Mr. HENDERSON. No; a justice of the peace in the DistCol. They only refused to issue the writ of mandamus, because they decided that in that case under the Constitution, the Supreme Court had not original jurisdiction to issue the wnt of mandamus; that it had only an a pellate Jurisdiction. It is trite that e judiciary act of 1789 had attempted to give the Supreme Court the power to issue a writ of mandamus, but the court decided that the law in that respect was unconstitutional, because the Constitution only have original jurisdiction in certain cases, an to issue a writ of mandamus was not one of those cases; and that view has been taken in some 15 or 20 decisions between that time and this. But I read further: " The discretion of the Executive is tobe exercised until the appointment has been made. But having once madet ienppointment. his powerover the office is terminated in all cases where by law the officeris not removable byhim. The rightto the officeis then in the person appointed, and ho has the absolute, unconditional powerof acceptingor rejecting it." I am aware that the court decided in this caSFnnd I think wrongly, if I may be permit ted to differ from so able atcourt that the president. after the confirmation by the Senate, has, the right to withhold the commission, that they gipointing power is not complete until resident signs the commission. The cotuhret ! seems to have fallen into this error from the fact that the 2 clauses the one granting the a pointin power, and the other providing that the Presideut shall commission a lOfficers thus a pointed Occur in different portions of the constitution, a circumstance which iaine unts to nothing, in my view of the Constitution. The granting of a commission by the President is a ministerial duty which he is compelled to do when he makes an appointment to the Senate and the Senate confirms it. It is, in my judgment, the absolute duty of the President under the Constitution of the U.S. to issue the commission in such a case, though I am aware the court in this case took a contrar view, and said it was necessary thatthe President slinll have signed the commission and that it shall have been sealed in order to make it complete. Mr. Jefferson, in order to carry out this power of removal, continually resisted the idea Ithat a writ of mandamus could go against any of the executive officers from any ndicinltribunal whatever, which laid another oundation for error onthis subject, in myjudgment. When the President makes an appointment to an office, and the Senate confirm that appointment, it seems to me that the writ should go against the President to compel him to de iver the commissmn. The right seems to me i to be, then, entirely perfect and complete; and the absurdity of the opinion of the court is found in their own reasoning, because they say it is not necessary that the Officer shall have the commission in his pocket in order to discharge the duties of his office; that an appointment may be complete without the delivery of the commission; that it is not the same as the delivery of a deed in order to make a grant of land complete, but that a man may properly be in the discharge of the duties of an office before the actual elive of thh commission. But read further from this opinion. On page 166the court say: “If by law the officer be removable at the will of the President, then a new appointment maybe immediately made, and the rights of the O car are terminated. But as a fact which has existed cannot be made never to have existed. the an ointment cannot be annihilated: and consequenty, if the officer is by law not removable at the will of the President. the rights he has so acquired are rotccted by the law and are not resuma In by the resident. They cannot beextin uishodby exccutiveauthority and he has the privilere of asse iting them in like mannepiis if they had been derived from any other IOIHCO It will be observed that the court decided in this case that a justice of the peace in the DistCol appointed for 5 years, an office created h Congress, had a right to his office, after conrmation by the Senate, and a right against the President, and that the Pros ident could not defeat his right in cousequence of a refusal to deliver the commission. f that be so, by analogy of reasoning why is it that the POTUS has the power after the commission has been delivered and before the expiration of the term of office to remove? Is there any such right? Surcl this O )inion of the court has no meaning in it if such be the correct view. The question has been adjudicated several times, and I refer next to the opinion of the Supreme Court reported in 13 Peters, page 230. This is a case in which the samequestion came up, and I think the opinion of the court is perfectly clear. It was an application by Mr. Hennen for a rule upon the judge of the district court of the U.S. for the eastern district of Louisiana to show cause why a mandamus should not be issued against him requiring him to restore Mr. Hennen to the office of clerk of the district court. It seems that from 1834 to 1837 Judge Harperhad been judge of that district court, and having the appointment of the clerk of the court. he had exercised that right and had appointed Mr. Hennen clerk. Afterward Hon. P. K. Lawrence was appointed jud c, and immediately upon his appointment e removed Mr. Hennen and appointed Mr. Winthrop clerk. Mr. Hennen resisted the right to remove him, and asked for this rule. The Supreme Court decided, of course, as they had done in the previouse ase, that they had not authority to issue the writ; that it could not go; and they decided also that the district judge had 11 perfect right to remove the former clerk an to appomt a new one; but now I wish to read from the opinion of the court to show that in their view the appointing power is the only power that can remove; and if that be true wherever Congress reserves to the Senate the right of giving its advice and consent to a nomination, the Officer so appointed cannot be removed without the consent of the Senate. 