ” says he “was against me as a citizen. Now I am a member of Congress, and I defy on to apply your order to me, a member of zlongress, because I was a citizen when you made your order.” The argument is as good one way as another. Take another illustration. Supose a man to be indicted for embezzlement of public funds as an officer of the Government, and when convicted and called up for judgment, produces evidence he has resigned his commission as In olIicer of the Government, will you say he is not to be punished? Not at all. He has been convicted as an officer of the Government, it is true; he has been convicted on the evidence provided for in the statute, and he can no more rid himself in this case than in that of the consequences after the rendering of the verdict against him. He cannot escape the execution of the judgment after it has been iassed in the case of an officer who has thus been convicted any more than in the case of a member of this House. Well, sir, what will this House do? Suppose you decide your proceeding has been against Lovuu. H. Rousseau, member from Kentucky, although it is not recited in your resolution, does anybody doubt some one has committed a breach of the privileges of the House I) an attack upon one of its members for words spoken in ( cbate? It stands upon your record. Is the House bound in the assertion of its dignity, to turn reun and order the rearrest of Lovsu. H. ltoussmu, citizen of Kentucky? If so, the House puts itselfin the position of enabling a person convicted to get rid of the execution of the judgment of the House, and strips itselfof all power to proceed. Gentlemen talk as if we ought to be satisfied because enough mortification has been brought home to the Gentfrom Kentucky, enough of punishment in being made to go from this House that we on ht to consider our feelings as suiliciently satis ed. Sir, I have no feelin in this matter. I say it is purelya question of riflht. of law, of the prerogatives oft is House, whether we will permit him to go to the country or not; that its orders may be affected by the action of anyone against whom an order has been made, and which remains to be executed. The Speaker cites a case in point.