Mr. HENDERSON. I propose to discuss the 1st section only so far as citizenship is nvolved in it. I desire to show that this section will leave citizenship where it now is. It akes plain only what has been rendered doubtful bylthe past action of the Government. If I be right in that, it will be a loss of time to discuss the remaining provisions of the section, for they merely secure the rights that attach to citizenship in all free Governments. Justice McLean, in the Dred Scott case, said: “Being born under our Constitution and laws. no naturalization is required. as oneof foreign birth. to make him a citizen. The most general and appropriate definition of the term citizen is a ‘freeman." So the learned judge held that “ Dred Scott, ” having his domicile in a State different from that of the defendant, and being a freeman, is a citizen within the act of Congress, and the courts 'Of the Union are open to him. From his argumentit follows that any person, black or white, born upon the soil of a State, is a citizen of that State, unless he be born in slavery, and if he be born a slave, he becomes a citizen so soon as by the laivs'of the State he becomes a free man. His opinion leads to the conclusion that citizens of States are necessa rily citizens of the U.S. All born on the soil free are citizens of the respective States of their birth, and therefore citizens of the U.S. Those born on foreign sci], he holds, cannot be invested with rights of citizenship without naturalization. He says further: “While I admit the Government was not made especiallyfor the colored rncc.yet many of themwere citizens of the NewEngland States, and cacrcised the rights of suffrage when the Constitution was adopted." Judge McLean might have gone further and enumerated other than NewEngland States that acknowledged the citizenship of African free men at that date. All remember the opinion of the supreme court of NCarolina, delivered by Judge Gaston, and reported in the case of State vs. Manuel, 4 Dev. & Bat. 20. He said: “According to the laws of this State. all human beings within it. who are not slaves, fall Wllllll] one of 2 classes. Whatever distinctions may have existed in the Roman laws between citizens and free inhabitants. they are unknown to our institutions. Before our Revolution. all free persons born Within the dominions of the King of GreatBritain. whatever their color or complexion. were native born British subjects; those born outof his allegiance were aliens. Slavery did not exist in England. but it did in the British colonies. Slaves were not in legal parlance persons.but property. The moment the incapacity, the disqualification of slavery was removed they became persons and were then either British subjects or not British subjects.according as they worp or were not born within the allegiance of the British King upon the Revolution. no other change took place in t in laws of NCarolina than was conseqnent on the transition from a colony dependent on a European king to af'rco and sovereign State. Slaves remained slaves. British subJects in NCarolina became NCarolina free men, Foreigners until made members of the State remained aliens. Slaves manumitted here became free men and therefore. if born within NCarolina. are citizens of NCarolina and all free persons born Within the State. are born citizens of the State. The constitution extended the elective franchise to every free man who had arrived at the age of 21 and paid a public tax: and it is a matter of universal notoriety that under it freq persons.Withput regard to color. Claimed and exercised the franchise until it was taken from free men of color a few years since by our amended constitution." Judge Curtis, in his dissenting opinion in the Dred Scott case, says: “ To determine whether any free persons descended from Africans held in slavery were citizens of the U.S. under the Confederation, and consequently at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the U.S. it is only necessary to know whether any such persons were citizens of either of the States under the Confederation. Of this, ” he said, “there can be no doubt.” At the time of the ratification of the Articlcs of Confederation free native born inhabitants of the States of NewHampshire, Massachusetts, NewYork, NewJersey, and NCarolina, though descended from African slaves, were not only called citizens of those States, but such of them as had the other necessary qualifications possessed the franchise of electors on equal terms With other citizens. In conclusive proof of his reasoning on this subject Judge Curtis cites the action of congress when framing the Articles of Confederation. The 4th article, it will be remembered, provides “that the free inhabitants of /303; June each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States.” While this provision was under consideration, June 25, 1778, the SCarolina delegates moved to insert the word “ white” after “ free" and before “ inhabitants, ” thereby securing the privileges only to white persons. The motion was voted down by 8 ‘tates to two, one State being divided. This proves beyond doubt that the privileges and immunities of citizenship were at that time willingly accorded to all men who were free, who were not slaves, whether white or black. I Judge Curtis, after statin that in 5 States at least free negroes enjoye the elective franchise when the Constitution was adopted, concludes very justly that they became “ citizens of the new Government, ” and “ so in every sense“part of the people of the U.S., ” among those for whom and whose pos terity the Constitution Was ordained and establilshed.” "There can scarcely be a doubt that all persons residing in the soveral States at the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution became citizens of the U.S., and no State thereafter can de prive them or their posterity of this right. The power to naturalizo is exclusive in Congress and the foreigner naturalized becomes a citizen of the U.S., and necessarily is a citizen of the State in which he is domiciled. The posterity of such foreigner so domiciled becomes a citizen of the State and of the U.S.byvirtue of his birth alone." 'If the opinion of Judge Curtis be open to criticism at all it consists in the conclusion to which he arrives "That it is left to each State to determine what free persons born within its limits shall be citizen! of such State, and therebybe citizens of the U.S." He leaves the inference that Federal citizenship may be given or tahen away by State action. e admits that being a State citizen confers the Federal right. If once the character of citizen of the U.S. attaches, no State, I apprehendtean take it away. T his error of Judge Curtis is shown in the opinion of the court in the same case where it is “ If said: persons of the African race are citizens of a Statoandof the U.S. theywould be entitled to all of these privileges on immunities in overy State, and the State could not restrict them: for they would hold these privileges and immunities uenrndmeretnhte, paramount aut oi'it of the Federal govandits courts would a boundto maintain and enforce them, the constitution and the laws of the Statenotwithstanding." Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, says: “A person who is a naturalized citizen of the U.S.by a like residence(tho same required of native born) in any Statein the Union, becomesi'pao 85:0 a citizen of that State." 2Story, secs.1693 and In another place he says: “ It has always beenwell understoodamongjurists in this country that the citizens of each State constitute the body politic of each community. called the people of the States, nndthat the citizens of omch State in the Union are ipaofuctocitizens of the U.S." Rawle, in his work on the Constitution, page 86, uses the following language: "The citizens of each State constituted the citi lens of the U.S.when the ponstitution was pdopted. The rightswhich appertain to themas citizens of those respective Commonwealths accomanied themin the o mation of the great compound oinmonwealth which ensued. They became citizens of the latter.without ceasingto be citizens of the farmer: and hewho was subsequentl.born a citizen of a State becomeat the momentof is birth a citizen of the U.S." 