Mr. WILLIAMS. I think not, because the case whichI put is the case where a man is found in the possession of goods to which he has no right y law, and in this case the man is found in the possession of goods to which he has no right by law, so that the cases, as it seems to me, are analogous cases. upon the northwestern frontierit is custom ary for persons to go on board vessels at Vic toria and come around to Portland with trunks and packages, and to violate the revenue laws in that way; and when a prosecution is commenced against the master of the vessel, although the fact of the importation contrary to law is established as a general rule, the defense that he makes is that he was ignorant of the fact that the goods were brought upon his vessel or that they were brought into the port of Portland contrary to the law. Now, if the law be that the fact that he has imported those goods in violation of the law is probable cause of prosecution, and he understands it to be the law, then it will make him diligent, and when goods are brought on board his vessel he will see to it that they are goods that can be transported, or on which the duties are paid, and that they are not brought into the ports of the U.S. contrary to law. In that respect I think this provision will be of advantage. It will make it necessary for masters and those who have the management of ships to be more diligent to prevent smug glin. Trunks ofo ium, for instance , are taken on s ips at Victoria and brought to Portland. When the master of the vessel is prosecuted for smuggling, the fact that a trunk filled with opium has been brought from a British port to an American port contrary to law is undeni able, but the master undertakes to defend himself upon the ground that he was ignorant, that he did not know that there were such goods on beard his vessel, and if he is inattentive to his duties he may successfully make that de fense; but if, when the fact is established that he has imported these goods contrary to law, he is then compelled to show that he did not know that the goods were on board the ship, it seems to me that he will be more diligent and take more pains to see that the laws of the country are maintained in this respect. It seems to me that to declare that when probable cause for the prosecution is established the onus probandi shall be on the de fendant, is not a proposition that is objection able as urged by gentlbmen who oppose it, and that in cases of this dese rition it is absolutely necessary. Possession of the goods by the man who transports them or by any person after they are transported is probable cause if the goods are found in his possession within area sonable time. That constitutes probable cause; and what does the court say to the jury when a man is prosecuted for smuggling or prosecuted for assisting in smuggling and the fact a pears to the court and jury that these goods after their arrival at the port were in the possession of theindividual prosecuted? Now, the court say “the possession of these goods at this time, within a short time after they arrive in the ort, is probable cause.” Ifa long time elapsed), their possession would not amount to probable cause, as in a case of larceny; but if the goods that are smuggled into the ort are found soon after in the possession of an individual who is prosecuted [gr a violation of this law, the court would say to the jury, “ Gentlemen, this fact that the goods were in the possession of this man is probable cause for the prosecution, and it is necessary that he shonqd explain this possession and show that it is consistent with is innocence.” That is all, it seems to me, that this provision amounts to, and it is not an unreasonable provision; and I think that, considering the difficulties in maintaining prosecutions for violations of this law and the various arts and expedients that are resorted to by men engaged in this bpsiness, this is not a rule too stringent and it Will be found to operate well in prac tice.