Mr. BUCKALEW. Mr. President, I shall not speaktoday as a party man, nor as a sections men, but as an American, asa citizen of the U.S. anxious to maintain its unity, and to romote, so far as my humble efforts can do it, the welfare of our common country. I have looked forward during the weary months of the recent war. to n time when a new class of subjects would arise for onr censideration. The discussion of measures of force in the prosecution of the war and the discussion of the various questions connected with the subject of slavery did not provoke me upon an single occasion to address the Senate at lengt. returning from a foreign country after the comI mencement of the war, when it weiin full prog ress, and when no human power could avert the storm which fell upon us, I found myself, as did most of the citizens of our country, absolutely controlled by the circumstances which surrounded us and which pressed us forward upon acourse of conduct which we could not avoid. I thought then, and I think now, that there was but one thin to do. We were engaged in a contest whic: was as it has been often described, a contest of litle and death, and there was nothing to be done except to light it out, to fight on, to promote or assist the collision of forces which were then arrayed against each other until some ultimate result should be reached. As a member of the minority in this Chnm her, I gave my vote for those measures of the majority which directly pointed to the use of the force of this Government to subjugate the insurrection which raised its head against us. I was opposed to the political policy of that majority, and have continued to entertain and evince that o position down to this time in a respectful and ppropermanner. But upon the question of roseeuting the war to a conclusion, never ha any ditheulty, I never had any hesitation. upon an examination of my rec ordand humple as it may be, even it may by some persons at some time be examinedit will be found that from the time I assumed the seat to which my State had assigned me in this Chamber, my course was such as I have indicated, and was in exact accordance with the convictions that I held.I thenght that there was little to be attained by speecmaking by a member, even from the great Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, upon political questions during the war. While the passions of the country were inflamed by the war, reason could not be heard. Logic is thrown away upon the passions. It can only be heard after they have subsided. But, sir, I looked forward to the days through which we are now passing, contemplating a condition oi things entirely changed, the coming up of new questions, especially questions connected with economy, with revenue, with finance, with ordinary legislation, with the administration of justice wherever the jurisdiction of this Governmentextendsall those questions which intelligence, which require investigation, lweqllilcllhle require labor, the be its of the student. I looked forward to that class of questions, intending to speak upon them on fit and properoccasions, and when, in my opinion, I might contribute something useful to the current of your debates. But there was one thing which I did not anticipate. I did not anticipate that nearly one year alter the termination of the war, one year after the great armies which were arrayed against us had submitted to our power and had capitulated to our forces in the field, nearly a year after open resistance to our authority had terminated, and when in point of fact there was no resistance to the Government of the U.S. in any portion of our country, we, in the Congress of the U.S., should be discussing the question of whether the war had been a success or not, whether our country was, as formerly, entire and complete, a unit under the constitution of the U.S. no longer broken and severed into parts, but one homogen eous whole, united together by the fundamental law, the constitution established by our fathers. I did not antici the the necessity of debating subjects of this dziscription, because I could not foresee either the passions or interests of party which precipitate upon us the questions out of which these debates arise. But, sir, these subjects are here, and they are to be met, and it in because with reference to some of these questions I have not heard my own ideas presented by others, that I now trespass upon the atten tlon of the Senate and pray their attention for a brief time. Among the other subjects which are brought before us by this celebrated committee of 15, which seems to have take): charge to a great extent of the affairs of the Government, which seem; to have assumed to itself the functions of Coneress and the functions also of an advisory body to the Executiveamong the other subjects thrown into Congress for the operation of the previous question in the HoRep and for the prompt lash of party discipline in the Senate, is the subject of representation in this Government, one that has undergone no consideration, or very slight consideration, from the year 1789, when the constitution of the U.S. went into operation, to this day. We have talked about everything else, we have considered everything else except this great subject, because we supposed that representation in this Government lilid been established upon just and properfoundations by our fathers. We were centent with their work. We took it for granted that they had made a properarrangement in that portion of the constitution which related to this subject. But the committee of 15 have introduced to our attention a resolution proposing a limitation upon the representation of the States of this Union in the HoRep in all cases where the right of suffrage shall be abridged by such State as to any clalss of its inhabitants on account of race or color. The resolution of the committee raises one of the questions which we are now to consider. That resolution had a swift passage through the HoRep, but here it has had a somewhat prolonged consideration, and it is well that it has. been considered, because as the debate has progressed more and more of opposition to it has been manifested and more an more plainly have appeared to the Senate and the people of the country who read our debates the imperfections of the plan of amendment propose by that resolution. Mr. President, I shall speak today upon the subject of representation of States in this senate, and of the people of States in the HoRep; and the particular questions examined will be 1. The senatorial representatibn of the castern States; 2. The present admission of Sens&Reps from the South; 3. The proposed amendment of the Constitution, limiting representation in the HoRep in future. he provisions of the constitution of the U.S. which will come under review in our present inquiry, are the 3 following; all to be found in the 1st article: “The Senato of the U.S shall be of 2 Senators from each State chosen by tchomfoeed legislature thereof, for 6 yours; and each Senator shall have one roto. ". clion 3. Clause 1. “The HoRep shall be composed of members chosenevery 2ndyear by the people of the several StatesI unththe electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite tor electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature. ”S47rlin2n, clause 1. