Mr. SHERMAN. No, sir. I ask the Senfrom Illinois if that is not the legal effect of the proposition. I should like to have him state whetter the effect of the proposition is not as I state. A removal occurs for cause, say for defalcation, during the recess; the vacancy occurs by removal for some good cause, a cause that he concedes to be gold. That is excluded, as I understand a person is appointed to fill that vacancy; the person who holds that office is an Officer of the Government, entitled under the law to his salary, just as much an Officer of the government as if he had been confirmed by the Senate in case the vacancy had occurred during the session of the Senate. Suppose that the officer thus legally appointed should die before the Senate could act upon him. In that case he would get no pay at all. Suppose there should be a division in the Senate on the question, and he should not be confirmed by the mere neglect or non-action of the Senate. The officer thus legally appointed would get no pay. I see difficulties in the way. I should like very much, indeed, if it is within our power I do not say it is not to have some law passed which may limit and restrain the power of removal during the vacation of the Senate. In deed, I do not think the question of the warm of congress to limit and control the authority of the resident to remove has ever been settled. In my judgment, Congress may by law limit the power of removal; and why? The wer of removal is not conferred upon the resident by the Constitution of the U.S. The Constitution nowhere gives him the power to remove any man from office. It is a mere inferential power, derived from the power of appointment. It was a power denied in the early organization of the government, and as a Senator has suggested, a resolution alhrming it was only carried by the casting vote of lohn Adams. It was regarded as a question of great doubt. The power of removal is nowhere conferred by the Constitution on the POTUS in express terms. His power of removal is simply inferential from the power given him by the Constitution to appoint cmbassadors, ministers, and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, dtc. What is there in the Constitution to prevent Congress from regulating and controlling to some extent the power of removal? Nothing whatever. We have done it in repeated cases. This very point was made at the time we passed the 1st law organizing the national ban s. It was then discussed whether or not Congress could limit or restrain the power of the President to remove a man from office. The 1st law that was passed expressly provided that he should not remove the Comptroller of the Currency except on such and such conditions. Where do we gain that power? From the Constitution, from the inherent right of conrose to pass laws which are binding on the resident. I therefore admit that Congress may by law restrain and limit the power of the President to remove. But in my judgment the particular proposition which denies to an Officer legally appointed during the recess his salary except upon a condition that may or may not happen, is at least a very harsh and violent measure, which I would hesitate very much to resort to. There is a remedy for the evil complained of, in my judgment, and it is without a measure of this kin. I dislike very much to see these roppositions attached to our appropriation ills. They are in the nature of conditions to what we ought freely to ant, appropriations to meet the expenses of the government. I do not like to see them put on in that way; but ifthe Senfrom Illinois or the ComJudiciary will frame ahill which will limit and restrain the power of the President to remove from office, so that when a man is appointed for 4 years he shall hold that office during that 4 years, unless he is removed for cause, to be submitted to the Senate, I will vote for such a proposition, and I say there never was a time when this great question could be more fairly met than now. It is admitted on all hands that at least a jealousy exists between the President and Congress; I will not say war, because I do not think th reis a war, but there is a jealousy and a watch.ulness probably on the part of the President and on the part of Congress. What is to prevent congress now from passing such a law as I have in icuted? The majority here is overwhelming. We have no object to accomplish of a mere partisan purpose. The majority in Congress is perhaps 2/3rds in a party sense. What is to prevent new the ComJudiciary from carefully framing a law prescribing the term of office of the various classes of Officers of the Government and declaring that the President shall not remove anyone of those officers except for such and such causes 7 I venture to say, although the epinion of Mr. Madison has been read to the elfect that we cannot control the power of removal, that no great statesman has ever declared that where a man is appointed to office for a period of time fixed by law, and the power is not given to the Presi cut to remove him from that office, he can be removed without cause. That power is not conferred by the Constitution, and it is only derived inferentially a power not to be extended. It seems to me that this is the solution of this whole difficulty. llicsitate very much to prescribe these tests in an appropriation bill, and [warn Senators that we yield an advantage, if I may so say, when we attach these propositions to appropriation hills which must pass in the ordinary course of business. Whoever is President, we must have appropriations to carry on the Government. We cannot justify any measure to restrain even a real, much less a fancied danger, by attaching these clogs and qualifications to appropriation bills. Now is the time, while we have ample power, even by a 2/3rds vote in both Houses of Congress, to pass a just and wise law on this subject. I do not see any reason why the law should not now be passed. If so, it would properly come from the ComJudiciary. It could be there properly considered and framed. The question ought not to be passed on in this informal way as an amendment to an appropriation bill. These are my views, and I am bound to express them. I desire to accomplish to some extent at least the purpose here indicated, and probably I should go as far as the Senfrom Illinois desires to go in this amendment; but I do not think it would be wise for us now to pass a proposition which would declare that an officer 0ft ie Government legally appointed under existing laws in accordance with the practice of the Government from the foundation to this time, shall receive no pay unless we should hereafter confirm that apointment. It is a stretch of power and oflaw tint I think there is no example of in this Government. The case cited by the honorable Senfrom Illinois is no parallel case, because that was a case where the appointment was made in violation of the Constitution, where the vacancy occurred during the session of the Senate, and the President undertook during the recess to fill up that vacancy. There was a case where he undertook to exercise a power and confer an appointment which he could not do except by the confirmation of the Senate, and the law properly declared that no money should be taken out of the treasur for such a bad and informal appointment. at this amendment goes beyond that, and declares that a man shall not receive pay for an office to which he has been legally appointed. The Senfrom Illinois says it is no great hardship, because if a good man is appointed during the vacation the Senate will confirm him; butI ask the Senator whether a man is compelled to hold office in this country upon those terms and conditions. The framers of the Constitution contemplated a necessity impending upon the Presideut to appoint officers during the recess of the Senate, and they provided for it. They are legal officers just as much so as I am. For us at this stage of the session to declare that those persons thus legally appointed shall not receive their pay until the Senate shall act at some future day, and that in the mean time public officers shall transact their business Withont pay for months is rather anextraordiuary proceeding. Take the case of a revenue officer collecting large sums of mono who has to appoint an army of depu ties, and in many cases those officers have to pay their deputies or employees out of their fees or salaries. You require the officer to go on perhaps for 9 months to discharge the duties of the office, aying in the mean time all the expenses of the Office out of his own pocket, upon the uncertain contingency of a future confirmation by the Senate, and then you provide that in case the Senate does not see proper to confirm the man, he shall not have anythinw during all this period of time. That is the legal effect of this amendment; and I hesitate, I confess, to embark in that kind of conditions, but I am perfectly willing to support the Senfrom lliuois in approposition to limit by law the power of the President over all the public officers. The amendment proposed by the Senfrom Missouridid not go so far. It contained 2 simple propositions affecting mainly those that were a poiiVd to fill vacancies occurring during the session of the Senate. It met my approval. The amendment of the Senfrom Missouriwent no further than the law of 1863, but this goes a great way beyond that, and I confess I hesitate in taking the step.