Mr. Rous snau, answered as follows: "Quentt'on.Was it so understoodthat on werenot to interfere between Mr. GRINNELLan myself? ".lminr. Yes sir. “Qiterffon.Did I have anyknowledgoofyour have in t, Aramrmwsr?. h o. s ir: nobody had.” There is the testimony of an additional witness negativing the idea of knowledge on the rI part of General Rousseau of such armed pres 0 once; and there is no evidence whatever to the contrary. So far. then, as the assault is concerned, the report of the committee leaves it simply here: a member of this House, without arms upon his own person, without any calling in of armed friends, for the purpose of inflicting insult and disgrace on another member of the House as saulted him' at the door of the Capitol and inflicted personal Chastisement on him. That case, standing simply thus, without other circumstances of extenuation, of excuse, or apol ogy, certainly stands strongly enough and should most imperatively call upon this House to vindicate its own character and protect the privilege of the assailed member. Nor do I propose, Mr. Speaker, to justify this action of I Mr. Rousseau. I do not feel called upon to discuss the question of the legal or moral justification. We are all familiar with the legal rule that there can be no legal justification of violence by provocation of any words, however insulting or abusive. Perhaps in a moral sense the same rule holds, that there can be no moral justification of an assault or personal violence by words ofinsult. But we all know, and there is not a man in this House, I venture to say, who would not so act if circumstances called for it we all know there is a great class of cases where erha s no legal or moral justification in a t'ec nicaF sense exists, where the person technically guilty of a wrong may be so far excused, his provocation may so far exten uate the act itself, that no body of men, no jury even, w0uld be found to visit upon him the extreme penalty of the law, even of the moral law. Although not justified, he may be excused and his conduct extenuated. Am I wrong in making this proposition? Suppose I meet a member of this House in the street and deliberately and wantonly there insult him, calling him. if you please, a liar or thief or coward, and he knocks me down on the spot for my words. Nobody can doubt Congress hasthe right to interfere, that the ’po‘;ef of Congress to interfere and protect the person of its member may be lawfully exercised; that the assailant may be brought in here and dealt with for breach of privilege. But I ask gentlemen to Say, if that state of facts fliould occur, whether anybody would believe it would be a proper case for the interposition of Congress? Where one by his own deliberate misconduct brought, perhaps wrongfully so for as the assailant is concerned, but certain] wrongfully so far as the insulter is concerne, where he has brought this personal violence upon himself, will it be claimed that Congress ought to interfere? I certainly think not. I need not. refer to a large class. ofsimilar cases where the whole tone of public sentiment enunciates that where a party has by provocaticm on his own part drawn violence upon himself, he should not be the one to invo 'e the aid of the law or the extreme penalty which a parliamentary body may impose for his own protection. Now, what was the provocation which led to this assault? Upon the 11th day of June last, according to your record, Mr. Gitixnnu. rising in his ace in this House to a personal explanation,)yleave of the House.use certain language, which I now ask the Clerk to read.