Mr. BUCkALEW. Mr. President, I to tened yesterday with very much of interes'.” attention to the remarks of the Senato o: Oregon [Mr. Williams] in support of the bi before the Senate; but I listened in V oth statement by him, distinctly and clearly.” i of the ground of power upon which was reported and its passage proposed. I understood him, however, at one stage of his argument to take the ground which was origin. ally taken when this question was discussed in the Congress of 1789 by most of those who then opposed the construction given to the Constitution upon this subject, to wit: that the power of removing from office in our Governmentarose by implication from the provision which confers upon the President the power of appointment, “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” If this bill be pressed upon that ground, upon the ground that there is an implied power in the President and the Senate to remove from office because they are joined together for the purpose of appointment, it inevitably will follow that this bill will stand condemned: it cannot be justified upon the ground which is stated in its support. Mr. President, there are but 2 possible locations in this Government for the power of removal under the Constitution of the U.S.; and I say this in view of former discussions and in view of the expressed opinions of leading men at different periods of our history, both those who have been concerned in the enactment and execution of the laws and those who have written expositions of the Constitution as scholars in the retiracy of their closets. If this power to remove be one conferred by the Constitution, it must be vested in the POTUS alone, who is the head of the executive dept and charged with the execution of the laws, or it must be vested in the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate upon the ground of implication which I have alreadymentioned. If the power be not vested in the President alone or in the President and the Senate, it is located nowhere; it exists nowhere; and the argument in favor of the enactment of a law proposing to vest it anywhere must be upon the ground that it is an ideal or latent power which may becreated or called into active existence by virtue of those general powers of legislation which are vested in the Congress of the U.S. But in asmuch as this is a Government of granted and vested powers, and inasmuch as the grants to Congress are specific; upon the very statement of the point itself the conclusion must be against it. We must reject the argument and recur back to the alternative before mentioned. Before I am done I will read authorities upon these several points by which my statement of them will be fully vindicated. I say, then, that the Senfrom Oregon, in his argument in favor of this bill, was not satisfactory in his statement of the ground of power, upon which he claimed that we could enact it. Taking for granted that he stands ppon the ground that this is a power arising by implication and by virtue of the Constitution vested in the President and in the senate, how stands his bill? Why, sir, upon that implication this power must be exclusive in the President and in the Senate; neither can divest themselves of it; nor can the lawmaking power charge its exercise upon one to the exclusion of the other. And yet what does this bill do? You propose by law to provide that the President shall suspend from office an exercise of the power of removal to a certain extent, and standing upon the same grounds of argument as the absolute and complete power of removal itself. If your argument be sound, you cannot by law provide that the President shall suspend, that he shall make a partial removal from office, without the advice and consent of the Senate before the suspension is made or ordered. Equally clear is it upon the very face of this bill that the main, the important exception which is made, and properly and necessarily made from it, is in {: view unconstitutional, to wit, the exception of the several heads of Depts from the operation of this prosed law. If the President and Senate are y the Constitution united for the purpose of removal as well as appointment, it will follow that you cannot, as you propose by this bill, permit the President alone to remove the heads of the executive Depts the principal officers who are associated with him in the execution of the laws. Your bill, then, stands condemned upon this ground, which is the only ground in my opinion that can be with any plausibility urged in its support. The premises from which you pro.will not justify the conclusion at which you arrive. The bill before us gives to Senators the same participation in removals from office that they possess under the Constitution in cases of appointment. Their “advice and consent” is necessary by the express terms of the Constitution to the appointment of “embassadors. other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, ” and all other officers of the U.S. whose are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution, and which may be “established by law.” The question now is whether their “advice and consent” is necessary under the Constitution to the removal of such officers, or whether a requirement of such advice and consent to removals may be established by law. The question is one of the 1st magnitude among all those which can arise in the practical action of the Government, and deserves debate which shall rise above the passions and selfish interests of the hour. The proposition which has been heretofore maintained by all the great depts of the Government, that is, by Congress, by the President, and by the Supreme Court, has been that all removals from office (except of “infe rior officers” whose appointments are vested by law “in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of Depts”) are to be made by the President without any Senatorial advice or consent. He is to act alone without check or limitation