'C'lianccllor Kent says: " Ifaslave bornin the U.S. be manumittod, or otherwiselawfully dischargedfrom bondage, or it ahlaok man be born Within the U.S and born free, he becomes th ceforward a citizen." 2 Keiifn Commentaries fo.urt edition, p. 2o7.note. Chief Justice Taney, delivering the opinion of the court in the Dred Scott case, says: “His true every person and everyclass and description of persons.who were at t a time 9t: the iandotpltion of the Constitution recognizedas ci ilcns a several States. becamealso citizen! 0 this new political body.” This opinion, then, concedes to all members of the several State communities, and to those Ihdshould afterward, by birthright or otherwise, become members thereof, all the personal rights, privileges, and immunities guarantied to citizens of this new Government.” In fact, the opinion distinctly asserts that the words “people of the U.S.” and “citizens” are “synon mous terms.” They both describe the polities body, who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the Government through their representatives. The rent error into which Chief Justice Tancy lls consists in the fact that he arbitra rily excluded all negroes, though free, from this sovereignty. e unfortunately rejected the text 0ft 10 Constitution itself, and sought judicial light in what he erroneously supposed to be “t 10 legislation and histories of the times.” Instead of construing a plain instrument as its language directed, in order to secure freedom and happiness to those who made it and their posterity, he went back 70 years to explore “ the State of publico iniou” which then existed in “ relation to" what he termed “that unfortunate race, " (the negroes,) and came to the conclusion that for more than a century before that time they had been regarded by civilized and enlightened nations “as beings of an inferior order and alto ether unfit to associate with the white race, eit ier in social or political relations, and so for inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.” He entirely ignored the fact that in man of the States at that time free negroes enjoye every privilege and im munity of citizenship. Indeed, the fact is perfectly clear, established beyond all question by “the legislation and histories of the times, ” that free negroes, in both free and slave States, enjoyed ful citizenship, and yet Judge Taney says “it cannot be supposed that they intended to secure to them rights and privileges and rank in the new political body throughout the Union which every one of them denied within the limits of its own dominion.” In formin his 0 winion he abandoned the Constitution an the DeclarIndep, for be distinctl says “the general words contained in the eclaration would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood.” He distinctly admits that he put aside those words, as a part of the history of that period, and based his conclusions upon a certain supposed state of feeling which in reality did not then exist upon something which he called history, but which was really a perversion of history. He admits that the Constitution was made for those who framed it and their posterity; in other words, that “every class and description of persons” recognized as citizens in the severa States became a part of the political body known as “the people of the U.S." This would clearly include the free negroes who enjoyed the full rights of citizenship in nearly ha f of the States of the Union at that time. Being citizens, then, of their respective States, they necessarily became citizens of the U.S., and having become citizens of the U.S., no State can divest them of that high privilege. No power inferior to the national sovereignty could deprive them of U.S. citizenship. They therefore remained citizens of the States in which they might reside, and when they desired to remove from one State to another they had a right to claim in the State of their domicile the privileges and immunities of “citizens in the several totes.” Sargent, in his work on Constitutional Law, at page 111, commentingon the clause givingjuris diction to the Federal courts between citizens of the different States, says: “This oltizonship means a residenceor domicilp in gamicplar State y onewhois a oitison of the U.S. We have now seen that each judge in the Dred Scott case and all the commentators assert 1 that. State citizenship b the adoption of the Constitution became federal citizenship; and Mr. Sargent says that when one isnatnralized lie 1 becomes a citizen of the U.S., and a lf residence or domicile in a State gives him State citizenship. The Federal Constitution failed to define U.S. citizenship, and equally failed to declare what classes of persons should be entitled to its privileges. If those persons who enjoyed “all the privileges and immuni ties” of State citizenship at the adoption of the Constitution were not b the Constitution made citizens of the U.S., it would be difficult to ascertain who were to be considered such. To deny it in such cases would lead to a total denial of such a thing as U.S. citizenship at all. But that cannot be the case, for, in defining the qualifications of a Representative in Congress, the Constitution requires that he shall “have been 7 years a citizen of the U.S.” The same instrument, prescribing the qualifications of a Senator in Congress, declares that he “shall have been 9 years a citizen of the U.S.” It is also fixed in the instrument that no person shall be President except a “natural born citizen or a citizen of the U.S. at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.” These clauses show that such a thing as U.S. citizenship existed at and pri0r to the time when the C(llf stitution was ado ted. Another curious fact may be seen in lliis, that while the Senator an Representative must be a citizen of the U.S. at the time of their election, it is only necessary that they be “inhabitants” of the ir respective States. One may be a Senator or Representative in Congress before he has acquired the rights of citizenship in his State. But he must have once been a State citizen. For instance, if an individual, 7 ears before the adoption of the Constitution, had been recognized a citizen of one of the States. acquiring the right either by birth or by naturalization therein, and had continued to remove from one State to another, failing to remain in anyone of them long enough to acquire “all the privileges and immunities" of a citizen therein, he would yet have been a citizen of the U.S and eligible to a seat in Congress from the Statein which he, was domiciled at the time. And so would one have been pligible to the Senate who 9 years before had enjoyed State citizeiiship in one of the States under the Articles of (Jon federation. In the clause fixing the qualifications of the President, the language is changed from " citizenship” to “residence.” It says no person shall be elected President who shall not have been “ 14 years a resident of the U.S.” 14 years went back to the period of the battle of Lexington. It must be that a higher evidence of attachment to the country was intended to be secured in the President than in a member of Congress, but unless “residence” in the States be regarded as furnishing that evidence equally with citizenship itself, then the qualification of the President is not of so high a character as that of a member of Congress. It cannot be otherwise than that all free natural born residents of the States and all who had been naturalized by the States became, at the adoption of the Constitution, citizens of the U.S. Their descendants of course followed their condition. All born of such parents became citizens at their birth. The States, after the adoption, could no longer naturalize. This power, by the Constitution, was given to