Mr. JOHNSON. Not so much as I am. However, I am not so liable in this instance, as I argued the case to which the honorable member refers. The bridge was built under a law of Virginia incorporating a company for the purpose of building it. The law provided that it should be so built as not to interfere with the navigation of the Ohio river. After it was built, after it had been a structure for sometime, there were some 5 or 6 vessels built at littsburg, for the purpose of trading between Pittsburg and points power dowu the river, with chimneys so elevated that at certain stages of the water it was impossible for them to pass the bridge, or, at any rate, to pass the brie without hazard ofinyu. The Supreme ourt, by a majority, decided that the court had jurisdiction to ascertain whether the bridge itself was an obstruction to the navigation of the river without any particular legislation on the part of Congress. The minority of the court, consisting of 3, I think, held that before the courts of the U.S. could possess jurisdiction there ought to be legislation upon the part of Congress, giving the courts authority in a case of that descrition. The court therefore decided that the bridge was either to come down, or to be elevated to such a height as the court itself prescribed, or ifthe obstruction could be practically removed by a draw in the brid e over the “western branch, ” which when the water was high af forded easy navigation, and therefore should not make it necessary for the vessels to pass under the bridge, that such a draw should be constructed. Then Congress passed the act to which my friend now refers declaring the brid e to be a post route and deciding thatit was of a sulficientheight. nhe majorit of the court held that Congress, under the authority to regulate commerce between the States, as the brid le, in the absence of legislation, interfered with the freedom of commerce, interfered with the navigation of the river, (which they considered as included within the power to regulate commercc) had a right to prescribe for itself what should not be an impediment to navigation. But if the honorable member will look at that decision as given by Mr. Justice Nelson, I think he will find that they disavowed expressl the authority of Congress to bridge at all. They considered a road as between the States as trusted entirelyto the jurisdiction of the States. All that they maintained was that if the States in the exercise of that jurisdiction construct a bridge which interferes with the navigation of a navigable river, then Congress can interfere, either by deciding that it is not to be considered in the aiticular instance an interference with the navigation, or by authorizing the courts to abate it.