upon his power or division of his responsibility. And this has been held to be a constitutional principle, secure from molestation by statute. The President's power of removal was well considered in the 1st Congress which assem bled under the Constitution, and fortunately the debate as well as the decision then made has been preserved to us. There is no express provision in the Constitution on the subject of removals from office, except one under the head of impeachment, which is to be found in the 3rd section of the 1st article. The power, therefore, if it exist at all, except in the Senate when sitting as a court of impeachment, must be an implied one, and manifestly it must be vested in the POTUS or in the President and Senate. That this power is vested in the President alone by the Constitution ought not now to be questioned in view of the past practice of the government, and of the decisions which have been made by its several depts. But as this bill does question that location of the power, and brings up again the objections which were urged on former occasions against such location, we are obliged once more to traverse the field of debate upon the general subject, and to repel again those arguments which were formerly advanced in favor of senatorial participation in removals. The most favorable occasion which has ever presented itself for considering and deciding this subject was presented in the Congress of 1789; for the Government was then about to be put in operation. Its organization was just begun. Most of the offices under it were unfilled. There were no private interests to be effected by a construction of the Constitution upon the question of removals from office. Political parties, as they afterward took form, were unknown. General Washington was President, and many leading men who had participated in the forming of the Constitution and in its adoption by the several States were members in both Houses of Congress. This E. was J.' with great propriety and force y one of the members who participated in the debate in the HoRep, and who had been prominent in convention; the constitutional I mean Mr. Madison. He said: “In another point of view it is proper that this interpretation, should now take place rather than at a time when the exigency of the case may require the exercise of the power of removal. At present the " of every gentleman is to seek the truth and abide by its guidance when it is discovered. have reason to believe the same disposition prewails in the Senate, But will this be the casewhen someindividual officer of high rank draws into question the capacity of the President, with the Senate, to effecthis removal? If we leave the Constitution to take this course it can never be expounded until the President shall think it expedient to exercisethe right of removal, if he supposes he h?s it; then the Senate may be induced to set up their pretensions. And will they decide so calmly as at this time, when no important officer in any of the great depts is appointed to influence their judgments? The imagination of no member here or of the Senate or of the President himself is heated or disturbed by faction. If ever a proper moment for decision ia offer, it must be one like the present.” Annals of Congress, vol. i., p. 547. These words of wisdom deserve as much consideration now as they did when uttered, exhibiting as they do in contrast the superior competency and fitness of the Congress of 1789, before parties were formed and personal interests in the tenure of offices had come into existence, over the present, Congress filled with heated partisans and subject to the influence of 1000s bf officers deeply interested in the subject of The quesotuiorndebates. was decided after full discussion in both Houses in favor of the presidential power of removal under the Constitution, and this decision was indorsed by the signature of President. Washington to the bill in which it was contained. And that decision stands unre versed to this day during a F. of 77 years. No more authoritative decision upon a constitutional question, open to debate, appears anywhere in our political history, nor one in which there has been more uniform and complete acquiescence by all depts of tjuherisGtosvernment. Even those public men and who have sometimes suggested their doubts of the propriety or correctness of the decision have acquiesced in its binding force and asserted the impropriety of attempting to disturb it. It is true that the “pretensions” of the senate to participate in removals, spoken of by Mr. Madison, in the extract just read, were faintly pressed, although not persisted in in the senatorial debates of 1834. At that time Mr. Madison was yet living and gave once more an emphatic jo.of his opinion. In a letter ohn M. Patton, dated March 24, 1834, he Sald: “Should the controversy, on removals from office end in the establishment of a share in the power, as claimed for the Senate, it would materially vary the relations among the component parts of the Govern;ment, and disturb the operation of the checks and balances now understood to exist. If the right of Senate be, or be made, the a constitutional one, it will enable that branch of the Government to force on the executive dept a continuance in office even of the Cabinet officers, notwithstanding a change from a personal and political harmony with the President, to a state of open hostility toward him. If the right of the Senate be made to depend on the Legislature, it would still be grantable in that extent; and even with the exceptions of the heads of Depts and a few other officers, the augmentation of the senatorial patronage, and the new relation betweenthe senate directly and the Legislature indirectly, with the Chief Magistrate, would be felt op; in the general administration of the Government. The innovation, hgoewr eyer modified, would more than double the dan of throwing the executive machinery out of gear, aanltdogtehthuesr.a”rresting