Mr. HOWE. If my friendfrom Nevada will wait and see, he will know when I reach him. I was referring to the argument introduced by the Senfrom Ohio. I say the Constitution intended that the action of this lawmaking tribunal should be absolutely independent of the action of the Executive, except through the simple exercise of the veto power. But the argument which is paraded here calls upon us as a matter of usage, as a matter of expediency, as a matter almost of necessity, to inquire at the White House what sort of legislation will be approved there before we venture upon it. I am unwilling to see any such usage adopted. I shall regret most profoundly the day when by any act or vote of the Senate or of the HoRep such a usage shall be sanctioned or seem to be sanctioned. When any proposition is laid before this body I ask, and think I haVe a right in the name of the Constitution to demand, that its merits shall he passed upon with strict regard to its own terms. If we, a majority of this body, approve the merits of the proposition, we have no right to reject it. We betray what, in our judgment, is the true interest of the people if we to reject it. No man has a right to tell us that he President will veto the bill, and we have no right to listen if we are so told. When the Senate approves a measure right, it is bound to assume that the President will think it right, and that he will approve the measure; and upon this point I will not believe any testimony exec t the direct and official testimony of the President himself. When we have considered and approved a measure, then he is called upon to consider, and approve or disapprove; and when he has had an opportunity to consider, and has told us that he disapproves, I will believe him, and I will believe no man but him. I therefore lay out of view entirely the suggestion that the adoption of this amendment will involve us in any controversy with the President. If he does not approve of the bill with this amendment upon it, he will veto the bill possibly; if he does not see fit to approve the bill, be will unquestionably veto it; and then the 2 Houses will be called upon to determine what they will do in that contingency, to pass upon the reasons he gives for not npproving the bill. But, says the Senator, it is an amendment to an appropriation bill an qppropriution bill every ollor of which is neeed for the good of the public service, and by putting upon this bill this measure which may prove obnoxious to the President, you jeopur, you hazard the safety of the bill. How so, or if so, what possible measure can you put into an appropriation bill and not run the same hazard? lavery single individual appropriation in this bill might have been oppose upon precisely the same ground. If any Senator had assumed to say the President is o posed to this or that appropriution, he couldhave called upon us with just as much authority to lay aside that particular appropriation upon peril of having the bill vetoe, and the appropriations lost in case we put it in. This is on y designed to be one of a great many provisions in a single bill. It is not in terms an appropriation. It is in terms a direction as to the disbursement of the money appropriated, and I know of nothing more proper or more regular than the imosition of just such regulations as this, touching the disbursement of moneys upon bills making appropriations of public moneys. But, says the Senator. if we do at it on and if the President does veto this bill, then the postal service must suffer and languish through a whole year, and we shall beheld resonsible. Wh shall we be held responsible? but shall we modem to occasion this disaster to the postal service? We have seen lit to incorporate a.section into the bill making appropriations for that service, which we approve, which we deem right in itself, and it is conceded by those who nr c this argument to be right. We put it on to his bill; and the President, it is assumed, does not approve it, and therefore he will not assent to the approprintions, and we are to be held responsible for the disaster that overtakes that branch of the public service. I conceive that he who wrongfully refuses to approve the bill is alone responsible for the consequences that follow. If we put a provision in this bill which the President ought not to approve, then he is justified in vetoing the bill, an the consequences that may follow upon this service justly attach to us; hutif we put nothing on this bill but what the President ought to approve, then I do humbly conceive that he ought to upprove the bill, and if he refuses to approve the bill be is not only responsible for rejecting this proposition,eon ceded to be right in itself, but he is responsible to whatever consequences follow to this branch of the public service. But the Senfrom Ohio insists that it is not necessary. He says there is no necessity for it now; it is entirely within our power to do this thing; it will be justified if the President should assume to make removals for insufficient or unworth reasons. Hut, the Senator says, that time as not come; wait; do not inau rate the war; pass your regular appropriation bills; whenanother session shall have convened, if you find the President has exercised this power, then put on the checks. Is that sound) advice to give to the Legislature? It is assumed here on the part of some that in the recess of the Senate the President may remove every officer employed in the public service, the term of whose office is not fixed by the Constitution. If there be danger that he will exercise this power for partisan or political purposes, the time will not come, perlaps, until Congress shall have adjourned; and the occasion will have passed before the next session will convene. The Senator says, do