Mr. WILLIAMS. This section it will be observed consists of 2 propositions. The 1st makes the heads of the several Depts irremovable at the mere pleasure of the President. Having thus made them, as I think, practically independent, then the 2nd clause authorizes them to appoint, as they have unuestionably a right under the Constitution to o, the subordinates in their respective Depts. This clause is so framed as to take it out of the rule or precedent established by the Congress of 1789, to the effect that in the ab sence of any statutory provision or of any legislation defining the term of office the President might remove at will. I. propose here, in order to obviate all possible difficulty on this ground, to define the term as it stood originally in the bill in these words, “for the term of 4 years.” It was suggested by my friendfrom Iowa and other gentlemen that there would be a difficulty at the incoming of an Administration. I have endeavored to obviate that by so modifying the section as to confine the period to “the official term of the President by whom they were appointed.” The 2nd clause is an amendment. If the 1st should prevail I see no reason why the other should not prevail also. If, in other words, the heads of the Depts can be lifted from their present abject attitude and made independent of the Executive, then I see no reason against conferring the appointing power upon those officers. Under our present legislation and under the precedent that has already been established, so far as regards the postoffice Dept, we know in some few cases, where the salary is some 1,000 or 2,000 dollars, the appointments are made by the PostMGenl without any supervisory power or power of revision in any uarter, except it be on the part of the presient himself, and I think the experience of the country shows how this power has been exercised. I think there ought to be a limitation on it. I propose, therefore, that no appointments shall be made except subject to the approval of the Senate, and no removals except upon the same terms. When I offered this amendment, or when it came up yesterday in another form, in regard to this point of making the heads of the depts independent of the President, I confess I was a little surprised and I trust I may be pardoned for saying a little pained at the result of the vote, which was taken in a thin House. I was not allowed the privilege, or perhaps I ought to say I did not claim it in time, for having the yeas&nays on the question, and the gentlemen from Iowa, with the aid of the gentlemen upon the other side of the House, was enabled to defeat the proposition. I propose, as I said, to make these appointments independent. The Gentfrom Iowa, in his remarks yesterday, had something to say in reference to the confidential relations of these officers to the President. He seemed to think that they were intended to be confidential advisers of the President. I do not know that any such thing as advisers of the President is represented by the Government. I suppose the President may take advice elsewhere, and if he should take such advice he would perhaps be better advised than some Presidents have been.