1 read from the opinion at page 259 of 18 Peters: "It cannot for a momen the admitted that it was the intention of the Constitution that those oficcs which are denominated inferior officesshouldbeheld during life and if removableat pleasure.by whom; is one removal to be made? In the absence of all constitutional provision or statutory regulation. it would seemto e a sound and necessary rule to con1 sider the power of removal as incident to the poworl of appointment." The President cannot a point in some cases without the concurrence of the Senate. Where ever the concurrence of the Senate is necessary the Senate is a part of the appointing power, and if a part of the appointing power, the court say that the same power that appoints must necessarily, in the absence of any law on the subject, have the power to remove. Again, on the same page, the court say: “ In all theseDeptspower is given to the Secretary to appoint all necessary cler " Alluding to the power of the Secretaries of the hxecutive Depts. We have by law given to those Secretaries the power to appoint their own clerks; the Presidenthns nothing to do with it; and the court held that where we have done that the heads of the Depts have the power of removal. “ In all those Depts power is given to the Secretaryto appoint all necessaryclerks (1Story, 45:) and although no power to remove is expressly giovlednt.hyeeirt otfiheicrceactatnhebWoiulloanddoudbistctrheatitonthoeftsheeclheeraksd of the Dept. It would beamost extraordinary construction of the law that all these officeswere to be held during life, which must inevitably follow tniootneosfthe incumbent was removable at the discre the head of the Dept; the President has certainly no power to remove.” Why 1 Because he did notappoint; and he did riot appoint because the law puts the appointing power elsewhere, and having put it elsewhere, if the officer is to be removed he must be removed by the power that appoints. The courts a exressly that the power does not exist in t a resident to remove a clerk in one of the Depts; and yet it hasbeen claimed on the floor of the Senate, and Will be a in claimed, that the power existsin the Presideat to remove the head of a Dept and to put somebody there who will remove the clerks. deny. that proposition. I say it is defeating entirely the constitution; it is defeating the opinions of all or a large majority, of the distinguished founders ofourGovernment, leaving out Mr. Madison, and he surely, I admit, was as distinguished as any of them, and l give full weightto his opinions. It will be defeating the construction.given by the courts in later days to the appointing power; and in the case from which 1 was quoting the court contin"ue to say: These clerks fall under that class of  nferior ofll cers. the ii pointment of which the constitution authorizes Congressto vest in the head of the Dept. The samerule, asto the powerof removal. must be applied to officeswhere the appointment is vestedin the President alone." If Congress gives to the President the power to appoint inferior officers, not reserving the right to consent to their appointment on the part of the Senate, then, say the court, the resident has the right to remove of his own motion. Again the court say: "And the Constitution has authorized Courage, in certain cases. to vost this power in the President aloue.in the courts of law or in the headsof Depts and all inferior officers aplpointed under each, by authority of law. must hold their officoat the discretion of the appointing power. such is the sethod usageand practical construction of the Constituton and laws under which these officos are held.” I am aware that in the opinionof the court, in this case, they refer to the decision of congress in 1789, but they clearly give their dissent from the construction then sanctioned by congress. There is another opinion of the Supreme Court in 19 Howard, to which I will not refer; it is unnecessary to do so, because it establishes the same doctrine to which I have referred in the other 2 decisions. On this same question Judge Story, at page $00 of the 2nd volume of his Commentaries, section 1538, says: " Thelnngnage of the Constitutionis, 1hiit the Presldent shall nominate and by and with the adviceand consent of the Senate, appoint. 6w. 1 hp p9werto nominate does not naturally or necessarily include the power to remove: and if the power to appoint doesinclude it. than the latter belones coine intly tol the Executive and the Senate. In short. und csruch! circumstances the removal takes place in virtue ofl the now appointment by moreoperation oflaw. It FBSIiPE, an is not separable from the appointment ilse." It will be observed that Judge Story takes the round that if the President can remove at all, it is by virtue only of a new appointment, and inasmuch as that new nppomtmept has to come before the Senate for confirmation, if it is an office of that character which requires the confirmation of the Senate of course no removal can take place until the Sepate has confirmed the new appointment; that isto say, the effect of the confirmation by the Senate removes the officer, and the officer is not removed until that confirmation occurs. He says further, section 1539: " This was the doctrine maintained with great earnestness by the Foderalist; and it had tendency iiuiostiniiterial to quiet the pist alarms of the overwhelm iuu influence and arbitrary exerciseof this prerogative of tin; Executive. which might prove fatal to the personal independence and freedom of opinion of public officers.as well