not anticipate any such thing; wait, try him, and when you convene again if on find he has done it, then provide the remedy. When the wolf is in the yard, be sure you shut the Gatel Well, I am not anticipating any maladmimstration on the part of the President; but I find a certain power claimed here to make these removals, with or without cause, forany reason that pleases the President; I deny that such power is given to the President by the Constitution; I insist that the Legislature should not recognize any such power; but because I find it insisted upon here, and by some assuming to speak in the name of the President, I am led to fear that the power maybe exerted, and if exerted it will be exerte during the very next vacation of this body; and when you come together again the occasion for its exercise will have passed; officers of the obnoxious kind will all have been removed from their places and those places will be filled with officers of the right ind, approved by the President himself. When that is the coachsays the Senfrom Ohio, then put on the brakes, to use a form of exression Igetfrom the President himself. When c gets all these offices filled with just such men as he likes, then pass an act of Congress which will prevent him from making a removal without the consent of the Senate! It strikes me that that would be a little latoin the season to plant with any certainty of a valuable crop. But these were not the only objections urged by the Senfrom Ohio; they were the objections thatl regretted to hear the most, for I do not like to have such considerations addressed to a legislative body ever. I like to have their judgments, their reasons, their convictions appeaed to; their fears never. There was another objection. He argues that by the adoption of this amendment we restrict the power of the President to make removals. I think so; it is the very purpose. But if we restrict him in the exercise of that power, says the Senator, we may put it out of hi. power to.remove a civilian who has been in O cc from the beginning of the war and to putin his place a poor soldier who has been crip led in the war; and will you not leave him thiat power? No, Mr. President; I think we had better not under existing circumstances leave him that power. I take it that all the occasion of the exercise of that power that will exist for a good many years exists now. I thank my God that we are enabled to reflect at last that our soldiers are done being crippled. All the crip ples that are to be made in the progress of this rebellion are now made and are to be provided for; here is the tribunal, the President and the Senate together, that can make provision for them; an I shall not concede, either upon the suggestion of the Senfrom Ohio or upon the suggestion of any other member of the Senate, that the President is more willing to take care of these crippled soldiers than we are. There are numerous cases of the kind that wait to be provided for. I will not encour age the President to postpone that act of justice until this Congress shall have adjourned, and then do it upon his own private account. Let him do it now, because now justice waits to be done; let him send here the names of these crippled soldiers and let us pass upon the case. We can cooperate now, we are here to conperate with him both in the act of removal and in the act of apointment., The Senator admits, and Ipbelieve all who have spoken in opposition to this amendment conce e today, that the poweris in the Legislature to fix the terms of all these officers and to take from the President the right, if he has it, as I think by the statute he has, not by the Constitution, to remove any of these officers. We can, it is said, take that from him; and they say, why not do it? This is an indirect method of accomplishing the purpose, and the Senfrom Ohio says it does not accomplish it after all. What is our purpose? To restrict the exercise of this power of removal. Do it then directly, they say, by act of Congress, and declare that the President shall not make these removals. Sir, that is only one way to do it. Is it a better way than this? That is the exercise of a greater power than this is. This does notsay in terms, " You shall not remove atall, ” but it says thatifyou do remove without cause the officer whom you select to succeed shall not be paid. They tellus we may prohibit him from removing at all, but it is very hard to say when he has removed and a man has been appointed, that man shall not be paid. Hard? W y? Upon whom is it hard? It is nothard upon the incumbent particularly. It is not any harder than the existing law, under which the President can remove him or does remove whenever he pleases. It is harder upon the incumbent of the office, to be sure, than would be a law which said heshould not be removed at. all; but that we do not choose to say; we want to reserve the power somewhere to remove for cause; but is it hard upon the appointee? Yes, it does seem to be rather hard upon a poor, ambitious aspirant for a postoffice to say that after he is putinto it and discharges the duties of it he shall not be paid; but recollect that is no harder upon the aspir nut for the postoffice than it is to say to the President, as they suggest to us to say, “ You shall not make the removal; thercforeyou shall not make the vacancy; and therefore you shall not make the appointment, " for if we say that, as they urge us to say it, certainly the vacancy cannot be made, and certainly the as irant cannot be gratified. But, says my frien from Vermont [Mr. POLAND] in an “aside, ” in the one case teman would hold the office, in the other case he would not. True as holy writ; but by whose fault or connivance does be hold the office? By the connivance of the Legislature? By