Congress. But now upon the moment of naturalization the foreigner becomes a citizen of the U.S., and may become a citizen of anyone of the States by the same residence and under the same circumstances as native born citizens of other States. Now, if there be any force in the reasoning to which I have referred or any weight in the authorities cited, U.S. citizenship is just what it is defined to be in the 1st sec‘tion of this amendment. I mean that those persons who are to be made citizens by this amendment are the persons and none others, who have ever been citizens of the U.S. under a fair and rational interpretation of the Constitution since its adoption in 1789. I now proceed to consider briefly the 2nd section of this amendment. It materially changes the Constitution as respects representation in the lower House of Congress. The same change, of course, will be produced in the Electoral Colleges. The Constitution, as itnow stands, apportions Representatives and direct taxes among the States according to the number of their inhabitants; but this number is to be ascertained by taking the whole number of free persons, male and female, including ap ren tices, and addin thereto 3/5th s o the slaves and excluding all Indians not taxed. It is upon this enumeration, ascertained by the census every ten years, that Representatives have been apportioned to the States since the formation of the Government. At the time the Constitution was framed the large slave holding States desired that the whole number of their slaves should enter into the basis of representation. This was resisted by States having few or no slaves. The question was one of great difficulty. It was finally compromised, however, by estimating each slave as 3/5th s of a person for purposes of representation. But it was insisted that if he were 3/5th s of a person for representation he should also be 3/5th s of a person for purposes of taxation. The controversy was there ore settled by imposing direct taxation upon the States in the same proportion in which they might be represented upon their slave population. The clause was so adjusted that when ever a slave became free he necessarily became a full person for purposes of representation and taxation. He then was included in the list of "' free persons, ” and not in that of “ other persons.” Therefore, whenever a State emancipated its slaves, as many did before the late war, it increased its representative power in Congress and fell subject to increased taxation to the extent of 2/5th s of all persons so emancipated. The recent war of rebellion has terminated in the abolition of slavery in all the southern States. This cmnncipatimi, ofcourse, was against the will of those States; but it none the less increases their representative power because it was forced on them. This provision of the Constitution, like many others, looked to the ultimate extinction of slavery in all the States. It was so worded, of course, as to be adapted to either state of affairs. It compromised a present difficulty growing out of a state of slavery, but antici nted a period when it would cease to exist. When the for mer slave became a free man he was to become one of the people. He ceased to be property, and became a person. I confess I can see no good reason why the negro thus emanncipatd should be excluded from the basis 0 representation. I believe that no one in the Federal Convention asked the exclusion of any person, white or black, citizen or alien, provided he were a freeman. Indeed, in the 54th number of the Federalist, Mr. Mad ison, commending the Constitution to the people", says: It is not contendedthat the number of peoplein each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of thosewho are to representthe peopleof each State." And in the same connection he remarks: "That if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away the negroescould no longer berefusedan equal shareof reprmentation with the other inhabitants.” For myself, I cannot refrain from expressing regret that it becomes necessary for me to'give apparent indorsement to a principle contained in this 2nd section. It departs from the views of the framers of the Constitution in several particulars. The 1st promi nent objection is that it separates representation from taxation. If it were proposed to base taxation upon wealth instead of numbers it would be much better. Mr. Madison said t"h' at the rule of representation referred to the personal rights of the people, ” and therefore should be based upon numbers, irrespective of their political condition. But he remarked that the rule basing taxation upon numbers is “in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit one, ” The amendment, as proposed, does not base taxation upon wealth, but leaves the Constitution in this respect as it now stands. If direct taxation be hereafter levied it will be apportioned among the States, according to their numbers, including free negroes as well as all other persons. “If I believed it probable that direct taxation would be resorted to in the future legislation of the country, nothing could induce me to support this proposition. A 2nd objection to it consists in the argument furnished, that we admit the necessity, or at least the propriety, of excluding arbitrarily a freeman from the elective franchise; and it will be contended that we render a present doubtful power of the States to do so certain. A 3rd objection which is urged consists in the fact that while it inflicts punishment for the exclusion of the negro from the ballot, it permits the white citizen and the alien inhabitant to be excluded by the States without loss of representative power. A 4th objection will be urged that it presents too great an incentive to the States to extend suffrage to persons who are ignorant and uneducated for the mere purpose of acquiring power, inasmuch as those who may be excluded under this provision on account of the want of intelligence will be equally excluded from the basis of representation. The amendment fixes representation upon numbers, preeisel y as the Constitution nowdoes, but when a.State denies or abridges the elective franchise to any of its male inhabitants who are citizens of the U.S and not less than 21 years of age, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, then such State will lose its representation in congress in the proportion which the male citizen so excluded earsto the whole number of male citizens not less than 21 years of age in the State. The original amendment reported by the committee of 15, which passed the HoRep and was efeated in this body, put the basis of representation on numbers also, at it differed from this in some important particulars. It provided that“ Whenever the electivefranchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on accountot'racoor color, all personstherein ofsuch raceor color shall be excluded from the basis ofrepresentation.” That proposition seemed to admit in express terms the right of the States to exclude from suffrage on account of color. The words “race or color” are left outof this proposition entirely. The States under the former prosition might have excluded the negroes no or an educational test and yet retained their powerin congress. Under this they cannot. For all prac tical purposes, under the former reposition loss ofrepresentation followed the disfranchisement of the negro only; under this it follows the disfranchisement of white and black, unless excluded on account of “rebellion or other crime.” The former might have had the effect to keep the negro uneducated, in order that he might be permanently excluded under that pretension. There was to be no penalty on such exclusion, and if prejudice against race exists to the extent supposed in the southern States, peppetual ignorance must have been the fate of e negro unless Congress could have interfered to educate him. If equally educated with the white man, no possible pretext remained for the denial of suffiage except the color of his