Mr. COOK. The Gentfrom Kentucky says that the proposuion is unconstitutional, and he called upon me for the clause in the Constitution upon which I placed the authority to pass this bil. I now cite it for the gentleman. The 8th section of the 1st article of the Constitution provides that Congress shall have power to provide for callin out the mi litia to execute the laws of the inion and to suppress insurrection, and section 2 of article 3 provides that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the U.S. It was Democratic in 1833 to enact that all revenue officers and all persons aidin and assisting them in the execution of the uties of their office should be entitled to a trial in the U.S. courts when charged with injuring citizens of a State in the execution of the revenue laws. That law was passed by a Democratic congress and approved by Presi I: is exceedingly strange that should be unconstitutional and antiDemocratic now. But says the Gentfrom Kentucky the law of 1833 related to the collection of the revenue. But will he seriously contend that it is constitutional to give the Federal courtsjurisdietion to try men for acts done under the revenue laws of the U.S and unconstitutional to give the Federal courys jurisdiction to try men j for acts done under the laws which were t n. acted to suppress the rebellion? That question has been passed upon; the law of 1803 gives the jurisdiction. This bill gives no new jurisdiction; but if it did, the acts of 1833and 1863 are both undeniably constitutional. The wou der is this, that the question should be raised by men who claim to be the representatives of the men who enacted the law of 1838.lack son men condemning one of the leading measures of General Jacksons administration. But it is said that this is an arpostfaclo law. I always supposed that an expostfacto law was one that imposed a new punishment for an offense committed before the passage of the law, and that it did not apply to remedies, and that it was clearly competent for the Legislature to change the remedy in any case, and to take awaythe remedy entirely, except in cases where such repeal of the remedy would impair the obligation of n contract. This I understand to I be the law. But the question whether this bill is retroactivedoes not arise fairly. U in its face this act is precisely like the acts of 1833 and 1863. Both laws provided for cases that had occurred before as well as for those that should occur after the assage of the bill. If this bill is retroactive, tiose acts are. But this is all aside from the real question. The act of 1863 and this act are merely designed to regulate and define the evidence. It is admitted that any act done under the authority of the Government of the U.S. in suppressing the rebellion does not subject any man to personalliability. This principle is distinctly stated by the Gentfrom Kentucky. Now, this bill and the act of 1863 only provide that the order of a commanding oficer commanding an act to be done shall be conclusive evidence that the act was done under the authority of the U.S., a principle as old as the courts. A. writ fair on its face was always a full justification to the officer executing it, however improvidently issued, and a man should be protected from personalliability for acts which he was compeled to perform by military order. The cases cited by the Gentfrom Kentucky of men who had been killed wantonly and unnecessarily by men who were ordered simply to make an arrest have no application. The military order justifies only the act which is ordered to be done, notan excess of force. In the case stated an arrest could be justified, but not an unnecessary killing. It is said that this bill greatly extends the act of1863. That the order of the President should be a justification, but not the order of a commandingofficer; or, ine therwords, thatthe Generalwho has the order of the President shall be protected, but the subaltern or private who acts and must act under the order of his military superior shall not be protected. If this be so, it is wrong. We should afford the same protection to the subordinate officer or the private soldier in executing the orders of his commanding officer as is given to the general who is executing the direct order of the resident. Upon what principle of equity is it that we protect the man who is able to protect himself and leave 1,000s of oor men who have fought for the Union, an whose property has been wasted, and whose homes dbstroyed by rebels, defenseless in the power of men who are as much their enemies now as when they stood op osed in the strife of war? Mr. LEBLOND. Will the Gentfrom Illinois permit me to ask him a question?