Mr. KERR. Mr. Speaker. the bill of the Senate (No. 61) in which that body ask the concurrence of this House involves propositions and principles of the gravest importance. It attempts the attainment of ends iy moans hitherto untried and unheard of in congressional legislation. It appeals to power which, if it be nominated in the bond, has lain dor mant since our national birth. It challenges, therefore, and should receive, the most dispassionate consideration. ln times like the present, when so much of human action is prompted by the sentiments and feelings. uncontrolled by the severer discipline of reason and legal limitations on power, it maybe well to remember, and especially for the majority in this Congress, the words of Montesquieu: {It in n. instinc expericnce that everyman who has power is brought to the abuse of it. He goes on until he finds its limit." Many of the objects desired to be secured by this bill have m earnest sympathy. In any effort to secure tie in which is. in my judgment, consistent with the Constitution and sound public policy, I will cheerfully cooperate. I care not who leads. But. out of the great mercy of a kind Providence the time has come again when the American legislator can and ought to approach the consideration of such measures as this in that spirit of libertv so happily defined in the followmg words of Daniel Wcbster, the great Expounder: "The spirit of liberty is indeed a bold and fe ar less spirit: butit is also a sharp sighted spirit; it cauions anxucious discriminating larset iiicinlcilsli} irence: it isjcalousof enernacbment.jealousof power, jealous of man. It demands checks: it socks for nerds: it insists on securities: it intrenchcs llrfllf behind strong defenses and lhllllltlfl iself with all possible care arrainrt the assaults of ambition and assion. It docsnot trust the amiable weaknessesof human nature and thereforeitwill not iirrmit power to overstepits prescribedlimits. though benevolence, Iood intent and patriotic purposc conieulong with it. Now, in this spirit let us turn to the important provisions of this bill and briefly consider them in their order. In the 1st section it de clares “all ersous born in the U.S and not subject to any foreign POWer, excluding Indians not taxed. to be citizens of the U.S. without distinction 0"; This dec aration appears to me to 00:32, 9 l} vain. L cannot persuade myself that ; accomplish any effective result. It is not an exercise of any express power in the Constitution. It is not a law “to establish a uniform rule of naturalization.” act of investing an alien with the rights and privileges of a native subject or citizen. Howard IL, 578.) But native subjects or citizens need no act of naturalization to enable them to receive from the hands of their government an enlargement of their rights and pivileges if that Government has power to enlarge tfiem. The real purpose of this bill is to bestow such enlargement upon the African subjects of our Government. It oughtto bear that name. Any other title is a misnomer. The act of naturalization requires some acts on the part of the person seeking it. It implies a subsisting relation to some other Government on his part which he desires to cast olf; some allegiance orobligation which he desires to renounce. But such is not the case with any of the persons to be affected by this bill. I as uine, therefore. that this declaration is entifcly nugatory. But it has a purpose. It is designed to cover up and conceal from critical observation the real aim of this measure, which is to enlarge, by act of Congress, the rights and privileges of negroes, not as subjects of the Federal Government, but as subjects or citizens of the several States. Has Congress the power to do this? I deny it because I can [in no warrant for it in the Constitution. But this question may properly be further considered in connection with the balance of the same section, which reads as follows: and there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities amongcitizensof the U.S. in any State or Territory of the U.S. on account ofraca, color or previonsconditionof slavery: and such citizens of every race and color. without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude. except as a punishment for crime whereof the party sha l have been duly convicted shall have the same right to make and enforce tracts. to sue, be parties and ive evidence. tocoiini herit. purchase.lease.sell, hultfiflnd conveyreal and personal property and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedingsfor the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens and shall e subject to like punishment. pains, and penalties and to nonouther any law. Statute ordinance. regulation or custom to the contrary notwithstanding. The phraseology of this provision was obviously dictated by a desire to find support for it in the 2nd section of the fourt article of the Constitution, which provides that “ the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the severa States, " and in the last amendment of the Constitution abolishing slaver. So far as the last amendment is concernet, I shall not take time now to discuss it at any length. I hold that it gives no power to Congrcsfto enact any such law as this or any other law, except such only as is necessary to prevent the reestablishment of slavery. Slavery was a domestic relation only. That relation gave a right to the master to require involuntary service from his slave. That relation is now severed and there exists now no power to renew it. The personal freedom of the slave is established, and no power can take it from him. He needs no such law as this to protect him against