Mr. WILLIAMS. I suppose that the senator intends by his remarks to suggest that this authority is not applicable to the question before the Senate, but I claim that it is applicable because these identical persons were appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and therefore this decision relates to the same class of officers contemplated by this bill, and for that reason this is an authority in point. I cannot see why Mr. Madison, notwithstanding the views that he expressed at an early day, did not assume in this case that he had no power to remove these officers after they had been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. His manifest object was to keep these men from having their offices, and he undertook to ef. fectuate that object by withholding their com: missions; but if the doctrine that is now prac: ticed upon had then been recognized, instead of doing that he would at once have removed those officers and appointed others in their places, for that is the rule at the present day. W. are nominated to the Senate; the Senate advises and consents to their nomination, and the President, if he sees proper, instead of withholding the commission, at once removes them and appoints other persons in their places. If Mr. Madison had recognized any such authority in the President, he would have pursued that course instead of attempting to defeat these appointees by withholding their commissions. Now, sir, I refer to another case in 17 How ard's Reports, the case of the U.S. vs. Guthrie, where this question was elaborately argued, but not decided, by the court, but in the opinion of Mr. Justice McLean he refers to this subject and the authorities upon the point; and I invite the attention of the honorable Senfrom Maryland to what Mr. Justice McLean there said: “It was supposedthat the exercise of this power by the President” And he is discussing the power of removal “was necessaryfor the efficient discharge of executive duties. That to consult the Senate in making removals, thesameas in making appointments, would be too tardy for the correction of abuses. By a tem porary appointment the ". service is now provided for in case of death, and the same provision could be made where immediate removalsare necessary. The Senate, when called to fill the vacancy would pass upon the demerit of “This the late incumbent. I have never doubted was the true construction of the Constitution, and I am able to say the opinion of the late SupremeCourt, with at its head.” This statement of Justice McLean is either false or true, and he had an ample opportunity to know whereof he affirmed; and I say that he declares that the SCOTUS, with Chief Justice Marshall at its head, was of the opinion that the POTUS could not exercise the unlimited power of removal., Sir, you may bring on the opinions of your Attorneys general and the arguments and speeches of your politicians, and I overwhelm them all with the authority of the SCOTUS, with Chief Justice Marshall at its head, a court that towered in its wisdom and purit above the partisan clamor and strife by !. it was surrounded, as Teneriffe towers above the noisy, and impotent waves that break around its base. Now, sir, it is admitted by honorable Senators who contend for the existence of this power that there is no express provision for it in the Constitution. But the great argument that has been offered time and again and repeated here from day to day is, that it be inconvenient for the President not would to have and to exercise this power. Sir, can a power of this magnitude be incorporated into the Constitution upon the argument ab enti, incomrani because it is inconvenient that such a power should not exist? It is inconvenient very often that other powers which do not exist cannot be exercised by different depts of the Government. Take for instance, if you please, the election of a representative from any State, the State in which I live, where the law requires a candidate to have a majority, and suppose no man at the election receives a majority. It is inconvenient for the State not to be represented in Congress; but does it therefore follow that the Governor has a right to appoint a member of Congress? When the electoral body has decided that there shall be no election, then can it be argued on the it was arshall ground of inconvenience that the Executive shall have the power of appointment? Take many other cases that have occurred, where the 2 branches of a legislative assemblyfail to agree in the choice of a Senator; it is exceedingly inconvenient to the State to be without its whole senatorial representation in Congress; but it has been time and again decided by this body that the Executive had no power of appointment in that case. Take the case of my honorable friendfrom NewJersey whose election is now pending, Mr. FRELINGhuysen;] suppose the Legislative Assembly of that State now in session does not effect any election at all; it will be inconven ient for that State to be without one of its Senators on this floor; but the Governor of NewJersey would have no power to fill the vacancy, because the legislative body whose province it was to elect chose not to elect, and that choice is the judgment of the State constitu.tionally expressed that there shall be no representation in the Senate so far as that office is concerned. It is very inconvenient, when we pass bills here by a large majority, in accordance with the wishes. interests of the people, to have the President interpose his veto; but the constitution gives