Mr. LANE. If it is not considered out of order I will take a very few moments to attempt to direct the attention of the Senate to the question before the body. [Laughter] I. not undertake to anticipate a state of things where the POTUS shall be regularly impeached by the lower House and where the members of this grave body shall be his triers. I know not what the result of such an investigation may be, but I hope we shall all be prepared to decide that question upon its merits whenever, if at all, it shall be presented. But I desire now to enter my protest against this doctrine that the freedom of debate in the Senate of the U.S shall be or can be curtailed. I know by the parliamentary law that it is out of order to speak disrespectfully of a coordinate branch of the Government. The meaning of it is that when it is not necessary for the purposes of the debate that we shall travel out of the record to denounce improperly a coordinate branch of the Government it is out of order to do so. But here is a bill proposing to restrict the power of removal of the President, based upon the supposition that there has been an abuse, a shameful abuse of the power of removal and appointment. That is precisely the subject matter before the Senate; and every Senator, under his responsibility to his constituents, his conscience, and his God, may characterize the conduct of the President in such language precisely as he believes to be fit and proper, having no other possible restraint in the law or in the Constitution. We are called upon to act on the subject of the abuse of the executive patronage. That is the subject now before the Senate. If it be not so, the whole object of the bill is aimless and purposeless. And if we are to be tied here, if a padlock is to be placed upon our mouths here, we have a despotism instead of a Republic, and this high body, the grand inquest of the nation, has no right to characterize tyranny and usurpation as they should be characterized ' We may not travel beyond the verge and scope of proper debate to denounce a coordinate branch of the Government; but when it comes legitimately within the proper discharge of our duties we may, we must, we are recreant if we do not, use fitting terms to characterize what we consider an abuse of the appointing power. Now, Mr. President, what is contemplated by this bill?, Simply to restrain and restrict the unlimited power of removal now claimed by the POTUS This has always been a doubtful question. It was raised in the 1st Congress oft. U.S and decided in the Senate only by the casting vote of John Adams, the then VEEP. From that time to this the power has been doubted by distinguished lawyers. The power has been supported also, I admit, by distinguished lawyers; and perhaps the Supreme Court alone can determine who is right and who is wrong as to the construction of the constitution on this point. But this bill steers clear of all possible constitutional objections. There are certain officers known to and recognized by the Constitution, whose duties are defined by the Constitution, whose necessary qualifi.cations for office are defined, whose tenure of office is defined. Congress has no right to fix additional conditions or qualifications or a different tonure of office for these constitutional officers; but every other officer in the civil, or military administration is subject to the jurisdiction of Congress, and they have a perfect right to fix the tenure of office, the mode of appointment, the duration of the term, and the compensation. This bill does not pro. pose to touch a single constitutional officer, but simply to provide a different tenure of office for those officers provided for by law and whose only existence is under the statute law. You have breathed the breath of life into their bod. ies. The Constitution never called them to be and to exist. It is your action and yours alone under which they exist, and the Congress alone can fix the tenure of their offices. This bill by its 1st section provides that certain officers, excepting the Cabinet of the President, shall hold their office for a certain time and until their successors shall have been confirmed by a vote of the Senate. That is substantially the 1st section of this bill. We might, if we chose, apply this principle to the officers of the POTUS I know heretofore the doctrine has been held that Cabinet officers stood in a relation to the President so confidential that he alone should be consulted in their choice; and except perhaps in 2 instances no Cabinet officer has been rejected by the Senate; but if we choose we may fix the tenure of their offices. We have as much power over them as we have over an inferior clerk. They are only head clerks of the President, echoing his wishes and will; and the moment their action becomes objectionable to him they are removed. such is the theory of our Government, and such is the practice that has always prevailed. I do not i. that it would be expedient now to embrace the Cabinet officers in this bill; but I am willing to go even to that extent. I think, however, they may be properly left out of this bill as proposed by the Senfrom Vermont, and let the President have the absolute power of appointment and the absolute power of removal in reference to them, and I do not care how soon he begins to exercise that power of removal. What furthermore is contemplated by this bill? That where an officer during the recess of Congress shall be shown to be incompetent or unfaithful the President shall have a right to suspend him from office, and the duties shall then be discharged by the person empowered by law to perform those duties in case of a vacancy, and that the President shall report that suspension, with his reasons for it, to the Senate of the U.S. at their next session. I see nothing wrong in that. The law in most instances already designates the proper person to discharge the duties when the incumbent shall be incompetent from absence or any other cause. I see nothing wrong in giving the President power to suspend for good cause and allowing the functions to be discharged by the persons defined in law in other cases, or even