Mr. BUCKALEW. The Senfrom Ohio is for a “killing” construction, foraconstrnction of the law which defeats the purpose for which the law was enacted, for a construction which every man of sense and understanding knows in his soul was never the contemlation of the men who framed the statute; and by says “let it kill.” Well, sir, his whole speech was of that temper. It was all toned to the observvation which he has made in response to me. His agument is false and his position untenable for the very reason that his construction kills and destroys the life of the statute. Mr. President, we are told that there was. once a law that no man should draw blood within the limits of the palace or within the limits of the court, Blackstone will tell you that that law was construed not to apply to a physician who drew blood from a person in order to save his life, in order to restore him to health, in order to preserve his existence. The statute was made against men of criminal intention who drew blood in violation of the laws of the country; and therefore, although under the strict letter of the law the physician who came with benevolence in his heart to rescue a victim from impending death and drew blood, came within the express letter and language of the statute, he was not held to be included in the enactment. “Hold office under a government hostile to the U.S.” but does that mean when it comes to be applied to an individual, as in the present case, who has exercised the duties of a judicial position, or rather continued the exercise of them after his State had at tempted but attempted in vain, to sever her bon f connection with the Union? What does this holding of office under a hostile government mean? It means that the indivi nal shall assist that government; that he shall give it the assistance of his influence, of his power, of his efforts, and shall exercise uutho y under it in aid of the hostile purpose. That is what that statute means; and although men may be entangled in the meshes of a technical argument, embarrassed by n. strict construction of the language, instinctively nearly the whole of usemancipate ourselves from all these cobwebs of the brain, from all this folly of construction, when we come practically to act upon this question. Every one of us instinctively feels that this man was not a.criminal, was not guilty, was not included within the intention of the legislative power when it hurled this statute against our enemies. Every one in stinctively feels that it was not intended to embrace and to crush our friends, and especially those who in the enemy’s country were true to us, who, under circumstances of extreme difficulty and embarrassment, saw the road of duty and trod it with faithfulness and with courage. “Holding office under a government hostile to the U.S.” means holding it with an allegiance to that government. That is implied holding it with the intention to assist that government in the hostile purpose against as, to assist in destroying our Jurisdiction and I preventing its restoration within the hostile region. Why, are gentlemen to shut their eyes to all the merits of a question of this sort, to all those considerations which pertain to it, and, I may add, to settled rules of interpretation in such cases, and stand, as the Senfrom Ohio stands, upon a “killing” expression of the law? Mr. President, in connection with this point, which I shall not further elaborate, there is another which I will mention. The oath act of July, 1862, has been several times debated in this Senate. I enjoyed the advantage of hearing it discussed very thoroughly at the 1st session of the 38th Congress. I confess that my mind was never convinced upon the question of power involved, by which I mean that I never heard an argument in vindication of the power of imposing this oath of 1862 upon members of congress which satisfied and convinced my judgment; but the nearest approach to it was produced by the speech of the late Judge Collamer, delivered in the debate to which I have alluded. He was too clear headed a man to put the argument upon the ground upon whiclr it has been ordinarily put. He was not willing to take upon himself the burden of insisting that we had the power of adding a qualification of office for Senators to those enumerated in the Constitution, which are, age, residence, and so on. His argument proceeded upon different premises and from a different point of view. t was the only occasion on which I ever list ened to that distinguished Senator, when he cast his whole power into a debate, where my mind did not fo low him all the way to his conclusions. Now, sir, what did be state? You will find his argument in the Globe. It is reserved to us; it can be referred to; and Whether we agree to it, or dissent from it, we must say of that as of all other arguments from him, that it is instructive. He said that under the general power to pass criminal laws, this Government might provide that men engaged in the rebellion should never hold office under this government, and might extend that prohibition to members of Congress; and then it might further provide an oath which would ascertain this guilt and inflict that deprivation of office, or apply the principle of exclusion, as has been attempted by the existing statute and rule of the Senate. 8 did not treat it as a question of a specific qualification for office to be added in enumeration to those mentioned in the Constitution, but simply as a penal result flowing from the statute which should declare the offense and provide the mode by which guilt should be ascertained. He argued also that trial by jury was not necessn before excllusion was enforced. But I use not go into tiat. Now, sir, view this oath act of 1862from the some point from which it was viewed by the ablest man who ever opened month in its vindication, and what is it? Simply and purely a criminal statute, and not one of official qualification. It is in this view a criminal statute and provides a mode by which guilt shall be ascertained, and ascertained out of the mouth of the offender himself. He is to pronounce his own condemnation. If he do not condemn himself by declining the oath when he is actu ally guilty there is another provision for the case. He is to be held guilty of perjury, and not only may he be ignominiously expelled by this bo y by its expulsive 2/3rd s power, but he may be sent into a criminal court and punished along with the vilest and most abandoned felons of the land. Now, sir, considering this statute as a enal one, as was the one against drawing lood within the limits of the palace or court, mentioned by Blackstone, how much clearer and more necessary it becomes that the construction to be given to it shall be such as l have contended for; that when the claimant to a seat is obliged to condemn himself, if within the law, to exclude himself from a seat in this high place of power, and to go forth with the brand of Cain upon him, that we construe this statute to apply only to men truly and really guilty and criminal, and withhold its application from those who are innocent, from those who have committed no crime and have in tended the commission of no crime, whose souls are pure and spotless from the offense of treason 5 who, instead of assisting our enemies, have assisted us; who, instead of holding office under a hostile government in' the true meaning and genuine sense of that expression in this penal law, have held office at the instance of our friends, for their protection and for the maintenance of our cause; and who, because they have done so, have been persecuted by our enemies, and have only been enabled to maintain their rights of person, of property of reputation, of social enjoyment, and of all the comforts of which this life is ca able, because we triumphed in the war an not our enemies. Had they triumphed, such individual would have been branded for life; nay, more, might have lost his dearest rights or sacrificed life itself. What I ask, then, is that men shall construe this statute according to the laws of hu manity and of sound reason, and according to accepted principles of interpretation; that they shall not construe it accordin to the rigid, technical, killing letter which has such charms for the Senfrom Ohio, giving to his voice such emphasis and to his manner such warmth and earnestness. Perhaps it was more the Senator‘s tone than what he said that induced me to stand up to protest in the name of logic and oflaw against this perversion of logic and of law by which innocence, merit, ntriotism, and patriotic service are to be punished instead of treason, crime, infamy, and uilt. g