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may bein cluded within this Union. According to their respective numbers. which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons. including those bound to service for n. term o years and excluding Indians not taxed. 3/5ths of all other persons.”Sam section. clam 3. These provisions, regulating representation in the Government of the U.S., have remained unchanged from the formation of the constitution down to this day, or for more than 7 tptive years. Shall they continue to stand, or sha l they be changed? Phatquestion must now be met and answered, for the committee of 15 has proposed, and the HoRep has passed, a resolution proposin a material chance in one of these clauses; and other changes lieve been proposed in both Houses, an are now pending; and for the time being Congress declines or delays to execute these clauses of the constitution so far as they relate to the representation of southern States. I shall speak, in the 1st place, of the representation of the eastern States in the Senate for although this subject has not been raised direct] by any bill or resolution presented in either llousc, or been referred to in debate in either House, so far as I have observed, it is intimately connected with the questions which have been raised, and which are undergoing public debate. sitransssririos or run IAST is run sxiurii. The 6 States beyond the Hudson river, commonly called “ NewEngland, ” have 12 Senators on this floor by virtue of that clause of the constitution relatinvto senatorial representation which I have read. Each State is to have 2 Senatorsneither more nor less without any regard to the number of inhabitants it may contain and by the concluding clause of the 5th article of the constitution, relating to amendments, it is provided that " No State. without its consent, shall bedeprived of its equal suffragoin the Senate.” By referring to the census of 1800, the population of the eastern States is found to be as follows: sssriisn sures. Maine. NewHampshire. Massachusetts RhdIsland. Connecticut. Ver t 6 States with 12 Senators. Dividing this total of population by the number 12, will show the number of inhabitants to each Senator upon an equal a portionment accordin to numbers. The resulting ratio or number for a Senator will be found to be 261, 278. In other words, there is one Senator to each 261, 278 inhabitants. It requires a little over a quarter of a million persons in the East (the whole population there being considered in the computation) for one Senator in this body. Having thus ascertained the ratio of a pertionment for the East, let us ascertain what it will be for the other States represented in the Senate and which adhered to our Government during the war. Their population in 1860 was as follows: CENTRAL STATES. NewYork. NewJersey. 6 hio Michigan 740. 11 Indiapa. 1. 3. 418 Illinois. 1. 711. 901 Kentucky 1. 1. 54 Missouri. 1. 18; 2 Wisconsin". Here are 18 States with 36 senators, and dividing their whole population by the number 36 will shown ratio for one Senator of 534, 976. It requires, therefore, more than half a million inhabitants in those States for one vote in the Senate. For the purpose of further comparison let us next turn to the States of the South. which are now unrepresented in Congress. elation in 1860 was as follows: soumess srArss. Their pop Virginia. 1. 246. 620 NCarolina 99?622 SCarolina Alnlinm Mississippi. Tennessee. ” Louisiana Arkansas. Texas. Here are 11 States with 22 senators, and dividing their total population by 22, there results aratio or number to each Senator of 897, 892. I have deducted from the population of Virginia the population of the 48 counties which were, under the name of WestVirginia, admitted into the Union as a new State by the act of 31st of December, 1862. The new State, with its pror number of inhabitants, apears in the table of the central States alrea y given, inasmuch as it was represented in the last Congress. Let us now consolidnte these totals of population in the several divisions of the country, as just given, to obtain a common ratio of distribution: 6 customStates. 3. 185. 283 18 central and westernStates. 10. 259118 11 southern States. 8. 753. 834 Total 81. 14841! Here are 35 States in all, with 70 Senators, and by dividing their total population by the number 70, we obtain a common ratio for the whole country of 444, 972. We are now prepared for a comparison of eastern representation with that of other sections upon exact data. The Territories, not being represented, are excluded from the cal culation, as is also the State of Nevada, which was not represented during the war. But it is to be remmnbered that as the new StatQof the West increase much more rapidly in population than the old Atlantic States, the inequality between the East and the central and western sections is now greater that it was in 1800, when the census was taken. But upon the figures as now stated, the case will sum up as follows: RATIOS FOR A BRNATOI. For the easternStates. For central and western States. For southern States., Common ratio. 444. 972 Deducting the ratio of NewEngland from the common ratio for the whole Union will show is deficient population in the former, upon each Senatoral owed her, of no less than 183, 699; and multiplying this deficiency upon one Senator by 12 (the whole number of her Senators) will show a total deficiency to the enor mous extent of 2, 204, 888, that is, she has representation in this Senate for nearly 2 and a quartermillion persons who are actually located in the central and western States. But astonishing as these figures are, the do not exibit the full extent of the inequalit which now exists with the South unre resente. The population of all the States is taken into account to produce the result just stated. But drawin the comparison between her and the cent and western States, actually represented here, will show her deficiency in population greater than before by 258, 936, or a total deficiency of 2, 463, 324. These 2 and a half million people exist. They are not a mythnot inmginary personsbut real breathing men, women, and children in New 1 ork, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, and Missouri. They are found along the Hudson and the Mohawk, by the Susquehanna, the Wabash, und the Ohio and the men among them are a main support of this nation, bearingits industries forward and abiding by its laws. They turn the furrow in the field, or push the plane in the worksho, or smite the anvil in the smitliy, or dig fuel mm the bowels of the earth, or build great towns and smiling hamlets throughout the great States of the center and the West. Not one. of them is found in the East, though men of the East vote for them in this Senate. Not a dllar of fishing bounties wrung from an impoverished Treasury ever reached them in its disbursement. They have been content to receive justice rather than favor from Government; their patriotisin has been spontaneous, constant, on sure, without calculation of immediate advantage, and with no shrewd calculation of future profit or do minion. When, therefore, the readjustment of representation in this Governmentis proposed; when Congress and the country are considering propositions of amendment and of