Mr. SHELLABARGER. I think that under the circumstances in which we are now placed the committee have done wisely in recommending the postponement of this bill. I desire now to ask to leave of the House to have printed with the debates some remarks, which I have prepared as carefully as I could, in regard to the constitutional right of Congress to pass this bill, and also in regard to the propriety of doing so. I desire, if I can, to attract the attention of my fellow members in that way to the bill, and also, as far as I am able to do it, to call the attention of the country to it. [The speech will be found inthe Appendix.] Mr. SHELLABARGER. Mr. Speaker, I regret that the ComJudiciary, having charge of this bill, has not been called since the committee agreed to report in favor of this measure until now, when it is too late to fully discuss this important measure and to pass it through both house. of Congress. It will, I I doubt not, be taken up and passed at our next session. Ihere, and now, submit some remarks upon the right of Congress to pass this bill into a law. I desire, if I can, to attract to its consideration the attention of my fellow members of this House. 0 The design of this bill is to enforce that demand of the Constitution which declares “ the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens” [of the U.S.] “in the several States.” The bill occupies this single ground, and aims at nothing beyond. Its scope is distinct from that of the “civil rights bill.’7 That insures equality in certain civil rights. This protects all the fundamental rights of the citizen of one State who seeks to enjoy them in another State. The “civil rights bill, ” therefore, has, in no sense, rendered this law unnecessary. To accurately a prehend what remedies may be provided by Congress for enforcing this clause of the Constitution some well settled principles in regard to it ought to be carefully noted. One of these is thus stated by Judge Story. He says: “The intention of this clause was to confer on sthaeym," [ the citizens of each State] "if one way so a general citilenship." 2 StorvnCommentaries, section1806. This clause, therefore, enacts that all “the p“rivileges and immunities", of a “general” or national" citizenship shall be enjoyed in every State by the citizens of the U.S. Again, it was the design of this clause, as is exressed by the court ofappeals of NewYork, in liemmou vs. The People (0 Smith’s Reports, 626, 627,) to secure to tie citizens of every State with iin every other State the “ privileges and immunities (whatever they in' ht be) accordedin each to its own citizens.” Judge Story ( 2 Commentaries, section 1806)expresses this design in these words: “The intention of this clause was to confer on them.if one may 50 my, a general citizenship and to communicateall the privileges and immunities which citizensof the same Statewould be entitled to under like circumstances." Chancellor Kent (2 Commentaries, page 71,) says the same thing in these words: “If they that is native or naturalized citizens of the U.S. ]remove from one State to another theyare entitled to the privilegesthat personsof the same descrition are entitled to in theStateto which the remove is made, and to noneother." The same thing is decided in Livingston vs. Vaningin, (9 John. B., 507) and in numerous other cases. The next proposition touching this clause, which is thoroughly established, is this: that these words, “privileges and immunities, ” of this general or nationa citizenship, include and embrace at least the following, to wit: “ the rights of protection of life and liberty, and to acquire an enjoy property, and to pay no higher impositions than other citizens, and to pass through or to reside in the State at pleasure; and to enjoy the elective franchise according to the regulations of the law of the State.” This I copy from Chancellor Kent’s enumeration. (2 Kent, s. p. 710.) He takes this enumeration of rights from the opinion of Judge Washington, in the case of Corficld cs. Coryell, (4 Washington's Circuit Court reports, 371,) in which case Chancellor Kentsays: ffIt was decided that the privileges and immu nities concededby the Constitution of the U.S. to citizens in the several States.were to be confinedto those which were fundamental and which belongedof right to the citizens of all free Governments. a Snudchtoaarecq the rights enjoy propetrty and life to. pay no higher impositions than other citizens, and tograssthroughor reside in the Stat. but pleasnre. an to emoy the elective franchise according to the regulation of the law of the State." To this enumeration of fundamental rights Story adds what I “ have already quoted, to wit: all such as citizens of the same State would be entitled to under like circumstances." Whatever confusion there may be (and there is some) esto what those local, and not funda. mental, privileges ambich a State may give to its own permanent inhabitants and deny to sojourners, (sec 2 Kent’s Commentaries, age 72,) it is universally agreed that these, which Kent enumerates as “fundamental, ” cannot be taken away from any citizen of the U.S. by the laws