Mr. RAYMOND. I submit to the gentleman that what he has just read is not. only not a question, nor a correction, but in the nature of a repl to my argument, and as such not warranted at this point on the score of parliamentary propriety or of personal courtesy. I have no objection at the propertime to answer the question, and I probably shall do so in the course of my remarks and I beg to suggest to him or any other gentleman on this floor! at they will restrain their impatience to reply to me until I get through, or take some othertime and opportunity to discuss the question than that whiich belongs to me. The last clause of the passage from m remarks which the Gentfrom Ohio rea furnishes a clue to the whole of the m. As I said then, I believe we had a right to demand of the defeated rebels whatever might properly be embraced in the terms of a surrender. Ihat surrender, embracing not only their arms and mu nitions of war but the principles on which the rebellion rested, they have made and we have accepted; and now they are entitled, with certain limitations, which I shall hereafter explain, ifI nm allowed to proceed in the regular course of my remarks, to the rights given to them by the constitution, and we are particularl restrained by the constitution, which is bining on us, from doing anything toward those States which we may not ropeily do toward any other State within the nion. Now, sir, I return to the a ument of the gentleman in regard to the extinction of States. He takes the ground, as Iwas saying, that hab itual obedience to law is essential to the existence of a State in the view of public law and be quoted Wheaten and Grotius and Burlap mnqui and others to sustain that position. I position to quarrel with him on that point. I admit it. I o not think it an ade quate definition of a State, but as far as it goes it is just. Habitual obedience to law is essential to a State. He takes the same ground in regard to a State in the Union, that a State to be such in this Union must be characterized by habitual obedience to the constitution and laws 1866. 485. of the U.S., and that when this habitual obedience ceases then the State ceases to be a State of the Union. I admit that also. Now, in regard to the 1st proposition, as to the continueriexistence of a State, I have to draw his attention to one point which he over looked. It is not simply e fact that habitual obedience to law is essential to the existence of a State upon which he lays stress, but he assumes that this habitual obedience must be uninterrupted that it must never be intermitted or suspended; for if it is suspended or interrupted, the course of his argument requires him to hold that the existence of the State is ended. He noted from Wheaton to sustain the point he made, and he quoted correctly as far as he went; but like an adroit and skillful advocate, he stopped the quotation just where it ceased to beof service to him. If he will excuse me, I will complete it. After laying down that principle, t t habitual obedience to law must characterize a State, Wheaton proceeds to say: But whatever be its internal constitution or form of government or whoever may be its rulers, or even if it be distracted with nnnre 3;. through it violent contest for the Government between different parties among the people. the State still subsistsin contemplation of law, until its sovereignty is completely extinguished by the final dissolution of the social tic or y some other cause which puts an end to the being of the State.” The interruption of habitual obedience to law, then, does not extinguish the State. The State, says Wheaten, “still subsists in the contemplation of law.” We have seen examples all over the world, from the earliest date of national existence to the present time, where habitual obedience to law was suspended by a variety of. causes sometimes by anarchy, sometimes by usurpation, sometimes by civilWar. All through the great contest of the French Revolution habitual obedience toluw was suspended. Some English publicistSBurke, I be ieve, among them contended that the social ties were actually dissolved, and that France had ceased to be a State; but she never was so regarded by England or by the coalition which attempted to restore order and the Bourbons to France. What does the gentleman say in regard to the Mexican empire today? There ins been usurpa fion there; there habitual obedience to law has been suspended, and what we regard as the rightful government of that State 13a fugitive among the mountains. Does the gentleman contend that the State has ceased to exist, and that when Juarez comes back to take possession of the Government of Mexico he will find no State therethat it has perished because of the suspension of obedience to its rightful law? and yet Maximilian holds its capital, its ar chives, und its laws. The sovereignty resides in him and in the French army which is at his back today. The gentleman applies the same principle to the continued existence of States as States within this Union. He holds, and holds correctly, that they must be characterized by an habitual obedience to the constitution and laws of the U.S. But, sir, that obedience maybe suspended. I will read from the speech of the Gentfrom Ohio his own language upon thigi point, lest I should misrepresent his VIEWS. he said: “No one who can read the constitution will deny that eachState in this Union must have everyone of these properties limphed inhabitual obedienceto the constitution and laws]beforeit can commence to exist in the Union; because the constitution so declares. Now the question I consider is, whether it shall continuc to be a State. in the sensethat it holds the powers and rights of a State, after it has lost every property which it must have beforeit could commenceto exist in the Union.”