change in to basis of political power, I insist that their views and interests shal be taken into account rather than those which exist in a section which has been, heretofore, favored at their expense if not to their inury. But, be ore suggesting an change in the senatorinl representation of e East or show o mg the connection which exists between the inequality already described and the question of southern representation in Congress, it will 1 be instructive and useful to illustrate eastern influence in the Government (resulting from her senatorial representation) by some pertinent examples. That influence is shown in the selection of Presiding Officers of the Senate. For 4 years fromthe 4th of March, 1861, an eastern VEEP occupied the chair at the openingof sessions and occasionally afterward, with the power of the casting vote. He was chosen by the people. But the officer who usually prelides over our deliberations the President protempmeis selected by the Senate itself, and, in solectin him. the powerotthe East is man ilested. Aficur lresiing Officers recently have been from that quarter; in the 37th Congress the Senfrom Vermont, [Mr. Foor:] in the 38th Congress the Senfrom NewHampshire, Mr. CLARK;] and in the present Congress, the Senatorfrom connecticut, [Mr. Fosrsn.] In brief, the East has held the chair of the Senate during the whole war, and holdsit now. Her grasp upon it has not been released for a moment, an still continnes. In caucuses or consultations of the majority, where very often the course of action in open session is determined; where the laws of party discipline are applied to crusn out dissent and to overrule individual judgment! 1515most 9"”dent that the 12 voices from the East must be very potential. But upon this pointimust speak With some prudent reserve. The mys teries of the caucusroom are shut off from direct, observation; and my curiosity is circum scribed by the limits of the possible. As I cannot know what occurs in those secrct consultations Ishall notspeculate much upon them, and shall limit my remarks on this point to the general inference concerning eastern influence which naturally arises. I I pass to another point which is not obscure, the iiicts of which are open and known, or may be known, to all. I mean the constitution of committees, and particularly the selection of their chairmen. he Congressional Directory, just published, shows 23 standing committees of the Senate, and 3 joint ones established in connection with the House. Among them the following have eastern chair men: Foreign Relations, Mr. Sumner, of Massachusetts; Finance. Mr. Fessenden.of maine; Manufactures, Mr. Sprngue,of RhdIsland; MilAffairs and Militia, Mr. Wilson, of hibssac usetts; Post officcs, Mr. Dixon, of counecticut; Claims, Mr. Clark, of NewHampshire; DistCol, Mr. Merrill of Maine; Public Buildings and Grounds, Mr. Foot, of Vermont. These are all standing committees or the 3 JtCommees, that on Printing has for its chairman Mr. Anthony. of RhdIsland. The general result is, that while the population of the East is loss than one 7th of the population of the States represented in the Senate, she has the chairmanships of 1/3rd of the committees, including the lending ones. The case was still stronger in the last Congress. I observed, at one time, that of the 20 cight joint, standing, and select committees then organized, 14, or 1/2 the whole number, had New linclnnd chairmen. At the same time the great State of NewYork had bone, and my own State a single one that on Patents. Let us contemplate the figures which apply here for a moment: i i Population of easternStates. msics":. Population of Penn! lvanin. 2, 9“). 215 3 Population of New. 3, 880, 735 The East, with her. 3 million, had the control of 14 committees out of the 28, NewXork none, and Pennsylvania the comPatents. Well, sir, NewYork has since been promotdd in the senatorial scale. One of herlSenatorsat the present session has been assigned to the head at“the ComPrivLandClms. I am not sure that that Qcmmittce ever meets, but it is displayed in e the list of committees in elegant t, doubtless very much to the satisfaction of t a good people of the Empire State, who are thus honored through their representative. As to the ComPatents, I look upon it with special affection. I have a faint recollection that some bill was reported from it at a former session; but my particular interest in it arises from the faot that it was assigned to my State as her particular post of honor during the war. Massachusetts took charge of Foreign Relations, Military Affairs, an Slavery and the Treatment of Freedmen. PostOffices and Public Buildings were in charge of Vermont; Connecticut attended to Pensions and matters in this District; NewHampshire had charge of the Navy and Claims; ilaine looked after the Finances, while little RhdIsland burdened herself with the subject of Manufactures and the subject of Public Printing. Thus there was an engrossment by those States of the leadership of most. of the committees which commanded collective power, patronage, and influence. But it is refreshing for a man from my own State to reflect that she was not altogether overlooked. Her modest claims received. duc recognition, and the positionthen assigned her she yet retains. Sir, whenever the Senfrom Massachusetts, wILSON7] of the ComMilAffrs , shall marshal the Senate committees in military array as a home guard, in deicnseof the Capitol, each with its appropriate organization, there, in the midst of that patriotic throng, will be seen the stalwart form of my colleague bearing aloftin proud de fiance the banner of the ComPatents Mr. President, the chairmanship of a committee is a position of much influence and power. The several distinguished gentlemen holding that position have Virtual control over the transaction of business, both in committee and in the Senate. Each one has also control of a committee room, and the services of a competent clerk, not only for public business but for conducting private Correspondence, and for the various other labors imposed upon a Senator by his station. I will say here, in view of complaints made in the country, that I consider the employment as clerk of a son or other relative by a chairman as wholly objectionuble. The relation of clerk and chairmanis both confidential and intimate, and hcnce such clerkship is quite unlike any other Office which may be filled by senatorial influence. A POTUS may very properly employ his son as private secretary, an it hits been the practice from the foundation of our Government for ourminis tors sent abroad, among whom have been the most distinguished and able men of the country, to take their com; with them as secretaries of legation. The newspapercriticisms which have been directed against the employment of young gentlemen as clerks of committees who are related by tics of family or blood to chairmen are wholly misapplied. Nepalism, the appointment of relations to othee, or the obtaining their appointment. by the use of ones official influence, is justly odious, and should always be denounced as of evil example and corruptive tendency. But an appointment to private and confidential service or to duties which involve such service is not within the general objection, and is justified by the opinions and pradtice