Mr. ELAN 0. Mr. Speaker, I have listened with pleasure to the remarks of the Gentfrom {entucky, [Mr.ltoussssu] I have also heard with approbation portions of his speech. He has proceeded under a palpable and mani fest misunderstanding of my opinion in reference to the condition of the States lately in rebellion. He regards me as concurring in the Opinion that these States are out of the Union, or, to use the compact and forcible language of the Gentfrom Pennsylvania, “dead;” and seems to infer that I agree in the natural and inevitable consequences of that position. Some of these consequences I will a lnde to. If these States arcdend, they are without law, except through military authority; and it is the duty of Congress at once to provide territorial governments for them or to recoguiZe such governments as their people have set up and canallished. Without oing one or the other of these things, and granting that the States are dead and civil government entirely destroyed, those communities are in chaos, subject only to the law of power. Nothing can do me greater in justice than thus to interpret my remarks. If hereafterl shall be fortunate enough to obtain the floor I propose to place my views fully before the House and the country on this subject. At present, I will but say that I repudiate entirely, as groundless and unsustainable, the position that the States are “ dead.” They live, as integral parts of this Unioa. They are States for the purposes of local and State government; and to a certain extent are in actual harmonious relatiOn with the other States forming the Federal Union. I hope soon to see each one fit for restoration and actually restored to all its privileges and relations under the Constitution of the U.S. The time allowed for this exlanation is too brief to go further into this so jeetat present. While discussing the question of claims of citizens of the States late y in rebellion growing out of the destruction or appropriation of property by our Army and Navy during the war, took occasion to place the refusal to )a a certain class of such claims on the ground that it was impossible to distinguish correctly between loyal and disloyal claimants. While enlarging upon this point, I Was interrupted by the Gentfrom NewYork [Mr. Comt uimj with this inquiry, whether in a legal view merely there was any difference between loyal and disloyal persons as to the legalliability of the Government, the Gentfrom NewYork observing that he asked the question in view of the Supreme Court decision in what are termed the “prize cases.” To this inquiry I replied substantially, that as matter of law, merely, I knew of no distinction; that the decision alluded to treated all the inhabitants of the rebel States in a certain sense as enc mies, and hence I inferred that we might legally refuse to pay for all property taken or destroyed in suppressing the rebellion when owne by citizens of States in rebellion. In my report, however, I chose to put the refusal of Congress to pay for such property upon the ground of difficulty in distinguishing between the loyal and disloyal claimants rather than u n this rigid legal rule. The Gentfrom lientucky has proceeded upon the supposition that the term “ enemy” in the prize cases was used by me as signifying an enemy to the government, a public or foreign enemy. Nothing is more foreign to my meaning than such an interpretation. This will lead me to say that, so for as I have heard, the “prize eases” re ferred to, during the debates upon reconstruction, it seems to me that the law of those cases has been misapprehended and misapplied. I will, therefore, undertake briefly to explain the decision of the court in those cases as I understand it. In the 1st place the court decides“That it is not necessary to constitute warthnt both parties should be acknowledged as independent nations or sovereign States. A war may exist where one of the belligerents claims sovereign rights as against the other.” This principle leads the court to say, in another place "That it is a proposition never doubted that the belligerent party who claims to be sovereign may exercise hot elligemnt and sovereign righu.” Prsn Gases 6, 73. Hence, it follows that belligerent rights are granted by the party claiming to be sovereign to the party in insurrection, endenle betluvm, in order to mitigate the crne ties and misery produced by the scourge of war. Wherefore, the court say in these cases”This being the case.it isverygridentthat the common laws of war those maxim!of humanit. moderation and honor oughtto beobservedby 0th partiesin every civilWary Pages666.667 It is perfectly clear, therefore, that the ranting of belligerent rights, the exchange O pris oners, the exchange of flags of truce, and all other acts ofhumanity in mitigation of the cruelties of war, which were exercised and approved by the U.S., did not convert the insur gent States into a foreignation nor constitute them foreign States which we are authorized to say have been subjugated. Now in regard to the word “enemy” as used in these cases the court says: "All persons residing within this territory whose propertymay be usedto increase the revenueof the mole power, arein thiseontestto be treatedasene mies.though not IOIQlHIEIB.” PG|I6Q74 and again: "But in defining themeaningof enemysproperty wewill he led into error if we refer to Fleta or Lord Cokefor their definition of the word enemy. It is a utepeohnnpircianl pehiprlaesse of pubiic policy izaesedoiusrttins, gaunidshdee fernomds the common law." It is perfectly apparent from a careful examination of this case that the court applied the word enem to the people of the States in rebellion in the limited and technical sense “pe culiar to rize courts." That is, the property of all of the citizens of these States was subject to capture and condemnation during the war, because such property might increase the revenue of the hostile power, and because the U.S. Government had a right and was bound to put down this power; and by analogy the Arm might, I suppose, destroy the property of a1persons resrding within the hostile jurisdiction; and to authorize such ca ture and such destructiouthese persons are to c treated asenemies, and for no other purpose whatever. Hence, as the court sa, though enemies they are not foreigners, an that the term is tech nical and peculiar to prize courts, and must be distinguished from its common law definition. Therefore the theory fabricated upon this de cision, that the people of the southern States were converted into foreign enemies by the grant of belligerent rights during the war, or by subjecting their property to ca ture on the high seas and to conemnatiori, iss own to be base less and without law or reason to support it, so far, at least, as the prize cases are concerned. I trust the Gentfrom Kentucky now understands in what sense I applied “enemy” to the inhabitants of the insurrectionary States. God forbid that I should call those noble, loyal men of the South, enemies. They have done more, suffered more, endured more than we of the North lbr the salvation of our common country. They are not enemies, therefore, in the common law sense of the word, however they may have been treated during the war under the decisions of judges of the prize courts. On the contrary, the are friends; friends of liberty; friends of taUnion; friends of the loyal people everywhere throughout the Union and shall always be proud of the privilege of taking these noble men by the hand and calling them my friends, as they have been the friends of my country. It will be remembered, Mr. Speaker, that I offered, a few days since“, a resolution granting to the members elect from Arkansas the some courtesy that has been extended the members clect from Tennessee. These gentlemen from Arkansas are loyal and have always been loyal. They can take and are now ready to take the bath required by this House; their State is re organized and civillaw is reestablished; peace and security exist there. One of these gentlemen I have known for 20 years, and can vouch for his loyalty and his honor, yet they were denied the privilege of coming into this Hall as citizens; not as members, but as private gentlemen. Can we restore the Union by such a course as this? In regard to Tennessee I am ready to vote for the admission of her Representatives at once; vote that they shall sit here as R resentetives, as members of this House: an I believe, sir, it is due to this House and the country that the members elect from tennessee and Arkansas should be admitted speedily.