Mr. EDMUNDS. With all respect, sir, I cannot help thinking that my friendfrom Maryland is the person who misapprehends the see e of this clause of the 71st section oft 6 act of 1799 rather than myself. The language which operates upon this subject is " actions, suits, or informations." The term “informations, " as used in this act against property where any seizure is made pursuant to the act, is a technical term perfectly well known to the law and to lawyers. It is what is in the admi ralty tactics, in the cases Of seizure in rem, calledja libel of information; but in the more condensed language of the statute it is simply termed an information. When goods are seized by a customs officer fora breach of the revenue laws an information is filed against them; and if any party fails to come forward and claim the goods they are condemned without any hearing at all upon the mere seizure. If any person comes forward, accordin to the rules of the court, and makes oath that be is the owner of the goods, he is then entitled to enter his claim; an the term “claimant” is a tech nical term perfectly well understood by every body who practices in these courts as indicating, not the plaintiff in an action at common law, not the defendant in an action of trover or trespass, but the party in a court of admiralty who in a proceeding in rem, comes upon the recor as makinga formal claim to the property. My conclusion, therefore, is that these provisions of the act of 1799 respecting the onus probandi in cases of seizure bein upon the claimant, are provisions which by tevery letter as well as tesirit of the not apply to prosecutions against the property itse f where a claimant, technically and legallyknown as such, a pears in court and claims the propertv. In those cases, if I correctly understand the act of 1799, probable cause having been made out on the part of the prosecution, the onus probandi is then turned) over to the claimant who asks that the property may be delivered to him, to explain the circumstances under which he introduced it. Now, what is “probable cause?” It is very difficult to define the distinction between the meaning of the term “probable cause” and the meanin of the term rimafacic evidence.” It would puzzle anybo y except a Philadelphia lawyer to make any sensible and satisfactory distinction between these 2 terms. Then in a case of property I leave aside, for a moment, entirely that part of it which relates to condemnation and fine as to the person is it too hard to say to a claimant who comes into court and asks that property maybe delivered up to him, primafacie evidence having been brought forward on the part of the Government that the prorty is justly subject to fogfeiture, “You shailenot be entitled to receive it out of court again until you bring forward some proof to meet this rima (mic or probable evidence which has can aduced against you?" In my judment it certainly is not. then the question is whether this bill which we have under consideration goes beyond the act of 1799; and I may say, indeed before I come to that, that my experience on the border in the practice in the circuit and district courts of the U.S., presided over by Judge Smalley and Judge Nelson, has been precise y in accordance With the construction which I put upon the act of 1799. When I began, not many years ago, in those courts, I was quite as restive with my common law education about this notion of the onus probandi being upon the party whose goods were seized as anybody could be; I did not like it; my clients did not like it, for I generally appeared for the claimants, not being district attorney; but the inva riable practice in that district (and I have no doubt in the southern district of NewYork, where very large numbers of these cases occur) has been, as a matter of course, without debate, to apply the provisions which I have read from the act of 1799 to every cause of prosecution against property under the revenue acts; and probable cause being shown, to then call upon the defendant to overcome it if he could. Now, to come to the act which we have in guestion; this 4th section provides for 2 escriptions of things one is the forfeiture of merchandise which may he illegally imported, and the other is the punishment of the person who shall be guilty of the illegal and fraudulent importation. So far as the aplication of this rule of evidence to a case of distinct prosecution against a person by which he may be de prived of his iherty is concerned, I entirely agree to what has been said by the Senfrom Maryland that it is going beyond what the law has been hitherto and is going beyond the just principles which ought to furnish security in cases where liberty is involved; but when on limit it, as m amendment proposes to limit it, to cases of seizure of goods provided for in that section, and to cases where a party voluntarily appears in court and claims the property, then it appears to me that it is not asking too much to require such aclaiinant, probable cause having been made out against the property, to introduce some proof in order to authorize the court to give it up to him. In most cases, in all cases of admiralty seizure, of maritimejurisdiction, that is not a question forajury at all; it is only in cases of munici l seizure that a jury has anything to do with it; so that with the amendment which I have had the honor to submit it appears to me that we are only standing exactly upon the theory and practice under the act of 1799.