Mr. hEil R. I submit that.the pesition new taken by the gentleman evades the whole question. The gentleman dodges the issue concerning which lain speakinv. I am speaking new about the limitations upon the power of Conercss. I am telling him, and I am telling thisdlouse. that they have no richt to find a grant of power in what was intended as a lim itation upon power. That is my position. There areno guarantees in these limitations in the Constitution. Chief Justice Marshall, in the case from which I have cited, exressed the unanimous opinion of the court Wien he said that these are limitations upon the power of Congress and not upon the powers of the States. They are not guarantees at all, except to protect the States against the usurpations of Congress and the General Government. They simpl say that Congress shall not invade the rights of the States of this Union to do things that are forbidden to be done by the 1st 11 amendments of the Constitution. I say, therefore, that so far as the basis of this power insisted on by the Gentleman in his argument the other day is concerned. he cannot support it by any reference to these amendments of the Constitution. So far as the Constitution does contain guarantees in favor of the people, which it is the right of the General Government to enforce, hold I them as sacred as any man can and where they need congressional legislation to enforce them. I am in favor of enacting it. The same construction is given to these amendments by the same court in 5 Howard IL, 432. See also 17 Alabama IL, 516; 8 Wendell H., 101); 10 Id., 44.); 24 1d., 337. Now, Mr. Speaker. these considerations convince my judgment that this bill is not fit.to be voted for. LintI cannot hope that they will produce the slightest effect upon the minds of those gentlemen on the other side of this Chamber whose fashion it is to treat with derision the frequent appeals to the Constitution which are made on this side. Ifany Gentleman on that side considers such conduct consistent with the high duties of an American legislator, that is his matter, not ours; but it does not change or lessen the duties of the faithful minority on this floor. I beg leave to remind the majority, in no spirit of uukindness, that if the y had been more mindful of the admenitions they have received from the minority here it would not have become necessary or the President, more faithful to the Constitution than they, to cast them into ine urning by his late invincible veto. If my wishes were dictated by mere partisan motives I should earnestly pray them to continue to act in the same reckless spirit and to propose and pass such measures as this. such measures will plead our cause before the popular tribunal of our country with more eloquent. tongues than our most. eloquent popular advocates. The popular verdict upon such legislation cannot fai to vindicate us sooner or later. We say to you, therefore, ifyou will: “Be thou the trumpet.of our wrath and sullen prestigeof your own decay." Now, I will advert to some of the details of this bill. The 2nd section reads as follows: That any person who. under color of any law, statute, ordinance. resulatiun or custom, shall subect or cause to be subjected any inhabitant of any tats or Territory to the deprivation ofany right ile cured or protectedby this nct or to different punishment. pains, or penalties on nce ount of such person having at on time been held in acondition of lla very or invo untary servitude, except as a punish dmuelynt.for crime whereof the party shall have been convicted or by reasonof his color or race.than is prescribed tor the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed nuilly of n.misdemeanor and on conviction shall be punished by fine not exccedinl H.000.oriuprisonment not exceeding one year, or both. in the discretion of the court." Viewing this and the 1st section of the bill together, we learn that the proposed statute will be both remedial and pena in its character. It proposes to protect certain rights and to punish for the failure to protect them. Cleamcss and certainty should be found in every criminal law. This bill is liable to the very great objection that its provisions are uncertain as to their meaning. Its intentions are expressed in terms which are alike undefined and indefinable. For example, what does the word citizen mean in the 1st section? Etymolovically, it is said to mean a person who enjoys flie freedom and privileges of a city. In American law, one writer says it means a person, native or naturalized, who has the privilege of voting for public officers and of being elected to otiico. Another says it means any person, native born or naturalized, of either sex, who is entitled to full protection in the exercise and employment of the socalled private rights, but oes not define what those rights are. This bill says: There shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities amongcitizens of the U.S. in any State or Territory. on account of race. color, or previous condition of slavery. But it does not define the term “civil richts and immunities." What are such rights? One writer says civil rights are those which have no relation to the esta lisliment, support, or man agement of the