Mr. SCEIENCK. I have an amendment to propose which will meet the inquiry vf the Gentfrom [Mr. Ricar.) Mr. Speaker, I believe the House will acquit me of any disposition, either in regard to its general business or when considering any matter which comes from my own committee, to protract discussion by making speeches for speaking sake. I prefer, so far as practicable, always to have business debate upon the subject which may be under consideration by the House. I proose, therefore, not to speak in general terms of our Army and its organization but of that very important element connected with its prosperity and usefulness, the pay and compensation that shall be allowed to those who are enged in the public service in that Army. Andal will explain the particular object the committee had in view in the bill which they now present for the consideration and action oft e House, and those circumstances and existing facts which seem to require that a achange shall be made in the present mode of compensating those who serve, either as officers or men, in the armies of the U.S. This bill, it will be observed, is entitled “ A bill to reduce and establish the pay of the officers and to regulate the pay of the soldiers of the armies of the U.S. ” In one sense it increases the pay of the soldiers by retaining to them the pay allowed bylaw, that which was iven them during the late war, and not permitting that pay to expire by limitation, and thus revert to the old pay of 13 dollars permonth. So far as the officers are concerned, this is a bill not so much to reduce their compensation in any great degree as it is to attempt by legislation to readjust the sys tem of payment now in use in the Army so far as officers are concerned. The pay of the officers of the Army of the U.S. has always been rather a mystery to outsiders and the uninitiated; and well it may be. Itscems to me that at no time heretofore, nor even now, have the officers of the Army been at all ade quately recompensed for their service, when you consider their pay proper. Their pay proper point of the cw Jersey has always been insufficient: and the pay being low, there has beeningrafted upon the sys tem, as a traditionary mode of eking it out, various allowances. And those allowances have been changed and varied from time to time, with a general tendency to increase, until now what is given to an officer as his compensation is made up in some small proportion; of pay proper, but in a very much more considerah e proportion of allowances. Now, the object of this bill is to simplify this whole matter, and to readjust the system of payment, so that Army officers shall here after he paid as naval officers are paid and as civil officers are paid, by yearl salaries, given to officers in.their several grages according to the nature of their services and responsibili ties, with as few allowances as may be possible. This bill increases the pay beyond what appears upon the statute books as the recognized and established pay proper, but not the full compensation inc uding pay proper and allowances. Now, you may take the pay of an officer of the Army of any grade; for instance, look at the pay of a major general as it now, stands upon your statute book. The pay proper of a major general is $220 permonth, or a yearly aggregate of $2,040. Now, according to this bill, which makes his pay $6,000 or $7,000, it might be supposed that his pay is very largely increased; but the truth is that which is called “pay” is proportionately but a small part of the money which a major general actually receives. He is allowed commutation for 4 servants at 16 dollars permonth each, or $768 ayear. The allowance for clothing for those 4 servants is $312 peryear. He is allowed for subsistence for himself 15 rations perday for 365 days, or 5,475 peryear; and for his servants 4 rations perday, or 1460 peryear, making an aggregate of 6,935 rations, which, at 30 cents perration, would make $2,080 50. This is allowed him for subsistence for himself and servants, without taking into account the possibility of his having charge of a military dept, when his allowance for rations, for himself at least, is doubled. Then there is an allowance for forage for horses. A major general is allowed to draw forage for 5 horses, amounting, at the present appraised value of forage here in this city, to $208 50 for each horse, making an addition of $1,042 50. This, however, the officer draws in kind for the horses he actually keeps; he cannot, under the present law as changed some 3 years a 0, have commutation in money for forage. f stationed at this city, or any where else at a ost, a major general has an allowance for fue; and at the price estimated for fuel in this city this allowance to a major general is, when commuted in cash, $500 62. Then there is commutation for the number of rooms which he is allowed, being, by the present regulations, 18 dollars for each room in this city, 12 dollars in NewYork, and 9 dollars elsewhere, making, in this city, 31, 296 more. The total is $8, 648 62, all of which is drawn in cash, with the exception of the forage for horses, amounting in value to $1,042 50. About the same proortion prevails in regard to the other officers. Tor instance, a brigadier general here in Washington receives a brigadier generafs pay, $1, 488; but by reason of the allowances in cash, and $834, the value of the forage allowed in kind, his actual pay, without double rations, amounts to $6, 269 75; thus illustrating whatI have stated, that with respect ‘to all these officers, the pay proper bears but a small proportion to the amount actually paid to them or their services to the Government. I might, with the paper which I have before me, exhibit and comment upon the difference between the pay proper of the various officers of subordinate grades, showing the same difference. But I will not do this now, being ready, however, to make any explanation upon these subjects to any gentleman who may wish to make an inquiry. There is, also, I may say, a class 0 allowances not included in this statement, one particularly, the longevity ration, which increases the pay by the addition of a ration for every 5 years’ faithful service, that ration being 30 cents a day. Now, sir, I am not to be understood as objecting particularly to these allowances, embodying the system which has prevailed, under the present aw, for properly compensating those who are in the military employ of the Government. But this bill is introduced, as I have said, for the purpose of readjusting and simplifying the whole matter. While, by this bill, the pay of