Mr. LAWRENCE, of Ohio. I propose to discuss House bill No. 634, to repeal certain parts of the act approved April 30, 1790, entitled “An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the U.S. ” By the act approved April 30, 1790, it is provided:." Sko. 1. That if any person or R.owing allegiance to the U.S.A., shall levy war against them, or shall adhere to giving them aid and comfortwithin the U.S., or elsewhere, and shall be thereof convicted on confession in open court or on the testimony of 2 witnesses to the same overt act of he or o the treason whereof shall stand, indicted, such person or persons shall beoguilty of treason against the SUtnaittuetdesS atat tLeasrgaen, d shall sufferdeath.’ 1 U.S. 112. The same act provides as follows: “SEC. 32.That no person or persons shall be prose cuted, tried, or punished for treason or other capital offense aforesaid, willful murder or forgery excepted, unless the indictment for the same shall be found by a grand jury, within 3 years next after the trea son or capital offenseaforesaid shall be done or Initted, comnor shall any person be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offensenot capital, nor for any fine or forfeiture, under any penal statute, unless the in dictment or information for the same shall be found or instituted within 2 years from the time of mitting comthe offense or incurring the fine or forfeiture aforesaid: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall extend to any person or justice.”–1 persons fleeing from U.S. Statutes, 119 That act created 4 capital offenses trea son, murder, piracy, and forgery. There is not in the act, and never has been, any limitations as to prosecutions for murder and forgery, but forgery has ceased to be a capital offense. The act therefore limits prosecutions now to 3 years in cases of treason and piracy. The act approved July 17, 1862, provides “Sec. 1. That eyery person, who, shall hereafter commit the crime of treasonagainst the U.S and shall be adjudged guilty thereof shall suffer death”. " or be imprisoned for not less than, 5 years and fined, ” &c. “SEC. 2. That if any person shall hereafter incite, set on foot. assist, or o in any rebellion orinsur rection against the authority of the U.S or the laws thereof, or shall give aid and comfort thereto, or shall engage in or give aid and comfort to any such existing rebellion or insurrection, and be convicted thereof, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not od. ten years, or by a fine not exceeding$10,000 and by the liberation of all his slaves, if any he have; or by both of said punishments at the discretion of the court.”–12 U.S. Statutes, 589. There is no repeal in terms of the act of 1790. The act approved July 31, 1861, makes it a fineable offense for 2 or more persons to conspire together to overthrow, put down, or destroy by force the Government of the U.S., or to levy war against the U.S., or to oppose by force the authority of the government, &c. (12 Statutes, 284.) The actual hostilities which opened the war of the rebellion commenced in April, 1861, so that there were many “overt acts of treason” prior to the acts of July, 1861, and July, 1862, and prosecutions for which are now barred under the act of 1790. The act of 1790 also limits prosecutions for treason under the act of July 17, 1862, since the limitation of 3 years in the former act applies to all cases of treason, whether defined o, that or any subsequent statute. The bill now under consideration (H.R.No. 634) declares: gThaot so;much of section32 of an act for the of States, approved ceArptariiln 3cor, im17e9so, against the U.S. as provides that no person or persons shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for treason or other capital offenseunless the indictment for the same shall be found by a grand jury within 3 years next after the treason or cap: ital offenseshall be done or committed, shall be, and is hereby, repealed. And all persons who have been omramy pay be guilty of treason or other capital offense at any time be indicted, tried, and punished therefor. I am instructed by the ComJudiciary to report this bill to the House with an amendment to come in at the end of it, as follows: Provided, That nothing herein shall apply to crimes the prosecution of which is already barred by the provision herein repealed. If this amendment shall be adopted and the bill passed and approved the effect will be that in all cases of treason and piracy, in which prosecutions are already barred by the act of 1790, no prosecution shall ever be commenced, and of course the guilty offenders will forever escape all punishment. That is, every act of piracy and every overt act of treason committed 3 years ago or more will escape prosecution and punishment. If the amendment shall not be adopted, but if the bill be passed and approved in its original shape, assuming it to be valid, then pirates and traitors will simply stand upon the same footing with willful murderers under the statute; that is, they may be prosecuted and punished at any time when the evidence can be procured and the population of the rebel States shall be sufficiently loyal to render the administration of the law practicable. The ComJudiciary have not instructed me to recommend this amendment, but only to report it, to test the sense of the House. 