Mr. JENCKES. Mr. Speaker, in clofing this debate I wish to state and to reply to some general objections that have been raised to egislntion upon this subject. 1. The 1st objection is, that no law should be passed which authorizes the discharge of a debt without payment in full, or which cancels the obligation of a contract. All bankrupt Jaws on this principle would be pronounced inespedient and unjust. My repl is, that in the progress of civilization it hasliecome repugnant to the conse iences of enlightened nations that there should be any longer servitude for debt. There are 2 parties to every contract, and there are uncer tainties with regard to the performance of it by each. All commercial nations have discovered that it is as necessary for the prompt transaction of business, the preservation of mercantile honor, and the encouragement of trade and enterprise, to provide a remedy for the honest, unfortunate debtor against the persecution of some graspin creditor, as to provide a remedy for the cre itor against a fraudulent debtor. The security even the life of trade, requires that the relief provided by law should be mutual. Otherwise, honesty is con. founded with fraud, and misfortune with crime. A well adjusted system of bankrupt law provides the desired remedy; and while it strength ens rather thau weakens the creditors rights and powers, it rewards unfortunate honesty with emancipation. Hereafter, if this bill be comes a law, imprisonment for debt, that relic of barbarous a es which still lingers in some of the States, wilT cease to exist and can never be restored. The energies of the unfortunate debtor will no longer be lost to his family and his country. The net, with its retrospect of embarrassment antijmisfortune, will no longer cast its baneful shadow over his mind, hisfuture will no longer be uncheered by hope. The par suit of happiness, the road to honor, a career of industry and enterprise, with its rewards, will again be opened to him, and he will enter anew, as u. reeemed man, into the life and prosperity of the State. 2. Another objection is, that although the power to pass a system of laws on the subject of bankruptcy is clearly granted to Congress by the Constitution, yet it isinexpedient for conrcss to exercise it. such an argument might have weight if this bill were brought forward as a party measure, or if it were partial and une no] in its operation, and did not tend to prouce the beneficial results it aims at. Butthe mostingenious and suspicious mind has failed to discover any partisan character in it, and the closest criticism, in and out of Congress has not disclosed any of the other obnoxious qualities. It cannot be pretended that State legislation can afford adequate relief, for its power over the subject is limited, and over the persons ceases entircl at the States boundaries. At the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, RhdIsland had a perfect bankrupt law, discharging the debt as well as the person of the debtor, but the Supreme Court declared it to be unconstitutional and null. NewYork once passed a similar law which met the same fate before the same tribunal. The power resides solely liere; and being sole and exclusive it implies a corresponding duty, which is the exercise of that power for the benefit of the people. The Republic has a right to the free and unfettered services of all its citizens, and every interest of the State de mands that they should have the free exercise of their faculties in all the pursuits of life. It is contrary to wise policy to permit one class to hold another in a bondage where freedom from incarceration only makes the sufferin 1 more intense. With ruined fortunes, blaste( hopes, paralyzed energies, how can those irretricvahly insolvent, contribute to the welfare of the family or the prosperity of the countr? Not alone the miseries of these men, but. the material interests of the Republic demand the exercise of this benefieent power. Nor is there any considerable opposition to it from that class who may be supposed to be benefited by the present state of the law. The great creditor interests of the country, to their onor be it spoken, have up ealed to you to nationalize the relation of debtor and creditor by the passage of this bill. After one unparal leled revulsion in trade, and another caused by unexpected war, and after the vast fluctuations of a 5 years state of war, they have discovered that their true interest requires that the law should he so framed as to bring about the most prompt settlements, and give each party the quickest and most thorough relief. I had the pleasure of submitting to this House the most weighty testimony ever offered on this subject to any legislative body in the world. Thoflj timbers of Commerce and Boards of Trade their constituencies do not fear that any rogue, or willful rebel who threw his property into the scales of rebellion with himse f, will ese ape through the meshes of this bill while creditors are vigilant and courts are honest. They wish to meet their debtors, North and South, under the common protection of national law. Their enlightened self interest has risen to the degree of wise stutesmanship. Cannot this Congress be as magnanimous, as just, and as wise? 3. Others object to the system because they say it is retroactive, and avow their willingness to accede to it. were it wholly prospective and applicable only to contracts made after the bill s iall have become a law. If this be urged on constitutional grounds, it meets with a perfect answer in the decisions of the Supreme Court. nothing can be clearer than the language of Chief justice Marshall explaining the clause in the Constitution under which this bill is framed, and that which contains the prohibition upon the States. Far more cogent, if not altogether conclusive, is the constitutional argument against legislation to take effect only on future contracts. Some date must be fixed in such a statute before which. cbuirncts must remain binding, and beyond which they may be an nulled. The business of the country must go on, with or without such a and debts must be contracted ual credits. A man fails a month e day desi ated. From, the obligations month he may be discharged. but he must remain in the chains of all his previous liabil ities although they may run back through a period of 20 years. In fact, as the evidence of debt may be ajudgment or specialty, no statute could give equal and full relief to all debtors on this principle, unless its operation should be postponed until 20 years after its passage. such an e tment would be an absurdity. As a presenmof relief, a purely ros pectite statute, to take cifect from its te, would be worse than amocker;, uts a man into fractions; it severs awe and his life; one half, or some a motion of him may be bond, the other, i. It breathes the spirit of the terrible Roman statute which gave the living body of the debtor to be cut in pieces by his creditors a horrid dividend. It would be as unjust to the creditor as to the debtor; they should all be treated alike, and stand equal before the law. It would discriminate against some and favor others; some would take the dividend, and the balance of their claims would still be valid; others would be compelled to discharge their whole debt for the same dividend. such a statute could not be uniform in its operation, and would therefore be unconstitutional. For, as I have maintained in this debate, the constitutional requirement in a bankrupt law, it should be uniform in its elation of debtor and creditor. personal relation. Their rights are p 1 rights; their contracts are personal c; their remedies are by personal actions, and the relief granted by a bankrupt law is a discharge from these personal actions. The effect shouldbe uniform upon all, or the constitutional requirement is violated. But this statute cannot. properly be called retroactive even in the sense that all remedial statutes are retroactive. It is not within the prohibition of expostfacto laws. It takes effect upon the business of the country as it is, in the same manner that the 2 previous statutes took effect at their respective dates. The warrant to enact it is found in the clear and explicit language of the Constitution, and to a bill like this, with less propriety than perhaps to any other, can the term retroactive or retro spective be applied in the offensive sense that it changes existing rights and liabilities without notice; for every contract that has been made since the ratification of the Constitution has been entered into with full knowledge of its contents, and subject to the power of Congress to pass at any time a law by which that contract might be annulled. About the details of the bill, as originally reported. the committee have never been tenacious. I merely carried out their instructions in contending for what they had carefully considered and prepared, and in insisting upon the provisions of the bill as they were, unti something better was offered. Since the last ref erence of the bill, friends of the measure, not upon the committee, have submitted amendments which the committee have become sat isfied were improvements on the original plan. These have m every instance been incorporated into the bill as now reported. None of them were matured and offered while the bill was under discussion in the House. If they had been, they would have been promptly accepted then. I was instructed to sustain and defend the bill in the spirit of the teaching of 1 the Roman poet, which forms a maxim in his art: “Si quid novisti rectins istis, Candidus imperti; si non, his utero mecum.” and whenever the better have been imparted they have been gladly accepted. Mr. Speaker, I now call the previous question.