skin; and if he were excluded for race or color, he no longer constituted a part of the representative population. Under the former proposition the exclusion of ten negroes in a State because of race or color excluded from representation all persons of that race or co or, though they might number half a million or more. This encourages to give the ballot, because it gives power in the same proportion as the ballot is given. In some respects, therefore, this proposition is far superior to the one defeated. No amendment can be offered on this subject which would not be liable to objections, but this is not subject to many of the harsh criticisms to which the other was. I have already said that no one in the federal Convention asked that a freeman should be excluded from the basis of representation, and that I could see no good reason for excluding the negro now. The same reason, however, which requires that he should be. counted in the basis of representation equally demands that he should constitute a part of the political sovereignty in the several States. It is true that no one in the Federal Convention asked that the free negro should be excluded from the representative basis, but is it not equally true that the distinguished statesmen of that day admitted the citizenship of the negro and acknowledged his right to suffrage in the States? I have already shown that in 5 States of the Union the negro enjoyed the right to vote when the Constitution was a pted. He was therefore a citizen in those States, and the Constitution declared that, being a citizen in one State, he should have the privileges and immunities of citizenship in every other State. Having the right, therefore, to vote in one State, the right would attach to him on equal terms with the white man whenever he removed his domicile to another State. Mr. Madison expressed confident belief that the people in the several States would not abri ge the rights of suffrage, but would rather extend them. such, no onbt, was the general belief. If these anticipations, in connection with the hope of earl emancipation, had been realized, we should on since have had a Government founded upon the consent of the governed. Had such been the case we would have had no war. The war came, however, and brought with it the bitter fruits which we have gathered during the last 5 years. The Virginia. convention, on the 12th of June, 1776, uttered the sentiment of patriot ism, and proclaimed the true theory of republican government, when it declared that “all men having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with and attachment to the community have the right of suffrage, and cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for public uses without their own consent or that of their representatives so elected; nor bound by any law to which they have not in like manner assented for the public good.” No one pretends now to doubt that slavery and the discussion growin out of it produced the late war. Slavery is tenatural result. of a certain degree of inferiority. The father is the patriarch and governor of the family, because of this inferiority. Until the child is 21 years of a e the father has the power of correction and enjoys the fruits of his labor. This rests upon the admitted fact that the mine r is inca able of takiii proper care of himself. The ether is boun only to treat him with humanity, but has the right to control his person and take his earnings. Slavery proceeds from the same argument. It is assumed that the black man is not only infe rior to the white man, but incapable of self government. Admit the truth of this proposition and slavery becomes justified y the highest attributes of justice and humanity.Mr. A. H. Stephens, the wisest of the southern statesmen, fully comprehended this theory when commending the confederate constitution to the people of Savannah in 1861. He said “the revailing ideas entertained by him Jefferson and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old Constitution were, that the enslavement of the AfiT cans was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wron in principle, socially, mor ally, and politioai y.“ He said, further, “the new constitution has at at rest forever all the agitating questions re ating to our peculiar institution African slavery as it exists among us the proper status of the negro in the form of our civilization. This, ” he repeats, “was the immediate cause of the late rupture and the present revolution.” Again, he says, the corner stoned the new Government “rests upon the great truth, that the negro is not equal to the white man.” speaking of the antislavery fanatics of the orth, he said, in the same speech, “Their conclusions are right if their premises are; they assume that the negro is equal, and hence conclude that he is entitled to equal privileges and rights with the white man. If their prem ises were correct their conclusions would be logical and just; but their premises being wrong, their argument fails.” The position taken by Mr. Ste hens is certainly correct. If the negro be inferior to the white man, and incapable of self government, modified slavery results as a matter of course. The southern argument, asserting the divinity of slavery, proceeded from this idea. We have declared that slavery in no form shall exist hereafter. In so declaring, we necessarily deny the negro’s incapacity to take care of and govern himseif. Now, if the abolition of slavery is not to be followed by such privileges and rights as will maintain and perpetuate the freedom of the emancipated, it amounts to nothing. It is “as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal.” Mr. Stephens said that this idea of inferiority, upon which slavery was founded upon the one side, and the opposite idea of man’s equality on the other, carrying with it equal rights and equal privileges, caused the late war. ltwas 1st a contest of opinion, then a contest of force. In the overthrow of the rebellion one idea triumphed, and necessarily the other was vanquished. False ideas, then, and false teachings had corrupted our institutions. These teachings interfered with the bar mony of the Government. They had produced disease. That disease had develope itself in adestructive war. It was for us, when violence had ceased, when the paroxysms of acute pain had been allayed, to consider whether the cause of disease should be removed entirely or be left in the system to fester again. I think it somewhat unfortunate that congress was not in session when armed hostility ceased. It is possible that, had it been in session, it would have done nothing. It had certainly been derelict in failing to provide for a contingency, which for many months before its occurrence it was evident must soon happen. And why did it fail thus to provide? For the same reason that produced the war. Because we could not agree as to the status of the negro. We feared to grapple with prejudice and did nothing. PresidentJohnson, findin the rebellion overthrown and himself just a vanced to the executive power of the nation, naturally enough felt a desire to see the Union at once restored. He had borne a prominent art among the friends and supporters of the government, and it would be by no means stran e that he were possessed of an ambition, lau able and honorable within itself, to take a yet more prominent and exalted position in rebuilding the shattered columns of the Union. The war had been waged that the States might be kept in their proper relations to the Government. It was the wish of every earnest patriot in the land to see complete restoration, and to See it as soon as possible. It had been a fearful period, those 4 years of anxiety and dread. The loyal people never desired the war. They accepte it simply as a necessity. They went to the battle without malice toward their enemies, but simply to save the Union, and in so doingl to secure the hap iness and even safety of both North and Sout. Hence when vieto came the 1st shout of excitation was immediately