2 questions therefore are presented for determination: 1. Shall the 3 years' bar against prose cutions be removed as to piracy and treason already fully barred, or if it shall not, then, 2. Shall the bar of 3 years be repealed as to acts of piracy and treason where the lim itation is running, but is not yet run out. I will present my views on these questions briefly and in the order stated. Questions of expediency and of constitutional power are involved in the proposition to restore the right of prosecution in cases already barred. Under circumstances no one perhaps would desire to interfere in such cases, for it is undoubtedly correct, as a general proposition, that even the errors of existing laws should be remedied by changes prospective in their operation. No one now desires many sacrifices of life, even for the treason and piracy of that greatest of all great crimes, the late rebellion. But JeffersonDavis at least should not escape the punishment due to his great crime. I agree, in part at least, with the late AttyGen Speed that "It is the plain duty of the President to causecrim inal prosecutions to be instituted before the proper [civil] tribunals, and at all proper times against some of those who were mainly instrumental in inaugu rating and most conspicuous in conducting the late hostilities. I should regard it as a direful calamity if many [some few at spared, least] whom the sword has the law should spare also.” Letter to ident, January pres4, 1866. No traitor has ever yet been punished in the U.S. The opinion has become quite prevalent, that it is only a political offense, indulged in by respectable gentlemen, and should be exempt from punishment, which is only designed for more humble offenders. If this be so, then abolish your treason statutes forever, and let your books, no longer emblazon the lie that treason is a crime, when your practice says it is none. Ours is the only country where treason is made respectable by exemption from all punishment. I maintain that it is expedient, that it is alike the dictate of justice and sound policy to restore the right of prosecution, even in cases already barred, for many reasons, and among them these: 1. It is against the general policy of the law, universally maintained by Af publicists, that any right of the Government, id: in the prosecution of great criminals or in the assertion of civil rights, should be speedily defeated, thus giving immunity to crime in its worst forms. 2. The rebellion took possession of 11 States and rendered prosecutions impossible until its suppression; and even since then the disloyal condition of the people in most of those States has in fact made it impracticable to prosecute. The act of 1790 only contemplated in its general spirit and purpose a limitation of 3 years, when all the courts were open and trials were practicable. 3. Unless the right of prosecution is restored most if not all the traitors will be exempt from the death penalty for treason, and will only be liable to a fine not exceeding $10,0imprisonment for ten years, because it has been solemnly iodthat for every act of treason since July 17, 1862, which consists in assisting or engaging in the rebellion or giving aid thereto, no punishment but fine and imprisonment can be inflicted. And as every act of treason prior to that time an for more than a year and a half later is already barred by the 3 years' limitation, no traitor can be punished except by fine and imprisonment, as the law now stands, if the decision to which I have referred be sustained. In support of these propositions I will present some authorities. Every statute of limitations which defeats a right of the Government is against the policy and the wisdom of the common law. It was long ago ruled “That the king has aoquod nullum tem {im.itoacticounr, riot rregi, and therefore the general acts of of plonary, hall not extend to him.” 11 Co., 68 74b.; S. C., 1 IRoll. 18., 157. And Angel, in his work on Limitations, says: “It has been considered, that in all representative governments”, “.. “the reason for this doctrine is at least equally cogent here as in England.” And in People vs. Gilbert, 18 Johnson reports, 228, Woodworth, Judge, declared that, on the ground of expediency and public conye nience, it was a necessary principle, and that hence the rights of the Government could not be barred, even by a statute, unless specially named. Then again the right of prosecution must be restored or JeffersonDavis and all his coconspirators may, and under the ruling of one of the judges of the Supreme Court probably will, escape only with fine and imprisonment. In the case of The U.S. vs. Chapman, tried October, 1863, in the U.S. circuit court for the northern district of California, before Justices Field and Hoffman, the defendants were indicted under the 2nd section of the act of July 17, 1862. The in dictment charged that defendants did traitorously engage in and give aid and comfort to the i. by fitting out an armed schooner with intent that it should be employed in the service of the rebellion to cruise on the high seas and commit hostilities upon the citizens, property, and vessels of the U.S.. Justice Field, in his charge to the jury, sal (1. “In 1790Congresspassedan actfixing to the offense the penalty of death. By the 1st section of the act of July, 1862, Congressgave a discretionary power to itmheprciosounrtms etonti, npflricotvitdhineg penalty of death or fine and that in either case the slaves of the party convicted, if any he have, shall be liber ated. The 2nd section of the act declares "that if any person shall hereafter incite, set on foot, assist, or engagein any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the U.S or the laws thereof, or, shall give aid and comfort, to any such existing rebellion or insurrection and be convicted thereof, spuecrihodperson shall be punished by imprisonment for a tonoot. '.ten years, or by a fine not exand by the liberation of all his slaves, if any he have, or by both