Mr. HARDING, of Kentucky. What I am contending for is that the order itself is made a complete justification. The gentleman cannot gainsay that. The order is of itself ajns tification for all acts; the order of any officer, verbal or written, general or special, is of itself made a complete justification, however villaine us or criminal the act may have been. The gentleman has amended the bill a little, as he has informed me, and I will read it as he intends to have it stand. It is made worse in some respects. It places a corporal or ser geant or lieutenant on exactly the same ground with the POTUS or the SecyWar; a sort of association which seems to me to be alittle immodest, to say the least of it. Here is what the bill says, and I defy any gentleman to show that I construe it too harsh y or too rigidly: o That any search, seizure, arrest, or imprisonment made, done, or committed, or any actsdone 1 No matter what they may be, involving mur der even or omitted to be done.during the said rebellion. by anyofice r or personunder and by virtue ofuny order, written or verbal. general or special, issued by the POTUS or the SecyWar or by any military officerof the U.S., holding the commandof the Dept, district, or place. &c. Now, you will perceive that the order itself, issued by any military officer, though he be but a corporal or a sergeant, in command of a little squad of soldiers in any town, is a complete justification. Gentlemen smile as I mention these officers; but if they were Kentucky ians, they would not smile. The truth is, that.all over Kentucky, in every little town or vil lage, and in almost every neighborhood, there was a little squad of soldiers, sometimes left under the command of a captain, sometimes under the command of a lieutenant sometimes under a corporal or sergeant. how, all the acts of all those swarms of officers are placed on exactly the same ground as the acts of the POTUS Then, I repeat, the defendant, if you pass this bill, will be armed with the law exact y to suit his defense. He may acknowled e that at the time when he made the search of the mans goods and effects there was no ground for suspicion against him; he knew that he was an in nocent, law abiding citizen, guilty of no offense. But there was an old account to settle. This man, the plaintiff had once, years before, insulted him; and for this, with the full knowl edge of his innocence, he searched his effects, seized his property, arrested and threw him into rison. et, notwithstanding all this, he is able to defy the retributive justice of the law, because he acted under an order issued by some captain or sergeant or any other officer. That is a full defense and answer. Observe, too, how convenient it is to sustain this defense. How charitable the revisions of this bill are to the defendant! e is told that if he cannot produce the original order he may produce a copy; or if that is a little haz ardous, if its genuineness is likely to be called in question, he may resort to a telegram; or if that cannot be produced, he may give arol evidence that there was a telegram. Ifhe t inks that there is any danger in attempting this, all he has to do is to resort to anotiier provision of this bill, and defend himself on the ground of a verbal or parol order. There certainly can be no danger in that. Any lawyer in his defense will take the hint. In Kentucky, for instance, there were swarms of officers posted in every neighborhood, at every town and village. lhey have now gone to their homes in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and other States, and all the defendant has to do is to claim that some lieutenant from the State of Ohio or elsewhere told him to make the arrest, and he may call one of hise o conspirators to prove that such an order was given. The Officer himself cannot be reduce, and hence there is a full defense. ill any gentleman say that this does not come plain] within the scope of the provisions of this bill? I affirm that it does, for the bill prevides that the order, parol or written, of anyofficer to do any act whatever shall be a justification of the act. The Gentfrom Illinois says that a soldier is bound to obey the order of his commanding officer. Now, sir, I suppose that there is some limitation or restriction in reference to that. I ask the gentleman this question: when a commanding officer orders his subordinate to go and commit murder, to shoot down an inno cent citizen, is the subordinate bound to obey that order? No, sir. “hen the commanding officer transe ends all properauthority, when he issues an order in defiance of all law, civil and military, when he takes his stand above constitutions and laws, and issues an order for the commission of murder, or any other crime, both he who issues the order and he who executes it incurs the guilt of that crime, and are liable to the punishment denOunced against it. But, sir, this bill goes still further. It proposes to go back and operate upon past acts. t gives to a man a defense which he had not when the suit was brought. It is retroactive in its provisions. It attempts to destroy a legal right of action. It is exposffacto, and therefore contrary to the Constitution. There is another provision which deserves attention. The judge of a State court may entertain have doubts, may believe that such a law as is is unconstitutional indeed, I cannot see how he could regard it otherwise and may refuse to proceed under it. One section of this bill provides that a judge thus shall be deemed guilty of an offense and acsthipfi be punished. n regard to this provision of the bill, I might call to my aid the Gentfrom Ohio. [Mr. Bisonon] The other day, when the bill in reference to civil rights was under consideration, that gentleman denounced a section in that bill containin a similar but less objection able provision. this bill contains a provision that ifa judge, sworn to administer the law as he understands it, with due regard to the constitution, shall not, immediately on the filing of the petition, suspend all further proceedingn if he shall take another step in the litigation he shall be subjected to a suit for damages, with double costs. In other words, if he is an honest man, if he honestly believes the law to be unconstitutional, he must commit perjury, or else, if he observes his oath, he must submit to costs and damages. The gentleman called my attention on yesterday to what he called the force bill of 1833, a bill which was passed for the purpose of securing the collection of the revenues from imports. I will say, and the gentleman will not controvert it, that that bill has not a single solitary retroactive provision in;it that it is wholly pros ective; entirely free from the objections which I am now urging against the nding proposition. There is no attempt there to legislate upon anything that is past. It is wholly free from any such objection. I ask the attention of the gentleman again. Here is a.bill which provides that the circuit courts of the U.S shall have jurisdiction of nearly every form bf trespass, seizure, arrest, imprisonment, involving not only all torts but all trespasses upon person and property. 1 repeat, this bill involves all arrests, searches, seizures, imprisonments, and other acts done, and the parties sued are allowed to transfer their cases from the State courts to the U.S. circuit courts. It involves nearly every imaginable tort and trespass upon person and property. It provides that these cases may be transferred to the circuit court of the U.S., and consequently gives jurisdiction to that court in all these cases. Now, the question I have to ask the chair man of the ComJudiciary or the honorable gentleman who reported this bill is, whether in his judgment there is constitutional power to confer upon that court jurisdiction in this class of cases? I ask the Gentfrom Illinois whether he considers there is constitutional wer to clothe the circuit court of the UniStates with such ajurisdiction?