Mr. HUB PHREY. I desire the attention of this House for a very few moments, and particularly of such members as are lawyers, to the 4th section of this bill. One of the amendments which I have offered proposes to strike out the words “ and the burden of roof shall lie upon the claimant where proable cause is shown for such prosecution, to be judged of by the court before which the prosecution is bad." This bill, as it now stands, prooses to incorporate into the crimiiiaLlaiv, as it shall be administered under this bill, a principle entirely new, a principle which has never been adopted in the administration of criminal law for the punishment of crimes in this country in respect to any offense whatever. This question was discussed in the Senate at considerable length, and I think it is worthy the consideration and discussion of the House or of any other body where members are called upon to settle a question of criminal law as remarkable as this., This section makes provision for the punishment of crime, and having declared that the doing of certain acts shall be regarded as a crime, it provides that “the burden of proof shall lie upon the defendant where probable cause is shown for such prosecution.” This language is taken from tie law as it has existed and still exists in relation to civil proceedings for the purpose of obtaining property which has been seized under the law and which the Government seeks to forfeit. In such a case, the claimant comes into court and says, “This property is mine;” he resorts to legal proceedings to determine the question of ownership. The law, as now settled, simply requires in a case of that kind that the Government shall give proof that there was probable cause for the seizure, and it then eeomes incumbent upon the claimant to show the facts which go to establish his right. In the criminal law no such rule has ever prevailed. It is the pride and boast of this nation, as it has been for ages one of the glories of the country from which we derive the great principles of the common law, that, in the administration of criminal justice, the presumption in favor of theinnoceiicc of the efeiidant commences when he is at on trial and contin ues down to the time when a verdict of guilty is rendered. In all criminal trials the prose cution must establish beyond all reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused; otherwise a verdict of “ not guilty” inust be returned. This just and beneficent principle of the common law it is proposed in this bill to abandon. This Congress is asked to enact that, with ref erence to the cases covered by this bill, the showing of probable cause by the prosecution shall throw upon the defendant the burden of proof Noh, I desire to ask the attention of the House to the definition of what constitutes “probable cause, ” so that members may see what is necessary to be proved for the purpose of putting a prisoner in such a position that he must be declared guilty by the court unless he be able to produce affirmative proof of his innocence. Iread from Copkling's Treatise on“ the Practice of the U.S. Courts: It may be addedthat the term 'probnble cause, according to its usual acceptation, means lessthan evidencewhich would justify condemnation and in all casesof scizurehasafixed and well known meaning. Itimports seizure made under circumstances which wnrrnnt suspicion. In this, its legal sense. the court must understand the term to have been usedby Congress." Now, the conviction of a man under some of the provisions of this bill will send him to prison or a term not less than one year, and which in the discretion of the court may be ten years. Yet all that is necessary for his conviction is simply that the prosecution shall prove “circumstances which warrant suspi cion” against the defendant, when, unless ie produces on his part satisfactory affirmative proof of innocence, the court directs the jury to render a verdict of “guilty.” Now, Mr. Speaker, I submit that among a civilized and enlightened people, in a country where the criminal law is administered according to those just and righteous principles which should always control its administration, no interest of commerce, no interest of the reve nue can warrant the adoption of so odious a rule as that proosed to be enacted by this bill.