said punishments, at the discretion of the court.’” “There would seemupon a 1st examination to be an inconsistency between the 1st and 2nd sections of this act the 1st section, declaring a particular punishment for treason, and the 2nd declaring, pfourniaschtms ewnht.ich may constitute, treason, a different. It appearsfrom the debate in the senate of the U.S., when the 2nd section was under consideration, that it was the opinion of several Senators that the commission of the acts which it designatesmight, under somecircumstances, constitute an offense less than treason.” st to: o “But we are unable to conceive of any act desig nated in the 2nd section which would not constitute treason, except perhaps that of inciting to a rebellion. If we lay aside the discussion in Senate, the and read the several sections of the act together, the apparent inconsistency, disappears. Looking at the act alone we conclude that Congress intended– 1. To preservethe act of 1790 which prescribesthe penalty of death in force for the prosecution and punishment of offenses committed previous to July 17, 1862, unless the parties. } are accused under the act of the latter date for subsequentoffenses. 2. deathT, o punish treason thereafter committed with or fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, unless the treason consist in engaging in or assisting a rebellion or authority insurrection against the of the U.S., or the laws thereof, in which event the death o. to be abandoned, and a lesspenalty inflicted. By this construction the apparent inconsistency in the provisions of ent sections the differ is avoided and effectgiven to eachclause of the act. The defendants are therefore in trial for treason without being liable fact on in case of conyiction to the penalty which all other civilized nations }.} awarded to this the highest of crimes known to e law. And the court say that the acts charged in the indictment constitute a “levying of war, ” and are therefore “treason” in fact; though as the 2nd section of the act of 1862 uses other words, it is sufficient if the indictment follows the words of the act without specifically using the terms “levying war.” I do not wish to be understood as indorsing the opinion of the learned justice, that if trea. son consists in “engaging in rebellion” it is only punishable under the 2nd section of the act of 1862. It is the duty of courts to give effect to the legislative intent, and it is conceded that the opinion of Senators when the 2nd section of the act of 1862 was under consideration was “That the commission of the acts which it desig nates might under some circumstances constitute an offense lessthan treason.” I am equally well aware that the legislative intent, where it is palpably manifest from the letter, spirit, and general purpose of the statute, cannot be. by evidence aliunde, either from the debates or otherwise. But, inasmuch as every case of treason was made punishable by the act of 1790, and by section one of the act of July, 1862, without subtraction or diminution, it would seem to me that it is unreasonable to suppose that section 2 of the latter act covered any case of treason, and this section should therefore be construed as applicable only to “offenses less than treason, ” as the Senators enacting it declared. I must be o to say, with the most profound respect or and deference to the opinion of a justice so distinguished, that it seems to me much more reasonable to hold that whenever the act of “engaging in rebellion” amounts to “trea son” it is punishable as treason, rather than to hold, as the distinguished Justice Field has done, that if admitted “treason” consists in “engaging in rebellion” it can only be held criminal as rebellion. It is the duty of the court by a well known rule of interpretation to give effect to all parts of a statute; but in doing this there is no reason why “treason” should be merged and lost in the less crime of rebellion than that rebellion when it consists of admitted treason should not be held and punished as treason. And if the same criminal acts palpably constitute both “treason “ and “rebellion” the Government may have an “election of reme dies;” the right to prosecute for either according to the character, position, legal and moral criminality of the offender, and the necessities of the case. The lawmaking power may prescribe cumulative punishments, giving the government an election to pursue some one of them. The most philosophical and learned writer on American criminal law asserts on high authority that “If a new statute createsan offensewith aggravations not embraced in the old law, and creates a higher penalty, or omits some aggravating quality and provides a lower penalty, or if it is applicable to a particular class only of persons who owe particular duties in the matter, the new punishment does not supersedethe old.” 1 Bishop, Criminal Law, 99, 268. And again, he says: “There may be several concurrent remedies ‘of a different nature' for one offense, carrying with them their respective penalties, and each may stand, pen alty and all, without conflicting with the others.” 