Mr. JOHNSON. Certainly we cannot prevent his going; but what may follow from his goin. If we attempt to carry out the threat which is involved in the instructions to our minister at Austria to leave that court, warwar with Austria. Where can we strike her? We may strike the few soldiers she ends into Mexico, but that will do her little if any harm; but where can she not strike as? Fill the seas with privatecrs, and for anglit that we know en ge Napoleon as an ally.mention such contin encies as this not for the purpose of saying than if the occur they are not to be met in a manly an a patriotic spirit. but for the purJose ofinvokin my friends in this body to avoid, if it is possible to avoid, any dissension among ourselves. I should fear that while as I think no practical good of any appreciable extent, except perhaps in a part sense, will be accomplished by such an amendment as my friendfrom Illinois proposes, inli nite mise hief may be the consequence of our holding in the presence of the world divided councils. 11 States of the Union are now not represented, and as far as Congress and the presidential election are concerned, not to be represented until after the next presidential alection if the report made from the committee of 15 shall be adopted by Congress. this is not a time to exhibit before theSuwroerlyd divided councils. Our wishes individually are as nothing; our party hopes, whatever they may be, in my estimation, are as nothing; partyase endency by either of the parties which are supposed now to divide the country is as nothing compared with the restoration of the Union, and standing, not divided, but standing as one and a united people all under the protection of the Constitution that our fathers framed for us and adopted for us, and entitled to all its rights. I have now the letter to which I alluded some time ago. It is a letter from Mr. Madison to Edward Coles, who had been his former ec retary. dated October 15, 1834. It is q o a long letter; but there are only one or 2 portions of it that bear on the particular question. In a former letter he had told Mr. Coles that in his opinion the Senate of the U.S. were inculcating what he termed innovating doctrines; and Coles asked him to specify what he considered to be innovating; and in answer to that request Mr. Madison says: " You are at a loss for the innovating doctrines of the Senate to which I alluded. Permit.metospecify the following: "The claim. on rnnetimtmnalground. to it sharein the removal as well as appointment of olficcis is in direct opposition to the uniform practiceof the government from its commencement. It is clear that the innovation would not only vary. Essentially the existinir balance of power.but exposethe Executive, occasionally.to a total inaction, and at all times to delays fnta to thodue execution of the laws. "Another innovation broughtforwardin the Senate claims for the Legislature a discretionary regulation of the tenure of odices. This. also, would vary the relationof the Deptsto each other and leave a wide field for legislative abuses. The power of removal. like that of appointment. ought tobe fixed by the Constitution and both. like the right of suffrage and appointment of Representatives.to benot dependent on the legislative will. In republican Governments the organization of the executiveDept will always befound the mostditheult and delicate. particularly in regard to the appointment and most of all. to the removal of officers.It may well deserve consideration how far the present nipd ification of thesepowers can be cumititiuwnulluim pruved y Isaaooat “ Anothnr innovation of greatpractical importance espoused by the Senate relates to the power of the Executive to make diplomatic and consular appoint merits in the recessof the Senate. Hitherto it has beenthepracticeto makesuehappointmentsto places calling for them. whether the places had or had not beforereceivedthem. Under no Administration was the distinction moredisregardedthan under that of MLJelfersonmurticularly in consularappointments. which rest on the sometext of the Constitution with that of public ministers. It is now assumedthat the appointmentse an onlybe madefor occurring vacancies. that is. placeswhich had beenpreviously filled. The error hasinconfnundiuir foreign missionsunder the law of nations with municipal officers under the local law. If they were officersin the constitutional sense.a legislative creation of them being expressly required. the could not becreated h the President and Senate. 1. indeed. it could be admitted that as offices they would imofnclo be created by the up pointment from the President and Senate.the office would expire with the appointment and the next appointment would createa new othee.not fill a vacant one. By recording those missionsnot as offices. but asstations or airencies.alwaysexisting under the law of nations for Government: agreeing.the one to send the other to receive the properfunctionaries. the case.thouirh not perhaps altogether free from difficulty, is better provided for than by any other construction. The doctrine of the Senatewould beas imurious in practiceasitis unfoundedin authority." The 1st extract which I read is that which bears more immediately; and I Will read it again. The italics are in the work, no doubt by Mr. Madison himself. “The claim. on constitutionalground. to a share in the removal aswell as appointment of oflioers is in direct opposition to the uniform practice of the Government from its commencement. It is clear that the innovation"The innovation being a claim of participation in the power of removal “wouldnot only vary essentiallythe existlngbalance of the powerbut exposethe Executive occasionally. to a total inaction and at all times to delays fatal to the due execution of the laws." and the more mature reflection of the rest and patriotic men who adorned this bo y at that time led them to abandon the contest. Now we are about to renew it. My friendfrom Illinois says that that is not the purpose of the amendment, and yet he cannot be saying that his very object is to deprive the resident of the power to remove, not directly, but by taking from the appointees whom he may appoint the compensation which the law would otherwise give. Now, I submit in all frankness, and, to repeat, without the slightest wish to effect any party purpose, without the most remote idea that my judgment upon this question is influenced at all by any party consideration, that it is all important to the peace, quiet, prosperity, and honor of the country that we should get along with the President, however he may be, without trenching at all upon the powers which from time to time have been held from the beginning of the Government to belong to that Dept.