the march of the Government. q. “… “The Constitution of the U.S. maydoubt less disclose, from time to time, faults which call for the pruning or theingrafting hand. But remedies 3. to be applied, not in the paroxysms of party and popular excitements, but with the more leisure and reflection as the great depts of power according to experience may be successively and alternately in and out of public favori and as changey hastily accommodated to destroy these Yicissitudes, would the symmetry and the stability aimed at in our political system.” In a letter to Edward Coles, dated Mont pelier, August 29, 1834, he said: “For clairns are made by the Senate in opposition to the principles and practice oftion, my every Administra own included, and varying materially, in someinstances, the relations between the great depts of the Government.” In a subsequent letter to the same person, dated October 15, 1834, he said: “You are at a loss for the innovating doctrines of the Senateto which I alluded. Permit me to specify the following: “The claim on constitutianal ground to a share in the removal as well, as appointment of officers, is iGoverment conptpofrsoimtionitstoctohmemuennifcoermmenptr.acItticeisocf lethaer t the innovation would not only vary essentially the existing balance of power, but expose the Exec. utive occasionally, to a total inaction, and at all flwoso. ” delays fatal to the due execution of the Lastly, on this point I quote from his letter to Charles Francis Adams, dated October 13, 1835, being one of the very last letters written by him, in which he said: “The claims for the Senate of a share in the removal from office, and for the Legislature an authority tIo regulate its tenure, have had powerful advocates. must still think, however, that the text of the constitution is best interpreted by referenceto the tripartite theory of government to which practice has conformed, and which so long and uniform a practice would seemto have established. “The face of the Constitution and the journalized proceedings of the Convention strongly indicate a among the tomtohsattdtihsteionrgyu, is the nd actomitsmzeenntiathtorosfofnavthoer organizations of political power. “The right of suffrage, the rule of apportioning representation, and the mode of appointing to an removing from officeare fundamentals in a free govIefrnment and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. alterable by the Legislature the Government might become the creator of the Constitution of which it is itself but the creature; and if the large States could beenraetceo, nciled to an augmentation of power in the construeted and endowed as that branch of the Government is, a veto on removals from office would at all times be worse than inconvenient in its operation, and in party times might, by throwing the executive machinery out of gear, produce a calami tous interregnum. “In making theseremarks I am not unaware that in a country wide and expanding as ours is, and in the anxiety to convey information to the door of every citizen, an unforeseenmultiplication of officers may add a weight to the executive scale, disturbing the equilibrium of the Government. I should, therefore, seewith pleasure a guard against the evil by whatever regulations having that effectmaybewithin the scope of legislative power: or, if necessary, even by an amendment to the Constitution, when a lucid interval of party excitement shall invito the exper iment.” But it was not formally proposed in 1834 that the concurrence of the Senate in removals should be required, although a proposition to that effect wasmentioned. The debate was mainly upon a proposition that, in case of re; movals from office by the President he should report his reasons to the Senate. The power in his hands was to be left undisturbed, entire and without limitation. But the question was never pressed to a vote, although the Senate was politically opposed to the President, and m uchsfeellin, g existed with the majority regard. which had been made. hat the power of appointment is with the President will appear from considering particular clauses of the Constitution. The 2nd article declares, “that the executive power shall be vested in the POTUS ” By the 2nd section “he shall nom inate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint, all officers of the U.S. ” except such “inferior officers' as Congress may think proper to be appointed “by the President alone, by the courts of law y y and by the heads of Depts.” Further, “he shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session.” By the 3rd section of the same article, it is provided, that “he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed and shall commission all officers of the U.S. ” Thus it appears that the general mass of executive o is vested in the President, including the power of appointment to office and the commissioning of offices appointed, and he is charged with the duty of taking care that the laws be duly executed, which has particular reference, as I understand the in junction, to his control or influence over the officers of his dept or branch of the Government. And although laws may be enacted for the appointment of certain inferior officers by the heads of Depts, his control or influence is preserved, as to hem, by his selection of the heads of Depts who appoint them. For particular reasons, however, not affecting the general argument, certain officials may be selected or appointed by the legislative and judicial depts. Each House of Congress may select their own officers necessary to the transaction of their business, and the officers so selected are not considered to be “officers of the U.S. ” within the language of the Constitution, but simply officers of each House. So subordinate officers of the courts may by law be made appointable by the courts in which they serve, and the President will have but a slight or remote influence over them. For although he appoints the judges, the