1 Bishop, Criminal Law, 97. But the fact that a justice of the Supreme Court has made the ruling to which I refer should admonish us that it is possible, if not probable, as the Supreme Court is constituted, that the greatest of all great criminals now will be held only subject to fine and imprisonment. For this reason we should restore the right of prosecution for overt acts of treason, committed prior to July 17, 1862, so that adequate punishment may be inflicted on the chief conspirators of the great rebellion. The constitutional power to restore the right of prosecution after it is barred I regard as entirely clear. In the hurried examination I have given this subject I do not find that this precise question has ever been made or decided by the courts. On principle and by way of analogy it must be so. The same traitors who planned the assassination of the late lamented President Lincoln might in one or all of the judicial districts assassinate the judges, or by violence or terror as now in the rebel States, intimidate grand and petit juries and defeat all prosecutions for more than 3 years. Yet ji this peril be in vited by a concession of legislative impotency to restore the right of prosecution? In principle and independently of the Constitution there can be no difference between the effect of the bar of a statute of limitations in civil and criminal cases. The inhabitants of a State in rebellion may owe 100 millions to creditors in a loyal State, and yet if the rebellion should obstruct the courts and the collection of debts until the limitation had expired is the law powerless to restore the remedy? All the authorities agree that there is a distinction between the right of action and the remedy to enforce it; between the crime and the public of redress by prosecution. A right of civil action may exist, as, for instance, the debt evidenced by a promissory note, and yet there may be no remedy to recover it, either because the law has provided no court in which to sue, or because the time has passed by within which by a statute of limitations, an action may be brought.. Now, in either of these cases the debt may still exist long after the remedy is lost. A party having committed murder or treason still continues i. of the crime, even after the statute has declared that no prosecution shall be had therefor. Story, in his Conflict of Laws, says: “It may be important, then, carefully to distinguish between caseswhere the statute of limitations is strictly a mere bar to the remedy and caseswhere it goes directly, to the extinguishment of the debt, claim, or right.' And Angel says: “The difference between the obligation of a contract and the remedy to enforce it is that they originate at different times.” Limitations, page 18, section 11, chapter 2. “There is no such thing as a vested right in any 0.4.;.Commonwealth Bishops Commenrsa, l Laof. section 6 Peck, 50l. Now I concede that the lawmaking power could, in the absence of any restraining constitutional provision, provide in a limitation statute that, after a given length of time, a right of action or a right to oin the claimant should cease and vest in the debtor or occupant. This has been done by statute. (Soin Jamaica, Story, Conflict of Laws, section 582; 17 Vesey, Jr., 87, note; Lincoln vs. Battle, 6 Wend., 475. So Connecticut, Act of 1822, Digest R. I. Laws, pages 363, 364, edition 1822; Ersk. Inst., B. 3, title 7, sec. 1; Newby vs. Blakeley, 3 Hen. & Mum. R., 57; Brent vs. Chapman, 5 Cranch, 358; Shelby vs. Grey,; Dudley vs. Ward, Ambler's R.,; Gallis R., 3 Clark & Finnell R., 1, 17.) And I will not say that a similar effect might not be given to the limitation of prosecutions for crime by declarin that after a time the act previously crimina should cease to be so, thus giving an effect equal to that of a pardon. But here there is no such question. The act of 1790 does not undertake to wipe out the crime, but only to say that after 3 years no person shall be prosecuted; that the remedy shall not be pursued. The very fact that the Congress of 1790 did not exercise the high power they held of declaring that after 3 years the overt acts constitutin treason through that limited period should thereafter cease to constitute crime is high evidence that there is a reserved power to restore the remedy while the overt acts continue criminal. In all such cases the suspended remedy is within the control of the lawmaking power and may be restored. A question analogous to this came before the supreme court of Ohio in Johnson vs. Bentley, 16 Ohio Reports, 100. By a statute of 1816 unincorporated persons are prohibited from banking, their notes issued are not void. A statute of 1824 enacted that courts should not entertain any action upon bank notes issued by unincorporated bankers, but this was repealed in 1840. Between 1816 and 1824 Bentley and others, unincorporated ebankers, issued bank notes, and in 1846 the plaintiff sued to recover on such notes. The opinion of the court was delivered by Judge Read, who said: “After the passageof the act of 1824there was a liability without a right of action to remedy enforceit. The was denied; it has been restored by a repeal of the act denying it. This is, then, a caseof mere suspended remedy, and the Legislature has the full power to restoreit.” (See Lewis vs. McElvain, 16 Ohio Reports, 347; Trustees vs. McCaughey,? Ohio State Reports, 152.) etrospective laws were not then prohibited by the constitution of Ohio. Congress has repeatedly sanctioned such laws. (Satterlee rs. Matthewson,? Peters, 380; Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge, 11 Peters, 420; Webb vs. Den, 17 Howard, 576; Wilkinson vs. Leland,? Peters, 627, 16 Peters, 294; Watsonts. Mercer, 8 Peters, 88. See Woart vs. Winnich, 3 NewHampshire, 473.) There is another class of cases which, by way of analogy, establishes the power to restore the remedy. In Bulger vs. Roche, 11 Pickering Reports, 36, the remedy on a cause of action was barred by the local law of Nova Scotia, where both parties resided during the whole period of the running of the statute of limitations. rig“hTthe supremecourt of Massachusettsheld that the of action after a change of domicile of the defendant by