reenslavement or to assure his personal freedom. Is it slavery or involuntary servitude to for bid a free negro, on account of race and color, to testify against a white man? Is it either to deny to free negroes, on the same account, the privilege of engaging iu certain kinds ofbusiness in a State in which white men may engage, such as retailing spirituous liquors? Is it either to deny to children of free negroes or mulattoes, on the like account, the privilege of attending the common schools of a State with the children of white men? Is it either fora religious society, on the same ground, and in pursuance of its long established custom to refuse to a free negro the right to rent an occupy the most prominent pew in its church? Is it either for a State to refuse to free no roes and mulattoes. the privilege of settling within its boundaries or attaining property there? will require a most vigorous exercise of the (is t l Naturalization is the t imagination to give aflirmative answers to these questions. But if these discrimination s constitute slavery or involuntary servitude, which are the only things prohibited by the last constitutional amendment, then whose slaves are the persons so discriminated against? They are not the slaves ofindividuals. They must, then, be the slaves of the State. It follows, therefore, that my State, Indiana, has been a slave State ever sirice its organization, a fact which its citizens will hardly admit. Let it not be inferred thatI am opposed to allowing negroes to testify, or to providing facilities for the education of their children. I am in favor of both. But I assert that the Federal Government has no power whatever to do either in the States. The State alone has the power. The construction which would allow Congress to do these things would give it equal power to grant the rightof sutirage and holding office in the States. But this act rests chiefly for support on the constitutional provision 1st cited, and is so understood by its authorz Senator IrttitnULL, and I will now return to its consideration. This bill rests upon the theory that Congress has the right to declare who shall he citizens of the U.S., and then to provide that such citizens shall enjoy in the States all the privileges and immunities allowed therein to the most favored class of citizens of such State. Does this right exist? If it does, it is a propermode of argument to trace it to its logical results, and thus test its proriety and reasona bleness. If it exist at til, it exists without limit on its cxercise, except the will of congress. congress may, then, go into any State and break own any State constitutions or laws which discriminate in any way against any class of persons within or Without the State. It may thus defy and set aside the right of each State, in the exercise of its own judgment, to exclude cenain persons from its boundaries, or to withhold from them certain civil rights. It can admit into Indiana negroes or mulattoes, coolics or Mexicans, Hotteutots or Bushmen and make them equal there in civil rights and privileges to the highest type of human beings. The people of the State may be convinced. nomatter how firmly, that such classes are unfit to be admitted to live with them or to share full civil rights with them, or that their presence will ten to deine ralize or to destroy their society and ultimately their institutions. But all this makes no difference. They have no right to have any opinions on these subjects. The sacred right of self defense is to this extent surrendered by them and by the States to Congress. Congress may present inducements to all the inferior races of the earth to seek nsylums and civil rights in America, and then declare them citizens of the U.S., and by the magic power of this decla ration invest them with all the high civil rights accorded to any class of citizens in any State in which they may please to abide. We may thus, by the liberal exercise of this mighty power, become substantial] Africanized, Meicanized, or Coolytzed, ancfour glorious institutions and national and persona individuality give place to anarchy an weakness. Was any intention to confer such power on Congress ever expressed? Did our ancestors ever intimate any such intention?. There is certainly nothing in ourearly history to justify such an opinion. There is uothingin the writin s or the proceedings of the early councils of our statesmen to justify it. There was nothing in the circumstances customs, or laws of the colonies or States at the date of the formation of the Constitution to supportit. On the contrary, they are all utterl and irreconcilably at variance with any sue views. There were no 2 colonies or States in which there were not discriminations against such classes, differin both in extent and principle. Is it rationafto suppose that the framers of the constitution intended to clothe Congress with power to wipe out these discriminations, to break down these barriers, and determine for each State the civil status of every person, of any race or color, who should elect to settle therein? The propOsition isalarming. It is most.dangerous. It suggests its own most emphatic denial. (19 Howard B., 579.) There is an equal lack of evidence in the subsequent practice of the States and in the decisions of the courts to sustain such a doctrine. There is not one single adjudication. State or Federal, that aproves or tolerates any such claim of iower in congress. But it is said that this bill is justified by section 2, article 4,of the Constitution. Let us analyze somewhat that provision: "The citizens of and }State shall be entitled to privileges and immunities of citizens in the