him that right; and can we, be: cause it is inconvenient, because it is contrary as we believe to the will of the people for him to exercise his power in that way to defeatour legislation, disregard the veto of the President and treat it as a nullity? I might multiply cases where it is inconven ient for certain powers to exist, or for certain powers not to exist; but the fact that there is some inconvenience attending the one or the other does not prove that one or the otherdoes or does not exist. When you come to consider the argument as to the inconveniences thatmay result from the enactment of this law, you must remember that there are other inconveniences and abuses that exist because there is no such law which threaten to change our republican Government into a practical despotism. Sometimes it is argued that this power be: longs to the President because the Constitu,tion declares that the executive power shall be vested in a single person who shall be called the Executive of. States. I answer any argument that may be derived from that source by saying that the clause of the Con; stitution referred to was evidently intended simply to create the office and not to confer power, because it is followed by other provisions defining and describing the powers of the office, and similar phraseology is employed as to this as is employed in creating the other depts of the Government; and besides that, I find by reference to the proceedings of the Convention that this portion of the Consotution when it was reported was in these words: “that there shall be instituted an executo dept to consist of a single person; which was referred to the Committee on Style and that committee changed the phraseolo substituting the word “vested.” for “instituted, ” and it was passed without questio, showing that the Convention understood the word “vested” in that connection to be equi". alent to the word “instituted, ” and did no understand it to convey any other or greater power than was conveyed by words necesso to create the executive dept of the Government. Ali executive powers are defined and do scribed in the Constitution, and I claim, theo. fore, that a new and independent power cannot be drawn to the Executive by mere infereo or by some imaginary reason for its existo". Whatever idea may obtain in a country who the Government is a monarchy or a despoo." as to executive power, that idea canno be adopted in this country, for the Executo here is as much under constitutional limitation; any other dept of the Government.” it was so intended by the finen who ftamo". Constitution. Beyond question they do. mined to restrict and control the Pro for Mr. Franklin is reported to have said, notwithstanding the provisions which the Constitution contains, that the country was about to try an experiment with an Executive that would end in monarchy. The Constitution, as it will be seen, does not confer upon the President the power of appointment. I know that in common par lance it is said that the President appoints an officer, but the Constitution does not give him that power. It provides that “he shall nom inate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint.” The President names persons for offices. A name is transmitted to the Senate; but whether or not that person so named shall fill the office for which the President designates him is the province of the Senate to determine. I say that the Constitution of the U.S., not in phrase ology perhaps as explicit as might be employed, practically constitutes the Senate an electoral body, and when a name is submitted the senators proceed to vote, and if a majority vote in favor of the appointment of a man nomi nated the Constitution contemplates that he is appointed; if a majority vote against his appointment he is not appointed; and so the power over the appointment is in the Senate of the U.S. Now, sir, if it is claimed that the Constitution confers upon the President the power of ap: pointment in any of its general clauses, I will ask the honorable Senfrom Pennsylvania what it means when it provides that “the congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone?” Does not the Constitution clearly convey the idea that the President alone has no power to appoint unless that power is conferred by Congress? To assume that under the Constitution the President has the absolute power of appointment in all cases is to make the Constitution, so far as this clause is concerned, perfect nonsense; for if all power to appoint was conferred upon the President by the Constitution it would be absurd to confer such power in specific cases. Why should Congress be authorized to confer a power which is already in the hands of the Executive by virtue of the Constitution? It is to be remembered, too, that the President is authorized to fill vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate. I argue that if entire power of appointment was in the hands of the President it would not be necessary to specify these particular cases in which he should exercise the power, and the inclusion of these cases is the exclusion of all others. Sir, it seems to me, when you put a reasonablo construction upon the clauses referred to in the Constitution, there is no escape from the conclusion that in all other cases, except where it is otherwise specially provided, persons must be appointed to office upon the nomination of the E.by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. To concede the power of removal to the President is to concede the absolute power