Government. Xnother says they are the rights ofacitizen; rights due from one citizen to another, the irivation of which is a civil injury for which redress may be sought by a civil action. Other authors define all these terms in different ways, and assi n to "them larger or narrower definitions accoring to their views. Who shall settle these questions? Who shall deline these terms? Their definition here by gentlemen on this floor is one thing; their definition after this bill shall have become a law will be quite another thing. The antislavery amendment of the Constitution had one very simple object to accomplish when gentlemen on the other side of this House desired to secure its adoption; but now it is confidently appealed to as authority for this billand almost every other radical and revolutionary measure advocated by the majority in this Congress. Those gentlemen often have strange visions of constitutional law, and it is not safe to judge from their opinions today what they will be tomorrow. This bill forbids any discrimination in civil rights and immunities on account of race or color. Under the laws of Indiana no person except white male inhabitants can be a lowed to engage in the business of retailing spirituous liquors. Buta negro procures the requisite pe tition and applies to a county board for a license to retail liquors. It is refused. Now, this discrimination is based both upon color and race and the county board, by refusin the license, violates the 2nd section of this net, and thereby commit a misdemeanor, for which they may be fined each not exceeding $1,000, or imprisoned not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court. But this punishment shall not be administered in the courts of Indiana, but must be in the Federal courts at the capital of the State, as prescribed in the 3rd section of this bill. Or, the city of NewAlbany, in which I live, whose ordinances follow the State law, might refuse a license to a negro under the same circumstances, and the common council would thus become wrong doers, subject to the same punishments. Now, it cannot be said that selling liquor according to law in Indiana is not a civil right. It certainly is; but if it is not, yet a license is a contract, and this bill says the negro shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts” as the white man. It is as much a contract or civil right as would be a license to sell meat in their market house or to run a dray in their streets or to carry on any other business. Again, the constitution of Indiana has ded icated a munificent fund to the support of common schools for the education of the children of the State. But negro and mulatto children are by law excluded fiom those schools. negroes and mulattoes are exempt by law from school tax. They are denied a civil right, on account of race and color, and are ranted an immunity, (from school taxation, . but are taxed for all other ur oses. Now, a negro or mulatto takes his c il to the common school hoiise and demands of the teacher that it be admitted to the school and taught as the white children are, which is refused. The teacher then becomes a wrong door and is liable to the same punishments, to be administered in the same way; because all the persons referred to would be acting under color of some law, stat ute, ordinance, regulation, or custom. The constitution of Indiana, adopted in 1851, forbids any negro or mulatto to come into or settle in that State after the adoption of that constitution, and declares all contracts made With any negro or mulatto cominginto the State contrary to the provisions of that constitution shall be void. This bill proposes to annul those constitutional provisions and all State laws passed to secure their execution. A negro comes into the State in defiance of them, and makes contracts, and the courts of Indiana, acting under color of those provisions and laws, refuse to enforce those contracts. There will thus arise, not only a conflict of authority, which may lead to most unhappy results, but the officers refusing to enforce such contracts would, under the provisions of this bill, at once become criminals, subject to the penalties alreadymentioned. Or it a State court or otheer refused in any such proceedin to receive the testimony of any negro, where e was forbidden by the State law to receive it, he too would incur the penalties of this bill. It cannot be claimed that the persons to whom I have referred could not be punished under the provisions of this bill because they were acting as officers and their conduct was the result of errors of judgment only. That would be no valid defense no defense at all Against the positive terms of this law. I hold that the only persons intended to be punished by this bill are persons actin under State authority in some sort, of officieficapacity. By its ver terms, it only applies to persons who shall of these prohibited acts “under color of any law statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom.” Vho can act under such color but otheers of some kind? I might go on and in this manner illustrate the practical working of this extraordinary measure. But I have said enough to indicate the inherent viciousness of the bill. It takes