of any State, neither from its own citizens nor from those coming in from another State. We have now seen what the fundamental rights are which every citizen of the U.S. holds es the gift of his national Government, and which neither any individual nor any State can rightfully deprive him of. Our next and principal proposition is that, as these rights grow out of and belong to national citizenship and not out of State citizenship, and as the Constitution expressly enjoins that every citizen of the U.S. “shall be entitled ” to them “in the several States, ” therefore it is within the power and duty of the U.S. to secure by appropriate legislation these fundamental rights. And, in entering upon the statement of this point, it is proper that I should here state that, in order to avoid every doubtful exercise of power by the U.S., and not to assume or trenc upon the powers of the States, this bill has been carefully limited in the following partie ulars and ways: 1. It protects no one except such as seek to or are attempting to go either temporarily or for abode from their own State into some other. It does not attempt to enforce the enjoyment of the rights of a citizen within his own State, against the wrongs of his fellow citizens of his own State after the injured party has become or when he is a citizen of the State where the injury is done. This is because the bill is confined to the enforcement of this single clause of the Constitution. Without determining what further powers the Government may have in enforcing rights of “national citizenship” in favor of all its citizens, without regard to the fact of their passing from one State into another, it was thought best to make this act single and compact in its scope and structure, and to that end to confine its revisions to the single object of seeing that this clause of the Constitution was executed throughout the Republic. In Abbott vs. Bailey (6 Pick. R. 92) it is decided “that the privileges and immunities of ‘the citizens of each State, in every other State can, by virtue of this clause, only be applied in case of a removal from one State into another." To conform the bill to this view of this constitutional provision, it was deemed best to limit it in accordance with that decision, and to make it secure to all the people those great international rights which are embraced in unrestrained and secure interstate commerce, intercourse, travel, sojourn, and acquisition of abode. 2. As a consequence resulting from the last stated legal idea, the criminal provisions of this bill are so framed and drawn that no offense is created by it at all, unless it shall be proved (in addition to the proof of the other facts required, by the common law, or by the other provisions and terms of this act, to be establilslied to make out the offense charged) that the act was done with the criminal intent of preventing the injured party from enjoying the invaded right in the State where he is injured. In other 'words, the act creates no offense of which the U.S. can take jurisdiction, unless the intent is proved, to prevent an Amer ican citizen from sojourning or staying or taking up abode or from doin business and the like in that State, or, what is the same thing, in that part of it where his interests and choice lead him to attempt the exercise of these privileges. The act, therefore, does not attempt to punish an ordinary wrong, such as murder, assaults, &c., of which the States have juris diction. It only attempts to see to it that the citizens of the U.S shall have what it is solemnly and expressly declared by their national Constitution they shall be “entitled to in the'several States.” With these preliminary remarks, I now wish to condense into the shortest possible space a statement of the authority for saying that Congress can pass a law on orcing this right. The 1st authority I introduce.in support of the bill is the fact that Congress has already exercised its legislative power in enforcing this identical clause of the Constitution. This was done in a way which asserts the power of congress to enforce the rights of citizens, as so cured by this clanse, more emphatically, if possible, than this bill does, because it was one in the repeal or abrogation of a clause of a State constitution which seemed to invade the privileges gnarantied by this clause of the Constitution of the U.S. By aJtResolution of March 2, 1821, (see 6 U.S. Statutes, 64 5,)it was declared that the State of Missouri should be admitted into the Union“Upon the fundamental condition that the 4th clause of the 26th section of the 3rd article of her constitution shall never beconstruedto authorize the passageof any law and no law shall be passedin conformity thereto.by which any citizen of either of the States of the Union shall beexcluded from the enjoymentof any of the privilegesor immu nities to wine such citizen is entitled under the Constitution of the U.S."’ These are the words of this act, and the Legislature was required to assent to it. Now, it will be seen that Congress solemnly enacted for the entire future of the State of Missouri that “no law shall be passed" by which any citizen of either of the States of the Union should be excluded from any rights of citizens of the U.S. as secured by the Constitution. And this statute is yet in force. By this memorable act of Congress, passed in that 1st great contest of the free spirit of our Constitution with the despotism of slavery, it was settled, and has ever since by its continuance in force stood confessed that it is the duty of Congress to secure, by appropriate legislation, to the citizens of each State the privileges of the American citizen in the several States. I next refer to legislation by Congress on fOrcin other provisions of the Constitution, the validity of which legislation has been established by decisions of the courts, by the settled practices of our Government, and by the common consent and acquiescence of the people; but which depends for its validity upon identic ally the same principle as the bill before the House depends upon. The bill before the House rests for its constitutionality upon 2 propositions of constitutional law, both of which are now so firmly established as to have become postulates in discussions determining upon the validity of an act of Congress. One of these the SCOTUS exresses in the case of Jones vs. VanZant, (5 oward, 229, 230,) in these words. The duty is upon the Government "0f enforcing.by appropriate legislation, every constitutional provision whether 'ip favor of itself or others. This grows outof the pOSIUODa‘nd nature of such a Government: and is as imperative in cases not enumerated specially, in respect to such legislation, asin others." The other postulate is thus expressed in U.S. cs. Fisher, (2 Cranch, 358:) “ The powerto make all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers granted coners on Congress a choice of means and does not confine it to what is indispensably necessary." If these 2 principles do not embrace in them the power and duty of “enforcing, by appropriate legislation, ” that supremely important and imperative provision of the constitution which declares, the citizens of the U.S. “shall be entitled to all the privileges of such citizens in the several States, ” then we have no power to pass this, or, indeed, any other law enforcing any provisions of the Constitution in any "case not enumerated specially in respect to such legislation.” Let us now look at some of the laws which this Government has kept in force during all its existence, and which rest for their validity upon no express grant of power to Congress to enact the law, but upon the“Duty of Congress, by the aid of appropriate legislation. to enforce every constitutional provision." “A duty which Is as imperative in cases not enumerated specially in respectto such legislationasin others.’ Justice Story declares that“The various instancesin which Congress, in the progressof the Government, have made use of incidental and implied meansto executeits powers it is almost impracticable to enumerate, ifitwero not use less. They are almostinfinitely varied in their ramifications and details.” 2Sloru aConstitution1, 453. Indeed, a glance at the subject will show that those acts of Congress which rest alone for validity upon the implied powers of the Government compose almost, if not quite, a majority of all the acts of Congress ever passed. There is no express power given in the constitution to erect forts or magazines or lighthouses or piers or buoys or public buildings or to make surveys of the coast. (2 Story, 145.) There is no power expressly given to congress to acquire territory or to make a government for or exercise jurisdiction over any territory, (2 Story, 144;) nor to bring any suit, (Ib.,) nor to make any contract, (1b.;) nor to create any corporation, (4 Wheaten, 409;) nor to make any military road, work, or defenseWhat ever; nor an customhouse; nor to remove an obstruction from or to improve any harbor or navigable river nor to lay embargoes, (2 Story, 170, and 6 He can, 426;) am to establish a military or naval academy; nor to secure exemption to nor protection of the officers of ‘the U.S., (2 Story, section 1246;) nor to protect anyproperty of the U.S.; nor to punish crimes by citizens committed an ships of war; nor to punish robberies or other crimes against the U.S. mails; nor even to provide for carrying the mails. (3 Mc: Lean, 393.) You have no express poWer by the Constitution to protect the sessions of this body, nor to punis any breach of its privileges. such a mere glance at the subject shows how vast, both in number and importance, are the subjects as to which this Government‘s powers exist only by implication. The very 1st act of Congress ever passed was dated 1st June, 1789, and related to the vital matter of providing for the administration of oaths of public officers; and its constitutionality was denied, (2 Story, 166,) because there was no express power to enact it. What is said with so much emphasis byJustice Story (Constitution, seclion 1255) was very early in our history found to be true, to wit, that the provision of the constitution enabling Congress “ to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution” the provisions of the constitution, was necessary“ To removeall possibledoubt respectingtheright to lo islute on that vast mass of incidental powers which mustbe involved in the Constitution if that instrument be not a splendid pageant or a delusivs ph“antomof sovereignty.”, There is besides the power of Congressarisingout of that clause just cited, another sort of implied powerwhich hasbeen called with greatpropriety u. resultin power arising from the aggregatepowers of the General Government.” 