Mr. WILLIAMS. I ask the Senator to be patient and hear what I have to say. It is impossible for me to embrace the discussion of all questions within 5 minutes. I will endeavor to answer the gentlemansin uiry before I conclude, as I sha i probably refer particularly to the State of Tennessee. I propose, Mr. President, in the 1st place to notice an argument that is always emp oyed to maintain the proposition that these States are within this Union, or that they are States entitled to all the rights and privileges of States within this Union. It is argued by gentlemen who advocate this doctrine that the ordinances of secession were unconstitutional and void, and therefore did not affect the relation of the rebel States with the General Government, and they remain as States within this Union. This logic is plausible, but it leaves out of view one important and decisive fact. Admitting that these ordinances of secession were void in law that is, that a court upon a question made would ronounce them unconstitutional and void, it is nevertheless true that they were operative. Every lawyer is familiar with the doctrine that astatute may be unconstitutional and at the same time it may be operat ive, and it may produce all the practicaf effects that it won d if there was no doubt whatever as to its validity. Take as an illustration the law that was passed making U.S., Treasury notes legal tender. When that law was before Congress the opinion was expressed thatit was unconstitutional. Thato inion may becorrect; it may eventually be so eeided by the SCOTUS But I ask, even if that decision is ultimatel made, has not this law sustained the financial credit of the country through the late struggle to the same extent and with the same effect as though there had been no question as to its constitutionality? When that law organizing the freedmens Bu reau was before this body the other day it was pronounced by eminent Senators here to be an unconstitutional act. Suppose they are correct in that opinion, but this law goes into operation, an everybody acquiesces in its validity for 3 years or five years, and it is then re pealed; will not that law during the time of its operation have accomplished all that it would itP no question had been made as to its validity? Now, sir, these ordinances of secession may not absolutely have dissolved the legal relations between the States and the General Government, but they produced a practical dissolution. Take, to illustrate, a case where a hus band and wife quarrel and separate; their home is abandoned, their thmily broken up, their children scattered, and reduced to indience and want, all concerned are humiliate and disgraced; still, in law, the man and the woman are as much husband and wife as they ever were, but the practical effect of their separation is just as disastrous as though the cgal relation was severed at the time their personal association ceased. I say, then, as to these ordinances of secession, that they were contrary to the Constitution and were without right in law, but they were practically operative in the rebel States because they were received and accepted by the people upon whom they were intended immediatey to operate, ari as to those they ha the power and effect of vali peoorpdlie nances. Sir, are we to assume in the view of the history of the last 4 years that these ordinances of secession were mere nonentities? Pursuant to these ordinances State governments were organized in 11 States; they combining and confederating to ether organized a confederate government, an that confederate government or 4 years, with more than a million bay onets, sustained its existence and carried on a war thatmade this nation tremble from itscenter to itscircumference. Is it true, then, that these ordinances were mere nothings? Is it true that with all our mightylarmaments of war we were simply nullifyin what in themselves were perfect nullities? I suppose it is well known to every Senator that there is a doctrine in the law which recognizes a distinction between a de facto officer or Government and ade ju re officer or Government. Acts of a defacto officer or of a defacto Government are regarded as valid although they may not legally originate or exist. These governments, whatever may be said as to the question of right, were defacto governments, and do not concur in the opinion that was expressed the other day by the honorable Senfrom Michigan Mr. HOWARD that a man who was compelled by one of these governments to bear arms against the U.S. was guilty of treason. I say that if any man under one of these de facto governments fin order to save his own life, was compelled to bear arms against the Federal Government, he was guiltless of treason in that act and there is no tribunal in in judgment in Christendom that would punish iim for crime under such circumstances. Acts derive their criminality or their moral character from the intent with which they are committed. Homicide may be murder or it may be justifiable, depending upon the intent of the person who commits the act, and certainl if there be no intent to commit the crime O treason no man can be justly punished for a necessary or involuntary commission of the act. Let us suppose that under one of these rebel governments, in 1862, a law was passed providing that conveyances of land should be valid u without any witnesses, when the law of the State prior to that time was that 2 witnesses should, be necessary to the validity of a deed. Suppose under that law a man conveyed his landp to another, and received an equivalent therefor, I ask, notwithstanding this whwas passed by a rebel Legislature and the conveyance made under it, if all respectable courts would not hold and recognize that as a valid conveyance, one by which the title was transferred from the grantor to the Suppose, to illustrate still gurrathneter, e?that the cop c of the U.S. should elect a man President who was only 30 years of a e, when the Constitution requires that he shall be 35 years old; that would clearly be an unconstitutional election; but suppose he should enter upon and continue in the discharge of the duties of the office until the expiration of his term, I ask if