to allowing a new appointment of a temporary character in such a case. Then comes the amendment of the Senfrom Massachusetts, more wide sweeping in its scope than any provision contemplated by the bill; and that is that all officers whose annual compensation is more than 1000 dollars shall be appointed by the President subject to the approval or satisfaction of the Senate. That applies, I understand, to all officers who are not properly constitutional officers; those I suppose we may not touch. Excluding the Supreme Court, the President, and VEEP, and according to the provisions of this bill the Cabinet officers, all others shall be subject to confirmation by the Senate of the U.S. When this propsition was moved a few days ago upon a pension bill which I had the honor to introduce, I opposed it as an amendment to that bill; but I now support it. From my heart of hearts I support it as a proposition to be attached to this bill, to it is properly germane. I would make all these officers subject to confirmation by the Senate of the U.S. We must lodge discretion somewhere, either with the Executive or with the Senate. In the light of passing events I prefer to trust the Senate. I have confidence in the Senate, But gentlemen here upon this floor echo the objection of the President in his recent veto message, that danger to public liberty comes from popular representation. Sir, if you will read the history, ancient and modern, of the Old World, you will find that popular liberty" has been in no single instance stricken down by popular representation. Look to the revolution in England, look to the termible French Revolution, look to the Greek republics, and to the republics of the middle ages, and you will find that it was the tyrants, the dictators, the self constituted usurpers of authority who overthrew public liberty. I deny that the great danger in our institutions results from popular representation. If that be true, all history is a lie; if that be true, your Government is a fraud and a cheat and the people are not capable of selfgovernment. But that argument is used by the President and repeated here. There is no danger from popular representation. Under our theory of government the only danger is that the popular voice may not be heard, and constitutionally heard. I would not strip the POTUS of a single one of his constitutional pow ers. But, sir, what are the 2 powers now threatening the liberties of the people? They are the veto power and the indiscriminate use of the power of removals from and appointments to office. The people, thank God, have disposed of the argument arising out of the veto power, and we have now a 2/3rds majority in each House of Congress. The loyal voice of this country is heard. By the echo of the previous decision of the people the veto power is no longer regarded, although such is the frequency of its exercise that it has wrought a secret and almost silent revolution in the country, so that now when we look to measures of legislation we do not inquire as to majorities, but whether we can secure a 2/3rds vote and overrule the action of the President. So much, then, for the argument attempted to be drawn from the assumption, as I conceive wholly unsupported in history, that the danger to public liberty results, not from the power exercised by the king or the emperor or the despot or the President, but results from the tyranny of the majority. Sir, if you will cause to pass before you in procession the grand nations of ancient and modern times, if {. will open the mausoleum where reposes the history of the past and the dead of ages, you will find that popular representation has never threatened popular liberty in any country upon earth. Gentlemen tell us, however, that there is no evil here to be remedied, and consequently no necessity for a new law on this subject. Gentlemen tell us that the removals have been few and far between, and that the President in the main has selected men for office who voted for himself and Mr. Lincoln in 1864. I know not how it may be in other sections; but in my own State I do know that 2 collectors of internalrevenue have been appointed by Mr. JOHNson who were among the most able and efficient supporters of McClellan and Pen dleton during the controversy of 1864. I know of those 2 instances; there may be 100s of others, and perhaps there are; but the argument is that he has not always appointed Dem ocrats to office, that he has sometimes, carrying out the sentiment of one of his Cabinet ministers, appointed men to eat his bread and butter who were ready to sell their principles for the sake of office. I regard that as more demoralizing in its character and tendency than the appointment of honest and upright Democrats. Now, Mr. President, I desire to say a few words in reference to this question, so that I may be properly understood at home. We are told upon this floor that out of 4 million votes cast at the last elections 1800,000 were for the President's policy; and out of a vote of 4 millions there was a popular majority of only 400,000 in favor of the congressional policy; and that the 1800 who supported the policy of the President are a large minority who have a right to share in the patronage of the General Government. Sir, our Government proceeds upon the the ory of majorities. The majority have a right to rule. Heretofore when an Administration has come into power, as in the case of Mr. Lincoln, where the President has been in accord with his party, he has distributed the offices to his party friends. That system was introduced by General Jackson, as I believe, under the counsel at least it was so stated of Mr. Van Buren; and from that time to the present it has always been considered that upon the incoming of a new Administration there should be a clange of officers, so to make them generally in accord with the Administration. In 1860 Mr. Lincoln was elected President, and when he came into power in 1861 there was an extensive removal from office, but I believe not so extensive as there should have been; but he was in accord with his party, that party representing a constitutional majority.? the people of the U.S.