judicial tenure is during good behavior and the judges cannot be removed by him. Excepting, however, these 2 classes of subordinate officers in other depts of the Government beside his own, his power of appointment extends directly or indirectly to every officer of the U.S. at home and abroad. It is a great and extensive power and is appropri. ately placed in his hands as the executive head of the Government. But this power is subjected to an important check in that provision of the Constitution which requires the advice and consent of the Senate to all appointments except the subor dinate ones beforementioned. He must in all other cases obtain senatorial assent before appointing and commissioning an officer, unless in case of vacancy during a recess of the senate. I do not understand the act of the senate in advising and consenting to a nomination to be in any sense an act of appointment. It is simply a permission and recommendation that the appointment shall be made, and the actual appointment and the issuing of a commission to the person appointed, acts executive in their nature, are performed by the President alone. The advice and consent of the Senate does not compel him to make an appointment. It is simply a prerequisite to his exercise of the power and no part of the power itself. such appearing to be, upon examination, an exact and just description of the nature and effects of senatorial advice and consent in cases of proposed appointment to office, we are preared to go on to the main question involved in this debate, which is the question of removals. It must be manifest to every man of reflection that in any constitution of government there must be provision made for dismissing criminal and incompetent persons from the public service. For without this power it would be impossible to preserve the Government from corruption and imbecility. Ourancestors were not so foolish as to took this great necessity, this indispensable requisite, for rendering t.heir work complete. Having established the depts of the Government, they conerred upon each all the powers necessary to its successful action. The question with which we are now concerned is, what provision did they make for removals from office for relieving the public service, when necessary, from incompetent and vicious men? The answer to this question is given in part by the 4th section of the 2nd article of the Constitution, which provides that “The President, VEEP, and all civil officers of the U.S shall be removed from office upon impenchment for and conviction of trea son, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemean ors By the 3rd section of the 1st article the Senate has the sole power to try all impeachments, which are to be preferred before it by the HoRep, and in case of conviction the judgment shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold or enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the U.S. The members of the Senate are to sit under oath, and a 2/3rds vote is required for a judgment of condemnation. This remedy for official misconduct is certainly extensive in including all civil officers of the U.S. but it can be invoked only in case of criminai conduct of a high order of enormity, and is utterly inadequate to the ordinary demands of the public service. As to Sens&Reps in Congress, who are not liable to impeachment, they can be removed from their offices by 2/3rds votes of the respective Houses to which they belong. Military and naval officers are also excluded from the impeachment power for reasons which need not now be investigated. Manifestly also the Congress of the U.S., by virtue of its generallegislative powers, may in certain cases prescribe the punishment of removal from office and disqualifications for holding office, in case of conviction of crime in the courts of the U.S. But none of these remedies, important as they are, and necessary to the working of our constitutional system, are sufficient as a check to official delinquency. They are inadequate to secure integrity and efficiency in the administration of the Government, to guard against the innu merable abuses of official life and conduct, and to retain to republican institutions that degree of excellence which is necessary to their popularity and perpetuity. And hence the concession has commonly been made that a power of summary removal from office in addition to those alreadymentioned must exist somewhere in the Government, and the debate has been not so much upon the existence of the power as upon its particular location. Is it vested in the E or in the President and Senate, or is it a floating, unlocated, or latent power, which may be defined and located or called into existence by statute law? These are the questions to which we may turn our attention, to which all further debate may be confined. A strong objection to “advice and consent” by the Senate to removals from office is the incompatibility of such function with the senatorial powers of trying “all impeachments of civil officers of the U.S. ” When acting upon an impeachment the Senate sits as a court and its members are under oath; and the judgment it renders is a judicial judgment, imposing punishment upon the accused if guilty, and completely discharging him from the accusation if innocent. Now, the most indispensable requisite upon the trial of an impeachment is, that the Senate shall be impartial between the Government and the accused; in fact, impartiality is indispensable above every other qualification to a judicial tribunal, and the utmost care is to be exercised in constituting such tribunals in order to secure it. But if the Senate is to participatein removals from office, if it is to be consulted and its judgment taken in cases of proposed removals, it is manifest that it cannot be an impartial court for the trial of impeachments. Its char. acter as an impartial tribunal for judicial purposes will be destroyed. In exercising a power or function of advice and consent in questions of removal 2 classes of cases will arise: 1st, those where the senate will advise and consent to a removal; and 2nd, those where their assent will be refused. Let us examine each of these classes in the ordermentioned. 