racers in as. It will not be claimed that this permits the citizen of Ohio who desires to become a citizen of Indiana to carry with him into the latter and enjoy there the “privileges and immunitics” which he enjoyed in the former State. Chancellor Kent, speaking of this provision, says: "The laws and usagesof one State cannot be permitted to prescribe qualifications for citizens. to be claimed and excrciseq in other States in contravention to their local policy." This opinion is sustained by the decisions and opinions of other judges and statesmen too numerous to he cited here. (2 Kent, 71; 19 Howard B., 405.) It will hardly be claimed that this or any other provision gives Congress power to declare who shall be citizens of each State. Neither government can confer citizenship in the other. The provision in question only requires that the citizens of each State shall on 0y certain privileges in the other States to which i they may temporarily or permanently remove; but not that citizens of the U.S shall enjoy such privileges in the States. We should not confound the rights of citizenship which a State may confer within its own limits and the rights of citizenship as a member of the Union. It does not follow that because a person has all the rights and privilegesof a citizen of a State he must be a citizen of the U.S. He may have all the r hts and privileges of the citizen of a State on yet not be entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other State. Previous to the adoption of the constitution of the U.S. every State had the undoubted right to confer on whomsoever it pleased the character of citizen, and to endow him with all its rights. But this character was confined to its own boundaries, and gave no rights or privileges in other States beyond those secured by the law of nations and the comity of States. The States have not surrendered the power of conferring these rights and privileves by adopting the Constitution of the U.S. Each State may still confer them upon an alien, or anyone it thinks proper, or upon an class or description of persons; et they won] not be citizens in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution of the U.S., nor entitled to sue as such in its courts, nor to the privileges and immunities of citizens in the other States. Congress has the exclusive right to establish a pni form rule of naturalization for citizenship in the Union. It may confer what Mr. Story calls “ a general citizenship, " which would entitle the recipient of it to the protection of the General Government within the s here of its constitutional power, and wool confer certain fundamental rights, which I will not stop now to enumerate. But they are by no means identical with those attempted to be secured by this bill. Congress might declare every person of foreign birth, of whatever race or color, who should come to this country a citizen of the U.S. on merely taking an oath of allegiance. Would that entitle such persons to citizenship in every State of the Union? and if it did, to what civil and political rights would it entitle them? (19 Howard B., 405, 678, 579.) Again, it should be borne in mind that by its terms the provision in question relates to the privileges and immunities which the citizens of each State shall enjoy when in any of the other States. Now, when I. a citizen of Indiana, go into the State of Kentucky for a temporary purpose, with no intention to change my permanent residence, I go there as a citizen of Indiana, and am entitled, by virtue of this constitutional guarantee, to enjoy “all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States, ” so long as I so remain. But citizenship and the rights of citizenship in Kentucky form no art of those privileges and immunities, forH am still a citizen of Indiana. If I had gone into Kentucky with an intention to leave Indiana and settle permanently in Kentucky, I would then have ceased to be a citizen of Indiana and could no longer claim rights uarantied to me as a citizen of that State, for I would then have become a citizen of Ken tacky, and would by my own not and choice have become subject to the laws of Kentucky, and could claim and exercise there only such rights of citizenship as tnose laws allowed. The vlaws “of Kentucky would then determine my status, both civil and political, and not those of ndiana. (19 Howard lt., 422.. but let us suppose that Kentucky, disliking I ndianians because the are abolitionists, should provide in its laws that the citizens of Indiana should not be permitted to come into and settle in and become citizens of Kentucky, with full civil and political rights under its laws on the same footing as the citizens of Virginia or any other favored State; then mig it they not justly complain that the spirit of this guarantee was violated? Or let us snp pose that Indiana, in the exercise of its fundamental right of self protection, believing that the safety and nrity of its society and institutions require tihat coolies should be entirely exclude from the State, should by law prohibit all persons of that race anywhere from coming into or settling in the State or acquiring property or civil or political rights there. Would such a law involve any violation of this guarantee? What, then, does this guarantee mean? I understand its primary object to be to secure equal privileges and immunities to the citizens of we State while temporarily sojourning in any other State, and its 2ndary and only other purpose is to prevent any State from discriminating in its laws in favor of or against the citizens of any other State merely because they are the citizens of such other State, or in other words. for