as to the public liberties of the country. Indeed, it is utterly impossible not to feel that if this unlimited power of removal does exist, it may bemnde.in the and sofa bold and designing man of high ambition and feeble principles, on in strument of the worst oppression and most vindictive vengeance. Even in monarrhics. while the councils of state are subject to perpetual fluctuations and cphanges.the ordinary officersof the Government are itted to remain in the silent possessionof their O cos.undisturbed by the policy or the mpsionsof the favorites of the court. But ina republic the where floedom of opipion and action is guarantied by the very 1st principles of the Government. if a successful partyma 1stelevatetheir candidate to officeand then make him the instrument of their ri sentinentsor their mercenary bargains; if men may be mades ies upon the actions of their neighbors to displace them from office; or if fawning sycophantsupon the popular leader of the day may am his patronage.to e exclusion of worth ier and a ler men.it is mostman lfest that elections will be corrupted at their very source, and those who seekofficewill have everymotive to delade and deceive the people. It was not. therefore. without reason that in the animated discussions already alluded to it was urged that the power of removal was incident to the pnwor of appointment: that it would beamost unjustifiable construction of the Constitution and of its implied powers to hold otherwise; that such a prorognliye in the Executive was in its own nature ine niirchicul and arbitrary, and eminently dangerous to the bestinterests as well as liberties of the country. It would convert all the officersof the country info the more tools and creaturesof the President. A dependence so servile on one individual would determen of high and honorable minds from engaging in the public service and if. contrar to expectation snc men should be brought into ii c.they would be reduced to the necessity of sacrificing every principleof independonce to the will of the Chie ngistrate or of exposing themselves to the CllSglflCoOfcing removed fiom office. and that. too. at a time when it might no longer be in their power to engagein otherpursuits." I read yesterday, Mr. President, from a speech of Mr. Webster in 1835. I desire now to read a little more from that same speech in regard to the polio of the exercise of such a power as is claims for the President: "The unlimited power to grant office and to take it away gives a command over the hopes and fears of u vast multitude of men. In the main it will be found that iower over a mans support is a power over his will. When favors once granted may be withdrawn at pleasure, there is ordinarily little security for personal independence of character. The power of giviu olhce thus affects the fears of all who are in niidf e hopes of all who are out; those who are out endeavor to distinguish themselves by active political friendship, by warm personal devotion, by the elaaiorous support of men in whose hands is the power of reward. while those who are in take care not to be surpassed in such qualities or conduct as will secure favor." Again: " The consequence of this is. that a competition ensues.not of patriotic labors. but of compliiisriness, of indiscriminate support of exccutiv measures, of pliant suhserviency and gross adulation. "The patronage of office, the power of bestowing place and emoluments creates parties. not upon any principle or any measure. but upon thesingleground of personal interest, and thus they form round a leader and go for the spoils of victory; if the party chicftain becomes the national chieftain, he is apt to consider all who oppose him as enemiestobe punished and all who have supportedhim as friends to be rewarded. “Blind devotion to a part and to the head of a party thus takes the place of the sentiment of genu knet patriotisnai nd a high and exalted state of public u y. I desire now to refer to one more authorit, and I shall relieve the Senate. I refer to the opinion of Judge Story, in his Commentaries, to justify the legislation that is attempted by this provision of gclredby the Senfrom Illinois. He says, on page 405 of volume 2, section 1544: “ Whether the predietiensof the original advocates of the executive power or those of the opposers of it are likel, in the future progress of the government. to be realized, must be left to the sober Judment of the community and to the impartial awar of time. If: there has beenany aberration from the true constitutional exposition of the power of remoynl.(which t a reader must decide for inise lf) it Will be difficult and perhaps imvneticable. after 40 years experience, to recall to practice to the correct the cry. But at all events. it will be a consolation to thosewho love the Union and honor the devotion to the patriotic discharge of duty. that in regardto inferior ofllcers (which appellation probably includes 99 out of 100 of the lucrative offices in the Government) the rained for any permanent abuse is still within the powerolY COngressI: the simple expedient of requiring the consent of e Senat to removalsin such cases.” Mr. President, I have ocen ied too much of the time of the Senate, but the question is an important one. Iknow perfectly well that this proposition will be attacked all over the country, and it will be declared that it is an effort on the part of the Senate to curb unconstitutionall the power of the Executive. As I stated yesterday, I have no war to make upon the executive; I have made no war in this body or elsewhere upon the Executive; but I have felt for many years that if this practice is to go on, whenever a President comes into office, of removing all Officers who disagree with him in political opinion, however meritorious they may be, however