1st, where the Senate upon investigating complaints against a public officer shall be of opinion that the charges are sustained and shall thereupon advise and consent to his removal, the President still may not remove the officer. The preliminary consent of the Senate will not compel, but only permit him to remove. He may change his opinion either upon new evidence presented to him or by reason of fuller reflection upon the case, or, pending the proceeding, a new President may come into office who may disagree in opinion with his predecessor. If for any cause the officer shall not be removed by the President, the HoRep may impeach the officer and bring him to the bar of the Senate for trial. But the Senate has already disqualified itself from trying the ease as an impartial tribunal. It has already formed and expressed its opinion in the prior proceeding, and it would be an outrage upon justice for it to assume and exercise its duties as a court. Take another case, a case where a removal is actually made by the President after Senatorial advice and consent. The officer is removed from his office, and nothing more. But this punishment for trangression is very different from that which might be adjudged to him upon impeachment. Upon impeachment in a proper case the sentence would include a disqualification for holding office in the future under the U.S. So it appears that in acting upon an impeachment of an officer referred before it, the Senate would impose one rm of punishment, while in acting with the President upon the same question of misconduct it would advise and consent to a smaller punishment; to one into which no disqualification for holding office would enter. e need not here determine the question whether an officer thus removed by the President, with senatorial consent, would still be liable to impeachment by the HoRep; for whether liable or not the participation of the Senate in his removal stands equally condemned. If no proceeding of impeachment can be instituted against an officer when out of office for a crime or misdemeanor committed by him when in office, it follows that the right of the House to have a judgment of disqualification pronounced upon him is evaded and ! If, on the other hand, the House can still prefer articles of impeachment against him and bring him before the Senate for trial, you have again the difficulty of a tribunal already committed in opinion and judgment upon the guilt of the accused, iamndpartthiearleby disqualified for giving him an trial. ake another &e from the 2nd class of cases, according to the division already mentioned a case of the refusal of consent by the Senate to a removal. The officer remains in office; the President cannot remove him because the Senate has formed and expressed its opinion in his favor upon all the grounds of.against him. But the right of the House to prefer articles of impeachment and to demand his removal, if they are sustained by proof, must remain, unaffected and in full force. But, as in the former case, the Senate has disqualified itself for entering upon the trial. Its impartiality is gone from it; it is already committed against the prosecution; and its pride, self respect, and regard for consistency, its feelings, passions, and opinions, all fix it as a partisan of the accused, and commit it to his vindication and support against the impeachment of the House. Under such circumstances a proceeding by the House to bring an offender to justice would be vain, fruitless, absurd. As regards all cases of this description, the impeachment power might as well as not be struck from the Constitution, for its operation, its vitality is destroyed. It may be said that the Senate, upon a full trial, might change its opinion, might obtain and act upon new views regarding the official conduct of the officer accused. This is not a reasonable supposition; it is opposed to the teachings of experience and to human nature itself. Besides, it is to be remembered that a 2/3rds vote is necessary to a judgment of condemnation upon impeachment, whereas a majority merely may advise and consent or refuse their advice and consent to a removal from office by the President. If therefore a majority have refused their consent to a presidential, removal and become committed in favor of the officer accused, it is hardly within the bounds of possibility that 2/3rds should afterward condemn the same officer upon a proceeding of impeachment. In whatever light, then, you view the alleged power of the Senate to advise and consent to removals from office, it appears utterly inconsistent with its unquestioned power and duty to try all impeachments of “civil officers of the U.S. ” The conclusion is inevitable that the authors of the Constitution, who conferred upon the Senate in express terms the power to try allodid not intend them or empower them to act in any way whatever in conjunction with the President or as advisers of the President in questions of removal from office; and it is equally clear that so long as the Senate shall be the constitutional tribunal for the trial of impeachments it ought not to be authorized to act upon questions of removal, either to investigate them or to give advice upon them. This argument, then, founded upon the impeachment clauses of the Constitution, is decisive upon both points of the present inquiry; it is decisive against the existence of this alleged power in the Senate, and also against the pol icy, the propriety, i had almost aid the possibility, of vesting it in the Senate by constitutional amendment or (if that were possible) by statute law. And this argument might be extended and strengthened by observations upon theimpeach ability of the President himself