mere sectional reasons. For example, Indiana cannot form any tacit or express alliance or friendship with Kentucky which shall require or justify Indiana in giving to the citizens of Kentucky who shall settle in Indiana any privileges and immunities it does not equally give to the same class of citizens from any other State. Our ancestors had formed a sisterhood of States, and they merely intended by this provision to prevent any combinations arising out of mutual interests or animosities between certain States from takine lhe form of legislative discriminations against the citizens of other States. Texas cannot, because itdislikes Yankees, with hold from the citizens of NewEngland any privileges and immunities it accords to the citizens of the same class from Louisiana. But Texas can deny to the paupers, vagabonds, or negroes of NewEngland privileges and immunities which it denies, on grounds of local public policy. to the same classes from other States, and which it denies on the same grounds to persons of the same classes within its own limits, although such persons may in NewEngland have been invested with greater rights. Ihis interpretation is reasonable. practical, and free from the dangerous and centralizing tendencies of the one claimed in this bill. It is consistent with the full enjoyment by the States respectively of the sacred and natural right of local self government and self protection. It will enable the States to protect the body politic against the dangers and demoralizations which would inevitably result from the other theor. In this view, I am fully sustained by that distinguished jurist whom have once quoted. He says: “The article in the constitution of the U.S. declaring that citizens of eachState were entitled to all the gnvileges upd immunities of citizens in the several tates. applies only to naturalhornor duly naturalized citizens; and if lhcu remnmfmnloneSlulr toanother, "WI!are entitled Inf/le privilrge n that personof themuh (lcccrlption ure entitled to in theSlatetowhich I theremovalis made.out!to none other.The privilege (hue conferred are local and necessarilyterritorial in i their nalurc." 2Kent, 71. To the same effect is the opinion of Justice Story: The intentionofthis clausewasto conferon them. if one mayso say, a general cllizemhtp; and to communicate all the privileges and immunities which the citizens of the name Sale would beenlitleillo unrlerlhe like circmmlancea." StoryaConunenlarleeon Comtilution, see.1806. Now, if my construction of this constitutional provision is incorrect, and the one claimed by the friends of this bill is correct, then it follows that aliens made citizens by the States are entitled to all the privileges of citizens in any other States to which they may remove, because they were citizens in the State they removed from. But the contrary is both the law and the practice throughout the Union. such a citizen, removing to another State, is then entitled only to such privileges as are accorded by the laws of that State to persons of the same class. Chancellor Kent says: “These civil privileges, conferred upon aliens by State authority.are dictated by njust and liberal pol icy. bul.they must be taken to be strictly local: and until a foreigner is duly naturalized mccordinlz to the act of Congress, he is not entitled in any other State to any other privileges than those which the laws of that Sin/callow toaliens." 2Kent, 70:6 Gilli/omits1)., 250;2 Curtiss History of Conllilulton, 200. Therefore if negroes remove from Massachusetts, or coohes from California, to Ohio or Indiana, they are entitled there to enjoy the same grivileges and immunities which are accorde by those States respectively to negroes or coolies from any other State, “ but to none other.” They cannot import into those States the laws of Massachusetts or California. The right to exclude them or to limit them in civil or lpolitical rights and privileges is fundamental an necessary to the existence and safety of the State. It antedates all constitutions. It is original in the State. I now cite, and invite careful attention without much further comment. to certain high authorities, in corroboration of these views. 1st, I consult the Chancellor again: “Citizens under our Constitution and laws. mean free inhabitants. born within the U.S or naturalized under the laws of Conzrcsn. If a slave. born in the U.S. be tunnnmitted or otherwise lawfully discharqed from bondage or ifu. black man be born within the U.S and born free, he becomes thenoe forward a citizen. but mtrler such dimlnlilier an the lawn o/ Ihe Staten respectively may deem 1! c: alien! to prescrrbetafrrs permnn(Jeolor.” 2Kent, 1213H9n; hbnvs. Form, 6 Walla, 553: theSlate vs. Claiborne, Mcigc, 331: Opinions qfAltorncul General. vol. 1. Next, hear the views of Justice Washington: “ The inquiry is.whature the privilegesand immunities of citizens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are in their nature undamental: which belongof right to the citizens of all free Governments; and which have at all tunes been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which composc this Union. from the time of thoir be cominufroc, independent, and BUVLTOUHL What these fundamental principles are it would crhaps hemore tedious than difficult to enumerate. he may, huw ever. be all comprehended under the following general hands: protection by the Govei nment: the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of ever kindiund to pursue and obtain happiness and an ety. subject. nevertheless. to such restraints as the Government may Justly prescribe for the general goodof the whole. The right of a citizen of O to State to