deserving the confidence of the country; if the public offices are to be given as mere rewards for party fenlt and without consideration of merit it will ultimately lead to a destruction of our government. I believe this as conscientiously as I believe any fact on earth; and it is not for the purpose so especially of curbing the present Executive as to curb any Executive who may come after him that I favor the amendment. The Senfrom Marland said yesterday that this precedent would return to lague the inventors. I hope so. If the next executive shall be elected, as the present one was, receiving my vote, I de sire thst this same curb shall aply to him, and I pledge the SenfromMaryland that if this proposition is adopted no vote of mine, so long as hold a place here or elsewhere where I can affect the ( question, will ever be given to confer upon the President an absolute power of removal. It is clear that we have the power to legislate on this subject. I have shown it from the contemporaneous histor of the Government. I have shown it from the opinions of all the leading men of all political parties. vI have shown it from the legislation of the country. It was only 3 sessions ago that we passed an act in regard to the Comptroller of the currency, that Mr. Lincoln should not remove him: without the consent of the Senate. I know it was modified the session afterward, and it now stands that the President must give his reasons for such removal to the Senate, without retaining for ourselves that power which we right fully hold of preventing the removal entirely. I cannot doubt that we possess this right. If this assumed power of removal by the President was a dangerous power in days gone by, how much more dangerous has it now be, comcl I disagree with the Senfrom Ohio and the Senfrom maryland that patronage of this character is calcu ated to weaken the man who holds the power of dispensing it. I think I have shown from the opinions of Judge Story, from the o inions of Mr. Webster, from the opinions of Mr. Calhoun, (which I might read to substantiate the others if it were necessary.) that they believed from circumstances surrounding them at the particular time that it degraded the American O aracter; thatit was calculated to make clamoreus partisans of the Executive of all men who happened to hold office for fear they might be removed; it took away the independence of those who were in office and made mere slaves and barnacles of those who were out. We see plenty of it now. It is not worth while for us to disguise the fact; we knew there is the greatest abundance of it at this day. We know that individuals in office who, judging from their past course, do not.at heart agree to the policy of the Executive, have become clamorous advOcates of it, and we know also that individuals who are outside have become clamorous advocates of the Presidents policy for the merepurpiise of obtaining office. fany incumbent O any office anywhere in the land stands in Opposition to the Presidents policy, there is somebody ready to take his place, and read to declare his fealt to the pass on that policy, because it does not legitimately come in the purview of my argument. I have nothing to do with it on this occasion. I have attempted to examine this question legally and historically, and I think I have shown beyond all doubt to the in rejndiced mind that the power proposed to e exerted exists in Congress. ow, are we to exercise it or not? That is the question. Are the circumstances of the country such as to induceus to exercise it? I say they are. I am not afraid to take my position on this subject. I have nothing to ask from the present Executive in the way of patronage; and I can safelyJexpress the o inion here that if I had the resndent would not grant it. Iam satisfied from various appointments that have been made in in own State, and from appointments that I anderstand are to be made in that State, that nothing I could say would have any influence whatever. Gentlemen may say that is the reason why I insist upon this reposition. We have bad a bitter contest in t 10State of Missouri; we have had a bitter contest in this nation; it has been a contest for the life of the nation itself; and ifpatronage is to be distributed, I for one am frank to say that if it is in my power to prevent its going into the hands of those who, during the last 4 or 5 years have advocated a policy antagonistic to my own and antagonistic to the nation, to the existence and salvation of liberty on tbIs continent, I will prevent that. I do not Wish to be misunderstood. I do not wish gentlemen to misunderstand the positionI occupy here. I am frank. I have nothing to ask of anybody; Iain indebted to nobody; feel dependent on nobody; butI desire to see the fruits of the victory we have achieved in this late contest garnered up and kept in the future for the preservation of liberty and of freedom in this nation, and that they shall not turn to ashes upon our lips. I do conse ientious! believe that the policy entered upon by the resident is well calculated to dash the hopes of the Union men of this nation. I have often said, and I now take occasion to repeat, that it is not my belief that the President intends by his course of policy, whatever it may be, to put under his heels the Union men of this land, and fobuild up the old rebel party. I have never so said, nor do I now say it; but I say that the effect of his policy is just that thing and nothing else. He has adopted a policy for the restoration of the southern States. congress claims to have something to do with it; the President thinks not; and he persists in forcing upon us a system of policy to which we object and which we believe will put in power our enemies, not only in this branch, but in the other branch of the legislature also.