followed by an exhibition of charity and magnanimity toward a fallen foe which brought to the national name more true glory than all the achievements of war, and gave each hero a fame that will live when his most darin deeds of martial prowess shall have been ‘long forgotten. The assassination of Mr. Lincoln checked but did not subdue this feeling of mercy. The incoming President took counsel of his Cabinet advisers as to the course of policy to be pursued. They were substantially the same.4 who had devised a plan of restoration with the lamented Lincoln in 1863. Atthat time not more than 3 of the seceded States could possibly be drawn into any scheme of restoration. The rebel government held undisputed sway over all the others. The erection of loyal governments in these 3 States at that time should have been regarded in the light of a military measure, a means rather to crush out organized treason by fostering a counter power in its midst. Mr. Lincoln’s plan was certainly not designed to build up permanent institutions to exist in a time of peace, founded upon the consent of one 10th of the inhabitants. An oath had been prescribed for the voter, good enough for that period and well calculated for the purposes desi ned, but wholly unfitted to the spring of 1865, when the armies of Lee and Johnston had returned home and the re‘establishment of the Union had become a fixed fact. They had been stripped of the musket. They, of course, expected fbr the time being to be deprived of the ballot. It was the ballot in the seceded States which had made their rebellion so for midable. It had given the rebellion form and consistency; It had clothed treason with legal sanction. t gave the insurgents a government and lent organized purpose to every movement. The ballot had previously aided treason only because the ballot was partial. If even 1/2 of the negr'oes could have voted in the seceded States in 1861 secession would have been lost in each one of them. Secession was successful at that time, because it was entirely in the hands of those whose fancied interests and whose real prejudices had brought on the war. One would suppose that when armed violence had been suppressed entirely, they who had commenced it should give a full and not a partial acceptance to the situation. I think the South at 1st was willing in good faith to do so. They expected nothing else. The more intelligent among them admitted that the whole case submitted to the arbitrament of the sword had been decided against them. sion, but the point was decided and they ielded to the decision. They did not believe that slavery should be abolished, but slavery was in volved in the case as made up, and they yielded, as yields the unsuccessful suitor in the highest court of judicature. They did not believe that equal rights and equal privileges should be aceorde to the negro. But this question they knew was involve; in the contest also. The premises taken by the supporters of the Union were proved to be correct, and now, in the language of Mr. Stephens, the whole conclusion was “logical and just.” The Cabinet, however, had committed themselves to a policy, and now came that thing so dangerous always in human conduct prideof opinion, attachmentto reconceived notions. It may be possible that the mind, like machinery, runs best in old and worn grooves. It is certainly true that the change ofcondition in public affairs made no change in policy. What had been an acknowledged temporary arrangement was now to be made a permanent institution. A plan of restoration was adopted which put the political power of the South right where it was at the beginning of the war. Many persons think that this was desi ned, and the President and his Cabinet wishedto build up a new party, having its strength in the old rebelelement. Icannotthink so. I do notthink so. I think they were actuated by the best of motives, but committed a blunder. They were certainly too hasty, but I attribute their haste, 1st, to that ambition of which I have spoken, and 2nd, to a false pride of opinion, with which man’s happiness must ever contend until his whole moral nature has been reconstructed. So soon as the southern people found political power again in their grasp, the spirit of humiity gradually disa peared, and they conceivedahopethat the jurTgment reuderedagainst them in the tribunal ofarms might now be ar rested. They supposed that something might be saved from the wreck of their political for tunes, which, properly invested, would alti They did not cease to believe in seces1 mately restore them to their former place and grandeur in the Government. If slavery could be saved, this were an investment of the most priceless character, but the President said, “Slavery shall not be saved.” For this the country owes AndrewJohnson a debt of grati tude. They then thought ifthe technical right of secession, even, could be admitted in the words of their conventional proceedings, it would be so much laid up for the future. The President said “that no words must be used upon which an inference could hang favoringithe right of secession.” In this Andrew Jo nson was right, and no true man will with hold his raise. They next endeavored to save treason from odium by providing that the debt contracted in its perpetration should be acknowledged and paid. To this the President gave his refusal, and again the country is thankful to AndrewJohnson for this act of true statesmanship. For these acts the President was denounced as a tyrant. 1 only regret that his tyranny did not go far enough. He stopped at the precise point where the greatest degree of moral cour age was needed. Southern prejudice against race had started the war, northern prejudice had prolonged it. Southern prejudice, if unsustained, would have given us awarnf but short duration. Northern sympathy came to its aid, and doubled its miseries. At this period the South was ready to cast off its prejudices if the demand had been made. The Igresident and his Cabinet had boldly conducted us to the overthrow of southern rebellion. But they now cowed before this spirit in the North which had aided and prolonged the strife. The South sawits opportunity and promptly collected together all the elements of prejudice and hatred against the negro for purposes of future party power. They denied im the right to hold real or personal property, excluded him from their courts as a witness, denied him the means of education and forced upon him unequal burdens. Though nominally free, so far as discriminating legislation could make him so he was ycta slave. It was at this period, as I have said, that the President and his Cabinetfaltered. if they had puttheir veto upon these measures, their voice would have been the law; the South would have been saved from their worst enemies, themselves, and the whole country would have felt secure in the beginning of a better era. But they were encouraged by this indecision and want of moral firmness in the President and his Cabinet, and adopted a sys tem of laws which doomed the negro to hope less ignorance, degradation, and misery. They not only denied him the ballot, but denied him the commonest rights ofhuman nature. lfthis thing were to be continued there was no hope left for his future amelioration. He must be a degraded outeast. The only change made was in the name: he was once a slave, and men called him a slave; men now mocked his condition by calling him a freeman. Thus encouraged the southern States he came insolent in the immediate prospect of power, and resumed to insult the loyal sentiment of the country by conferring honors upon the most obnoxious leaders of their rebellion. They even elected and sent to Congress the men who have held the highest places in the rebel government. In this condition of affairs Congress convened. The 1st thing, of course, was to close the doors of Congress against this rebel invasion. The next was to do a simple act of jus tice to the negroes and poorer whites of the South, who had been always loyal to the