Mr. MERCUR. Mr. Speaker, I am obliged to differ from my colleague on the committee who last addressed the House in reference to the restrictive clause of this bill by which it is confined to debts incurred after its passage. It seems to me that it is right and proper, as a general proposition, that a man shall have the benefit of all laws which were in force and effect at the time his contract was entered into. I am aware that it is held by the courts in many of the States that there is a difference between the contract itself and the remedy for its enforcement; that Congress has the right to impair the remedy I have no doubt. But I question very much the expediency of exer: cising that right, except in extreme cases; and it seems to me that this is not such an extreme case as to call for the exercise of any such power. The bill, as framed and reported, limits its operation to contracts entered into after the passage of the law, which, to my mind, is just and reasonable. The other amendment is in reference to restricting the operation of the bill to actions pred icated on contracts. The Gentfrom Illinois [Mr. FARNsworth] objects to this, and can see no good reason why it should not extend to cases of tort. I willmention one reason which it strikes me has force, and shows that this restrictive clause should be kept in the bill. It is this: a man who commits a tort in taking the personal property of his neighbor may have judgment recovered against him. That is the usual remedy which the owner of personal property resort to in a case of trespass or tro ver to get a judgment against the man who has taken E. the owner personal property which it is adjudged has been improperly taken from him. He holds it exempt from execution. He sets at defiance the man whose rights he has infringed upon, and who has recovered a judgment against him; and there is no remedy by which the plaintiff can collect the amount of damages awarded to him by the court. It may be said, however, that instead of bringing an action of trespass and trover the man may bring an action of replevin and thus recover the specific article taken. I answer that it is not the province of the law to encourage expensive litigation, but to leave the oand usual action open to every one whose rights of P. erty have been infringed upon, and not only enable him to recover judgment, but enable him when he has recovered it to enforce it by execution, and not to enable the other party to retain the property and set the law at defiance; and therefore, in my judgment, this is a proper limitation.