pass through or to resido in any other State for purposes of trade. agriculture professional pursuits or otherwise: to claim the benefit of the writ of Imhmwcorpuq; to institute and maintain actions Many kind in the courtsof theStato; to take. hold, and dispose of property, cither real or personal: and an exemption from higher taxes or imposition: than are paid by the other citizeps of the State, may be mentioned as somcof the particular prlvdeges and immunities of citizens which arqclcarly embracedby the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be added the elective franchise, on rmnlnhnl and establishedbylhe laws or constitution of (12.5011:in which 14 in tobertercinml." Coriclil vs Coryell, 4 Washingtons Circuit Court Reports.page380. Ihcse Views were uttered in reference alone to white citizens, as were also the followmg: “A decision by thesu remecourt of Massachusetts up“on this clause of the constitutton declares that the privileges and immunities securedtothepoople of each State in every other State can be applied only in caseofrernovul from one state into flnililt Mr. By such, removal they becomecitizensof the adopted State Without naturalization, and have a right to me and be suedascitizens: and ye!I/napi{vi/mull: qualificrl and no!ubm/nle. Tbr the 1c/annotenjoylhr rig/ll of flfllnflC or of eiirlltlJy to0172i wil/mu! Inn i tern of resirlent "unfilm” hcprevmifnibl y[hr ruiznlifulion llllll lawnof lhe Sluts iulo which theyplm/l re. nnr.Tncy shall have the privileges and immuniics ol citizens; that is. they shall nothe deemed aliens. but may talus and hOId real estate: and pray, according Io Il/r [(4104of such Slufe eventually enjoy the full rights of citizenship Without the necessit of beingnaturalized." 6Pickering. 92.Abbottvs. aylev. I now refer at some length to the views of the judges in the Passenger cases, 7 Howard, 466, which bear directly upon and illustrate this subject. After referring to the cases of Holmes vs. Jennison, 14 Peters, 540; Groves vs. Slaughter, 15 Peters, 44;): and Prigg vs. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16Peters, 639, Chief Justice Taney, remarks: "If these casesare to stand the right of the State is undoubted. Aud it is equally clear that. if it may removefromamongits citizens any personor description of persons whom it regard as injuiious to their welfare. it tollows that it may meet them at the threshold and prevent them from entering. For it will hardly besaid that the U.S. may permit them to enter and compel the State to receive them and that the State may immediately afterward expel them. There could be no reason of policy or humanity for compelling the States, by the power of Congress. To itnbibe the BO130", and thenleaving them to find a remedy for it y their own exertions and at their own expense. Certainly no such distinction can be lound In the Constitution and such udivision of power would be an inconsistency, not to say an absurdity, for which I presume no one will contend. If the State has the power to determine whether the persons objectedla is tall remain in theState in asso ciation with its citizensit must. as an incident inseparably connectedwith it. havetheright alsotodeter mine who shall enter. Indeed. in tbo enscot Grores as.Slaughter the Mississippi constitution grohibited the out of the ObJQOlIOIlale persons an the opinions oft to court throughout treat the exercise of this power as being the samewith that of expelling them after they have entered. "Neither can this be a concurrent power and whether it belongs to the General or to the State government, the sovereignty which possess the right must in its exercise be altogether independent of the other. If the U.S. have the power, then any legislation by the State in ronflictwith a treaty or act of Congress would be void and if States possessit, then any the actpn the subject by the Genera Government in conflict with the State law would also bevoid and this court bound to disrespect it. It mustbe paramount and absolutein the sovereignty which possesses it. A concurrent and equal power in the U.S and the States as to who should and who should not be crmitted to residein a State would be a direct can lot of powers, repug nnnt to each other, contgnuully thwartim! and de feating its exercise by either and could result in nothing but discord and confusion. “Again, ifthe State has the right to exclude from its bordersany personor persons whom it mny regard as dangerousto the safety of its citizens, it must no CPSHHHliHHVO thoright to decide when undtoward whom this power is to be exercised. It IS in Its ua ture a discretionary Ipowerto be exercisedaccordin to the judzment oft O party that possessesit. An it must. therefore, restwith the state to determine whether any particular class or description of personsare likely to producediscontent or insurrection in its territory or to taint the morals of its citizens or to bring among them contagious diseases, or the evils and burdensofa numerous pauper population. For if the General Government can. in any respect, or by any form of legislation. control or restrain a State in the exercise ottbis power, or decidewhether it has been exercisedwith proper discretion and to ward properpersons. nndon properoccasions, then the real and substantial liower would be in Congress and not in the States. n the cases decided in this court and herein bolore referred to, the power of determining who is or is not dangerousto the interest and well being of the people of the State has been uniformly admitted to reside in the State. "I think it. therefore.to be veayelenr. both upon principle und the authority of adiuzedeases that the severe States