a removal to Massachusetts was not thereby extinguished in the State tribunals; but might be pursuedwithin the period by the statute of limitations of Massachusetts.” In other words, that the lex fori governed without regard to the lex loci contractus, and the foreign limitation only operated on the remedy, and that not extra territorially. o: t’s, Crowninshield, 17 Mass. R., 55; LeRoy vs. Crowninshield,? Mason R., 151; 10 Barn. & Cres., 903;? Bing. N. C., 209; 8 Johns. Ch. R., 219; 9 Mart. R., 526; 3 Bing. Comm. on Col and For. Law, part 2, chap. 10, sec. 5, p. 124; Story, Confl. Laws, sec. 581; Dudley vs. Warde, Ambler R., 113; McElmoyle vs. Cohen, 13 Peters R., 327; Angel on Limitation, 62, chap. 8; 1 Cowan, W. o R., 402; Andrews vs. Heriot, 4 Cowan, 528. But see Don vs. Lipp man, 5 Clark & Finnell R., 117; Story on Confl. Laws, sec. 582; Beckford rs. Wade, 17 Wesey, Jr., note; 22 Alabama, 631; 5 Maryland, 256; Newby rs. Blakeley, 3 Hexn. & Mum. R., $7; Brent rs. Chapman, 5 Cranch R., 358; Shelley vs. Grey, 11 Wheaton R., 372; Huber rs. Steiner,? Bing. N. C., 211.) This question is now before the SCOTUS Now all this proceeds upon the idea that the remedy is subject to the legislative power at the time an action or prosecution may be instituted, notwithstanding the right of action may have been previously barred. But now I come to a class of cases more directly in point and more, conclusive in their character. The statute of limitations may take away the right to prosecute for crime. In such case it is taken away by law. On principle and in effect it can make no difference whether a right of prosecution is taken away by a limitation law or any other law. Yet it has been again and again solemnly decided that a right of prosecution utterly taken away and extinguished by law may be restored by law, and that the restoring law is not expostfacto. The repeal of a criminal statute without any saving prevents all future prosecutions under the repealed law, including crimes committed prior to the repeal. (1 Bishop, 103.) But in such case, says Bishop in his excellent work on Criminal Law, (volume 1, section 105:) “Where after the old law has been repealed Legislature by subsequent the act authorizes the proceedings.as by repealing the repealing statute, in every such case, and though the right to prosecute should have once lapsed a The statute that repeals the law.u.nd or wmhaicyhbe had. a pris onercommitted an offense operates, ’ in the language of Wilde, J., “only as a suspension of his liabilit and not in the nature of a pardon.’” Commonwealt vs. Getchell, 16 Pitcekoering, 452, (contra Robertsys.State,? Opert, 423.)Com.vs. Mott, 21 Pick., 492;seeVanWalk enburgvs. Torrey, 7 Cotean, 252, 255; State vs. Dunk ley, 3 Iredell, 116: Dawsonvs. State, 6 Texas, 347; Mc ullen vs. Guest, 6 Teras, 275. " A statute creating a new court or giving jurisdiction to an existing one to try offensespreviously committed is notgo.;vs. Phil: 11 Pick., 28; ovs. Commonwealth, 3 Grat., 632; augher vs. Nelson, 9 Gill., 299. This authority is conclusive and unanswer able as applied to the question now under consideration. But it is supported by still otheran alogies. The constitutional prohibition against laws “impairing the obligation of contracts” is no less sacred than that against expostfacto laws. The remedy is as completely within legis: lative control in reference to the one class of laws as the other. Yet the SCOTUS, in discussing the constitutional prohibition against laws “impairing the obligation of contracts, ” used this language: “Undoubtedly a State may regulate at pleasure the modes of proceeding in its courts in relation to its pastcontracts as well as future. It may, for example, shorten the period of time within which claims shall be barred by the statute of limitations.” "Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered according to the will of the State, provided the alteration does not impair the obligation of contract.” the (Per Taney, C. J., Bronson vs. Kinzie, 1 Howard, 315; Sedgwick on Statutory Law, 188, 192, 200, 643, 650, and cases collected.) It may with equal propriety be said of laws affecting the remedy for crime, that "Whatever belongs mer altered according h. j}.}o's. }} may be And when we come to consider the definition of an expostfacto law it will be found that no definition ever given excludes the legislative right to restore the remedy by prosecution in cases where it is already barred. An expostfacto law is defined by Black stone thus: "When after an mitted, the Legislataucrt eiotnhe[inndf oifrfe 3 nftirisntittsimeleflidseccolamres it to have been a crime and inflicts a, punishment upon the person who has committed it.” Com., 46. This was the definition referred to in the debates which framed the national Constitution. (3 Madison Papers, 1399, 1450, 1579. Carpenter vs. Pa., 17 Howard R., 463.) In Colder vs. Bull, 8 Dallas, 890, Chase, J., discusses the question, what is an expostfacto law? and he remarks: “Literally, it is only that a law shall not be. passed and after the fact or thief done or action committed.”, " ". '. I will state what laws I intent ocfotnhseid perrohibiton expostfacto within the words and “1, Every law that makes an passing action done beforethe of done, crimintahle, law, and which was innocent when and punishes such action.. “2. Every law, that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed.. 3. Every law that changes, the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed. “4. