Mr. EDMUNDS. I move further to amend the bill by adding at the end of the 20th line of the 1st section the following words: Or so far as it operates as a defense for any not done or omitted in anyState representedin Congr during the rebellion and in which, at the time an p the c of any such act or omission.martial law was not in force. Mr. President, I am not one of that class of persons who are struck with constitutional paralysis on every occasion when some necessary law for the securit of the public is about to. be enacted; and thereforel am willin to go as far as any reasonable degree of patriotism, or even any reasonable degree of courage, will permit into the debatable land of constitutional doubt in passing acts of this kind, which are really designed for the security of men who have been acting under the orders of the government in enforcing the laws: but it has appeared to me that there are limits beyond which it is not only unsafe, but unwise. for those who represent the people to go, even for the good end in view O reaching so noble a purpose as that of protecting the persons whom it is said have been sued in actions at law for carrying out the orders of the POTUS, either directly or indirectly. The act of 1863, to which this bill is an amendment, simply provided that the order of the POTUS, or the order of anyone acting under his authority, should stand as a defense against actions of this description. This bill goes further, and provides that not only the order of the POTUS or of the SecyWar. but the order of any military officer of the U.S. holding the command of the Dept, the district or the place within which any search, seizure, arrest, or imrisonment was made, &c., shall stand as a efense in and of itself; so that in States of the Union which have never been in rebellion, in States of the Union where martial law has never been proclaimed, the act of a captain recruiting a company of volunteers is to be by an expostfacto law a complete defense to an action of tres pass against imfor false imprisonment, or (or taking a horse, or whatever it may be. Certainly it must be an extreme necessity in deed which drives us to such legislation as that it is the exercise, as it appears to me, in regions where manial law and rebellion have not prevailed at all, of a power which can nowhere be found in the Constitution, which can no where he raised by implication from any of its provisions, and which is contrary to the natural sense of justice which pervades every mans bosom. I know that there is a.precedent for this class of legislation. In the time of that king who was called, or rather mise alled. the 1st gentleman in europe, and who was certainly the worst monarc, and whose fears of assassination and the overthrow of his Government were such as to drive him nearly crazy,:1sub servient Parliament passed an act somewhat similar to this, which declared that all arrests of people suspected of treason which had been made or which might be made within a certain limited time, should be regarded as law ful,independent of the question of whether there was any ground of suspicion, and inde endeut of the question what subject of his titannic Majesty it was who should make the arrest. But. sir, I have yet to learn that any court in GreatBritain ever it held an act of that description. I believe that no decision can be found anywhere in any civilized community holding that.an expostfacto enactment, declaring, by mere force of the law, that a past transaction should be guilty or adguiltless, any force at all except as it fortified mar tial lnw or operated upon districts where civil law was not in force. Therefore it has appeared to me, not, as I have said before, as one of those persons who are delighted to find constitutiona objections to everything which is proposed in the disturbed state of the country, but rather as one of those who desire to use that noble instrument to its fullest extent, and not to abuse its powers, that it is unwise as well as illegal to pass a law of this description, which operates upon districts of the country where there has been perfect repose, and where themantle of the civil law has been unfolded da by day in the courts of justice.ow, if I correctly understand public law, (and I do not claim any great fami iarity with it.) where martial law does prevail, the order of the commanding officer. the order of his subordinate traced down through to the smallest corporal that carries a musket, so that it ema nates from headquarters. as all properdise ipline makes orders emanate. isa de ense, independent of enactments and independent of any special statute on the subject. There is no meaning which can be attached, in my judgment, to the term “ martial law, " exceptt. at it has the force of law; and therefore, i there were any sections of this country where martial law has prevailed and where these arrests and imprisonments and seizures have been made, whether right or wrong. so that they were made by authority of the superior commander, that very law itselffurnishes the justification and itneeds no act of Congress to confirm it. At the same time I am willing. if it be thought that an act of Congress will make it stronger, to acquiese e in that o inion. But when you ask me to go a step further and into region where peace and repose have prevailed continually, and martial law has not existed, and where no foe has raised his banner anywhere, and to say that the order of the POTUS, or the order of any other person professing to act under his authority, owever remote, is to be held as a defense in a court of law, then I am compelled to disagree, because it invades what have always been considered the fundamental private rights of every member of organized society. Where is the necessity of it? If any of these arrests and seizures and imprisonments were made in regions where civil law prevailed, and were rightfully made, can they not be de fended? If they have been wrongly made, ought they to be defended by an enactment of this kind. after the fact, which, without inquiry into the circumstances of the wrong, blindly declares that the wrong shall not be redressed? I am sure not. Therefore it has up cared to me that every good end which this blll has in view and l agree it has good ends in view is reached by adopting the amendment which I have proposed. The usual course, and in my judgment the right one, and the course which ought to be pursued even in these regions where rebellion and martial law have prevailed, and the one which will be most effectual for the protection of those persons who are sued, is a bill of in demnity rather than an edict of defense. Let us declare that the U.S. district attorney for every district where any of these suits is brought shall, upon properaffidavit and proof of the good faith of the officer, interpose in the name of the U.S and take charge of the cause himself; and if any citizen has been wronged, let him have his damages, and let the public pay them: if any citizen has brought a false and vexations suit, impose double or treble costs upon him as a penalty for bringing such a suit. That is a species of legislation, which I am sure would commend itself to the country. Butthere can be certainly no justice in denying to a man who has been really wronged the privilege of trying his cause in the courts of his country upon the ground that some man who has been v exa tiously, in his own opinion, injured, will turn around, and without authority and without right, bring an action which he ought not to sustain. such legislation, as it appears to me, will reach a much more beneficeut end. not only for the reputation of the country and for its peace and repose, . but for the personal protection and the personal advantage of the class of persons whom we are all so desirous to protect.