government. For that purpose, “ the act to establilsh a Bureau for the Relief of freedmen and Refu ees, ” called the “ Freedmen’s Bureau bill, and the “act to protect all persons in the U.S. in their civil rights, ” called “ the civil rights bill ” were presented to Congress and adopted. hVhatever may be said against these measures, and much has been said, their sole object was to break down in the seceded States the system of oppression to which I have alluded. ‘heir only effect was, after feeding the starving white and black, to give the right to hold real and personal estate to the negro, to enable him to sue and be sued in courts, to let him be confronted by his witnesses, to have the process of the courts for his protection, and to enjoy in the respective States those fundamental rights of person and property which cannot be denied to any person without disgracing the Government itself. It was simply to carry out that provision of the Constitution which confers upon the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of citizens in( the several States. These measures did not, pretend to confer upon the negro the suffrage. I‘hey left each State todetermine that question for itself. Their highest aim was to secure what the lawyers call civil rights to every person within the jurisdiction of the Government. The necessity for these or similar measures was imperative. To have failed in this duty would not only have rendered the results of the war perfectly abortive, but would have completel withered the laurels we won in its snccessfu prosecution., . The President saw fit to veto these measures, sugposin them to be unconstitutional. I never doubte the power of Congress to pass them. I never doubted that the Government would be disced if it failed to establish fdr the private citizen the muniments of freedom intended to be secured by them. I did have my doubts whether this was the best way to accomplish the end. It would necessarily brin about a conflict between State and Federa jurisdiction. I knew it would meet with resistance in the States. I thought it would be repulsed, as even beneficence itself is always repulsed when forced on an unwilling community. I feared that in the conflict to arise the rights of the weak would be lost sight of, and finally sacrificed. I then believe, and do now believe, that the necessity for these measures is an unfortunate necessity. That necessity cannot exist where the local government is founded upon the consent of the entire people. The people of Georgia know what laws are best for their own happiness and security. But when 1/2 of the people legislate for all this truth ceases in its application. Let all have a voice in making the law and the popular heart will execute it, because the liberty of all consists in its enforcement. It is only where political power is in the hands of a favored) few that oppression can be practiced. It is only where oppression exists that the agents of a superior power are needed for protection. Give the negro the ballot and he will take care of himself, because his interest requires it. Give him a bureau agent, and he will sometimes be plundered, because his interest and the interest of the agent may differ. At an ear ier day in the session I offered a proposition which I thought would secure these ends. It was a constitutional amendment in 3 lines. It prohibited the States, in prescribing the qualifications of voters, from discriminatin against the negro on account of his color. I had this been adopted, by its own force it made him a citizen in each State, because it gave him the hi best prerogative of a freeman. There would then have been no necessity for declaring who are citizens of the U.S., for every freeman would have worn the honored badge of citizenship. It would then have been useless to declare that no State shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the U.S., for those simple words presented an effectual bar against it. It would have been superfluous to interdict the States from taking life, liberty, or property from the citizen without due process of law; for liberty bein 1st given, the citizen can protect his own li a and property. The provision securing equal protection of the laws against inimical State legislation might then be dispensed with as wholly unnecessary. The very section we are now considering, with all its difficulties of verbal adjustment might be abandoned and the Censtitntion be left in that respect as our fathers made it. The necessity for abridging representation would have ceased, for both representative and elector would have been loyal. These few words would have accomplished directl what this proposes to accomplish indirectly after years of political strife, in which truth and conscience and patriotism are too often sacrificed to the attainment of success. Had that been done it were useless to enact an exclusion from office of the leaders of the rebellion. Where all men are interested in the Government, none but peaceful revolutions are needed. Reforms are worked at the ballot box. Government then, and only then, becomes a divine institution. Rebellion against it not only injures the public weal, but it shocks the moral sense of a contented and happy people. They who lead such rebellions are at once visited with public odium. In public estimation traitors then stand as the greatest of criminals. They are looked upon as monsters in human shape. Cain bore the mark of one crime murder; but a people perfectly free will never, fail to stamp traitors, as they deserve to be stamped, with the mark of all crimes. If that proposition had been adopted we need not pledge our faith to the payment of the public debt. That faith would have been best secured in the honest convictions and the moral sense of the people. Had it been adopted, we need not have proclaimed by constitutional enactment the invalidity of the rebel debt, founded as it is upon contracts made in contravention of public policy, against the best interests of the State, in violation of the laws of the land, and for the purpose of enslaving the very men whose substance would be required to pay it. But, Mr. Presidyent, in all this I may have been mistaken. The presumption is I was mistaken, for a large majority have ruled against me. I yet have faith in its ultimate success. Necessity, if nothing else, will soon bring believers. Believers may be now few, but as through the faith of the Hebrew mother, so again they will soon be “many as the stars of the sky in multitude, and as the sand which is by the sea shore innumerable.” The old saying is true, that we must take things as we fin them. I am somewhat an optimist, and this at last may be the best. The negroes during the war were our faithfulallies. They are now steeped in poverty and must remain so unless Congress does something to help them. The poor whites of the South are not in a much better condition. State governments are already in the hands of those hostile, through prejudice or interest, to their improvement or amelioration. The legislation of these governments even now frets with oppression. Within the scope of State jurisdiction there is no such thing as equalit in the law. The State courts are already eciding the “civil rights bill” to be unconstitutional. The validity of all laws must depend at last upon human judgment. Judges, even in the highest courts, are but mortals. Should the SCOTUS affirm the judgment of these inferior tribunals, the present period would be no better for the rights of the negro than that when the Supreme Court once before supposed he had no rights which the white man was bound to respect. Should such be the action of this tribuna, the problem would at once be presented, whether our million ople can be peacefully held nominally free, at actually slave. If it be true that these negroes are not susceptible of education; if they are more nearly allied to brutes than to men; if as free men they can add nothing to the wealth of the country; if they are unfit to take