Mr. EDMUNDS. The objections which the Senfrom Iowa has made, mainly, are answered, I think, by the amendment which I have had the honor to submit. I have no knowledge of the origin of this resolution, and therefore I cannot explain the motives under which the precise phraseology was originally adopted. at all that the resolution now proposes to do, if my amendment be adopte, is simply to create a board composed of the Sec retaries of War, of the Navy, and of the Treasury, who shall have authority over this subject; and the only iicstion to which I propose to address myself now is that of the power of Congress to pass this resolution. It was objected yesterday by the honorable Senfrom Maine, [Mr. Moniiii, i.] and is again objected today by the learned Senfrom NewYork, [Mr. HARRIS] that this exceeds our constitutional power. If it does, then we certainly ought not to pass it. If it does not, then in my judgment we ought to pass it. Now, what is quarantine? What is the precise thing which this resolution has in contemplation to be done? Is it not the regulation of the admission from foreign countries into the U.S. of persons and property 7 It is nothing more; it is nothing less. eare not under taking to rescribe specifics for a pestilence or disease. he threatened existence of pestilence and disease is that which furnishes the motive for us to regulate the introduction of persons who may be infected with it within our borders. Then, ifI have correctly stated the proposition, the question is, have we authority to prescribe the terms and limitations under which plat sons and property may be received into the U.S.? 1 nd thatis the whole question. v Upon this subject, rather than express my own feeble opinions, I beg leave to call the attention of the learned Senfrom NewYork and the honorable Senfrom Maine to the language of the SCOTUS, 5 cakingiii the passenger cases, decided in the ganuary term, 1849, where the precise point in judgment was the constitutional question whether it was lawful or not for a State to impose regulations and limitations upon the introduction of persons into the U.S.; and it was held, without dissensiou, by an able and unanimous court that the right to regulate the introduction of persons and property into the U.S. was clearly a regulation of commerce. Mr. Justice McLean, in pronouncing the leading opinion in that case, said: "Commerce is definedto be an exchangeof commodities. But this definition does not convey the full meaning of the term. It includes navigation and intercourse. That the transportation of pas sengers is a part of commerce is not now an O question. In Gibbons on.Ogden, en this court say. No O car distinction is perceived between the powers to regulate vessels in transporting men for hire and property for hire. The provision of the Constitution, that the migration or importation of sucb perlotil as any of the States now existinir shall think proper tondmit shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year 1808 is power n.restriction on the general of Congressto regulate commerce. In refer, Hoa, to thise lmso. this court say. in the above case, nonenation provesthat the power toregulate oom as 9g 7 to no the regulation of vessels menwho passfromplaceto tpalurigs. voluntnrily and to these who pass involun po"l iclyooefntchoisucraoguenftoryreaigt ntheemtiimgreation was a cherished adopted. As ii the constitutionwas branch of commercethe transportation of passengers h usalways inv ena profitable cm alosyinent to our ships, and Within a few years past required an amount of tonnage nearly equal to that of imported merchandise." and then they proceed to pronounce the judgment of the court that these State regulations imposin a tax upon the introduction of passengers, which implies the power of course, and with it the exercise of it, to regulate the terms of their admission into the country, are unconstitutional and void. Therefore, if the subject upon which this resolution is to operate is the regulation of the introduction of persons and property, although the motive to it may be the prevention of the spread of pestillence and disease, is it not clearly within the very letter of the definition which I have read, the regulation of commerce? I do not a cal, as was intimated by the Senfrom ffiiine yesterday, to the “general welfare” clause although I think if we all in legislation looked a little to the general welfare in the exercise of our duties we should not be the worse for it. I do not a peal, as is supposed by my honor able frienffrom NewYork, to the war making power merely because the power of the SecyWar is invoked to execute this law. I appeal to that clear grant of constitutional power which is given to Congress to regulate the terms upon which persons and property may be imported into the U.S.