Mr. HARDING, of Kentucky. Ifeelalittla disconcerted, Mr. Speaker, this morningin conSO(uenee of a little storm that has arisen ere. It is always painful to me to see old friends disagree. Vithont attempting any exlllanuuon for my colleague, [Mr. 11:18] but regret that he and his old political friends and associates who have heretofore harmonized so pleasant] should have any misunderstanding at al; and Ihope a little calm reflection on the part of gentlemen will at least restore that nunty offceling, ifnot of political action, which has heretofore existed. My colleague has always been considered a loyal man, but if things go on in this way I suppose he will by and by he charged with usin disloyal words by his old political friends. trust this excitement will pass away and that calmness will be restored. Mr. Speaker, when the morning hour expired yesterday and my remarks were suspended in consequence of it, I was proceeding to argue that the bill now under consideration was retroactive in its character, and I inquired of the entleman, and I now inquire of him, whether, in his judgment, there is constitutional power to pass a retroactive statute that shall operate upon acts which took place a year ago. Does the gentleman think that we can pass an act now that shall defeat the plainti s cause of action and that shall arm the defendant with a new defense unknown to the law at the time the act was committed? What would be the result? A plaintiff who came into court a year ago, for example, having a legal cause of action, comlaining of a wrong which was in violation of all laws then existing, is met by this statute, by which his cause of action, then legal, is destroyed, and by which his adversary, the defendant, is armed with a new defense not known at the time the act was committed. The result is, that having come legally into court with a rightful and legal cause of action, by this statute he will be turned out of court with costs. Is not that plainly an expostfacto law, such as the Constitution in express terms declares shall not be passed?, Now, sir, there is no reason that I can imagine at all for the passage of this act unless the object be, not to promote, but to embarrass and defeat the ends of justice. There can, so far as I can see, be no reason for the assage of this not unless the object is to can le guilty offenders to ese ape merited punishment. It is Well known that the common law prevails in all the courts of Kentucky and under the common law any Officer or soldier nay, any private citizen, may justify an arrest or imprisonment provided he can show reasonable and probable cause for the arrest or imprisonment comlaine of. That is the law now. I would not old any officer or an person acting under his authority resonsible for an innocent mistake, nor does the law hold him responsible for an innocent mistake. If an officer, in executing a general order to arrest guerrillas, should by mistake and without malice arrest an innocent citizen, the law does not hold him responsible for it, nor would I. All that is necessary now for any officer or any person acting under his authority is to plead and prove in his defense that there was reasonable and probable cause, and there being probable cause r the arrest or imprisonment the law are names that it was done in good faith and without malice. But in the absence of reasonable and probable cause the law presumes that the act was done maliciously. Now, it is plain that if the acts here referred to were justified by any law, by military law, by the common law, or by civi law, then the man is armed with a full and comilete defense. But the object of this bill is to a 0rd adefense for men who acted in violation of all law. Now, I want the attention of the gentleman; if I am wrong, he will correct me. I affirm that under the provisions of this bill, if I am sued as defendant for any outrage whatever, apy trespass, assault, battery, or other tort, either to the person or to the property of the plaintiff, I can go into court and acknowled e that I have been guilty maliciously of the whole charge; I can hold up my head. having been armed with this statute, and say that the charge Is true; that I did arrest an innocent citizen, one whom I knew was guilty of no offense; but there was an old controversy between him and myself, an old account to be settled; that I knew all the time he was guilty of no offense, thathe was a peaceable citizen; that knowing all this, having an old account to settle, I made the search and the seizure of his goods and chattels, and arrested his person and threw him into prison. I may acknowledge all this, and then defy the power of the court; for here is the order under which I acted.