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or required different testimony than the law at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. “All these and similar laws are manifestly unjust and oppressive.” In that case it appeared that the Legislature of Connecticut passed a law in May, 1795, which set aside a decree of the court of probate for Hartford and granted a new hearing by the court. The court held that the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of expostfacto laws had reference only to crimes. But the justice delivering the opinion makes a remark which shows that a law to be expost Jacto must relate to or affect the criminal act at the time of its commission. He says: “In the present case there is no fact done by Bull and wife, plaintiffs in error. that is in any manner affected by the law or resolution of Connecticut: it. not concern or relate to any act done, by them. e decree is the only fact on which the law operates. This definition of Mr. Justice Chase is the most comprehensive, exhaustive, and complete ever given. It is adopted by Story and Kent and every author and jurist of any repute in this country. fIam correct in the position that the remedy may be restored after it has been once barred, it will follow of course that while the statute is running the period of limitation may be enlarged or altogether taken away. Of this there can be no doubt whatever. The only pretext for denying the power of the Legislature to interfere with the remedy is, that it cannot create a right or reinvest a right already completely extinguished. (Bulger vs. Roche, 11 Peck, 36.) But no right is extinguished or lost while the statute is running. The right to change the limitation in such case is fully recognized in the authorities collected in a note to section 22 of the recent edition of Angel on Limitations, which I will read, as follows: “A statute of limitation may well apply to contracts in existence at the time of its passage, provided a reasonable time, be, allowed before the statute takes effect or the debt is may barred within which creditors institute their actions, (Pierge ps.Toby, 5 (Mass.,)168; Met, Patterson vs. Gaines, 6 How. (U.S.,)550; Force's Patton.j B. Mon., o: 172; Sleeth ps. 1 Morris, (Iowa,)321; West Fel. Railroad Co. o, Stockett, 13 S. & M."(Miss.)375; Beai o Nason, hep. Mo.) 3ii: Bank of Alabama re. j?ow. (U.S.) 53: Tutton.9 Webster vs.o 14 How., (U. S.,)488; Winston vs. McCormick, 1 Carter, (Ind.,).56; Pritchard vs. Spencer,? id., 486; DeCordoya vs. Gal yeston, 4 Texas, 470; Gilman vs. Cutts, 3 Foster, (N. H.,) 316i, Willard vs. Harvey, 4 Cave, id., 344; Slator. vs. 3 Ohio, (N.S.,)80; Briscoe vs.Anketell, 28 Miss., 6 (Cush.,) 36:State vs.Clark, 7 Ind., 468.) It held, however, has been in Arkansas that thestatuteofisifdoes nototo causesof action which had accruedat the time of its Poio (Calvert vs. Lowell, 5 Eng., (Ark.,) 147; Morse vs. McLendon, id., 512.) So also in Kentucky, as to the effect of the revised statutes where the right of action had accruedpreyious to their pass sage. (Ashbrook vs. 20; Quarle's Heirs, 15B, Mon., and seealso Didier vs. Dayidson,? Barb, (N.Y., Ch., of: Williamson ce. Field,; Sand. (N.Y.) Ch. 533; Thompson ps.Alexander, 11 Ill., 54; Brown vs. Wilcox.T. S. & M. (Mijo, Boyi'. Haringer, 23 Miss. 'I'Cush.) of Pada?eford. f Clemons Ínnoif Miss., to. Wilkinson, f) id., 57. Gordon vs. Mounts, 2(Hreene, (Iowa,)343; Hinch vs.Weatherford, id., 244; Dickerson ps. Morrison, 1 Eng., (Ark.,).264; Lucas vs.Tunstall, id., 448) Murphy "But a statute extending the time of not revive causeof action limitation will obarred under preexisting statutes. (Wright ps.Oa 5Met. 5 400;Joy vs. Thompson, 1 o(Michijo Haw: kins vs. Campbell, 1, Eng., (Ark.) 512;.Couch ve: Wickee, i. of Walker. Bank of Missiopi. 3 id., 561; Clark vs.Bank of Mississippi, 5 id., i; vs. Harlan, 7 Barr, (Penn.,).292; Forsyth vs. Ripley, Greenjeo, "(Iiojwaav,)i1s8'1;;M. cKinney os.Springer, 8.Bl Miner. Brown, 3 Oarter. (Ind.) 6.7. Wiregro. Farr 25 Vt., 41.) If, however, the cause of action be not already barred, the statute extendin; time will apply. (Winston vs. McCormack, 1, (Ind.,) 8. And see Royce es. Hardy, 24 Vt., eane,) o Henry vs. Thorpe, 14. Ala., 103;Cox vs. Davis, 17 id., 714.) In Louisiana it is held that where there is a change in the limitation the time prior to the change is reckoned according to the law then in force, and the subsequent time according to the new statute. (Deal vs. Patterson, 12 La. Ann. R., 728.)” And now I submit to the House that the constitutional power to restore the right of prosecution already barred and the expediency of its exercise is y established beyond contro th mit 1 D ersy. It will have a salutary effect if it shall be understood that this is one of the latent powers of Congress. One of the great errors, not to say one of the great crimes of AndrewJohnson, has been and is that he has encouraged the rebels to believe that they are already restored to all their rights and have no sins for which they should atone. The consequence has been and is, that the leading spirits of the rebellion, feeling the restraints of punishment removed, are defiant and insolent. Aided by the President, they have organized the forms of State governments in defiance of law, without consulting congress, the only competent authority. They have gone through the forms of electing rebels, who assume to be Sens&Reps entitled to seats in Congress, in utter disregard of the law prescribing a “test oath.” (Statute U.S., page 502; act of July 2, 1862.) These aspirants insolently demanded admission to these Halls while their hands are yet red and dripping with the blood of their vic tims, our murdered brethren. The spirit of" rebellion and disobedience is as rife today in most of the rebel States as it was when the last rebel army