the acts of that Administration would not possess the same validity that ey would if the President had possessed the qualifications required by the Constitution? I accept this position with all its legal consequences; and I say that as to persons who were living in those States and wh0 have suffered from the calamities of the late war, without respect to their private feelings or redilections, they must share the fortunes of the governments under which the lived. When a man went into the State of irginia to live, he took that State as a man takes his wife, 1for better or for worse” he took that State with all its blessings and advantages in a time of peace, and he took it with all its disadvantages and evils in a time of war. Although I do not say that there is not some case growing out of the ravages of war in the rebel States constituting a claim against the U.S. which can be recognized, I say that I have never yet heard of or seen a claim of that kind that I would consent to allow; and I put my objection upon the ground that the people res1dingin the rebel States during the war were defaclo the subjects ofaforeign power, and though they are to be commiserated for their misfortunes, they are not to be indemnified by the people of the loyal States for their losses. I think the people who sustained the war for the Union have expended blood and treasure enough without paying for the injuries they were compelled to inflict upon the citizens of the rebel States in order to put down the rebellion. I know it is sometimes said that these positions will make it necessary for the Federal government to assume the debts of the rebel States; but I answer to that, in the 1st place, that the Governmenthasthepowertorefuseto aythem, and thatis sufficient. In the 2nd place I do not believe that any precedent can be ound where a community having rebelled against a Government, and is defeated and subdued, that the parent Government, without any treaty or negotiation, is bound to assume, or has assumed, the debts created h the defeated community in its attempted rebellion and in the 3rd place, while those acts that were executed may generally stand, the contracts that were made to aid the rebellion are executory and void and cannot be enforced because they were made for an illegal consideration. Another argument that is urged, and hasbeen repeated in the Senate is that these States had no right to secede and therefore they did not secc e; and the Senfrom Nevada [Mr. STEWART] the other day put the in this form: they (referring to the repbroepoSstiattioens) said that they wanted to secede; we said the should not secede; the question was submitte to the arbitrament of war and decided in our favor. Now, with due deference to the Sena tor, I think he did not accurately state the issue in the war. The question was not as to whether these States had or had not acceded, but the question was whether or not they had a right to secede. SCarolina made her ordinance of secession, or nized her State government, and committed the overt act of secession. But the Federal Government denied the right of that State to secede, and the question before the country and in the war was not as to what had or had not been done, but as to the right fulness of the position assumed by SCarolina and her confederates. Numerous and forcible illustrations will occur to the mind of every Senator to prove the fallacy of this argument to which I now refer. Acts may be rightful or they may be wrongful. Booth had no righttoassassinate the POTUS, but he did it. England had no right to allow privateers to be fitted out in her ports to prey u n our commerce, but she did it. France ha no right tothrust Max imilian into Mexico and so port him there with French onets, but shed it. Russia, Aus tria, and russia had no right to trample down and divide Poland, but they did it and so I say that these rebel States had no right to secede, butthey did it, wantonly, wickedly, wrong fully did it. Suppose that a man wrongfully takes possession of my house and I bring a suit to eject him, while the proceedings are pending in court and from the time he entered until the writ of restitution is served upon him, Insk if he is not as much in possession of that house as though he was rightfully there? Treason took possession of these rebel States, and from the time that the ordinances of secession were set it and the rebel governments were organized, O power and authority of the U.S. were expelled and by the absolute possession and control of rebel authority these States were prac tically seceded from the Union. All the analogies of the law sustain this position. If the Constitution be a compact, as some claim it to be, then when the State of SCarolina has wantonly and wickedly violated that comct, can she claim under it the rights and privileges which she would otherwise have derived from it? 2 men make a contract, and one wantonly violates the contract, can he claim the rights he otherwise could claim under that contract? Suppose alegislative assembly passes a law conferring certain rights and imposing certain duties and obligations upon an mdividual, can he repudiate the duties and obli aliens and claim the rights under the law 1 Could the State of SCarolina, trampling the Constitution of the U.S. under her sacriligious feet and contemning and defying the authority of the Federal Government, at the same time min. flatu claim all the advantages and benefits which she ever enjoyed under that Constitution as one of the States of this Union? When a forfeiture occurs rights are not annihilated, but they are transferred from one party to another; and I maintain that the rights which these rebel States had under the Constitution prior to the rebellion by that rebellion became forfeited and passed into the hands of the Federal Government, and in my judgment they are today in the hands of the Congress of the U.S. Many elaborate speeches have been made here to controvert this position, and 2 to which I will particularly refer, one made by the honorable Senfrom Wisconsin [Mr. Doourruz] and the other by the honorable Senfrom Maryland, [Mr. JOKNSON] have been pronouced by those who concur in them as wholl