Mr. HARDING, of Kentucky. Very well. Now, sir, the next clause of the Constitution declares that the “ Judicial power shall extend to.all cases in law and equity BHHIHRunder the Cpnstiiutiop and laws “to a Not more of the U.S.;" cases nffectingambassadors.other publi c m ini sters, nunrtilsdeoientsiounls:: ttoo aclol nctarsoevseorfsiaedsintoirawhtyicahntdhme a U.S shall be a party; to controversics between two or more States: between nState and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States: between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of differcut States." 3:0. Now, there is the limitation of the judicial plower to be exercised by the courts of the U.S. The only exception to be found in the Constitution relates to citizens of the same State claimin land under grants from different States. 11no other case can the courts of the U.S. take jurisdiction in controversies between citizens of the same State. But here you propose to confer uris diction upon the circuit courts of the U.S. in regard to all matters of tort and tres pass between citizens of the same State, in regard to all actions relating to the rights of person and property that can arise between citizens of the same State; while under the Constitution the only exceptional case where the Federal courts have jurisdiction in controversies between citizens of the some State is the solitary instance where citizens of the same State claim lands under grants from different States. But I will call attention to some remarks made by the Gentfrom Illinois [Mr. COOK] yesterday on this subject. He says: “There are but 2 principles embodied in this bill. Both principles are embodied in the bill of 1833.which received the sanctionof Conzrcssand the assent of President Jackson." Now, in regard to the act of 1833 there is nothing retroactive in its provisions. More over, in regard to that force billof course there would be Jurisdiction in the Federal courts under it, because it was a law of Congress for the collection of revenue on imports, and all otheers and others engaged in executing it would be acting under the authority of the U.S. It is not at all like this case. The gentleman says further: "The 1st principle is that the U.S. will protoct its officers in executing its laws and maintaining its authority." That I deem asound principle. The U.S. will protect its officers in the adminis tration of its laws and the execution of its authority. I do not gainsa that. But what is the case here? This bill is framed on the express ground, conceded on its very face. that these orders relied on were issued by officers without authority of law, either civil or Military; and yet they are made a valid defense. The language of t ie bill is, “any order from any Officer shall be of itselfa complete defense, ” although that order maybe in utter violation of nlllaw. Now, the difficulty is this: that there is no more authority for the order than for the not done under it. Both are equally violations of law. In addition to the cases Imentioned yesterday, I willmention one or 2 others. a great many officers of the U.S. have been in our State, some of them very good men, others ver bad, like all other men in that respect. at this bill places the authority of every officer from the highest to the lowest exactly on a or with the authority of the POTUS, so that every one of the 3 or 400 officers in Kentucky is armed with the lawmaking power. It matters not whether the order is in the very teeth of all law, military or civil, if it is made it justifies the act. In other words, every military commander of every grade is made an absolute despot. Whatever order he issues is law, rising above all other laws. An order of a sergeant or corporal is made tojustify the act. What I complain 0t is an attempt to clothe those orders, manifest] lawless and unjustifi able, with the power of defeating a mans just cause ofaetion. A man is arraigned for the murder of an innocent citizen, and he puts in as a defense the order of a sergeant or corpo ral to shoot down that citizen. such is the character of this bill. But I will appeal to known instances. In some caSes guerrillas were shot without trial. In other cases, though they were known to be guilty, they were allowed to ese ape by the connivance of those in charge of them. In other cases, good and honest citizens were arrested and Inimtpireisosneesds.ion of 1864 65 of the Legislature of Kentucky, one of m colleagues, now a member of this House, [h Mr. SHANRLIN] de clared on the floor of the HoRep that there were numerous orders issued and placed in the hands of the provost marshal issued by military commanders in Kentucky of this character: “Arrest ten or 12 of the most influential and wealthy men of your county and report or send them to headquarters." That, sir, is a copy of one of those orders, and it was declared by m colleague that in many instances those orers had been exc cuted; that in other cases, the provost marshal being an honest man, refused to execute them and that under those orders numerous good citizens of high res iectability had been incarcerated, some of them for months, and then turned out without specified charge, and without trial. Others, however, who were mom wealthy, and who were able to procure the aid of a set of lawyers that hung about these pris ons and headquarters, were very soon released, payin for the services of these men a fee ranging lrom 500 to 5,000 dollars. lhe same member also declared that there were honorable members then present on the floor, whose high character and veracity no man dare question, who were ready to prove these facts if controverted, and challenged a denial of them and now I will call attention to another case, where a guerrilla was allowed to ese ape. The circumstances were these: he had been taken, and without trial was sentenced to be shot. He was in irons and on his we to the placeof execution. Some friends of the family interposed and he was sent back to Lexington to be tried. While undergoing a trial there, he succeeded in making his ese ape. But not at all alarmed, he went right back into the same region where he was be ore, gathered some marauders, and commenced robbing and plundering. After a few weeks or months he was arrested a 2nd time. Meanwhile his guilt had become manifest and the evidence was overwhelming. He was taken this time to Louisville. There was no question in regard to his guilt. He had ese aped prison once and had gone right back into the same work, robbing and plunderin. Well, after a time we were informed that that man was sent off South with the simpleinjunction that he was to remain there an not return I any more to Kentucky: sent off without any trial or investigation. He had, in his mnrauding operations, doubtless accumulated a large amount of money; whether that had anything to do with the mild and merciful administration of military law in his case I know not. Other men, however, who were innocent were imprisoned, and purchased their release at the expense of their pockets, by means of a set of sharks and unprincipled lawyers, who doubtless procured their arrest for the simple purpose of extorting heavy fees to procure their release. This bill comes up, and it is now proposed by an expostfacto, retroactive statute, to destroy all right of action in all such cases. As I have alread trespassed so much upon the time of the l lbuse, l will say but little more. But I do insist that this is an important and a grave matter; it is a bill evidently in the interest of a set of unprincipled lawyers. They may not show themselves ere inperson; but anyone living where I live, and knowing as I do the operations that have gone on there, would be satisfied that whether they make their apearance directly or indirectly before the ComJudiciary, this bill is framed in the interest of unprincipled lawyers who want to secure lar c fees.