of the best of men. Mr. President, the burden of correspondence and of other business, independent of ordinary legislative duties, thrown upon members from populous States is very great. Their time is consumed and their exertions expended upon various matters outside of public business transacted in the Senate. Their time for study and properle inlative labor is thus our tailed, and they are ikoly to be overtasked by the multifarious duties which press upon them. Now, it is evident thatin the lastCongress, by the distribution of a dozen clerksor ine re among the 12 NewEngland Senators, they obtained an amount of assistance which removed from them a great part of the labor they would otherwise have home, and enabled them to act with more efficiency and influence in their high othee. But these advantageswere not enjoyed by a large art of the members from other States to whcm their allowance would have been more reasonable. I know it may be said that many of the oldest members of the Senate, possesising fitness for chairmanships, are from the East. The same explanation was made in behalf of the South in former years when she was charged with engrossing too many positions of influence here. gut the explanation is in sufficient in the present case, as it was in the former, and be sides it does not meet the main point of my argument, which is that the East is overrep presented. The overrepresentation of the East, and her consequent undue power in this Senate, must be taken into account by anyone who would correctly understand ast or present action in Congress and in the government. In the 38th Congress the Senate consisted of 49 members, including one from Virginia. By aresolution adopted by the Senate a quorum of the body for the transaction of business was declared to be a majority of the members from adherin States; in other words, a majority of mem ers elected and udmittedto seats. “" wh Membership from insurgent States was wholly excluded from the computation. 20 5 members, therefore, constituted a quorum for the transaction of business, and 13 constituted a majority of that quorum. In other words, it was a possible case that a law should be enacted by the 12 eastern votes with a single vote added to them from all the rest of the Union. SO nearly had the East approached complete control in this body! Nevada has since been admitted into the Union, and is represented here by 2 Senators. A quorum under the resolution justmentioned is therefore at present 26. If Colorado should be adpmitted as a State and her Senators to seats here, the uorum would be 27; but whether colorado be admitted or not, the number of votes required to constitute a majority of the quorum under the existing resolution would be barely 14. requiring, to secure it, but 2 votes to be added to the vote of the East; and yet the whole population of the East is less than one 7th of the population of the States represented here] It would require much more time than is at my command, and much more inclination for the task than I possess, to describe the effect upon the legislation of the country of the predpminance of the East. But I willmention 2 subjects which clearly illustrate it. 1st, the fishing bounties, or donations of money from the Treasury of the U.S. to men along our northeastern coast, engaged in the fisheries of the ocean. This money is bestowed under pretense of encour ng the training and making of seamen; an the an nual expenditure for the purpose amounts to 3 or 400,000 dollars. The whole amount heretofore exended exceeds 25 million dollars. his is the mostquestionable of all our appropriations of public money, and it. would long since have cen stopped the laws authorizing it swept from the statutebookif the disbursement were made in any othersection of the country except the East. The enormous political power of that section has maintained) these bounties in existence, and was found sutheientto maintain them even during the severest. financial press are of the war. Take, next, the 3rd section of the supplementary conscription act of July 4 1864, by which the agents of States were authorized to o into the southern country and procure enlistments of men, white or black, to fill their quotas under the conscription laws. It was material to the East to retain her laborers at home to maintain her industrial interests and general prosperity, notwithstanding the war. Accompanying this, meal re was another for the payment of liberal bounties by the U.S., to meet the outlays of which the celebrated special 5%. income tax was imposed. Inecrl not recite the proceedings upon these measures the debates and votes connected with their pass c. The East triumphed throughout. Vote down or repulsed upon more than one occasion, she rallied her jstrength, and by persistence secured her obects. We were coolly informed upon one occasion that if we did not assent to one of these propOsitions, the Massachusetts members in the House had determined to defeat, and would defeat, the whole of an important public bill in which it was contained. Of course, the point was conceded, and perfect harmony reigned over the concluding hours of a great session. Very active and energetic efforts in obtaining recruitsin other States of the North, negro recruits in the South, and foreign emigrants, enabled the East to fill her uotas without exhausting her laborin population at home, in consequence of whic, in connection with the expansion of the currency secured by her votes, the dividends of her manufacturing companies became splendid, and her profits in furnishing Government supplies immense. Her recruitment of southern negms to fill her quotas was checked the following year by the repeal of the section authorizing it, upon a motion submitted by me. There was a prolonged contest over the question of repeal, but. for once there was a sufficient force rallied to Overcome the eastern interest. One fact shown in the debate may be againmentioned. No sooner had the news been flashed North by telegraph that GenlSherman had ca tured Savannah, than agents were dispatcher by Governor and rew, of Massachusetts, to enlist all the negroes that could be obtained at that point. Havin" done this, he applied to the SecyWar for permission to his agents to go South and make the enlistments; and the computation of time was made with such exactness that it was believed the permission from the Secretary would reach Savannah precisely at the time when the negroes should, be shipped North. Enterprise and smartness are fine things in times of war as well as in times of peace, and influence with Government opensa fine field for their exercise, as in the case in question. It might be interesting to o on in this connection and examine the tariacts and internalrevenue laws which have been passed since 1860, and to show that in the particular ar rangements made of duties and taxes the East received more than her due share of consideration and favor. But why multiply proofs that political power will always seek its own ends, and give such direction to Government as shall be, or be thought to be, favorable. to its 01m interests? Look over the whole field of Government policy, whether political, sectional, or economical, and you will discover the marks of eastern wer in every part and by its alliance with? or