some officers will be consider ably reduced, others will have their pay slightly increased; but it is proposed that the whole of them shall be put upon a footing of pay proper in the shape of salary or general compensation, so that the system will be radically and entirely changed, and it will not be here after, as it has been heretofore, a mystery to anyone seeking to know how much an Army officer receives for his services to the Government. There are several objections to this mode of compensation which has revailed so long and which so many ineffectua attempts have been made, as I admit, to change, because, like any other long'established, traditional system, whenever you touch it eve body interested in it bristles up, and some plausible reason is urged fornot interferingwith that which already exists. One of the reasons against this system, the 1st which occurs to me as I speak, is that the moral effect of the present mode of payment upon the odicers themselves is bad. I will explain what I mean. When a man is made a 2nd lieutenant in the Arm of the U.S., the moment he receives his commission, or at the end of his 1st month, when he comes to the paymaster in order to obtain compensation for that month’s service, he is met by a temptation to misrepresent what he is entitled to. He knows what his pay proper;is he knows he has certain allowances, allowance for a servant, allowance for clothing for a servant, allowance for the pay of a servant; and he knows if he is stationed at a post that he is entitled to certain other allowances. If he is a mounted officer he has an allowance for a horse if he keeps one. What does he do? He desires, his pay being small, to obtain the largest amount the Government will afford to him. He therefore is induced by the temptation possibly to misrepresent a claim for a servant whom he never employs and for fora e for a horse which was never foaled. I say the usage has grown up in the Army so that it is almost a matter of course for the ay master or paymaster’s clerk to make out rofls including all these allowances, and the officer is tempted to certify to them when the fact is not according to his certificate. He justifies himself by saying, “ My pay is too small, and the only wzdy in which can be adequately compensate is to eke out this pay by putting in these allowances. Others do it and why should not I?" I insist one of the 1st and prominent objections we meet at the threshold when we come to look at this system of payment is the bad effect on the mind of the officer himself. I do not say this in disparagcment of officers, regular or volunteer, who have been in the Army and acted like others. I do not say members of Congress do not find the longest way round to be the shortest way to the capital when they feel their compensation as members is not sufficient and a ittle stretchin of mileage may hel to pay, perhaps, aboar bill unreasonably high in this extravagant city of Washington. I would not say anyling except to allude, for illustration, to allowances for newspapers, stationery, and other matters; and suppose members of Congress, no worse and no better than officers of the Army, were paid in whole or almost altogether by these allowances; the pay being small, and insufficient to buy everything, is it not to be expected the stretching would be more than the law allowed? I object, therefore, to this system of payment because of its immoral effect. Again, there is an objection to the payment because it opens the door for legislation by the chief oficers of the War Dept instead of by Congress. There is allowed commutation for so many rooms, and for so much fuel for these rooms, varying according to the different months of the year. These may be changed from time to time by an order of the War dept. What is the consequence? Take this instance. 9 dollars for a time was the commutation for a room. An officer is allowed so many rooms, according to his grade, and receives 3, four, or 5 times 9 dollars to make out his monthly allowance for that purpose. It was found during the war prices ran up so high in Washington the Dept increased the commutation from 9 to 18 dollars, doubling the allowance of those who got the benefit of it. A like change was made in NewYork city, while at all the other posts in the U.S. I believe itremains unchanged. The effect of this is, it leaves to the heads and chiefs of bureaus the power to fix the rates of pay. It may be said this is right because they understand the emergency of the occasion and the circumstances by which a man is surrounded in the locality where his duty may call him. But that may be said of every officer. It has been found that it works very well without it in the main. There are many good officers paid in a different way, and although there may be something in that argument, there is far more, it seems to me, in the arguments against this mode of compensation and in favor of iring ajnst, reasonable compensation altogether, with as few variations as possible, so that we may'know what it is that each man receives. Another thing which connects itself imme diately with this objection is, that it tends to take away the inde cadence of the officers. If an officer knows that according to his rank 110receives so many 100 or so many 1,000 dollars peryear for his services, and that it is secured to him by law of Congress, he will not seek 'or intrigue to get this or that post, or this or that particular kind of service which may tend to increase his pay or allowance. In so far, then, as these aflowance's are at the discretion of the executive dept and not under the control of the lawmaking power, they tend to take away the independence of the officer, who ought to feel that he is paid so much for his services, and that as long as he is fit to be kept in that place nobody can vary the compensation to which he is entitled. Another effect is upon legislation itself. We 7 are continually passing laws the exact effect of which we 0 not quite understand. For instance, it is understood at the War Dept if you want to add something to the pay of an officer, it is best not to come at it directly so many dollars and cents but to add a ration or double the rations, or make his allowances the same as those of some other officer who before that time has got his allowances increased by law, so that nothing appears upon the statute book indicating an increase of pay splecificall. I could point to a number of such cases like that where the pay is largely increased. We do not know iow much we increase it if we legislate in the dark, as most of us do who do not make