unanswerable. I do not presume that I am able to answer those speeches, but I am certainly able to examine an I hope to do them justice. It was argued by those gentlemen that resident Lincoln had said an done certain things and that President Johnson had said and done certain other things, and that the sayings and doings of these 2 Presidents amounted to a recognition of these States and proved that they were States within the Union, entitled to the rights and privileges of such States. An otherargument was that Congress, bv its legislation from time to time during the rebellion, had recognized these States as within this Union; and therefore they were not only within this Union, but were standing at our doors with a perfect right its loyal States to be represented ere, and Congress had no other power or jurisdiction over the great question of reconstruction but to pass upon the personal qualifications of the men who may be seeking to represent those States in the national Legislature. I will pass over for the present the argument derived from the acts and sayings of the presidents, but will notice here the argument de rived from congressional legislation; and, with due deference to those gentlemen who made the argument, it seems to me that they omitted to take a distinction at that point which must be recognized in order to arrive at a correct conclusion. The acts of legislation which they cite were nothing but expressions of power on the part of the Federal Government over these States; and that power was exercised and could be exercised without any acknowledgment on the part of Congress that these States possessed any rights as States of the Union. 0 man has ever contended, so far as I know, no matter how radical or extreme he may have been, that these States were ever beyond the jurisdiction of Congress, or that there ever was a time since the rebellion when Congress had not ample power to make such laws for them as in its judgment the circumstances of the country required. Reference was made to the apportionment and the tax law. The apportionment law was simply an exercise of power on the part of Congress. It was intended for the future, and it was made with a view that at no distant day, and before another apportionment could be made under a new census, these States would be restored to the Union, and then there would be a law to operate and take effect within those States. So with the tax law. Taxation was levied upon those States as upon others. congress had power to levy taxes; and certainly because these States were in rebellion, that was no reason why they should be exempted from the burdens that were imposed u it other States. Congress during this rebellion was legislating for these States, not in the way of levying taxes or making apportionments alone, but Congress was exerting unlimited power for the destruction of the property and the lives of persons within these States, in order to subdue the rebellion. Any argument derived from the exercise of power on tapart of Congress over the rebel States during the rebellion proves nothing to the point, for the question is not as to whether Congress had power or jurisdiction over those States. but the question is as to the rights of the States. Power on the part of the General Government is one thing; right on the rt of the State is another and diTTerentthing. federal power may exist and State rights be destroyed); rights of the States may depend upon the existence of Federal power for their protection, but the exercise of Federal power over a State in rebellion recognizes nothing but the necessity which demands its exercise. Authority was produced from the legislation of Congress to show that congress had maintained its right to legislate for ese States, but no precedent, no authority, was cited to show that Congress had expressed any opinion, or, in any way otherwise than by asserting its power, recognized the rights of these States during or since the rebellion. The argument derived from the legislation referred to is certainly fallacious, for if it proves anything it proves that the day the apportionment or tax iiill was passed the rebel States had the right of representation in Congress. lfthe enactment of those laws proves that those States have that right at this time it proves that they have had that right ever since the laws were enacted. But, sir, I propose to refer to an authority to show what view the Senate of the U.S. has taken of the rights of these States. Bear in mind, now, that all the authorities cited by Senators to whom I have referred were as to the power of Congress, but I desire to show a decision by the Senate as to the rights of rebel States, and I refer for that purpose to a reposition which was offered by.the honorablle Senfrom Missouri, [Mr. knows] to be found on age 344.) of part 4 of the Congressional G10 e, for the 1st session of the ThirtEighth Congress. I will 1st read the bill, on then the vote of the Senate upon it. The bill of the Senfrom Missouri was in“these words: That when the inhabitantsofnny statehave been declaredin astute of insiirrcction againstthe U.S.by proclamation of the President, byforceand virtue of the not entitled Annct further to provide for the collectionof dutieson imports and for other purposes are here yn. Declared Jutol 13.1861t.heyshall be and c incn ableof casting any votefor electors of President or VEEP or of electing Senators or Representa itsivesuspinprCeosnsgerdeosrsuntil said insurrectionin said State have abandoned and said inhabitants returned to their obedienceto the Government of the U.S. nor until such return to obe ddieennte, eshallbedeclaredbyproclamation of the Presiissued byvirtue of an act of Congressh, ereafter be passed, authorising the some." Here is a bill which declares that these rebel States are incapable of choosing electors for President or of choosing Sens&Reps in congress until agiven time. hat time is not when hostilities have ceased, when the rebel armies have been disbanded, but they are to be incapable of exercising any of these rights until the Congress of the U.S. has passed a law declaring the rebellion at an end and authorizing the President to make proclamation of that fact.