rather mastership of, a great political party of the North, it is at this moment almost omnipotent in the Government. Sir, the East controlled the Senate during the war, as she controls it now, and by virtue of that control she has dominated the HoRep and influenced powerfully and constantly the executive Dept. Her power here has been, in fact, a power over the whole Government, and when considered in its totality has been enormous and irresistible. Necessarily, the action of the HoRep has had reference to the action of the Senate whenever the concurrence of the iatter in any measure was necessary. Besides, the House is frequently filled with new men, while the Senate, on account of the long dunetion of senatorial terms, and of frequent reelection of its members, isless subject to change. For this reason, and because at its participation with the President in the distribution of offices, and in the formation of treaties, the Senate must possess a lnr er measure of influence than the Housqian must extend more of influence to that body than it receives from it. For the same reasons, and for others over the executive branch of tne Government party bonds with a Senate majority) must be very considerable. In the case of Mr. Lincoln this influence was an important force in giving direction to executive policy and conduct. He complained sometimes of the “pressure” brought to bear upon him, but sooner or later behests and unquestionably the same eastern out PPOSll cut an equa degree of acquiescence in its present and future demands. functions or surrender any portion of its power. lntrcuched, as it believos, firmly and orever within the constitution as to its senatorial Representation, it is unwilling to weaken that Representative powerb the admission of members from the South. t resists the admission of members even from Colorado and Tennessee, and bases its opposition to increased representation upon grounds which must long continue to exist and iirepresentation must hereafter be conceded to southern States and to new States, she desires the concession to he made upon condition of negro suffrage. The protege s of her policy, the objects oi her long continued agitation of the country, however unfit or unworthy of the elective franchise, are to be endowed with it as her political allies for the future. Mr. President, it is in human nature that power once held or wielded should be surren ered unwillingly. The individual who has held high Office very commonly retires from it with reluctance and under the pressure of some constitutional or popular power which he cannot resist and thus, also, great sectional or social interests yield power unwillingly, and when comelled to do so bitterly regret the sacrifice. t required the stroke of war to loosen the grasp of the slaveholder upon his slave he surrenders his power only when compelled by overwhelming force. A manufacturing or agricultural population, protected by the most extravagant of tariffs or by the most oppressive of corn laws. will never willingly yiel their power over markets and consumers. Politica interests stronger than they must wrest from them the advantages which they possess if they are ever to be deprived of their enjoyment. No one, therefore, need be surprised at the reluctance manifested by the East to surrender any portion of the power which she has held during the war, and now holds, in the Government. In this particular she but exhibits another illustration of that characteristic of human nature which I havementioned, and which, outside the breasts of saints and heroes, is Universal. 22 Senators from the southern States and 2 from Colorado being double the number of those from the Eastwould reduce the importance of the latter in the Senate and remit her back to the condition in which: she stood in her relations to the Union before the war. True, she would even then possess much more than her proportion of weight in the Senate, regard being bad to her population, but she would no longer dominate or control the Government of the U.S. A balance of power in the Union, utterly broken by secession and war, would be restored, and existing interests in all sections of the countrywonld be heard in Cangress, and be regarded in the enactment oflaws and the effects of this change would be felt in the executive and judicial branches of the Government. The principles of the constitution would waken to a new life. Justice and tolerance would return to the councils of the Government and to the hearts of the people., Public expenditures would be diminished along I with the pretended necessities which now create, 1 or excuse them. Trade would revive. produc Htion increase, and the public credit beestablished upon a sure foundation. More than equally obvious. the influence of the Senate. (especially when the President is united by l he a ways submitted to it, and performed its power ho cs ultimotel toobtain from the pres5 It is enthroned here; it grasps firmly the scepter of, authority, and has no intention to nbdicste its this, we would stand strong before the nations of the earth by being made thoroughly secure against their secret intrigues or open hostility. Mr. lrcsident, I do not dislike or despise NewEngland. I am content to acknowledge her merits, to deal justly by her people, and even to overlook in some degree what 1 conceive to be her errors of opinion and extrava gnncies of conduct. The man of the East is industrious, enterprising and thrifty; his ingenuity is remarkable, and his achievements in the pursuits of private life and in public employment constitute a prominent. part of the national history. He has reclaimed the forest arid the prairie to the uses of man: has been active in educational improvementand in establishing a literature which, however defective, gives promise of future excellence. He has been a producer of wealth, and his activity has been a great element of national force and of national progress and he has won distinction upon the ocean as well as upon the land. not only in naval conflicts in the late war, and still more in former wnrs, but also in the rsuits of peaoeful commerce. He carries our i ng over great seas, to distant islands, and to the utter most parts of the earth. lic drops the line as a patient fisherman off the Newfoundland hi or follows, with poised spear, the walrus. u the whale among the icebergs of the 9th 100 years ago the enterprise and thri ot the how England mariner was celebratw; 1) Edmund Burke in language that will never uie: “No son. but what is vexed by their fished; " By the way, sir, that excellent word vent 6 excclleut in the connection in which it is im, 1 I once thought was a scintillation of llr 2. e genius of Burke himself. Ithought u. i remembered that the great master bib: 1. an had written about “The vexed Bermoothes.” Sir, the passage is to be found in the To a pest. Protesting, then, that I am not pjrorptd o; antipathy or jealousy toward the ask Ig cee tomention the remedial measur s. will remove the inequalit complained of, r. least reduce it within to erable ban 5. 