Mr. TRUMBULL. We will see what that is. I read now from page 646, wherein the author is treating upon the writ of habeascorpus, the great writ O " right, in which he says: The penalty “01,000 is given in favor of the party aggrieved, against every officer and every member of the court asseutingto the refusal, if any court” Is that a judge in chambers? “if any court or oliirer authorized to grant the writ shall refuse it when legally applied fen". Is thata commissioner? If the judge refuses the writ when legally applied for, he is subected to the penalty of $1.000. Now, says the Senfrom Pennsylvania, That means when it is not in court. Is it not in court when the application is made to the court? Is not the case there? and for refusing that great writ to a party who is entitled to it. the judge is liable to this penalty. What further does Kent say? In treating still further upon this subject, and wherein he treats upon the rearrest of a party who has once been discharged by writ of habeas empus, he says: "And finally. if any personsolely or as a of any member court or in executionofnnyorder, knowinuly reimprisonssuch party, he forfeitsapenalty of 1,250 to the party aggrieved and is to be deemed gui ty of a misdemeanorand liable to lineand imprisonment." Now, what becomes of your proposition that CO it must be done as a commissioner and at chambers, and the “novelty” of the proposition? What further says Kent? “The habemcomm act of Mississippi makes the refusal or neglect of any judge or in ges to grant the writ a high misdemeanorand an impeaohoble offense. ” “Again: The habeascorpus acti n Illinoise confines thaliabil iwtyritolotflicha judgmei to a penalty for refusing to issue a corrupt refusacl.o rpuawhen legally applied for to a When a party applies for the writ, and the court or any member of a court decides that he is not entitled to that writ, and if in the State of Illinois he makes a corrupt decision, he is liable to fine and imprisonment. In the State of NewYork it is not required by the terms of the act that it should be shown that the decision is corrupt, but any court refusing to grant the writ when a party is legally entitled to it is subject to a penalty, and any judge of a court or member of a court who knowingly reimpris cos a party who has been discharged on a writ of habeascorpus is liable both to fine and imrisonment, and even to impeachment in the State of Mississippi. Now, what is the provision in this bill? It is not to imprison the party; but the provision here is that all parties, judges, Officers, and other persons thenceforth proceeding with a case, after it has been removed to the U.S. court, or after the proor steps have been taken for the removal of t 10cause to the U.S. court shall be liable. If a State judge undertakes, then, to act and proceed in that case, he acts without jurisdiction and he is made liable by the rovismns of the bill, and he ought to be made iable; and my friendfrom Michigan [Mr. Howmp] says he would be liable at the common law, too. This law that is proposed here is no such innovation, no such extraordinary provision as some gentlemen suppose. In my opinion, the main feature of the statute now proposed is nothing but a declaration of what the law is. A party is always protected in the discharge of a duty which is putupon him. The U.S. have authority to carry on war, to raise armies, to appoint officers, to prescribe rules and regulations for the government of the armies. One of those rules and regulations makes the private soldier and the subordinate oiiieer obedient to his superior commander. By law, at the peril of his liberty and of his life, he is required to execute the orders issued by his superior officers. In the execution of those orders he is to be protected. The common law protects him just as much protects the private soldier in the State of Kentucky in the execution of the order of an Officer, as it protects a constable or a sheriff in the execution of a writ issued by competent authority. But. sir, some of the State courts in these rebellious States refuse so to understand the law; they say that acts done under military authority afford no protection. Hence we propose to pass this statute declaring at the fact that the act was done by command the supe prior officer in the discharge of his duty shall be a defense; and the State courts refusin so to treat it, that the U.S. court shall have jurisdiction of such cases. It would be the most monstrous proposition everadvocated and utterly destructive of all government, if the citizen who is required to render obedience to the Government is not to be protected in the acts which he does in rendering that obe dience. Can it be possible that the Government of the U.S. may call into its service and into its armies, in order to maintain the honor of the nation and the integrity of the Union, every citizen in the land, and compel him to serve, and then has no power to protect him against prosecutions for doing the acts which he was compelled by the government to do? Sir, such cannot be the law. But I did not rise with a view ofarguing the question, but simply to reply to this assumption which has been set 11 here in the Senate and repeated as if it would seem that those repeating it were getting to believe it, that it was a novel thing to punish a judge. The Senfrom Wisconsin tells you that there is no necessity for it; punish the officer who executes the process; pass a law and put the responsibility upon the subordinate or the officer; let the judge issue an order and let the officer, the subordinate who is to execute it, take the responsibility and decide whether it is lawful or not. Sir I am for gain to the source of iniquity. I would take the ead chief who under takes to persecute Union men for doing their duty. I would take the man who issues the order, if he does it knowingly, as he must do it if he does it after the necessary ste s have been taken to remove the case to the federal courts. I would produce no such confusion into our judicial proceedings as to place upon the subordinate, the officer who is to execute the process, the responsibility of deciding whether it is void or not. Let the man whom the States place in the judicial office not on his resonsibihty, and if he acts corruptly or knowing y to oppress the most insignificant Union man that in defense of his country has committed an act for which he is sued, I would hold him responsible.