surrendered. If some few of the great leaders can be made to understand that they are yet liable to the penalties of trea son and that they may be candidates for these rather than for positions to make laws for loyal men, it will have a salutary effect in the way of inspiring respect for the law and obedience to its requirements. The learned Gentfrom RhdIsland [Mr. JENCKEs] has said that “If there is any offensefor punishment or prosecution to which a statute of limitation should bepassed it is of that class denominated political offenses, of i."treason is the highest.” Speech, December12, Rebellions have generally been inst des pots, to relieve people ground down by tyranny and to secure the rights of men. For such political offenses every generous impulse demands clemency and repose.. But for the political offense of treason in a Government of the peole like ours there ought to be no such generous umanity, for it is without excuse when the ballot is a sure corrective for all grievances. I know, sir, that from the very necessity of the case a great rebellion must be followed by a general amnesty. The President has not only issued his proclamation of amnesty for most of those engaged in rebellion, but he has by pardons relieved most of those excepted from the amnesty from all punishments, if his pardons indeed be legal. The reasons which existed at common law for regarding treason as a political offense, which should escape punishment whenever possible, do not exist here. “By the ancient common law, (says Story) it was left very much to discretion to determine what acts were and were not treason; and the judges” ". " becamebut too often instruments”, “of injustice.”, “They had abundant opportunities to sons.” 2Storv, Const., sec. 1797 create constructive trea But if a mistaken zeal has perverted the law in aid of tyranny in other countries and so induced charity for the oppressed, it is no reason why bad men should have the same charity now in an effort to overthrow a “Government guilty of no wrong.” To put all rebellion on the same footing is to disparage the moral heroism that combats tyranny and to dignify into respectability the criminal attempt to subvert a free Republic. A good government here should not fail to execute salutary laws against bad men, because elsewhere bad men have perverted the laws to repress patriotic efforts to establish good government. But now even in England treason is by act of Parliament a well defined crime. (Stat. 25 Edward HI, chap. 2, 1 Hale P.C.; 259.) Our Constitution has expressly limited it to 2 species and thus “cut off all chances of arbitrary constructions.” It can only be proved by “two witnesses to the same overt act or a confession in open court, ” and the “trial shall be held in the State” where the treason was committed. With these limitations on treason the public security is left vastly more in jeop ardy by giving traitors perfect immunity from punishment than by a faithful execution of the law in a few of the most conspicuous and aggravated cases. The question therefore for us to determine now is, whether all traitors shall escape the punishment awarded to great leaders of conspiracy in every other civilized country of the globe. The gentleman has cited cases of conviction for treason long years after the crimes committed. He might have cited similar cases of convictions for murder; for there is no limitation as to this either in the acts of Congress or in the States of the Union. I know no reason why an humble murderer should continue liable, and a great traitor, the leader of a conspiracy which counts its murders by 100s of 1000s, should escape. If, when we have vindicated the law by making an example, it shall be deemed expedient to prosecute no more, let it be so declared by oi.amnesty for all, or by a statute of repose. But as the law now stands, and with the construction given to it, not even one example can be made of any great offender. And surely if 3 years limitation was proper when the courts were open and trials practicable, there ought to be 3 years for prosecution after trials shall become practicable. The Gentfrom Pennsylvania, [Mr. his accustomedingenuity, but not with his usual fairness, spoke of this bill by saying: “I do not believe that it becomes this nation: I do pot believe it is safe for us to undertake to pass laws by which was an or may be able to punish men, however guilty, who could not be punished under the law existing when the crimes were committed.” Speech, December 11. It is enough to say, in answer to this, that the object of this bill is to restore the right to punish traitors “ under the law existing when their crimes were committed.” It does not propose to administer any law different from that which existed when the crime was committed. But it simply provides that inasmuch as trials were then and ever since impossible by reason of the continuance of the rebellion, by reason of the continued wrong of the rebels, that they shall not now take advantage of that wrong to escape all punishment. But the gentleman further we may suppose for want of any real objection to the bill sets up a man of straw to combat, and of course demolishes him. He said: “The Constitution and our laws provide very care fully that especially in the case of charged oil. treason the party that crime must be tried at the place where the overt act was committed, in a district preyiously ascertainedby law, and by a jury from that bailiwick. Now any law which professes to change that in any respect?o. to me so much like an attempt to commit judicial murder that I have always } traid to attempt it.” Stevens'sspeech, Decem I was quite as well aware