Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, if this bill is to pass into a law, it is of course advisable and am sure no one will admit that with more readiness than the honorable member of the committee who reported itthat it should be as free from objections as it can be made. What I am about to suggest is not, therefore, for the purpose of defeating the bill, though I shall not Be able to vote for it with the opinion I entertain on the question of power, but for the purpose of improving the bill, or atleaat relieving it from objections to which it seems to me to be new subject., The particular question before the Senate is the amendment suggested by the honorable chairman of the ComJudiciary as now amended by the honorable member from Kansas. By that amendment he proposes to define citizenship. Nobod is more willing to admit that it is very desirable that such a definition shouldbe given. Since the decision in the case of Dred Scott, as the Senate are aware, paperson of African descent whether born free or not, whether free by birth or free by after events, is not, Within the meaning of the constitution of the U.S., a citizen. Whatever objections may be made to that decision, with reference to the rent question which was decided and the question which agi Stated the country far and wi c, cannot be made to that art of the decision which relates to the particular point which I have just stated. The objection to the decision upon the great question was that that was no the fore the court for adjudication. The suit was instituted in a State court of Missouri, and afterward went into the circuit court of the U.S., and was brought, by writ of error, from the decision of the circuit court to the SCOTUS There were 2 questions. The 1st was whether Scott was a citizen of the U.S. within the meanin of the 3rd article of the constitution, which creates and defines the extent of the judicial power. The act of 1789 could not go further, perhaps, than the constitution provided. The Senate will remember that by that 3rd article the judicial power of the U.S. was made to extend to, among other cases, controversies existing between citizens of different States. It was very clear, therefore, that no one could be considered as embraced by that power except a person who should be a citizen of the U.S. The point was made in the court below, and upon the writ of error to the Supreme Court 6 judges out of 8, I think, ecided that Scott was not a citizen; and not being a citizen, that the court below had no jurisdiction to try the cause. The Supreme Court, however, went on afterward, for reasons satisfactory to the majority, to. decide the questions which arose upon the merits, as they must have decided them if they had sustained the point of jurisdiction. As far as the decision upon the merits was concerned, it ivas held to be obnoxious to very serious objection, and perba s alarge majority of the people of the U.S., incluing a great many of the members of the profession t rou bout the U.S., were of opinion that when the court came to the conclusion that they had no jurisdiction because of the inca aeity of the party to sue, all that they should have done was to affirm the judgment of the court below upon the round of want of jurisdiction. But as the Senate will see, the very point whether an African, free or not free born, rec or becoming free afterward by State man umission or by manumission given him by his owner, wasa citizen of the U.S., was before that court and was adjudicated. Now, without saying where the question has presented itself to my mind, it is sufficient for my purpose to sayt at I have been exceedtingly anxious individuall that there should be some definition which wi lrid this class of our people from that objection. If the Supreme ourt decision is a binding one and will be followed in the future, this law which we are now. about to pass will be held of courso to be of no avail, as far as it professes to define what citizenship is, because it gives the rights of citizenship to all persons Without distinction of color, and of course embraces Africans or descendants of Africans. My own opinion, therefore, is that the object can only be safely and surely attained by an amendment of the constitution, and I have tried in vain to form such a provision as would be free from objection. whother I or those who may be associated with me in the future will be able to adopt a definition free from all 1866. 505 objection is perhaps doubtful; but at any rate the effort can be made, and will be made in good faith; but I am very much afraid that, so far from settlin the question by this legislation, we shall fin that if the legislation is adopted the matter will be just as open to controversy as it was before. There is another observation with which I beg leave to trouble the Senate, for the reason that, as I have just stated, I individually have found very greatdifficulty in saying who is a citizen. Itisaquestion about which there is as much doubt as upon any other question in relation to which there is any doubt. How those doubts are to be solved, how the definition shall be made so plain as to be apparent to the comprehension of everybody, is with me now a prob lem. I am afraid, even supposing that we have the authority to do it by legislation, that the manner in which it is proposed to accomplish it by my friendfrom Illinois will not effect the purpose. A word nowupon the bill only in one particular. Nobody I am sure with whom it has been my happiness to associate during this war and who knows how anxious I have been from the 1st that the institution of slavery should be abolished, will doubt that from the same motives (whether they be of humanity or of some policy ounded on other considerations than more considerations of humanity) I should be equally anxious that the colored race should be protected in all their rights; that is to say in all properrights. The honorable member from Illinois yesterdayI have not the book by mereferred to a decision of Mr. Justice Wasingtou as reported I think in 4 Washingtons Circuit Court reports; but if I heard him distinctly he did not read the whole of that decision. He read that portion of it alone which he supposed bore a on the particular question before the Senate; at I think it will be found that anotherportion of it which succeeds the particular part that he did 9 read, will not justify him in finding a warrant for this bill in the opinion of Mr. Justice Washington. The case, ifI remember it, arose upon an objection to the constitutionality of some of the State laws of N ewJersey in relation to their fishing and their oysters. It was insisted that under the clause of the constitution which secures to the citizens of each State the rights and privileges of citizens of the several States where ever they shall go, a citizen of NewYork had the right to go into NewJerse and catch fish and dredge for oysters. New erse vdenied it. The decision in that case was that NewJerseys title to the oysters and to the fish was exclusive, that she could legislate on the subject as she thought proper, and that she could therefore deny to tecitizens of NewYork the privilege of catching fish or of dredging for oysters. He goes on to give the reasons why the particular rights which were involved in that case were not in the judgment of the court “fundamental rights.” He 1st states what, in the view of the court, were rights of the latter description, and then goes on to say that this right. of prep eityis not one of those fundamental rights which is secured by the clause of the constitution the interpretation of which was before the court in that case. Now, Mr. President, the right of a State to its fisheries and to its oyster beds within its territorial limits is no greater than the right of the State to its real estate, its land within the same limits; and it has been the universal decision that the mode of purchasin land, the mode of conveying land, and the rightto purchase were all within the jurisdiction of the State in which the subject of the purchase was located. N ow, if I understand this bill, it is not confined to persons of African descent. The language of the 1st part of the 1st section is: That there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the U.S. n account of race, color, or previous conditionof slavery. That is to say, that no State shall discriminate at all between any inhabitants within her limits on account of any race to which they may l. that law. I of the Government., the honorable member from Illinois nor any other member of the Senatewouldperhapshave i belong, whether white or black, on account of I color, if they are not white, or on account of, their having been previously in a state of slavery, so that the white as well as the black is included in this 1st section; and if this passes, and we have the authority to pass it, then it would be impossible, as I think, for any State in the Union to draw any distinction as between her citizens who have been there from birth or who have been residents there for any length of time, and he who comes into the State new for the 1st time as a foreigner; he becomes an “inhabitant.” If he comes from enland or from any of the countries of the worl and settles in the State of Illinois, that moment he becomes an inhabitant, and beingan inhabitant, if this bill is to pass in the shape in which it stands, he can buy, he can sell, he can hold, and he can be inherited from.