a long and fearful step toward the complete obliteration of State authority and the reserved and original rights of the States. It puts the local policy an officers, executive, ministerial, and judicial, of the States, at the mercy of the petty Federal officers, who, under this bill, may e made to swarm over the whole country, exercising both ministerial and judicial functions, by arresting, examining, and imprisoningpersons charged or suspected of having done any of the forbidden things under color oflocal laws or policy. Then the things attempted to be proibited are in themselves so extraordinary and anomalous, so unlike anything ever attempted before by the Federal Government, that the authors of this bill feared, very properly too, that the system of laws hereto ore administered in the federal courts might fail to supply any precedent to guide the courts in the enforcement of the strange provisions of this bill, and not to be thwarted by this difficult, they confer upon the courts the power of judicial legislation, the power to made such other laws as they may think necessary. such is the practical effect of the last clause of the 3rd section, which reads as follows: But in all cases where such [laws of the U.S]are not adaptedto the object or are deficient in the provisions necessaryto furnish suitable reme dies, and punish offenses against law. the common law, as modifiedand changedby the constitutiun and statutesof the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of the cause, civil or criminal, is held. so far as the same is not inconsistentwith the Constitution and laws of the U.S shall be extended to and govern said courts in the trial and dispositionof such cause, and if of a criminal nature, in the indietion of punishmenton the party found guilty. That is to say, the Federal courts may, in such cases, make such rules and appl such law as they please, and call it common aw. Then, as if to widen the breach and augment the irritations occasioned by the enforcement of such a measure between the Federal officers and the officers and people of the States, it is further provided in the third section that If any suit or prosecution. civil or criminal, has beenorshall be commencedin any Statecourt against any such person, or against any officer.civil or military or other person, forany arrestorini risonment, trcspasses or wrongs done or committed, y virtue or under color of authority derived from this act or the act establishing a Bureau for theRelief of Freedman and Refugees and all acts amendatory thereof.such defendantshall have the right to removesuch cause for trial to the properdistrict or circuit court in the manner prescried by the "act relating to hubemlcor pus and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases."approvedMarch 3, 1863. No matter how arbitrary, offensive, or out rageous the conduct or wrongs of these officers may be toward the citizens of the States, the people of the States are denied all remedy in their own courts, but must seek it at great expense and inconvenience, almost equivalent to its denial, in the Federal courts. The 4th section of the bill requires the circuit courts of the U.S. to appoint as many commissioners in their respective cir cuits as they may deem 0608888? “to afford a speedy and convenient insulin or the arrest an examination of persons charged with a violation of this act." hese officers may become as numerous throughout the country as justices of the peace are now. This never ceasing multiplication of officers over the country to consume the substance of the people is one of the most dangerous and mischievous evils of the times. If it is continued much longer it will not be strange if our Government become hateful to the people. In conclusion, I shall call attention to one more of the novel and original features of this bill. It is in the 9th section, which I will read: That whenever the POTUS shall have reasonto believe that offenseshave been or are likely to becommitted against the provisions of this act within any judicial district, it shall belaw ful for him. in his discretion, todirect the judgc.mar shal and district attorney. of such district, to attend at such place. within the district and for such time as he may designate. for the purpose of the more speedy arrest and trial of persons chargedwith avio lntion of this act: and it shall be the duty of eve judgeor other officer, when any such requisition shal a receivedby him. to attendat the placo and for the time therein designated. Our Federal courts are thus to be made itinerant, and speedy justice administered at each offenders own door, and if he is found guilty he may perhaps enjoy the singular felicity of being executed at home. But courts do not consist of judges alone. It will be the duty of the judges, district attorneys, marshals, clerks, grand and petitjurics, and the bailiffs of the courts, with the records, to accompany each other in these remarkable visitations and perambulations. It seems to me the framer of this section of the bill has left at least one defect in it. He should have provided for an executioner, who should be of the favored race and color, and should march in the forefront of the recession with a guillotine.