of appointment. Assume that the POTUS may, without the advice and consent of the Senate, remove a man from office, and you exnecessitate rei assume that he may make an appointment to fill the vacancy so created. Let us illustrate this view by the course of the present Executive. During the recess of the Senate he removed good men from office upon party grounds and then appointed his own creatures to fill the vacancies so made by granting to them commissions that would expire at the end of the next session of the Senate. The nominations of some of these creatures were rejected by the Senate and thereupon the President, instead of nominating other persons, waited until the Senate adjourned, and then reappointed the persons so rejected, thus at his own will displacing good men and perpetuating his own creatures in office in spite of all efforts of the Senate to prevent it. Sir, if the President can exercise the power in one case he can in all cases. I object, therefore, to this right of removal on the part of the President, because it necessarily involves the right of absolute and unlimited appointment, and I am confident that the Senfrom Pennsylvania will not contend that the Constitution contemplates that the Executive should possess any such power. 2 ideas are made prominent in the clause which provides that the President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate by grantin commissions which will expire at the end of their next session. Let it be observed that this clause does not confer upon the President the power of appointment, but he may “fill up vacancies, ” clearly implying that it is a tem porary arrangement required by the necessity of the case, that it is only to continue until the advice and consent of the Senate can be taken; otherwise the Constitution would declare that the President might make an appointment to fill a vacancy. But, sir, another idea which is made prominent by this section is, that this power is to be exercised within a given time “to fill up vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate;” no other vacancies. Any vacancy that may happen during the recess of the Senate the President may fill; and the clear intent of that clause of the Constitution is that as to time his power shall be lim ited until the next session of the Senate. I say that there are 2 noticeable ideas in this clause as to vacancies. One is that this filling up is to be temporary; and the other that it is to be exercised within a given time; and it is in disregarding this last idea that the President pretends to find his power to fill an office at any time that is not filled by a person appointed by and with the advice of the senate. What is the use of taking the advice of the Senate as to an officer if as soon as the advice is taken that officer can be removed by the President and another appointed in his place without consulting the Senate? such a power in the Senate is a shadow and a mock ery. I understand this clause as to vacancies of the Constitution to be intended simply to bridge over that space of time which may intervene between different sessions of the senate; but when this designation, or appointment if you choose, is made during the recess then when the Senate convenes the control of the President over that vacancy ceases, and it then becomes a question between the President and the Senate as to whether the vacancy shall or shall not be filled. The Senfrom Maryland suggested that this clause ought to be construed as though it read, “vacancies that happen to exist;” and that the construction contended for by those who advocate this bill was equivalent to saying “any vacancy that may happen to occur.” Now, to say that a vacancy happens to occur is simply to say that it happens; but when you speak of a vacancy that happens to exist you speak of a vacancy without any reference to the time when it originated. Take the reading of the Senator, and the President has the power to fill any vacancy; but the reading for which I contend restricts his power to certain vacancies; a certain time is described. The power is to be exercised with reference to that time. Now, sir, can it be said with any propriety that when the POTUS, for personal ends or party objects, deliberately removes a man from office, and so makes a vacancy, that the vacancy has hap pened? “Vacancy” here, as connected with the word “happen, ” implies some casualty, something unforeseen, something like the death or resignation of the incumbent. So far as the expiration of term is concerned, it happens as to the President. Whenever an office during the recess of the Senate is made vacant by any power over which the President has no control, then a vacancy happens as to him; but when he proceeds and by his own deliberate act creates a vacancy, then it does not happen, but it is made. Sir, you might as well o: that when the husbandman plants his seed and cultivates his crop that the har vest which follows “happens” to him; or you might as well argue that when the mechanic proceeds deliberately and carefully to construct a watch that upon its completion it happens to him. When the POTUS, consulting with his political friends, concludes that the removal of a certain man from office is necessary to advance the interests of his party, otherefore proceeds to remove him and make a vacancy, how it can be said that a vacancy then happens is more than I can understand; and to say that is doing violence to the English language and to the common sense of all men who can read the