Mr. BOYER. Mr. Speaker, I had not in tended originally to participate at all in the discussion of this bill; and during the very few minutes which are allowed to me now, it is of course impossible for me to present every view which, according to my conceptions of duty, ought to be presented if I were discussing the bill at length. I am opposed to this bill because it is an attempt by legislative action to override an express decision of the highest tribunal of the country. I am opposed to it because it singles out one profession in the country to visit upon it unusual penalties for an offense which has been committed by men engaged in all occuations alike. I am opposed to it because it inflicts a penalty which involves the loss of the means of livelihood without a lawful, trial or conviction of any crime. I am opposed to it because it is an expostfacto law prohibited by the Constitution. I am opposed to it because it makes no discrimination between those who voluntarily aided the rebellion and those who were compelled against their wills to enter its armies or to give aid and comfort to its cause. I am opposed to this bill also because, if it were perfectly legal in a constitutional point of view, it is not in accordance, in my judgment, with what ought to be the policy which should govern the legislation of this House. I do not know that I can better occupy the few moments accorded to me than to direct the attention of this House and the country to a portion of the opinion lately delivered by the Supreme Court in the matter of the petition of A. H. Garland, a lawyer who declined to take the test oath prescribed by this Congress, but who nevertheless was held by that tribunal to be entitled to pursue his legitimate profession. In that case the Supreme Court have said: “The profession of an attorney and counselor is not like an officecreatedby an act of Congress, which depends for its continuance, its powers, and its enol uments on the will of its creator, and the possession of which may be burdened with any conditions not prohibited by the Constitution. Attorneys and counselors are not officers of the U.S. They are not elected or appointed in prescribed by the manner the Constitution for the election or appointment of such officers. They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order upon evidence cohf atrhaecitrerp.”ossess:ingsufficient legal learning and fair: “They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct, ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court, after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Their admission and their exclusion are not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. The court is not in this respectthe register of the edicts of any other by It is the exercise of judicial power and has been so held in numerouscases. It wasso held by the court of appeals of NewYork in the matter of application the of Cooper for admission. “Attorne and counselors, ’ said that court, “are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial na ture, and hence their appointment may, with propriety, be intrusted to the courts; and the latter, in performing this duty, may very justly be considered as engaged in the cxercise of their appropriate judicial functions.’ ” 4 4. "The attorney and counselor, being by the solemn judicial act of the court clothed with his office, does not hold it as a matter of grace and favor: the right which it confers upon him to appear for suitors, and to argue causes, is something more than a mere indulgence, revokable at the pleasure of the court or at the command of the Legislature; it is a right of which he can only be deprived by the judgment of the court for moral or professionaldelinquency. The Legislature may undoubtedly prescribequalifications for the office, with which he must conform, as it may, where it has exclusive jurisdiction, prescribe qualifications for the pursuit of any of the ordinary avoeations of life; but to constitute a qualification, the condition or thing prescribed must be attainabie in theory at least, by every one. That which from the nature of things, or the past condition or conduct of the party, cannot be attained by every citizen, does not fall within the definition of the term. To all those by whom it is unattainable it is a disqualification which operates as a perpetual bar to the office. The question in this case is not as to the power of Congress to prescribequalifications, but whether that power has been exercised as a meansfor the infliction of punishment against the prohibition of the Constitution. That this result cannot be effectedin directly by a State under the form of creating qualifications we have held in the case of Cummings re. the State of Missouri, and the reasoning upon which that conclusion was reached applies equally to simi lar action on the part of Congress.” Now, what action does this bill propose? The very thing which has been judicially decided by the highest tribunal in the country to be contrary to the Constitution of the land. It is a sad spectacle, Mr. Speaker, and prophetic of approaching peril when we find a political party represented by a majority in Congress reaching fogh its hands to grasp both the judicial and exeditive as well as the legislative branches of the Government. This bill is only a part of that legislation which, during the existence of the present Congress, we have seen continually advocated and adopted by the majority in this House. The time was when all parties respected, at least, the SCOTUS Whatever vituperation and abuse politicians might heap on each other, whatever epithets might be applied to him who held the chief executive office of the country, the judges of the Supreme Court received from all parties the homage which was due to a tribunal distinguished during the whole history of the country for its learning and its purity. It has been reserved for our day and for this Congress to exhibit to the nation and the world a contempt even for that tribunal which hitherto has been regarded by the whole nation as the fountain of justice, purity, and law. The Executive is a barrier to the designs of the majority in this House, the Supreme Court is another barrier; therefore war is made upon both the Executive and the judiciary. This 39th Congress has been engaged from the very earliest period of its existence in attempting to control and absorb, not only the legislative, but likewise the executive and the judicial branches of the Government. For this it is that the ComJudiciary have reported a bill which provides that when the SCOTUS sit in judgment upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress, it shall require the unanimous opinion of all the judges to decide it unconstitutional. It proposes to enact that all the judges must unite in a judgment against congress, but a bare majority may decide in its favor.