this subject a study. I have in my mind at this moment a chief of a bureau whose pay was increased in that way. During the i exican war it was thought that the chiefs of 2 of the bureaus in the War Dept ought to be helped in some way, as those gentlemen are helped usually, and a law was passed which gave to them what was never before given to the heads of bureaus, namely, double rations. That added some 12 or 1400 dollars to their pay. Since this war commenced we have made another bureau, and we do not put that other bureau upon the same footing as the rest. Although it is by no means one of the highest bureaus, nor its head as high as some others in rank, or as high as some in the Army who had not got this double ration, yet when the bill came to be passed it was provided that the head of that bureau should have the same rank, pay, and emoluments, as were allowed to certain officers in 1846. There did not appear anything about money on the face of the bill, but he got about 1400 dollars additional compensation. The gentleman who now occupies that position could not possibly have been a party to the transaction, though he consented to receive it. The present head of the bureau was not placed there until the change was made by the last congress. I do not make any particular complaint against that bureau or that particular officer, but I cite the fact only as an illustration of this principle. The system is objectionable, because we are led by blind legislation to increase the pay in this indirect manner. I have given this merely as an illustration of the general objection. The great object of this bill is to introduce a system by which the country shall know what it pays to those whom it employs. This sys tem has worked very well in the Navy. I believe that the officers of the Navy are very inadequately paid, and receive very much less than the officers of the Army receive. In the naval service, as you will see by referring to the Naval List, the officers have graduated pay. I do not mean pay eked out by allowances, but graduated pay according to their services. For instance, a captain on the active list receives $3, 500 a year; when on shore duty, $2, 800 a year; when on leave, $2, 100 ayear; and if to be put on the retired list he receives only $1, 600 a year; that is, when upon hard, active duty he gets the most pay; when put upon what is considered lighter and easier duty, although it may involve additional expenses to him, his pay is reduced; and when upon his own application he is permitted to go off on leave of absence his pay is reduced still lower. That seems to be a fair and just classification of compensation to the officers as they happen to be engaged. Now, in the Army it is just the reverse. An officer of any grade in the field gets considerably less pay, because he gets no allowance for fuel, quarters, &c. I think he gets about 921 dollars less than officers of a similar grade who are upon duty here in Washington or elsewhere out of the field. It is true that the officer in the field is relieved from certain expenses, but at the same time he does harder and more active work. There is a difference made between officers of the Army and Navy in this respect. An officer of the Army on leave of absence I do not mean on furlou h, when he may be on reduced pay gets his ull pay, not allowances of certain kinds which are not given except in cases of duty at posts or elsew were, but the full pay that he would have had if in the field; so that the whole thing is between the Army and Navy. In the Navy the principle is that you shall pay a round sum. In the Army the principle is that you shall give too little for pay and help it out by allowances. In the Navy the man aid must be engaged in the hard and active uties appropriate to his profession. In the Army when a man is with drawn from active service his pay goes up, and he gets additional allowances. What has been the consequence? I am coming now to the general question, and I know how sensitive the case has been made to be on this subject. We live here in Washington in the atmosphere of the Depts, the bureaus, and of the staff, excellent gentlemen who have done good service, but who, as I said a little while ago, like all officers and soldiers, are human. The effect of our legislation in all times past has been rather to build u this bureau or deptal influence, and has been against the officers who have been active in the hard work in the field. It may be said that a great many who have been employed in the Depts during the war wou d rather have been at the front. I dare say there are instances where that would be the fact. I think I know some such cases; but, somehow or other, owing to some influence that is at work all the while, there is a tendency toward Washington, a centripetal instead of a centrifugal force at work, that makes men prefer work in the Depts rather than active professional duties. Now what is the consequence? You go to the War Dept and you find its different bureaus swarming with officers. Instead of having an officer of professional skill, as should he the case, at the head of each bureau, and under him officers of a subordinate grade, you find not only officers of rank for chiefs of hu reaus and heads of divisions, but there are employed under them commissioned officers doing clerical duty, from major general down to 2nd lieutenant; officers engaged in sitting at desks and looking after matters which might at least be just as well attended to by intelligent clerks employed for that purpose. It is not so in the Navy Dept fknow that comparisons are invidious, but it serves as a goo illustration. This is an old system. I do not give blame to the head of the one dept any more than praise to the head of the other for this system. It is a thing we are seeking to reform and correct. But it has been along time growing up, and the difficulty of reform, as we all know, increases just in proportion to the length of time the abuse has existed. What do we find in the Navy dept? In all the bureaus, outside of the arena of. Steam Engineering, in which are employed some 8 professional engineers of the Navy of different grades; in all the other 7 or 8 bureaus you will find but about 16 commissioned officers employed; but there is not a bureau in the War dept in which there are not only 16 commissioned officers employed, but in some of them many times 16 officers. In most of the bureaus in the Navy dept the chiefs are the only commissione officers employed. lcould illustrate my argument more at length, for I have all the facts and even the names here on my desk.