2Story, OOMLHILHOR, section1265. This General statement about the implied powers of the Government is made to show how utterly idle it is to say that it is unconstitutional to pass a law enforcing the express provision of the Constitution that the citizens “shall be entitled" to their rights in all the States merely because the Constitution does not say in express words that Congress may pass a law on that subject. What I have said shows that probabl half the laws ever passed by Congress would7 be rendered unconstitutional by such a rule; and it also shows that this bill rests upon the same authority which supports a vast mass of the legislation of the U.S. But, Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of show in how impregnable are the foundations of this bill, in the authorities of the Constitution, and to make the assurance of its validity doubly sure, I wish now to refer to cases where the Congress has exercised the power to enforce the provisions of the Constitution by criminal enactments, which, in principle, are not distinguishable from this bill. I Wlll take only a few. There is no power given to Congress to pass a law punishin any offense by one not in the service of the U.S. for a crime committed upon a ship of war. (2 Story, see. 1256.) And 'et the right to pass such a law is as well esta lislied as the Government itself. (3 Wheaten, 888; 7 Crunch, 156; 2 Peters, 439.) Or take the ease of the act of July 7, 1836, section 12, (Brightly, 208,) imprisoning in penitentiary for not over ten years every person employed on any steamboat, by whose misconduct any person’s life is destroyed, and this, too, although the act may be done upon any, water within the criminal jurisdiction of the States. There is nowhere any express power to pass such a law. And yet the courts have held invariably what Judge McLean says in U.S. US. Warner, (4 McLean, 469,) that “this is a subject clearly within the power of Congress.” (See 5 McLean, 212; Whar ton on Homicide, 607.) the authority for this criminal legislation by which the U.S. punishes men for crimes committed in the body of the States, and where the States can try and punish the same persons for the same acts, is only to be found by implication as arising out of that clause of the Constitution which authorizes Congress'“to regulate commerce among the several States.” (9 Wheaton, l Gibbons vs. Ogden.) Or take the 20th section of the act of 3d of March, 1825, (4 Statutes at Large, 121,) punishing the uttering of foreign coin made in the similitude of the'coin of the U.S. Mint. There is no exress power to pass such a law to be found anywliere in the Constitution. In the case of U.S. rs. Marigold (9 Howard, 568,) the SCOTUS says that the clause authorizing the punishment of eohnterfciting coin does not embrace the offense of utten' such coin, and then proceeds to trace and fin the poiver of congress to punish the uttering of such coin to be not expressly given in the constitution, but only to arise incidentally out of either one of the 2 clauses, to wit, that relating to the regulation of commerce or that authorizing the coinin of money. Upon this subject the Supreme ourt uses this language, to which I beg attention: “ conress had the constitutional power to pass this law. nder the power to regulate commerce, congresscan exclude, cither wholly or partially, any subject falling within the legitimate sphereof commercial regulat' n and under the power to coin money and regulate the value therco Congresscan protect the creatureand ohJectof that power." We have seen that the fundamental rights of national citizenship are the “ creatures” of the American Constitution. Shall we be told that this “creature” is of less value or less entitled to demand the protection of this government than the coin is which the Government makes? If not, then indeed may congress protect this “creature and object of its power.” It must be here noted again that this act of Congress punishes this act of attering counterfeit coin within the body of the States, and this, too, although the State may punish the same man for the identical act for which he had been already indicted and punished under this act of Congress. This is because the same act may be a violation of the laws of both governments, the State and the national. This has been expressly decided in the SCOTUS in several cases: Fox vs. Ohio, 5 Howard, 410; Moore vs. Illinois, 14 Howard, 13. I submit that it is beyond the powers of reason, logic, or law, to show how it is that the power to regulate commerce between the States enables the U.S.to punish as crimes negligent acts of steamboat