1st remedy will be what has already eer “ gested, the admission of Senators into the ate from the eleveuStates of the South; for by increasing the whole number of memb rs in the Senate the existing inequality will si in rel ative importance. Though it will. n disappear, it will be less potentaud pernici 5 than at present. The 2nd and more iicctual remedy will be an amendment of the Constitution readjusting senatorial representation upon a more just basis. Let it beprovided that States containing less than one million inhabitants shall have one Senator; States contaiuin more than one million and less than thrto milions, 2 Senators; and States containing more than 3 millions, 3 Senators. This arrangement will make representation in the Senate much more equal and satisfactory than it now is, and ought not to meet with objection in any uarter. It will make 3 classes of States, each class having representation somewhat in proportion to its relative importance in the own, while the State basis for senatorial Representation, one of the best featuresof our constitutional system, will be retained in complete integrity. Picmisinv that I shall recur to this point hereafter, fwill now proceed to the 2nd division of my subject, the question of ancossrnce riox. I use this term as including 2 points: 1st, the reorganization of southern State governments; and 2nd, the admission of southern Sens&Reps into Congress. This last point involves one of the remedies for eastern predominance in the Senate, already mentioned. I was one of those who thought the provisional governments set up in the South under Mr. Lincoln's Administration were legitimate and proper. But I rewarded them in a very different light ffom that in which they appeared to be regarded by him. He sent provisional governors to several of the southern States, at whose instance a portion of the people set up local governments. He also sent Major Hay to Florida upon an expedition of government inalting which ingloriously failed in couscquence of the defeat of the military force which accom nied him. I understood it to be the idea of the late President and of those who entirely supported his policy, that those government nts set up under his authority and protection should be recognized as lawfuland valid governments for those States in all respects, and that the people who adhered to them should, as a matter of course and of right, he represented in both Houses of Congress and participate in presidential elections. A doctrine so unreasonable, so monstrous, could not pass unchallenged. It was resisted in Congress and resisted with success. On the 29th ofJ one, 1864, Fishback and Baxter, claiming seats in this Senate as Senators from arkansas. were rejected by a vote of 27 to 6. 0n the 8th day of February, 1865, Congress byJtResolution determined that the electoral votes of Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Virginia. (as well as of other scuthern States.) should not be counted for President and VEEP in the joint convention of the 2 Houses then about to be held and at the last session, claimants to seats in this Senate from Louisiana, Arkansas, and Virginia were not admitted. In all this I concurred most heartily. I thought it unjust and scandalous thatasmall art of the population of a southern State should wield the whole political power of the State in Congress and in the election of President. Besides, the governments set up in those States were Military rather than popular: they were, noto riously, not only set u but conducted under military surveillance. a short, they were Military and provisional. both in origin and character and were wholly unfit to wield the former political power of those States in this Government rit. But, as local governments for the preservation of order and in aid of our military power, they were, in my opinion, most proper and useful. Local government which would otherwise have been managed exclusively by our military oficers, under the President, was, through them, managed and administered (as for as could be done with safety) by the people themselves. Those who were friendly to our cause in the hostile section, who adhered to us in the struggle in which we were engaged, acted in aid of us and in subservience to our military commanders, conducted their own af fairs. When our Army was in Mexico under General Scott, the municipal authorities of cities and towns who were friendly or abstained from hostilities against us were permitted to carry on their own local governments in sub ordination to our authority. I could never see the slightest difficulty in holdin that Mr. Lin cons provisional governors and local governmentnts were quite regular and lawful. But it was quite absurd to hold, as some held, that they were State governors and State governmentnts in the ordinary sense of those terms, and that the minorities who submitted to them were to be considered the whole people for purposes of representation in Congress and for participation in presidential elections. But now, the war being concluded, the southern armies having surrendered, the whole southern {people having submitted to the authority of the U.S., the question of the recognition of these Lincoln governments recurs upon us. They are still in existence, and ask recognition from the President and from Congress as real and complete State governments for all purposes whatsoever. It clearly follows, from wfigt I have said, that the argument in their favor must be placed upon rounds which did not exist during the war. ctual independence of militarycontrol, and the acquiescence of the people of the States interested, must clearly appear to justify the l admission of their claims. However imperfect they may have been as State governmentnts originally, however local and provisional in character and subservient to military domi nation formerly, they may become complete and acceptable State governments by the act or acquiescence of the people concerned, the military power lormerl exercised over them being withdrawn. In this view, neither irregularity of origin nor an imperfect constitution in their earlier stages need prevent their present recognition. 1 am content to take up each case and judge it upon the particular facts which pertain to it. But most of the reorganized State governmentnts present themselves before us in a different attitude; they form a distinct class from those just mentioned. They have been formed at the instance of the POTUS since the termination of the war, and in a manner which I consider to be perfectly regular and lawful. The people have. through selected delegates, formed constitutions of State government, and have, subsequently, under regulation of law, elected legislaures and Representatives in Congress and their legislatures have selected Senators for seats in this body. The proceeding of row anization has been popular, although initiated by the President, and has been free from any actual interference of military force; and the governments set up have been recognized by the Presidentasvalid and complete. wh should not Congress also recognize them? Vhy should not Senators and {representatives chosen under their authority be admitted to seats in the 2 Houses? Is the welfare of the country to be promoted by delay in their admission, or by the total rejection of their claims? These questions, in my opinion are easil answered, and by replies which shall favor immediate representation. One thing is manifest: by the admission of southern mcmbersinto congress the Union will be