Mr. SHERMAN. In the case. by the Senator the President was at perfect liberty to appoint him to another office. Governor Johnston was appointed a collector of internalrevenue; he was not confirmed; the reasons for that rejection we are not at liberty to debate here in open Senate. He was afterward appointed to another office, and nobody blames the President for that. My impression was, when the Senator 1stmentioned the case of Governor Johnston, that he had been nomi nated to us as eollector of the port of Philadelphia before we adjourned last summer. It seems I was mistaken in that; if so, what I said would not apply to his case; but we know that a nomination of a person to be a collector of internalrevenue in Philadelphia was submitted to us, was fully considered and rejected, and yet that person was appointed after we adjourned. ere was a similar case in Cincinnati. If we strike out this clause, on the motion of my friendfrom Indiana, shall we not be in yolved in this trouble? I see the difficulty that he desires to guard against, and I should like to do it. We might do it either by providing in all cases who shall succeed an ofter in the event of his death or resignation or vacation of the office, or we might do it by allowing the President to fill that office. Iff believed that the President would do it and act in concert with the Senate, that he would regard the deliberate judgment of the Senate, and in each case where we rejected one appointment would select another person and send his name in, then in case there was not before the adjournment a concurrence between the President and the Senate, after a reasonable and fair effort to produce such concurrence, I should be willing to allow the President to fill the vacancy on the adjournment of the Senate until the close of the next session; but when it appears that there is a disposition to disregard and utterly ignore the action of the Senate in the matter of appointments, I am not disposed to do it. It is true. we may bring upon the American people some difficulty by vacating offices whose continued existence is important to the revenue and the public service; but in the language of the Senfrom NewJersey, it. i be better that the oof the U.S. should submit to this temporary inconvenience than that the power of the Senate over appointments should be entirely overthrown. The concurrence of the President and the Senate is essential to the making of any officers above those regarded as inferior by the Constitution. The Constitution so emphatically declares. We cannot act upon a construction of the Constitution which places this great political power in the hands of the President alone, but must construe the Constitution and must legislate so as to give full effect to the Constitution by dividing this enormous power between the Senate of the U.S and the POTUS I shall not therefore, under the circumstances by which we are surrounded, vote to strike out this clause, because I believe that the temporary inconvenience of having offices not filled for a time is far less than the danger from the unlimited power of the Executive over all the offices of the U.S.