officers, and the uttering of spurious foreign coin, and that, too, within the jurisdiction of the States, and yet that logic be able to show that the constitutional enactment that U.S. citizens “ shall be entitled” to these national privileges and immunities gives no power to congress to carry out this provision of the Constitution. It may be said that the difference is in the fact that the Constitution says expressly that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce, to coin money, but that it does not say that Congress shall have any power upon this subject matter of the rights of citizenship. I answer this in 2 ways. 1st, I answer it by a direct denial of the assertion that the constitution does not expressly give to Congress power to legislate upon any matter as near akin to these rights of citizenship as is the preservation of life upon steamboats akin to the regulation of commerce. I assert that the entire subject matter of this bill is far more directly and plainly within the power to regulate commerce between the States than is neg ligence on steamboats or uttering s urions coin with the scope of that clause. W hat kind of commerce could there be between the States if the hostility of either the laws or of the individuals of the States were permitted to exclude menofotherStates from pa'ssinginto or’through, or sojourning in or doing business in such hostile State? Is it not absolutely self evident that if this clause as to the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States did not exist in the Constitution, yet all the powers assumed by this bill would amply exist in the other provisions of the Constitution? But, Mr. Speaker, I now turn to the presentation of an argument which is utterly conclusive of this and every other objection to the constitutionality of this bill. It is this: that other provisions of the Constitution which, like the one upon which this bill is framed, merely declare rights to exist, but as to which no express grant of power to legislate for their securcment is contained in the Constitution, have been held, by conclusive and overwhelming authority, to be capable of being enforced b'both the civil and criminal legislation of Chugress. Let us look at one of these. Take that 2nd clause of the 2nd section of the 4th article of the Constitution touching fugitive slaves, which is in these words: "No personheld to service or labor in one State under the laws thereof, escaping into another shall, in consequenceof an law or regulation therein be discharged from we service or labor.but shall be delivered upon claim of the party to whom such service or In or maybe due.” There is no provision anywhere in the constitution that Congress shall have power to pass any law, civil or criminal, to prevent “any law or regulation” of a State from discharging a person owing service; our compelling such person owing service to “be delivered up to the party to whom the labor is due.” If there be any power to enforce, by legislation, this right to the person owing service, then it is merely an implied power, arising out of the assertion in the Constitution of the existence of the right. And this clause too is one where the Constitution designed to prevent one State, and its people, from taking away the constitutional rights of citizens of other States. In this respect it is like the clause on which this bill is tonnded. It is impossible to conceive of a principle upon which can be rested the claim that civil and criminal laws of Congress can be enacted and executed within the States, as valid and constitutional, enforcing this provision of the Constitution in favor of slavery and yet it be unconstitutional, by civil and criminal laws, to enforce in all the States the rights of liberty which inhere in American citizenship. Now, what has been the action of your government touching the enforcement within the body of the States of this clause as to fugitive slaves ‘I The fugitive slave law of 1793, in the 4th section, punished as an “offense, ” and by fine, anyone who willfully obstructed the seizure of the slave, or who concealed such slave; and the other sections provided for that seizure, ke. The law of 1850 also enforces, by highly criminal provisions, this clause of the Constitution. It would;be an abuse of the intelligence and patience of the House to detain it by a review of the decisions of the States and of the nation sustaining the constitutionality of the laws. I shall, however, enu merate a few of the leadin' cases for the‘purpose of showing how uttery irresistible they are in authority and how overwhelming in number. As both the law of 1793 and 1850 contained penal and civil remedies enforcing a constitutional right, as to which the Constitution gave no express power to Congress to legislate, both acts are identical in asserting the vital principle upon which this bill rests; and the cases which I enumerate sustaining the one or other of these laws are equally applicable to this measure, and directly aflirm the principle on which it rests. the followin are some of the cases where this power of congress to enforce, by proper