completely restored. o severance of the parts, however slight, will continue. It is also to be considered that the power to admit members by each House of Congress is beyond dispute: for it rests upon a clear, distinct provision of the Constitution. By a simple, direct act, then, fully authorized, Congress can at once make restoration complete. I have not been at all troubled by the argument, sometimes urged, that these State governments were irregular in origin; that no specific law authorized the appointment of provisional governors, or authorized the pro visional governors to call conventions for forming new constitutions. What is material in the making of a constitution is, that the people concerned shall in fact make or adopt it; and the means by which their power is called into action for the purpose is immaterial, if there be no constraint. The convention which formed the Pennsyl vania constitution of 1776, was called by the Philadel hia committee of correspondence, and not ii the Legislature. No law whatever authorized the convention, and yet it made a constitution which stood for 14 ears as the constitution of Pennsylvania, and the State came into the Federal Union with it as herfundamental law. In that constitution the council of censors established by it was authorized to call conventions to amend the constitution, and there was no other provision for amendment. Yet under a simple resolution of the Legislature a convention was chosen which forme the constitution of 1790, which is yet in existence. Imny also mention, what is well known,that several new States whose constitutions were irregular in origin have been admitted into the Union by Congress. It was held to be sufficient that they were in fact made by the people who were to be bound by them. AIEXDING run cousrxrnriou. Having spoken to the other points rnposed to inlyselffordiscussion at this time, come to the ast and principal one. I mean the question of amending the Constitution on the subject of representation. the pending proposition of amendmentwas, in its original form, introduced into the HoRep on the 8th January, by on, of the members from Home. For purposes of convenience, I shall call it the Blaine amendment, naming it after the gentleman who proposed it. It was, in a modified form referred to the committee of 15, reported back to the House, and after some consideration again referred to the committee on the 30th of January. The committee again reported it to the House on the lollownig day, when it was passed under the operation of the Tprevions question, without general debate. he member reporting it was permitted to support it in aspoec of much bit terness and power, but the month of opposition was closed. It is now before us for consideration in the firm in which it passed the House, and reads as follows: Aimcu: —. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included Within tbii Uniun according to their respective nnm burs. counting the whole number of persons in each State. excluding Indians not taxed: Mfded. That whenever the clgctive franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on account of race or co 1 all personstherein of such raceor color shall be excluded cm the basis of representation. By referring to one of the clauses of the Constitution, read by me in the outset of my remarks, we are enabled to understand the nature and extent of the change proposed by the resolution. By the existing Constitution representation is based upon the whole number of inhabitants in the States, exclusive of Indians not taxed. Females, children, and foreigners are counted, and all negroes and mulat toes are also counted, inasmuch as slaver no longer exists. The computation of“ 3 fths of all other persons” besides free men, as contemplated in the Constitution, will no longer be may e; for there is no class ofinhabitants which falls within the description of those words. The are henceforth ine perative and useless. It fo lows that all inhabitants in a State, except untaxed Indians, are to be counted for purposes of representation der the Constitution and it will he observe. hat the rule for apportion in Representatives nce ordin to population will he also the rule for imposmg direct taxes. Each State is topay direct taxes accordin to the whole number of its inhabitants, excluding Indians untaxed. The abrogation of the 3/5ths rule by emancipation applies equally to the apportionment of Representatives and the imposition of direct taxes. Whatever change has been caused by emancipation applies equal y to both these subjects. Now,the Blaine amendment. leaving the constitution to stand upon this subject in all other respects precisely as I have described it, provides that whenever in any State there 5 all be any exclusion from the elective franchise on account of race or color, all persons of such race or color shall be excluded from enumeration for pul80588 of representation in the lower House of Congross. That is the very remarkable pro csition which comes from the committee of 15, and which has been approved by the HoRep by a 2/3rds vote. The amendment presents an alternative to each State in which persons ofan inferior race or color may be found, whether Asiatic: or Africans. In the Pacific States it may relate to the former, while in the southern and cen tral States it will apply to the latter; and the alternative is that suffrage shall be extended to such race generally upon the same conditions and to the same extent that it is extended to the white race, otherwise the whole of such inferior race shall be deducted from the population of the Smte in assigning it Representatives in Congress. Every State in which Africans or Asiatics are found is to be subjected to a constitutional pressure in favor of in discriminating suffrage to all races and colors of mankind found within its borders. If it refuse or neglect to establish such indiscriminating suffrage, it is to pay the penalty in a loss of power in the Federal Government and it is to be observed that even where the disfranchisement is but artial, the whole race, and not merely the part disfranchised, is to be deducted from the population of the State in assigning it Representatives., Now, one of 2 things must happen in a State in case this amendment be adopted. Negro or Asiatic suffrage must be accepted, or the State will be stripped of aportion of the power which she now olds under the Constitution. This is, therefore, a penal amendment. While it assumes to leave the State free to regulate suffrage for itself, it imposes a penalt upon it if it decide in a particular way. O matter how strong, or even inerntive, may be the reasons against lowering e standard of suffrage in a State to the capacity of the negro or Chinaman, the State must do it or be stripped of the constitutional right to full representation which she new holds. It is virtual ya decision by Congress that to withhold negro sufirage to any extent or for any cause is criminal and justly obnoxious to punishment, and that that punishment shall be imposed by 3 4ths of the States upon the remainder by means of a constitutionn amendment. Again, the amendment makes no change in the apportionment of direct taxes among the States. They are to be apportioned according to the whole population. There is to be no abatement