and the impro.of involving him in warm controversies Jefore the very body which may be required to sit in judgment as a court upon his official conduct. But not only is there no advisory power in cases of removal vested in the Senate by the Constitution, but there could have been no reason for so vesting such power. The constitution of the Senate does not adapt it to the performance of such duty, and the argument against it, upon this ground, becomes stronger every year. It might have been possible in the earlier years of the Government that the Senate should investigate questions of removal and determine them; for offices were few in number and the cases of removal were rare. Now, however, when offices have multiplied enormously; when they are counted by 1000s in each great branch of the public service, civil, military, and naval, and when remov als must be frequent and promptly made, it is impossible that the Senate should exercise the advisory power in question intelligently and justly, with convenience to itself or advantage to the public. As much of time is now bestowed by it upon questions of appointment as can be spared from the performance of legislative duties. But in the execution of the duty now charged upon it, it acts summarily, and not with prolonged or thorough deliberation. The evidence before it is partial and in exact; witnesses are rarely examined; papers are rarely verified by certificates or oath, and parties nominated are either unheard or heard irregularly and imperfectly. Only such information is sought or received as will enable members to form a general, unstudied opinion upon the qualifications and character of nom inees. And this is supposed to be sufficient for the due performance of the duty charged upon the Senate. The actual appointment, after all, is made by the President, and he is mainly responsible to the country for the selection made. It is found, I repeat, that the executive duties of the Senate upon appointments, although discharged in. manner described, are a serious tax upon the time and attention of the members, and interfere to some extent with the performance by them of other duties. How would the case stand if they were required to advise and consent to removals from office? In the 1st place, the charges against an officer, or the causes alleged for his removal, would be laid before them in specific form. This would be necessary to their investigation of the case. Next, they would be compelled to receive evidence in some form or manner, both for and against the officer accused or sought to be removed; and as it would be monstrous to condemn him unheard, rules for notice to him and for hearing him would have to be fixed. And as it would be impossible for the Senate in executive session to conduct an examination, that duty would have to be charged upon committees, and those committees armed with adequate powers for the purpose. Then would follow examinations of with messes before committee, or the taking of their depositions in some regular manner upon commission or rule. Possibly counsel might be introduced, or the parties themselves be heard. In any case, the decision and report of a committee on a case must be subject to review and debate by the Senate, with a consumpt on of time, and possibly with an exasperation of debate of which members can now form no conception. A code of rules for the management of this new business must grow up or be established, and the investigations made must as sume a judicial character. If justice is to be attained, if private right is to be respected, if sound or safe conclusions are to be reached, both the Senate and its committees must act through judicial forms; at least through such as are everywhere held necessary to the ascer tainment of truth. The accusation and the defense must be both heard; the evidence must be taken under oath and before competent authority, and upon reasonable notice; and opportunity must be afforded for argument and for deliberation and debate. Let no one tell me that these speculations are extravagant or chimerical because we do not encounter intolerable difficulty or inconven ience in acting upon questions of appointment. For the reasons already stated, and for many others which might bementioned, questions of removal are widely different from those of appointment, and they will involve senatorial duties of a different description and more arduous character duties to which the Senate is unsuited by its very constitution as well as by the pressure of other duties upon it. It is said that this bill may be a valuable check upon political removals from office, upon proscription for opinion's sake by the executive Dept. Well, sir, it is manifest that it will not be so when the POTUS and the majority of the Senate agree together in their political opinions. because the responsibility of removals will then be divided between 2 depts of the Government instead of being charged upon one, it is more likely that proscription o'. increased, that instead of the volume of proscriptive action in the Government being abated and reduced, it will be enlarged and swollen. The division of responsibility between the 2 depts will induce more extravagant and extensive action in purging all depts of the public service from political opponents. Nay, sir, the political majority in the Senate itself will be apt to urge forward the President in the business of proposing to them the removal of officers of the U.S. subject to their joint power. This will be the case, 1/2 the whole time or more, at all times when the President and the majority of the Senate shall agree in political sentiment and shall be inspired by common political passions and purposes leading to concert of conduct. Again, when the President and the majority of the Senate shall disagree, which is the only other possible case, we shall incur the danger that the Senate, for political reasons, will keep in office persons who ought to be removed.