legisation, any constitutional right, although the right is not one of those “enumerated especially in respect to such legislation:” [be case of G enn vs. Hodges, 9 Johns,07, decided by Chancellor Kentand other sin 1812. The case of Wright vs. Deacon, G S. & R., 64 decided by Chief Justice Tilgham in 1819. The case of Commonwealth vs. Griffith, 2 Pick., 11, decided by Chief Justice Parker in 1823. The case of Lock vs. Martin, 12 “lead, 314, decided in 1834. The case of Kauffman vs. Oliver, 10 Barn, 517, decided in 1848. The ease of Jones vs. Van Zant, 5 Howard, 229, decided by SCOTUS in 1847. The case of Commonwealth vs. Aves, 18 Piclr., 219, decided in 1836. The case of Bushnel, 9 O. S. R., decided in 1859 by the supreme court of Ohio. The case of Thompson, 11 111., 832, decided in 1849. The case of Graves, I Ind., 869, decided in 1849. The case of Sims, 7 Cnsh., 2&5, decided by supreme court of Massachusetts. [be case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, 16 Peters, 539. But, sir, it is unnecessary further to state cases. They are to be found in the decisions of the supreme courts of every State and of the U.S.; and have been repeated by these just as often as the question came before them. Every one of them affirms the power of Congress to pass civil and crimina laws enforcing in the body of the States and in the Federal courts, a right secured to the citizen by the American Constitution; and this although there is no express grant of power to Congress to legislate upon the subject. If these cases do not establish this right of legislation, then nothing can be established in our system of Government. It may be objected that antislavery men deny the constitutionality of the act of 1860, and some that of 1793. Some of the provisions of the nctof1850, if the question were a new one, I think would be, and ought to be, held unconstitutional, such as that depriving men of ajury trial. To these provisions the great mass of the constitutional objections of antislaver men have been directed. Comparatively ow, perhaps none, denied that single distinct principle for which I contend, and upon which this bill rests its constitutionality, and which I again repeat in the words of the SCOTUS, in 5 Howard, 229, that it is the duty of the Government to".Enforeehyaiipropriate legislation everyconstitutional| prov|s|on, whatherintuvorofitsclt'orothers. This growsout of the position and nature of such a Government. n ni(sl asimperativein casesnot oun lueratedspecially in respectto such legislationas in others.” But, Mr. Speaker, suppose these decisions affirming this power to legislate for the enforcement of the constitutiona rights of the people are not such as ought to have been me. 0, yet they have been made, and the principle has become the settled law of the country. Shall it be endured, sir, that after slavery has for 70 years asserted and used these powers in its service, freedom and the highest rights of the citizen shall be denied them the moment they are 1st sought to be employed in their service? In the solicitude which Wasfeltto avoid every assumption of powers of doubtful constitution alit, and to secure the best attainable forms an terms of legislation in execution of this clause of the Constitution, this bill was submitted to the careful examination of the At torney General of the U.S. He kindly submitted some suggestions in writing as to some of the details of the bill, which have been adopted into the bill as reported to the House. I understand that the AttyGen of the U.S. approVes this bill, both as to its constitutionality and necessity. And here, Mr. Speaker, I leave this measure. submitting it to the careful deliberation and judgment of Congress. I would gladly hope that it might meet with the unanimous approval of both Houses. The power to pass it into law is plain and unquestionable. t aims at no sectional orpartisan purposes. Its benefits, like the beneficences of all good government, are meant for all the people alike. The high and the lowly, the weak and the powerful, ta e of its protection. It is for the East and the West, the North and the South. All of the States and all of the people thereof will alike enjoy the protection it affords. Each child of the Republic, wherever he may go, however alone, frail, or defenseless, may by his touch startinto action the provisions of this short and simple law, and instantly he is neither alone, frail: or defenseless. but has summoned to him the sublime presence and power of his Government, all of whose energies that touch has started into irresistible force and activity for his safety. The necessities which demand the enactment of this law are so obvious ofsuch permanent du ration, and are so overwhelming as to make the presentation of them now and here an improper consumption of the time of the House. Since the period of modern civilization, I know of no nation which has presented such a spectacle as our own. I know of no other in whose dominions was embraced an area large as half its territories which had become to near one halfits own citizens a term incognito. In our country there‘ came to be a land into which its own children could not go and live. In that land for a quarter of a century could not be safely uttered that sublimest aphorism of our own national faith, and the very one with which we had propitiated the ear of Heaven in our imprccations for national life, “that all men were created 0 uul.