Mr. WILLIAMS. I have no doubt that 3. this discussion I shall be greatly in debted to the venerable Senfrom Maryland for information in respect to the matters involved. I know that when Mr. Madison saw what would be the legitimate effect of the doctrines contained in the resolutions of 1798 he did in letters repudiate the construction very generally put upon them, but the language employed in those resolutions is susceptible at any rate of the construction which has been put upon them by those who have contended for the extreme doctrine of States rights. I do not propose to discuss that question, as it is foreign to the one before the Senate; but I say that those resolutions, put any construction upon them you please, were o, nest egg of nullification and secession in the U.S., and they have been repudiated and condemned by the American people notwithstanding their respect for the author. Mr. Madison, on the subject of the National Bank claimed, if I am not mistaken, that it was unconstitutional, but still upon grounds of expediency he thought P.to approve the act creating the bank. refer to these things simply to show that it does not necessarily follow because Mr. Madison advocated this claim of power on the part of the Executive that therefore it exists. And, sir, if it be necessary to offset the name of Madison with another, I will put into the opposite scale the name of Alexander Hamilton, who entirely differed with Mr. Madison in the construction of the Constitution relative to this subject; and nobody will deny that if Hamilton was not the noblest he was the ablest Roman of them all. Since the decision in 1789, which is relied upon as the great authority for those advocating the unlimited power of removal in the Executive, different men have expressed different opinions upon this subject; distinguished states men have differed as to the correct construction of the Constitution in respect to this power of removal. Some, such as Webster and Clay and Calhoun, have followed the opinion of Mr. Hamilton, have concurred in the doctrine that the Constitution did not contain any such authority as the President claims to exercise; while others, such as Wright, Woodbury, an Buchanan, have followed the opinion that was expressed by Mr. Madison. Some opinions have been expressed by the Attorneys General in favor of the exercise of this power; but, sir, when it is found that any AttyGen in a conflict of jurisdiction : the President and Congress has decided against the claim of the President by whom he is appointed, then I shall begin to think that their opinions upon this question are entitled to considerable attention. To illustrate my view of the weight of those opinions I will refer to what tradition says occurred when Andrew Jackson proposed to remove the deposits. Consulting with his AttyGen, he found that some doubts were entertained by that officer as to the existence of any law authorizing the Executive to do that act, whereupon Old Hickory said to him, “Sir, you must find a law authorizing the act or I will appoint an AttyGen who will.” Attorneys General act generally in the capacity of advocates and not in the position of judges, and their opinions upon legal questions are entitled to as much weight as the opinions of other respectable lawyers, and no more. Looking at the authorities on this subject since the discussion in the Congress of 1789, we find prominent men arrayed on each side of the question, and it is perhaps difficult to decide on which side of if: question the authorities preponderate. Those who advocate the executive power of removal rely altogether upon the legislative construction of the Constitution, sustained by the practice and opinions of individual men. I need not argue that the legislative construction of the Constitution has no binding force. It is to be treated with proper respect; but few constructions have been put upon the Constitution by Congress at one time that have not been modified or overruled at other or subsequent times; so that so far as the legislative construction of the Constitution upon this question is concerned, it is entitled to very little consideration. Congress passes an act at one session which involves a constitutional question, and of course the passage of the act is a construction of the Constitution by that Congress; but at a subsequent time that act is i or another act relating to the same subject is passed involving a different construction of the Constitution; and so you may find, in tracing the legislative history of this country, that the construction put upon the Constitution by the legislative dept of the Government has been exceedingly conflicting upon nearly all of the prominent questions upon which public opinion has been divided. Putting aside, then, the opinions of individual men on both sides of this question, which are perhaps equal; putting aside the legislative construction of the Constitution for the present, let us inquire what, if any, has been f judicial exposition of the Constitution so far as this question, is concerned. I do not pretend to say that the SCOTUS has made any decision exactly in point; but I undertake to say that their decisions have a direct bearing upon the question, and so far as they do go they tend to sustain the constitutionality and correctness of this bill. I will refer in the 1st place to the case of exparte Hennen, 13 Peters, where the SCOTUS maintain the doctrine that “In the absence of statutory regulations, all constitutional provisions, or it would seem to be a sound and necessaryrule to consider the power of removal as incident to the power of appointment, This power of removal from officewas a subject much disputed, and upon which n great diversity of opinion was entertained in the early history of this Government.” I refer to this decision simply to show that the SCOTUS laid down the doctrine, in express terms, that where there was no constitutional provision or stat utory regulation to the contrary, the power of removal was incident to the power of appointment. Notwithstanding it was alleged the other day by the honorable Senfrom Maryland that until within a recent time there has been no controversy as to this power in the President, I do not see how the existence of this power can be reconciled with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Marbury vs. Madison. I suppose that honorable senators who oppose this bill will undertake to show that the exercise of absolute power over the offices of this country by the President is consistent with the decision of the court in this celebrated case. During the administration of Mr. Adams there were 5 justices of the peace appointed for the DistCol. Their nominations were consented to by the Senate; but before the commissions were issued Mr. Madison became President and refused to issue commissions to these 5 justices of the peace, and application was made to the SCOTUS for a mandamus upon Mr. Madison to compel him to deliver to these justices their commissions. I wish to call the attention of the Senate, in the 1st place, to the law under which these appointments were made, for. conforms to all laws that create offices and fix a term of office in the act of their creation. After dividing the District into 2 counties, the 11th section of this law enacts: “That there shall be appointed in and for each of the said counties such number of discreet persons to be justices of the peace as the POTUS shall, from time to time, think expedient, to continue in officefor 5 years.” Persons were to be appointed, and they were to hold their offices respectively for the term of 5 years. Under that law Mr. Adams made those appointments. Those appointments were ro. by the Senate. Mr. Madison refused to deliver the commissions: and the court granted a mandamus upon Mr. Mali. son compelling him to give to these men so appointed their commissions, upon the ground that after these fen had been nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, under that law they were beyond the reach of executive power and were entitled to hold those offices for the 5 years, and that Mr. Madison had no right to withhold their commissions.