Mr. JOHNSON., Mr. President, the particular question before the Senate is upon the amendment to this bill proposed by the HoRep. The bill as it passed the Senate excepted from its operation the Cab inet ministers. That exception the House have stricken out, and the question before the Senate is whether we will sanction that change. I do not know that the question which my friendfrom Wisconsin has so elaborately discussed in the view that he takes of this measure is to be considered as before the Senate on this particular amendment. The bill as it passed the Senate rather affirmed the power of Congress td take from the President the authority to remove without the sanction of the Senate officers generally, and in excepting, therefore, the particular officers who are named in the exception it is to be considered that a majority of the Senate were under the imPression that the President has not that power. The question of power I have already discussed in the previous debate, and I said perhaps all that I had to say on the subject; but in that discussion I said that the question might have been Presented for judicial determination when General Jackson directed the deposits to be removed from the U.S. Bank, which he could only do by dismissing from office the particular officer to whom in the 1st instance e sent that direction. Subsequently to the discussion which was had in the Senate in relation to the propriety of that removal, the Senate of the U.S. passed a resolution condemning General Jack son for usurping a power in that respect which, according to the view of the Senate, he did not possess. In that discussion, as I stated when the matter was before us formerly, it was conceded by those who contested the propriety of that action upon the part of the President that he had a right to remove the Secretary who refused to obey his orders in relation to the deposits. Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries, Mr. Chancellor Kent, and the Supreme Court in 2 cases to which I formerly referred, all considered the question of constitutional power as finally settled. I propose now upon that question merely to refer to a passage in the speech made by Mr. Webster in the Senate upon the protest of President Jackson in 1834: “In the 1st place, then, I have to say, that I did not vote for the resolutionon the meregroundof the removal of Mr. Duanefrom the officeof SecyTreasurry.Although I disapproveof the removal President, accotrhdein power of removaldoesexist in the to the established construction of the Constitution: and therefore, althoughin a particular caseit may be abused, and, in my opinion, jwuastslyabused in this case, yet its exercisecannot be said to be an assumption or usurpation. We hmauss, tthaellreafogrree, e thatMr. Duane is out of office. Hetionally competeene tn removedby a power constituthought to removehim, whatevermaybe of the exerciseof that powerunder the circumstances of the case.” In addition, therefore, to the authority of Story and of Kent and of the SCOTUS, we have the authority of Mr. Webster that the constitutional question is to be considered as practically settled. My friendfrom Wisconsin proposes now to open that question, to change what has been the settled opinion of the country, if we may judge from the continuing acquiescence in the exer. cise of that power, and to place ourselves in the condition in which we stood in 1789, when the matter became a subject of debate in this branch of Congress and in the other branch. Is nothing to be settled? Are the decisions of the Supreme Court to be wholly disregarded? Is the action of every POTUS, from Washington down to the Present incumbent in relation to the same subject to be also disregarded? If it is, we are virtually making another Constitution. In this I have the authority of Mr. Madison. In a letter to Mr. INGersoll of the 25th January, 1831, he said: "Can it be of less consequencethat the meaning of a constitution should be fixed and known, than that the meaning of a law should be so? Can, indeed, a law be fixed in its meaning and operation unless the constitution be so?. On the contrary, if a particular Legislature, differing in the construction of the constitution from a series of preceding constructions, oceed to act on produce uncertainty that difference, they not only introduce in the constitution, bat in the laws themselves; inasmuch as Fo all laws to the new construction and inconsistent for the future, but vir; pronounced nullities from the beginning.” o: 4:. it, then, be left to the decision f Wigenatndcandidini e decision of ge, which on the wehvoelery intel is or most lied on for thou. '. '. f. construction of itution, that which hofti g i. w e.lios uniform sanction through a period of thato the varied ascendency of parties; or legislature onds upon the opinions of every new Party, eager heated as be by the spirit of iedastra i. the pursuit of some favorite object,: e – res perhaps of the same misleading onder the influence So much in relation to the power. Now, supposing the power to exist which this bill assumes, as I said just now, the next question is whether it should be exerted as against the particular officers who are named within the exception, Cabinet officers. Why are