“ It was aland made of Heaven, rich an beautiful as the vale of Cashmere but whose moral terrors had became as deadly as the fabled horrors of that land of the Britons where the ground was cov ered with serpents; the air such that none could breathe it and live; whither fishermen ferried goblins at midnight, and where the speech of the dead was constantly heard by the mariners. It was a land where the best precepts of will berforce and Washington could generally not be uttered with safety to life; and where that last, best petition sent by Franklin to the American Congress could be whispered neither by men nor by the children, neither in the ear of nation nor of God; a land where the experiences of the citizen who would avow or would not discard the best precepts of his own national faith and religion can, without exaggeration, be told in that strangely sublime recital of the sufferings of the good men of other a es who suffered tortures, cruel mockings, an scour gings, bonds and imprisonment; who were stoned, sawn asunder, slain with the sword who wandered in deserts, mountains, dens, and caves of the earth, being ‘ilestitute, afllicted, tormented. And now, Mr. Speaker, since the people have poured out an offering of blood such as Liberty never had before upon her altars, to the end that the people might be free and safe throughout our country, the heart of the nation is again already sinking and sickening at the reappearance of that same reign of violence an terror which so cursed the land before. The sad and unwelcome fact is again being forced upon the attention of the nation that its own truly loyal citizens cannot safely dwell or go into all parts of their own country. It is becoming more manifest each day that the higher the evidences of the citizen’s loyalty to his conntr, and the greater his sacrifices of blood made for that country, the less secure these citizens are now in attempting to abide in or even to go into vast portions of the country which their own bloo has just delivered. In this Hall where I now speak, and within a few days of the time when I speak, one who was once a member of this House, and later a provisional governor of his State, and whose deserved eminence comes from his unconquer able loyalty, startled you and the country by the announcement that he could not return with safety to his home because that treason had prohibited his abode in the State of which he is the most illustrious patriot. Another sad proof of this return of the reign of prescription and of murder has just been taken in icksburg under the order of this House. Its horrid enormities, in the massacre of a defenseless people, in the exposure and mutilation of their dead bodies, in the burning of theirhomes, schools, and churches, makeone of the darkest pages in the annals of barbarism. Sir, in every country and in every a e the grave of a.nation’s soldiery has been e nation’s shrine a shrine whither science and art and song have ever repaired as rivals, emulous to bestow their choicest treasures; a shrine where gratitude and religion have sat together watching as sleepless Vestals forever; a shrine where 3' I100 xdghlflhuoeiibd lvinragrisailc'ilealyr." But, Mr. Speaker, already today, when the 1st daisy which God planted upon the grave of the American soldier is scarcely dead, their comrades dare not go thither to strew them with new flowers because treason and an officer of the American Army forbid it. Sir, from nearly every part. of that beautiful land land of the orange and the magnolia the soldier of the Republic and the friends of your Government are being driven today.Mr. Speaker, the nation must protect its citizens or else perish. Refuse or fail, and your country sinks into the deserved contempt of the nation, and of its own people. In that contempt, should it come which Heaven in mercy forbid the Republic will find its grave. Members of the 39th Congress, I entreat you to pass the bill. In it help to complete that circle of constitutional and legal defenses which the new nation must have. Fellow members, may it be our peerless honor to provide these defenses. Let them be made, in their amplitude, their strenvth, their virtue, and their adaptation, not in the interests of a single race, government, continent, or age; but in the interests of humanity, God, and the ages. And then, in that circle of laws, when complete, protecting everywhere all the rights of all, the people, behold that shield of the nation, beautiful and indurant as the shield of Achilles; part of the “ Arms which the Father of the firesbestowed Forged on th' eternal anvils of the god"ashield which shall cover the nation’s head as well in the hour of peace as of battle, as well in the day of prosperity as of disaster. For on have covered the nation’s head when you inve covered the head of her dhildren.