Mr. BOUTWELL. I wish to state more distinctly than I have done the constitutional and logical argument by which this bill is supported. Among the enumerated powers of Congress is this: “To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for, carrying into execution, the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Consti tauntyiondeipnatrhtme eGnotvernment of the U.S., or in or officer thereof.” Following the enumeration of judicial powers, the Constitution declares: “In all the other cases before mentioned the supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.” 2nd ly, further authority is given by the Constitution to Congress in these words: ” Dut the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officersasthey may deem proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of Depts.” These provisions of the Constitution sustain Congress in the exercise of 2 kinds of power, namely: 1st, the enactment of all laws which Congress deem necessary and proper to carry into effect any of the powers vested in any dept of the Government; and 2nd ly, in the authority given to Congress to confer on the courts of law, as well as on the Depts of the Government, power to appoint such infe. rior officers as Congress may see fit. We maintain this bill by maintaining the doctrine that an attorney in a court is an officer of the Government. We maintain it by the ancient theory, as old as the British law, of the official character of a counselor or attorney at law. From the very 1st he has been regarded as an officer of the court. The Supreme Court, in the decision which has been considered, maintain that doctrine, although they deny that he is an officer of the Government. That admission, as can be easily comprehended by any man, overturns this singular theory of the court. The Supreme Court itself is a dept of the Government. Every court inferior to the Supreme Court is a branch or judicial agency of the Government, and therefore when you have demonstrated or admitted, as the supreme Court in this decision have admitted, that an attorney is an officer of the court, it follows as a necessary consequence, from which there can be nological, legal, or constitutional escape, that the attorney is an officer of the Government, because the court itself is either a dept or a branch or agency of the Government.