part or lot in the State governments, it may be asked, why should they be represented in Congress? If the are incapable of choosin a Representative for themselves, why should those who treat them as in ferior beings, and almost deny their humanity, claim the right to represent them as citizens? It is said that women and aliens in the North are retained in the basis of representation, why should not the negroes be retained in the South? It may be answered that these women and aliens are treated as human beings; they are regarded as persons and not dumb brutes; they enjoy the right to acquire procrty, to enter the courts for its protection, to fo low the professions, to accumulate wealth, whereby national resources are increased and national power augmented; they are a part of the people. The road to the bal ot is open to the foreigner; it is not perma nently barred. It is not given to the woman, because it is not needed for her security. Her interests are best protected by father, husband and brother. The negro is the object of that unaccountable prejudice against race which has its origin in the greed and selfishness of a fallen world. That prejudice belongs to an age of darkness and violence, and is a poisonous, dangerous exotic when suffered to grow in the midst of republican institutions, where we boast an asylum for the oppressed of every land. Why do we shudder to meet this question? Nearly 5 million people, strong. vigorous, and inured to labor, are in your midst, partialy without civil, wholly without political rights. Vhat will you do with them? You have 3 alternatives before you, and only 3. You must kill them, colonize them, or ultimately give them a part of your political power. For this last alternative the country is not yet prepared. With the 2 former humanity and common sense will successfully struggle. But I am told that this proposition will operate as a penalty on the South. Suppose it were a pena ty from which she could not escape, would it be on ads uate punishment for the crime committed? (hlight it not, if justice untempered with mercy were consulted, be made apermanent rule until the public debt were paid and the curses of treason were elfaced from the land? if it be apenalty, it is one which the offender may escape. It is likened unto the penalties of the divine law. The choice of good and evil is before them. The indul gence of evil is followed by punishment, because it is an inexorable law of man’s organization. The choice of good is follows by happiness, contentment, prosperity. It is thus wisely ordained, that interest may constrain to duty, in the exercise of which the world is advanced and man is ennobled. This may be called a penalty, but a simple act of justice will fully discharge it. It is equal, for it applies to all the States. Another advantage consists in the fact that it comels the moral and intellectual culture of the power classes. If not properly qualified for the exercise of the ballot, the State governments may fall into the hands of incompetent and dangerous persons. Until all can vote, all cannot be represented. All cannot safely vote until a large majority are educated. This provision, then, may constrain to justicein a double sense. The strong argument in favor of it is, that as the Constitution now stands 4 white voters in the South, formerly soldiers in Lee‘s army, will be equal in representative power to 6 of those who followe Grant from the Rapidan to Richmond or Sherman from Atlanta to the sea. I therefore accept it, in the that the South, seeing its true interests. hwoipe I, even before the next census, learn to seek jus tice for themselvesin the exercise of the golden rule. The 3rd section of this amendment provides that no person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and VEEP, or hold any office, civil or military, under the U.S or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the U.S., or as a member of any State Legislature, or as an executive or judicial cili cer of any State, to support the Constitution of the U.S., shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or iven aid and comfort to the enemies thereof. but Congress may bya 2/3rd s vote of each House remove the disability. The language of this section is so framed as to disfranchise from office the leaders of the past rebellion as well as the leaders of any rebellion hereafter to come. It strikes at those who have heretofore held high otiicial position, and who therefore may be presumed to have acted intelligently. When the section is closely scrutinized, it will be seen that comparatively few men will fall subject to the exclusion. It does not, as some times supposed, reach all who may have taken an oath to support the Constitution of the U.S. llhc civil officers of the Federal Government, previous to the war, were comparatively few. With the exception of postmasters, perhaps not1,000 are yet remainingin the South. The Army and Navy of the U.S. were very small before the war, and I presume it is doubtful whetherthrce 100 military and naval oliicers yet survive the rebellion who will be affected, and these will be chiefly oliicers who were educated in the Military and Naval Schools at the expense of the Government. They not only forfeited their oaths, but committed an act ofin gratitude which forever stamps them as unfit for public position. I have but little idea what number of persons will be reached as former memberso Congress. The number cannot be very great. Those who were actuated by convictions of duty, and believed themselves right in their rebellion, boldly went to the front and fell victims to their error. Those who sinned against light and knowledge, knowing the in iquity of their conduct, exhibited such want of moral worth as to forbid an honest discharge of public duty hereafter. The executive and judicial officers of the acceding States are supposed to be men, not only of intelligence, but of distinguished abilities. These persons are not numerous, they will not likely exceed 2 or 300. Some of these took so promi nent a part, and were so relentless and vindictive in their persecutions of Union men, as to have become especially obnoxious to the loyal sentiment of the country. It will be best for the South itself to discard all such men for the future. Much the largest class of persons to be excluded under this amendment will be found among the former members of the State legislatures. Wlmtmay be the probable number I have but little idea. Perhaps 1500 or 2,000 will cover al classes debarred under this amendment from the privilege of holding office. If we deduct from this the number who will be able to provethemselvesinnocent when charged with complicity with the rebellion, we shall have 2 or 300 left, consisting chiefly of those who, as oliicers of the Army, educated at public expense, surrendered their commands into the hands of the enemy, or who as members of Congress metin conclave under the roof of the Capitol to plot treason against a Government which had honored them, and which daily aid them for acts of treachery done under the sacred name of public duty. Thoe fierce “furies of the guillotine, ” who came into public life under the reign of terror, inaugurated in 1861, and who sought and obtained the olIices of the confederate government because their natures were as wicked and devilish as the treason they supported, will ct be able to'hold office, State an national. They are not disqualified by this section. They never took an oath to support the Constitution of the U.S., for they were unnoticed until the reign of crime commenced. They were born into public life with the confederate constitution. 