Mr. STEWART. It appears to me that the reason why the Senfrom Connecticut fails to perceive the analogy, is that he fails to see the exact objection to this bill. The objection, as I understand it, is want of uniformity; and it is said that it must be uniform in distributing all the property of the debtor, that if it distributes all the property of the debtor in one State it must in another. We, on the contrary, say that what is meant by uniformity is the distribution of what property the debtor has which is liable to execution at the time of the act of bankruptcy. Our opponents say that it means the distribution of all his property. What difference does it make, so far as regards the principle of uniformity, whether the property is en under the State law and given to his family, or taken under the State law and given to his creditors? It is not in either event distributed under this bankrupt law. You say that if it is not distributed under the bankrupt law the law is not a uniform law. We show you instances where property was not distributed under the bankrupt I.but taken by attaching creditors who happened to get in 1st in some States where they have that process; and of course that proceeding was not allowed in other States, of the Supreme Court recognized the right of the attaching creditors in a few States that had this summary process to acquire a lien and take the bankrupt’s property, and thus to preventits distribution among the credit ors generally. A State enables its citizens to do i. by its laws, and the Supreme Court held the congressional act which permitted this to be done to be a constitutional bankrupt law. This bill provides that whatever is subject to execution under the State laws shall be distributed among the creditors. If in order to make a uniform bankrupt law you must distribute all the property that the debtor has, ou must abrogate the State laws that allow ens to be acquired. Then we say that the formerlaw was unconstitutional; because all the property was not distributed in some States, while it was in others it operated differently in one State from another. The objection to this bill is that it operates differently in one State from what it fo in another, because the amount of homestead exemption in one State is larger than in an other. The former bill operated differently in the different States; because Vermont all attachment law which enabled her citizens when they saw a debtor in failing circumstances to acquire liens upon his property, and other States had no such law, and consequently when the bankrupt's property came to be distributed in Vermont the State laws regulated the distribution to a certain extent. Now we say we will allow these State laws to operate in favor of the homestead exemption for the family of the bankrupt. It is quite as equitable and as fair to allow it for that purpose as to allow it in favor of the 1st grabbing creditor, if I may be permitted to use the exPression. Is it a greater exercise of power to let a State law come in i and take some of the for the support of the family of the bankrupt than it is to let the State law come in and take a portion of it for the benefit of the attaching creditor? The equity is as high in the one case as in the other, o: is as much uniformity in the one case as in the other. The objection to this bill is the want of uniformity. The act of 1841 had a greater want of uniformity in reserving the liens of attaching creditors and allowing them an advantage. I think the law of 1841 gave an undue advan tage to attaching creditors by Preserving their liens. I think that was bad policy. I do not think it was equitable and fair. When a man 9es into bankruptcy his property should be distributed among all the creditors. But that is not the point; the policy of the lo. mitted an exercise of power on the part of the States to prevent an equal distribution of the assets, if you mean by assets all that the bankrupt may possibly have. If you mean by a uniform bankrupt law one which shall operate alike on all the property subject to execution in the various States, that the same acts of fraud shall constitute a cause for forcing a man into bankruptcy in one State as in another, that the practice shall be the same in all the courts, and that when the assets are distrib uted the citizens of one State shall share in them like the citizens of any other State, here you have such a bill, and you run in conflict with no State laws. But if you say that there shall be no State law which takes or appropri ates for any purpose any portion of the debtor's property that does not exist in all the States, then you run in conflict with the legislation of the States, with the reserved rights of the States, and with their entire judicial system. If you give the Constitution a rational construction, if you say it did not mean to take away from the States the power to exempt from execution a portion of a debtor's property in order that it might be used for the support of his family, that it did not intend to take from them the power of keeping the poor debtor and his family from the poor house, that it did not intend to prevent the States from enacting attachment laws giving the preference to the most active; but did intend that when a man went into bankruptcy his assets should be fairly distributed among the creditors, citizens of all the States alike, did intend that the practice should be the same in all the courts of the U.S., did intend that the same acts of bankruptcy should be sufficient to force a man into bankruptcy if that is what is meant, you have here a law of uniform operation upon the people of the U.S. It takes hold of and distributes all property that is not exempt from execution, all that is subject to be taken by creditors. But if, to be uniform, your law must disturb and overturn the settled systems of the States, no bankrupt law can be F.; and if this provision cannot be retained am opposed to ever passing a bankrupt law, for I believe homestead exemption laws and laws exempting from execution the necessaries of life to a sufficent amount to support a family for a limited time are essential to the peace of society and to prevent suffering and distress. The States have exercised their power in this respect in a wise, economical, and judicious manner. If these most essential regulations of the States are to be set aside and overturned by a bankrupt law, I say let us have no bankrupt law. But I do not believe the Constitution requires any such thing. I do not believe any such stretch of power was intended to be conferred upon Congress. I have no doubt that if this bill be passed in the shape it now is, it will be easily harmonized by the courts with the systems of the different States, and the real spirit and intent of the Constitution in requiring the law to be uniform will have been carried out.