of the constitutional provision referred to as my distinguished and venerable friend, [Mr. STEvens, ] but as this bill does not relate to the place of trial, which he finds so amply food by the Constitution, his remarks which I have just read have no relation to the subject under consideration. Again, the gentleman used this language: “I am aware that the traitors in the South, if tried under our existing Constitution and laws, will not one of them be convicted. I should never attempt to try them for treason; I would try them asbelliger ents, under the law of nations and the laws of war.” I am happy to find the gentleman agreeing with me that a few at least of the traitors have been guilty of something for which they should be tried. As he is in favor of a trial by court martial “under the law of nations and the laws of war, ” I take it for granted he is in favor of punishment. He does not indulge the humane sentimentality that punishment should be meted out to small offenders and that great traitors should go unpunished. But in courts martial there is no venue, and traitors, if triable as belligerents under the laws of nations and the laws of war, could be tried out of the district or State where the crime was committed. Whether that would look like an “attempt to commit judicial murder” I lofe the gentleman's speech to answer for itself. But the gentleman's plan of trial is imprac ticable. No one knows better than he that AndrewJohnson will neither authorize nor permit it, and on this question his decision is final. The late AttyGen Speed, in an able opinion dated January 4, 1865, decided that military tribunals cannot “exist except in time of war, and connot then, take o cognizance of offenders or offenses, ” “except offenders and offensesagainst the laws of war.” (See Lawrence's speech in Congress, Febru ary 5, 1866.) such tribunals cannot punish for treason at all, but only for military offenses during “ac tual hostilities” or during that “state of war.” which may exist afterward. During a great rebellion the Government by its military power may crush conspiracy and execute conspira tors wherever found where the “salus populi" imperatively demands it, and no decision of the Supreme Court will ever in practice arrest the exercise of this power. (See exparte Mil ligan, Supreme Court U.S., Decem ber, 1866.). The war power will not wait until conspiracy has subverted the civil authorities to see if it is prudent to interfere. The Gentfrom Pennsylvania [Mr. STEVENs] further said to the House: “Now, it escape does not follow that every traitor will who is not prosecuted within 3 years of the time of the commission of the offense. The stat ute of limitations never runs in any caseunless it is possible to enforce the remedy; it only runs from the time when it was possible to enforce it.” I must be permitted to differ with my vener able friend,as I know him to be in the law, but in this instance I fear his law is even worse than his logic. Section 32 of the act of 1790 affixes a limitation of 3 years on prosecutions, but there is this proviso: “Provided, That nothing herein contained shall extend to any person or personsfleeing from justice.” It so happens that John C. Breckinridge and others did not flee the country until long after the act of July 17, 1862, nor until al treason prior to that date was barred. As to treason not barred, he and other fugitives would be liable to indictment and to fine and imprisonment only, if the ruling of Mr. Justice Field be correct. But there is no statute and no principle of t he co.mmon law which announces the general stated by the veteran statesman from Pennsylvania, [Mr. STEvess] Again, the gentleman said in nection: the same con“But whether that be so or not, still during the time of war, during the prosecution of the war, the crime continued: it was a continuing offense, and the offense continued up to be proclaimed, which the time when peace shall it never yet has been.” Certainly, Mr. Speaker, the gentleman could not have considered the words he used. He is too much of a lawyer to assert that overt acts of treason, committed 5 years ago are not barred by the 3 years limitation of the act of 1790, because the rebellion was continuous. The authorities are against the position. (Wharton's Precedents, 1117;? Chitty's Crim inal Law, 67; Bishop's Criminal Procedure, sec. 978, 982:) “An overt act must be alleged and proved.” 3 Greenleaf's Evidence, sec. 240. “Laying several. overt acts in a count for high treason isings not duplicity.” Archbold's Criminal Plead and Evidence, 13, London edition, 54; 1 Bishop's Criminal Procedure. “The evidence must be confined to the overt act or acts laid in the indictment.” 3 Greenleaf's Epidence, sec. 241. And Bishop in his Criminal Procedure says: “From this principle it might seem to follow that if taking the time alleged in the indictment to be the true time, the offense is barred by the statute of limitations, the indictment will be adjudged insufficient.” Section 256. Traitors and their sympathisers would not favor this bill. It may find opponents in the ranks of loyal men. But I warn gentlemen that the time for universal amnesty has not yet come. This House expressed that opinion on the 1st day of the session. This bill alone can prevent the speedy coming of what is equivalent to universal pardon and amnesty the end of all prosecutions. Let the country take notice that he who votes against this bill or to modify it o votes merited punishment for the greatleaders of the rebellion. such ill timed clemency is a crime against the Constitution, the majesty of the law, and the matured judgment of the loyal people of this Republic.