'hey were turbulent, dangerous men, who found no favor in times of peace. It required commotion and storm to bring them to the surface. The rebellion was in a large measure their work. It required daring and heartless men to conduct 1t, and they soon became its leaders. After the adoption of the amendment we shall see these men in public office. The whole country will conclude that those who are disfranchised are no worse than those who yet lead southern sentiment, and conrose, by a vote of 2/3rds, will remove the isability. I have no doubt that this/“will the conclusion of the whole matter, I would not be understood in what 'I amnow loyin t as comlaining of the ovision. I mflewpfmmeldffl will, simply because no ade uate punishment can be devised for the wic redness of the offense. We cannot punish all. To discriminate among those who are equally guilty wears the garb of injustice. We cannot even punish those who are guilty of the highest crimes, crimes which give treason its dar est hue. To do so would stamp the nation with cruelty; therefore we cannot begin without injustice. We must be merciful. I am willing to make the highest virtue of that necessity. There is so much guilt as to render the task of punishment hope less. Hence the provision depriving even the worstrebel leaders of the ballot has been wholly abandoned. Lee, Johnston, Wade Hampton, Moscby, and even Jeff. Davis, are left as qualified electors, competent to vote for State officers and members of Congress. Moseby, after the passage of this amendment, may be legally elected to any office in the gift of the Government. Distinguished Senators tell us that this dep rivation of office is a punishment. If it be a punishment, it is so msibilicant when compared with the crime that it is scarcely entitled to the name. They tell us that it is a bill of attainder. Suppose it were; are the people in their sovereign capacity prohibited from passing a bill of attainder? The people, in orming a Constitution, said that Congress should pass no such bill. They surely possessed t no power to authorize Congress to do so. But for the similar prohibition on the States each State could pass a bill of attainder. The people reserved the power to themselves. They surely can amend their Constitution. If they had the ower originally to declare that a member otpthe lower House of Congress shall have been 7 years a citizen of the U.S., a Senator 9 years, and the President a native born citizen, a resident. for 14 years, they certainly had the right to say that no man shall hold office who has committed murder, burglary, or larceny; and if they can so declare, they may certainly disfranchise one who has been guilty of treason. It is said the law is expostfacto in its character; what if it is? Have not the people the right, by a constitutional amendment, to enact such a law? It was even feared that Congress would be able to do so, and it was admitted that the States might do so if the people had notinhibited it in the Federal Constitution. I am aware that bills of attainder and expost faclo laws are unjust within themselves, and ought not to be passed where the power to do so is clear. But I deny that this is a bill of attainder or an expostfacto law. such laws are criminal and not civil in their character. In the one case they select a particular delinquent, and punish him by the sole act of the Legislature without the forms oflaw; in the other, they call thata crime which was innocent at the time of the act, and assume to punish it, or prescribe a greater degree of punishment for that which was already punishable. Before this provision can he.calls a bill ofattainder or expostfacto law, it must be amenable to the charge that it proposes in some form to punish. it is sufficient for this argumentto sayt at thisis an act fixing the qualifications of officers and not an act for the punishment of crime. And again, punishment means to take away life, liberty, or property. hese are absolute or inalienable rights. To ta 'e them away is an injury to the person. It is what we call punishment. They ought never to be taken away without due process of law. Office is the creature of Government. It is true it may be called a right. The right is not absolute but conventional. The Government created it and the Government can take it away. It has never been regarded in the American courts as a punishment when conventions and Legislatures deprived incumbents of the ir offices. Every State constitution contains provisions inhibiting the passage of bills ofattamder, expostfacto laws, and laws impairing the obligations of contracts. The Federal Constitution provides the same Imitation upon State power, which opens the Federal cow ts to any person aggrieved, and yet it is notorious that every State in the Union has turned officials out of office, changed their terms of service, reduced their salaries, and entirely abolished the laws under which they held. Nobody ever supposed that this was punishment, and unless that were punishment this cannot be. If this provision be all, even if faithfully car ried out, itwill be an act of the most stupendous mercy that ever mautled the crimes of rebellion. This rebellion was ceaseless. It was not only causeless but gigantic in its proportions, carrying 100s of1000s to an untimely grave, and leaving a legacy of debt sufficient to crush the energies of any nation less vigorous and powerful than ours. It was not only a gigantic rebellion, but it was conducted by its leaders in a spirit of fiendish ferocity which renders them wholly unworthy of public confidence hereafter. It is said that these eaders ought not to be condemned unheard, that they should not even be disqualified for official position until their guilt is established in a court of justice. If it were proposed to take from them life, liberty, or property, I would be unwilling to do so except according to the law of the land. But whenit is only proposed to fix a‘qunlification for office and deny them future distinctions, which would rather make their treason honorable than odi ous. I do not hesitate to act. I know this will do but little good; I doubt whether it will do any. If they shall bring forth fruits meet for repentance, I perhaps will be the 1st to remove the disability. I never have exercised a malicious spirit toward these people. I have pitied, but never hated. No not of confiscation has ever received my support. No such act ever will. I never but once voted to disfranchise those who participated in the rebellion, and then onlybecause I believed the best interests of my State demanded it. T he necessity for such exclusion there has erhaps already passed. They clamor for sut rage, and l for one am willing to grant it to them if they will. now be generous enough to extend it to all who carried the musket to defend the Government. while they carried the musket to destroy it. Mr. President, the only remaining section of the proposed amendment pledges the public faith to the honest discharge 0t those obligations which we have incurred in maintaining the national life. Thisis but an act of justice to the creditor and a proper precaution against the establishment of parties hereafter appealing to the sordid interests and lowest passions of men. It not only accepts honesty as a principle, but, indorses it as the highest and best policy of the State as well as of individuals. It also declares the rebel debt void, and therein it merely adopts an old and familiar principle of the common law. No agreement founded on an immoral consideration, no contract made, the object of 'which is to resist the law or overthrow government, can be enforced. It may be asked, then, why adopt this amendment? The answer is, the defendant may not avail himself of his defense. He may be willing to make a new promise, and the debt, though now void, may be sufficient to support this new promise. And again, paymentmafibe made voluntarily, though the debt be void. but the chief argument in its favor is that it forever settles a question, and settles it as it deserves to be settled. It precludes the organization of a political party, which might appeal to the pri e of the South and receive material aid from the corruption funds of foreign creditors. Under all the circumstances I think the country should accept the amendment, for it does much toward settling some of the vexed questions of the ast.