have a right to remove from nmoug their people, and to prevent from entering the Slate, any person or classor description of persons, whom it may deem dangerous or injurious to the interests and welfare of its citizens; and lhatt O exclusive right to determine. in its State has the sound discretion. whether the danger doesor does not exist. free tram the control of the General Government. Mr. Justice Grier, in the same case, said: " Itmustbe bornein mind (whnllms somct imcbseen forgotten)that the controversiin thisenscis not With regard to the right claimed y the State of Massachusetts in the 2nd section of i lll8act. to repel from her shores lunatics.idiots, criminals or pan ers, which any foreign country, or even one of her sister States.might endeavorto thrust upon her; our the right of any. etc, when (lunatic near slymiphl bd endangered b: the ndmiuion nffree near 00.10 exclude them fromer boy darn.Thin right of the Shim hf" W foundation in theon law Jualf defmc. Iv ughM power arauled loLnngrcucan ruh nmoramsul. “01 mittedbu ullthql those powers whichnlatotolrcly municipal leoulahoa, or what may be mnprm "1"11:2 infernal police fire notwr rendered or roslrniivrl; and { Hm![I in ancompete”I!lllll necessary ora SlnleIo ro, Itlle precautionary nvusuru(ignitinl themnrnlprstiencei qfpuuprra, urir/uboiulnc.ull cozmfell as fl is inmun i1 against the pIiflnh nl pestilence which may orlscfrom unsound (Ul infectious articles imported." Pags47. Justice Story, in delivering the opinion of the SCOTUS in the case of Prigg us. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 16 Peters, page 625, says; “ To guard. However against any possible miscon struotion of our views. it is proper to state that we are by no moms to be understood.in any manner whatever to doubt or to interfere with the police powerbeloiigincto the Stutes in virtucot their General sovercicnty. Thatpoliee power extends over all subects within the territorial limits of the States, and as never been conceded to the U.S. " Now, let it be remembered that in all these authorities it is assumed that the privileges and immunities referred to as attainn le in the States are required to be attained, if at all, according to the laws or constitutions of the States, and never in defiance of them. This bill rests upon it theory utterly inconsistent with and in direct hostility to every one of these authorities. ltasserts the right of congress to regulate the laws which shall govern in the acquisition and Ownership of property in the States and to determine who may go there and purchase and hold property, and to protect such persons in the enjoyment of it. The right of the State to regulatcits own internal and o mestic affairs, to select its own local policy, and make and administer its own laws for the protection and welfare of its own citizens is denied. If Congress can declare that rights and privileges shall be enjoyed in the States by the people of one class. it can by the same kind of reasoning determine what shall be enjoyed by every class. If it can say who may go into and settle in and acquire property in a State. it can also say who shall not. ltit can determine who may testify and sue in the courts of a State, it may equally determine who shall not. If it can order the transfer of suits from the State to the Federal courts, where citizens of the same State alone, nve arties, in such cases as may arise under this bill, it can by parity of logic dispense with the State courts entirely. Congress, in short, may erect a rent centralized, consolidated despotism in this capital and such is the rapid tendency of such legislation as this bill proposes. 1 now submit that I have established beyond successful controversy the propriety of my positions. But below I invite attention to the details of this bill, I must notice briefly on offier claim of constitutional authority for it. The entleninn from Pennsylvania [Mr. Tunas? has fairly won the distinction. in this debate, of having discovered a new fountain of congressional power. He informs us in effect that the 1st. e even amendments to the Constitution are grants of power to Congress: that they contain guarantees which it is the right and duty of Congress to secure and enforce in the States. Hitherto these amendments have been supposed by lawyers. statesmen, and courts, to contain only limitations on the power of congress. The history of the country teaches us that the people of the States feared that, by such vicious constructions as we new daily hear. Congress might usurppowers not. granted to it and thus peril the rights of the States and of their citizens; and therefore the States de manded these amendmentsas safeguardsagainst cucroachmeuts on the part of the General government. In almost every convention by which the Constitution was adopted, amendments to uard against the abuse of power by the General government were recommended. They were not intended to be, and they are not, limitations on the powers of the States. The are bulwarks Of freedom. erected by the peep e between the States and the Federal Government, and this bill is an attempt to prostrate them. What right has Congress to invade a State, and dictate to it how it shall protect its citizens in their right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due recess oflaw? Orwhat right has it to assume that a State will not do its duty to its citizens in these particulars, and then, upon such assumption, to usurp the functions ll of the State government? This bill attempts to do this thing. It applies to every State ii this Union. Are the States supposed to hays lost all interest in the welfare and protection of Llltll own citizens?