they appointed, and why are they named Cabinet officers? They are appointed for the purpose of aiding the%. in his official duties. They are not appointed, nor would the people of the U.S. consent to have them so appointed, for the purpose of thwarting the POTUS in what he might consider was the duty incumbent upon him as President. He has very high powers, and he is false to himself if he refuses to exert them. He has very important and high duties, and he is equally false to himself if he disre gards them. But how is he to exercise the powers with which he is unquestionably vested, and perform the duties which the Constitution imposes upon him, if he is to have around him not persons as friends and agreeing in the general scope of his policy, but men not subject to his control, and who may have a policy of their own entirely at war with that which he and the people of the U.S. may Su. to be the true policy of the country? e honorable member can gain, as I think, no support in the way of argument for the proposition of the House because of the particular condition in which the President stands now to the party that elected him. Suppose that unfortunate and calamitous event had not happened, the assassination of o President Lin and he had discovered that he had a Cabinet around him upon whom he could not place reliance; that his SecyTreasury, for instance, was pursuing a policy at war with what he believed to be the true policy of that Dept, and so in relation to the other Depts; that the SecyState, in whose hands are placed the management of the concerns of the Government with foreign nations, was adopting a course inimical in his opinion to the true interest of the U.S and injurious to their reputation; is he to be told “they shall retain their seats in spite of you unless we consent to their removal?” The time was, and that time was at the period of General Jackson's protest, to which I have alluded, when an excitement arose in the country that affected the very existence of this body. The papers of the day that supported General Jackson and General Jackson's policy were crying out from day to day, “Look to the Senate, the aristocratic branch of the Government, the branch that is seeking to usurp to itself all power.” At one time, judging from those signs, it was by no means certain that the tenure of office of the Senators of the U.S. might not be at some future day and at an early i. changed. The POTUS then was said to be the representative of the people, fresh from them, and therefore better able to know their will than anybody to be found in this Chamber. It was said that the very high and important duties which were devolved upon him ". the Constitution required that he should at early periods go before the people and account to them for the manner in which he had discharged his trust, if he thought proper to ask for a reelection, and his policy in advance, his character in advance, his faithfulness to the institutions of the country in advance, are supposed to be known before he is elected to the .; and when the Senate of the U.S., by the course which they pursued in relation to the deposits, denounced him, the voice of the country far and wide was heard speaking loudly in condemnation of this body, and speaking so loudly in its condemnation that it threatened to affect even its existence. Now, what is it proposed to do? To say, not to the Present incumbent of the office, not to anybody who may become an incumbent of the office by the death or removal from office of the President elected as President by the people, but that he who may be elected President by the people, who may have been mistaken in relation to the character or the ability of the men whom he had selected to advise him, shall not have the power of changing them and obtaining others. It has been said with truth, from the begin. ning of the Government, that there is to be found and has been found in almost ever Cab inet one or more aspirants for the Presidency, and that their duties have been fashioned in a way that they thought would be calculated to gratify that aspiration. That condition of things will exist hereafter if it does not exist now. The President, by the power that he has to remove, has the means by which he can keep such an aspirant within proper limits; but declare that he shall not have the power to remove him, and you have virtually a President in anticipation warring with the President that is in office. That will not be concord, which is the very character the Cabinet relation assumes is to result as between the President and the Cabinet, but just as many wills and as many policies, if there can be as many policies, different from those of the President as the Cabinet ministers themselves number numerically. do not know what may be the fate of the amendment upon which the Senate is now called upon to vote. It was defeated when proposed by my friendfrom Wisconsin before the bill went to the House, by a vote, I think, of 27 to 15; but this I know: I think I know, and knowing it therefore I will predict it, that if it passes, the next Congress that may be elected after the next Presidential election, if it contains a majority in each branch friendly to the President elected, will repeal it.