Constitution. Commissions granted during vacancies expire at the end of the next session of the Senate. One question involved in this bill is, whether or not, when the vacancy is not filled at the session after it happens, the President can afterward proceed and appoint a person to fill the office upon the assumption that the place is vacant. I have before said that when a nomination is submitted to the Senate by the President, and the Senate refuses to agree to that nomination, refuses to elect anybody to fill the office, it must then be concluded that it is the judgment of that body that the office shall not at that time be filled. Whether the Senate acts wisely or unwisely is not material to the question; whether they ought or ought not to make such a decision is of no consequence; but if they do so decide they only exercise their constitutional power, and it is to be presumed that the decision is made for good reasons and ought to stand, notwithstand ini the objections of the President. deny that the POTUS, by virtue of the Constitution, has any power of removal. I affirm, and it will not be denied, that the existence of that power involves the existence of the absolute power of appointment, and the Constitution is thus made to defeat itself. All the Constitution says about the action of the Senate as to appointments amounts to nothing if you find within its provisions any power in the President to make removals at is individual will or pleasure. I do not understand that this absolute power of removal has ever been contended for until within a late period. if I am not mistaken as to the history of the country, removals without cause aver aged about 2 for each Administration for the 1st 40 years of the Government; and general Washington, instead of removing an officer during the recess of the Senate when he was found to be unfit to discharge its duties, suspended him, as this bill provides that the President shall now suspend in such a case. He did not claim this extraordinary power of removal; it was not claimed by his successors until within a comparatively late period; and in the discussions of 1789 it was not contended by Mr. Madison that the President had the unlimited power of removal; but it was argued that if an officer was incompetent or dishonest he might be removed by the President. When there was good cause the President, it was said, might remove; but it was admitted then by the advocates of this power that if the POTUS, for any other purpose than to subserve the public interests, displaced a good officer it would be ground for impeachment. This is the view of the subject taken by the founders of the Republic. Some of them claimed that the President could exercise this power but only where there was cause. Now it is claimed that the President has the unlimited control of all the officers in the government, and that he may remove any or all of them at his pleasure and without any reason or any cause. This bill only undertakes to control what has been confessed by the advo cates of this power to be an abuse of the executive authority. What does it propose to do? Take it altogether and it amounts prac tically to this: that the President shall not remove persons from office without cause; but whenever an officer should be dismissed from the performance of his duties and another person put in his place this bill provides that it may be done. It provides for every case where the public necessities or interests demand a change, and it only prohibits the abuse of executive power. I presume that no Senator will contend that Congress cannot prohibit by law the abuse of his authority by any officer of the Government. Acknowledge, if you please, that the president has the power of removal, then cannot Congress by legislation declare and provide that he shall not abuse that power? It was admitted by Mr. Madison, and, for 40 years after the Constitution was formed, by every body, that a removal from office for personal ends or party purposes was an abuse of executive authority, and was a violation of the spirit if not the letter of the Constitution. Now, sir, all we propose to do is simply to prohibit and prevent the abuse of that power. f referred to the case of exparte Hennen, where the power of removal was held to be an incident of the power of appointment. All respectable authorities sustain that position. Now, is that law or not? Will some of these honorable Senators who contend for the existence of this power in the President tell me whether that opinion of the Supreme Court, deliberately pronounced, is or is not the law of the land? I assume that it is the law, because it has been sustained by other authorities and is not denied; and if it be the law, then I say that this bill stands upon an immov able foundation, because the power of apointment is undeniably vested in the president and Senate of the U.S. One cannot appoint without the other. Now, is it good logic to argue that the power of removal is incident to the power of appointment the power to appoint is in the President and senate, and therefore the President has the right to remove? Is it not just as good logic to argue that the power of removal is incident to the power of appointment the President and Senate appoint, and therefore the Senate may remove? But, sir, the correct logic is, that the power of removal is incident to the power of appointment; the President and Senate appoint, therefore the President and Senate may remove. There is no constitutional prohibition, there is no statutory regulation upon