ours? The law does not compel him to take the office. He sees fit to take it with the deliberate notice placed upon your statute that he cannot be paid if he sees fit to take office under those circumstances. He acts with his eyes open, and he acts volunta rily; there is no sort of duress or constraint laid upon him. Of what shall he compkiin? Why shall he complain? The Senfrom Nevada [Mr. STEWART] seems to think we are anticipating, reach in out for, seizing a weapon to strike before it egitimately comes to us. He does not like this amendment. Why? Not because we have not the power to pass it, not because it is not right in itself, not because he would avoid a collision with the President, but he has not got ready to enter into a struggle with the President, because he does not precisely know whether he can stand by Congress or not. He waits to know what is the policy of Congress. Until he knows whether he is on the side of Congress he does not like to make up an issue with the President. Until, in other words, he can see and understand precisely how he will relish the service of the Al mighty he does not like to desert no, I believe it would not be proper to go on with that seu tenee, I will omit the rest of it; until he understands clearly that he will relish the service of Congress, he does not like to step out of the service of the President. I do not know but that I am prepared to commend such prudence as that; and I cannot really relieve the Senfrom his difliculty. I do not know what is the policy of Congress. I am struggling here to find out, to develop, the policy of Congress. I trust in the name of the Almighty and of the people and of the Constitution that 8. art of the policy of Congress is to adopt this amendment; and if my friendfrom hevada approves it, I ask his assent to it. If he does not approve it, then I think he ought to vote ainst it. But I ask him to lay aside now an forever the idea that he is inaugurating a fight with the POTUS when he simply sits here like a Senator and gives to his country the benefit of such judgment as he ha! upon any and every question that may be laid ofore him. That is the idea that I want to see started. It has lingered about these Halls a great deal too long and it is because it has lingered here so long that it makes the adoption of just such an amendment as this so very necessary. I have spoken so far, Mr. President and I have s oken longer than I intended to do from testand point presented on the other side, conceding that the amendment was right in itself and entirely within our discretion. Is there any doubt about it? I understand the Senfrom Maryland concedes it. today. I said the other day, and I repeat again, that whoever doubts or denies our right or our power to incorporate this amendment upon this bill ought to vote against it, and whoever doubts or denies the power of Congress to restrict the right of removal and to fix the tenure of these offices, I think ought to vote against the adoption of this amendment, for I concede now, as I conceded then, that if the Constitution confers upon the POTUS the power to remove these officers. that is a power which he may exercise in defiance of us, and when he has exerted it in any case he has made a vacancy, and when he has made a vacancy he has not merely clothed himself with the right, but he has charged himself with the duty under the Constitution of seeing that vacancy filled. It turns, than, upon our right to restrict this power of removal. I shall not detain the Senate with any argument upon that point; todayI do not understand it to be controverted; and I have only one single remark to make upon that head. As I read the constitution, must say that if the President has the right under the Constitution, and independent of statute law, to remove a postmaster at pleasure and for political reasons, he has the right to remove a judge of the Supreme Court. If he has a right to remove one of these civil officers, he has the right to remove every civil officer. I mean if he has it under the Constitution. But you tell me that the Constitution expressly fixes the terms of the judges. limits them to good behavior. Yes, I admit it. If you see fit to fix the term of a postmaster at 4 years or ten years, or during good behavior, the 2 cases are put it on a footing so far as the law is conce rue. It being conceded that we have the right to fix the tenure of these offices, when we have done it it is just as much a law as the Constitution, for the Constitution of the U.S. is no more valid than any act of Congress made in pursuance of and in accordance with the constitution; and if you see fit to fix the tenure of these offices, and yet concede that in spite of your law, which says it shall be 4 years or 6 years, the President may, under powers derived from the Constitution, remove within the term, then he may remove the judge; and every one of the officers employed in the civil or in the military or in the naval service is not an agent of the people of the U.S., not an agent of the law, but he is a servant of the President. Sir, if any such notion has prevailed in the minds of the American people, I think it is time to wipe it out. I could illustrate the necessity of this by facts which have fallen under my observation within a very short time. This is not the occasion to parade them before the Senate; but there is not a Senator sitting here that cannot point his own finger to numer ous instances illustrating the necessity of teaching the American people that it was not the design of our institutions to make the POTUS responsible for public opinion, or to make him a missionary clbthed With patronage and power and emoluments for the purpose of inculcating his own opinions or his own political doctrines upon the people.