Mr. GARFIELD. M colleague is correct. Most of the 7 30 owls are included in this amount, but they must be redeemed in money or 5 20 bonds, at the holder’s option. The Secretary has no power to compel such an exchange. As I have already stated, there will be presented for payment in some form before the assembling of the Fortieth Congress $1, 201,000000, in addition to the ordinary exenditures of the Government. How are these emands to be met? With what power is the SecyTreasury clothed to enable him to meet this enormous obligation? There are 2 clauses in the existing laws which give him some power. The 1st and chief rs to be found in the last clause of the 1st section, of the act of the 8d of March, 1865, which has been soably discussed bym colleague on the committee, [Mr. ALLIson.] He has shown us and no man, I believe, will venture to deny the correctnoss of the position that the clause gives the SecyTreasury fpower' merely to exchange one kind of paper or another, but only with the consent of the holder. If the holder says, “I will not take your long bonds, I demand my money, ” his money he must have. If, when the 7 30 bond is due, the state of the market makes money more valuable than a 6%. bond for 20 years, the holder will of course demand money. He will of course take the option most profitable to himself and least advantageous to the Government. The other clause that gives the Secretary power is in the act of June 80, 1864. The 2nd section of that act allows the SecyTreasury to take u the various kinds of paper representing inde tedness and issue there or compound interest notes or 7 30 bonds. These 2 descriptions of paper are of all others the most expensive for the Government to issue. I say, then, concerning this power, it is one that the Secretary ought not to use. It would be a calamit should he be compelled to use it. It would be a calamity, in the 1st place, were be compelled to issue in exchange for maturing inde tednessthese compound interest notes, for they are the most costly paper the Government can issue to its creditors notes that are a able in 3 years with interest compoun e every 6 months. It is enough to break the financial strength of any nation. Again, by the provisions of this act the Secretary may issue 7 30 bonds in exchange for matured indebtedness. They are short bonds. They now fill the market more than any others, and will be maturing after about 12 months. If we pay these out it will be only for the purpose of taking up others of the same kind. Even this can be done only at the option of the holder. I say, therefore, that the Secrets is submautially limited in his power to t see 2 clauses of the law; one that he ought not to use and cannot use without great disadvantage to the public credit, and the other that he can use only for the purpose of an even exchange, and that, too, by the consent of the holders. Therefore he has but little valuable power or discretion in funding the national ebt. If Congress gives him no more power the Treasury will be at the mercy of the public creditors, who may combine to control he stock market and compel the Secretary to sacrifice the pub‘ lic credit to the gamblers of Wall street. I hold it demonstrable that if you leave the SecyTreasury where he is you aban don him to the mercy of the holders of the public securities, who, if they please, can utterly break him down and send the paper of the Government to protest. Under these circumstances it was the duty of the ComWays&Means to in quire what further power was necessary to enable the Secretar to meet these obligations as the mature, an put the debt into the form of ong bonds at a lower rate of interest than we now pay. The committee believe that the bill now before the House gives the Secretary no more power than is nee ful for the accomplishment of the work before him. With that power the Secretary believes he can do the work. Without it he cannot. If the lan now proposed be not adopted it is incum ent upon this House to offer one that will accomplis the work. It is not enon by that gentlemen are able to point out defects m this bill and raise objections to it; but it is incumbent upon them to show us a plan which will accomp lSfl the desired result and not be liable to equally grave objections. Now, sir, what has been proposed as a substitute for this bill? The distinguished Gentfrom Pennsylvania [ML Srsvnxs] has offered a substitute. I hope no one misunderstands his n ose. He is not only opposed to the pending ill, but he is unwillin to give the Secretary any additional power. e is not only unwilling to give the Secretary additional power, but he desires to take away much of the power already granted. His substitute consists of the committee’s hill with every vital provision cut out, and the following disabling section added. SEc. 2. That all laws or partsoflaws whichauthorize the SecyTreasury to fundor withdraw from circulation any U.S. lcsal tender notes not hearing interest be and the same are hereby. repealed. If his substitute shall become a law, I desire it to be remembered that the house must take the responsibility of the disastrous results which must inevitably follow. I have undertaken to state the 1st eat duty which rests upon the SecyTreasury, namely, to meet the maturing indebtedness of the Government. I will new state the 2nd.