Mr. WILSON, of Iowa. I mean to say that I see no difference in the principle involved. I do not mean to say that the phraseology of this bill is precisely that which is to be found in the State statutes. I am talking about the principle involved. And I wish to say here, so far as the Supreme Court affirms in that decision the power to debar a man for the delinquencies which are therementioned, I do not differ from it. It is because it stopped short of the application of the principle which I deem to be just and right that I say I differ with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has decided, also, the question of the power of the POTUS to pardon a citizen before or after conviction of any offense he may have committed against the law. Now, if it be said that under the provisions of this bill, which declares that a person who has been engaged in rebellion may be debarred from holding the office of attorney at law, I beg gentlemen to remember that a very large class of cases cov ered by this bill have the record proof of guilt in the pardon of the POTUS If before conviction the President has the power to pardon them, the very applica.tion of a person so pardoned is an admission of guilt as surely as would be a plea of guilty in open court. There are ofher limitations in the statutes of the several States, those which were referred to by the Supreme Court in that part of the decision read by the Gentfrom NewJersey, [Mr. Rogers] One I maymention is the requirement that the party applying for admission to the bar shall swear he has not been engaged in the practice of dueling, has not been a party to a duel either as jo or 2nd. e are seeking by this bill simply to enforce upon a court where we find a majority unwilling to carry out the laws of Congress a power which we have a right to enforce, and which has never, before been questioned the power to establish rules. The Supreme Court, in the Garland case, undertook to decide that that court possesses the power to prescribe the rules which are to govern it, and that Congress has no right to interfere. And yet any gentleman who will take the time and pains necessary to an examination of the various judiciary acts of the U.S. will find that there is nothing in the power of the court in that regard that does not depend upon the statutes enacted by Congress. e statutes declare that the courts may prescribe rules. This is the dec. laration of Congress. Now, sir, if Congress can clothe the courts with power to sprescribe rules, why may not the same body prescribe rules ijo. can do it indirectly through the court, why may it not do it directly through a statute? And that is all the committee propose to do in this bill.