Mr. STEWART. Suppose the State of confit of creditors. Within the circle of my ob. none at all, to some in others an unlimited amount would such a law be constitutional? Suppose these precise differences were in the text of the bill, and we were asked, under the Constitution of the U.S. which authorizes us to pass uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy, to vote for it, could we do it? Is there any Senator on this floor who would say we could do it? The idea of the Senfrom Nevada is that this term “a uniform law' means merely a uniform distribution of the assets of the bankrupt. What are the assets of the bankrupt? They are different in the different States according to the laws of the different States, and that, as I understand the honorable Senfrom Nevada, satisfies the provision in the Constitution that the law is to be uniform. You are to make uniform distribution of the assets of the bankrupt, and in some States he would have no assets at all, while in another State a man situated just as he was might have $100,000 of assets. Is that law uniform? In some of the States, I repeat, the law now is that a man may hold property to an unlimited amount and still under the State law have the benefit of a discharge from his debts. The situation of that man prior to his taking the benefit of this act would be that of a bankrupt; that is to say, he would owe more debts than he had property to pay, he might own a homestead exempt from all liability, unlimited in value, it might be worth $100,000; he might owe $100,000, so that he would in fact be a bankrupt; but applying under this bill for its benefits he would get discharged from his debts and this law would make him then actually worth $100,000, whereas before the act he was not worth one cent. Is that law uniform? Is it just? Is it honest? If we cannot in the act itself make discriminations as to the amount of property in one State and in another which a man may hold, because of the constitutional requirement of a uniform law, it seems to me perfectly clear that we cannot authorize the States to make these discriminations and differences. We cannot allow that to be done indirectly which we cannot ourselves do directly. The principle is plain and positive. Senators seem quite unwilling that Congress should interfere very much oã State laws in regard to debtor and creditor, and are very jealous of any intermeddling with State exemption laws. At certain times it is very popular on this floor to talk about, I will not say the omnipotence of Congress, but the absolute power of Congress and perfect weakness of the States. States rights, under certain circumstances, are sneered at exceedingly in certain quarters, and the man who talks about States rights is in danger, I have thought at times, of being regarded as in sympathy with traitors. But now if the Congress of the U.S. undertake to say that a man who is in debt shall pay his debts or rather that his property, except a certain amount, shall be applied to pay them, if they claim to judge how much shall be left to him they are exceeding their legitimate powers and trampling on State sovereignties. I claim to be a toler ably good States rights man and a tolerably good friend to a national, consolidated government. Both these governments are recognized in our system, and each is entitled to control in its appropriate sphere. I see no difficulty in allowing the law of Congress to be uniform throughout the States on this subject of bankruptcy, and to set aside State laws which may interfere in any way with such uniformity. I see in this no exertion of power on the part of Congress which is not plainly given to them by the Constitution. The insolvent laws of all the States have always been considered abrogated, or at all events their operation suspended during the existence of a national bankrupt law.