this subject, to prevent the application of that doctrine; and I say that.gentlemen can overthrow the opinion of Alexander Hamilton, the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Marbury vs. Madison, the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of exparte Hen men, they cannot escape from the conclusion that the consent of the Senate is necessary to the removal of an officer to whose appointment it was necessary to have the advice and consent of the Senate. The Constitution provides for certain appointments, but Congress is authorized to provide for certain other appointments. All the clauses of the Constitution bearing upon this subject contemplate that much of the control of the a power is to be in Congress. Where the President appoints, he is to appoint with the advice and consent of the Senate; but Congress may confer the appointment of certain officers upon the President alone or upon the heads of Depts; and so the Constitution recognizes the legislative control of Congress over this question. Congress has power to create an office; Congress has power to define the tenure of that office; and I ask why Congress has not power to say that when a man is appointed to an office which it has created, and the tenure of which it has fixed, he shall not be removed before the expiration of his term? Tell me, if you can, where in the Constitution can be found any provision that deprives Congress of this right. Does not the power to create an office necessarily imply a to declare when and how it shall be lled? Does not the power to create an office necessarily embrace the power to declare that when a man, upon the nomination of the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, is appointed to fill it, he shall hold that office until by and with the advice and consent of the Senate he is removed? I hope, Mr. President, that Senators who argue this question on the other side will not fail to notice this distinction. The question is not so much as what the Constitution does or does not provide, or as to what the constitution does or does not confer upon the President, but the question is, has the congress of the U.S. the power under the constitution to create offices and declare during what time the persons appointed to fill shall hold those offices? All that this bill proposes is simply to say, in substance, that when a man, under, the Constitution, upon the nomination of the President, is appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, he shall hold until his successor is nominated by the President and appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and I ask any reasonable man if that is not what the Constitution contemplates. I say it is a plain perversion of the Constitution when, under that clause which authorizes the President to fill vacancies, he undertakes to absorb all the power of the appointment and ignores and disregards the and will of the Senate. I have briefly and hastily gone over the grounds on which I assume that this legislation is within the constitutional power of congress; and surely its necessity is apparent. The honorable Senfrom Pennsylvania, [Mr. Buck ALEw, ] who will address the Senate upon this subject, is too candid to stand up here and say that there is no necessity for such legislation, because the encroachments of the executive power upon the legislative in this respect, if in no other, are alarming; and the abuse of executive patronage is tending to undermine our institutions and is producing a demoralizing and disastrous effect upon the best interests of the country. I shall not, therefore, undertake to argue the necessity of this legis.lation. Everybody knows what is transpiring and what has occurred since the last session of the Senate. 100s of officers, good and true men, have been removed without any cause, and greatly to the prejudice of the public service, simply to promote certain party ends and purposes; and others who were nominated and rejected by the Senate at its last session have been reappointed; and in this high handed way the interests of the country have been sac rificed and the authority of the Senate contemned to subserve the purposes of an ambi tious, unscrupulous Executive. And if this F.which has been growing every year and as at last assumed its present formidable proportions, is allowed to go on unchecked, the time is not far distant when the Senate of the U.S. will become a cipher and the President a perfect despot, so far as the offices of the Government are concerned. Sir, this bill is only intended to vindicate the constitutional power of the Senate. We have more light on this subject than the men who made the Constitution. Sir, they were good men and patriots, but they were born and educated under a monarchical form of government. Some of them had certain ideas about the executive power derived from their education. I do dot intend to impeach their wisdom, but they lacked our experience. We have seen the operation and effect of this power; we have seen how dangerous it can become in the hands of a bold, bad man; we have seen how it can be used to debauch the public mind. When the mischief is so great and obvious it is our duty, regardless of precedents, to apply the rem edy. Believing that there is nothing in the provisions of this E. which is in conflict with the Constitution, I hope that it will become a law. I trust it will not be regarded as any mere party measure, but as an honest effort to brin back the Government to the purposes an views of the men who made it.