in proportion to the disfranchisement of the State in her representation, although under the Constitution as it stands and always has stood, taxation and representation are put upon the same basis. While the rule for the latter is changed, the rule for the for mer is to remain unaltered. But it must be manifest that if either is to be changed, it should be the rule of taxation. The growth of the country, aggregating wealth in particular districts and States, to a greater extent than in others, has made the constitutional rule of taxation unequal and objection able. Au old State, and especially a manufacturing State, is much more able to pay taxes than a new State, ornn agricultural one; and the distribution of taxation according to numbers will press much more heavily upon the latter than upon the former. An amendment of the rule, therefore, which would impose taxes among the States according to the taxableproperty in each, instead of according to the number of inhabitants, might stand abun dantly justified upon grounds of justice and convenience. But no such change is proposed by this amendment. Whatever inconvenience or hardship arises from the present rule, is dis regarded, and it is leftwholly untouched; while the rule of representative apportionment, which involves neither inconvenience nor hardship, but proceeds upon a just principle of equality, is to be amended in a manner most odious and objectionable. his amendment is supported in part upon the ground that by emancipation 2/5ths of the slave population are, under the operation of the existing Constitution, added to the Representative basis in the southern States; that therefore an amendment is necessary to pre vent a positive increase of southern power. This argument may be repelled upon several grounds, which I proceed to state: 1. The rule for counting the whole population was originally intended to be restrained only so long as slavery should exist. It was intended by the fathers that whenever emancipation took place in a State the emancipated population should pass into the representative asis. Therefore, in amending the Constitution as proposed, we defeat their intention and over rule their judgment upon this subject. Have we not been told 1,000times that the fathers expected slavery to cease in the country, and took that expectation into account in framing the fundamental law? They did not even admit the term “slaves” or “slaveryn into the Constitution, but described slaves, in the clause we are considering, as “other persons,” after naming free men, and in the fugitive slave clause as “persons held to service and labor.” They gave Congress authority to prohibit the slave trade after 1808, under the words “prohibiting migration or immiation of persons, " and it was well known to em J that theStates had then already begun to emancipate theirslaves. The Permsylvania statute of emancipation had been passe a few years be fore, and other States had taken, or were about to take, steps in the same direction. Unquestionably, therefore, they contemplated that the 3/5ths clause would expend itself in the course of time, and that the whole population of the States would fall within the rule of representation which they established. I say, then, with confidence, that we have now realized a state of things which they foresaw, and for which they made provision; that emancipation, caused by the war, is not an unexpecte or unforeseen event, requiring a change of the constitutional rule which they established, if we are to be guided by the views and opinions which they eld upon the subject of representation. Nor, in this point of view, can it make any difference that emancipation is produced by our act instead of the voluntary action of the States themselves. In decreeing emancipation and enforcing it upon the States, we accepted all its appropriate consequences, including some enlargement of the representative basis. That it was our act instead of the act of the States we propose to disfranchise, can be no reason for imposing upon them the present amendment. 2. The argument is plainly insufficient, because it covers but a art of the subject matter of the amendment. he argument applies only to 2/5ths of the slave population emancipated by the war. But the amendment applies to the whole negro population, whether slave or free before the war, wherever suffrage is withheld from them. It strikes heavily at the representation of Maryland, Kentucky, and other States which did not join the rebellion, and eve where excludes colored non-voters, whether s have or free before the war, from computation. The free ucgroes of Pennsylvania and of Maryland are to be excluded from enumeration upon an argument which has no relation to them. 3. The argument does not take into account the rate of mortalit in the slave population since the outbreak of the war. That mortality has been very vreat, and has been estimated to amount to a fi th part of the whole. I do not think it impossible that the census of 1870 will show a decrease of the negro population within the late slave States, as compared with the census of 1860, of much more than one million. At all events, the rate of mortalit during the last 4 years and now is fearful y great, and thumb it cannot be exactly stated, it is a fact which must not be overlooked. But to the whole extent of decreased numbers among this people the argument I am answering fails, and it may be still further weakened hereafter. 4. But ifthe argument were perfectly sound and satisfactory, it would notjustify this amendment, but one of a very different character. If the addition of 2/5ths of the late slave population to the representative basis of some of the States is an unjust or pernicious change requirin a constitutional amendment to cor rect it, that amendment would properly be one which simply removed the cause O complaint; and an amendment which would provide that 2/5ths of the negro population,late slaves, and their descendants, should not. be counted, although free, would meet the whole requirement of the argument now under notice and if it. should be said that such an amendment could not be conveniently applied, I answer that one nearly equivalent to it, and more convenient of application, might be substituted. At all events, the argument does not support the amendment now pendin", which departs from it to the whole extent of pthe free colored population before the war, to the whole extent of 3/5ths of the slave population and also of all Asiatic inhabitants in the Pacific States. Of course Istate this point accordin to the existing facts, suffrage iicing withheldtfrom the negro and other inferior races in all the States where their numbers are considerable, my own included. Having answered this particular argument brouvht orwurd in support of the amendment, it only remains to consider whether the rule of representation according to population, or the whole number of persons in a State, is not the proper one for general adoption. The exccptional case of a population part slave is now removed from our problem, and we may consider it without re erence to that disturbing cause. Certainly our fathers thought population to be the proper basis, for they established it for themselves and for us, limited only by a temporary provision, which met the exceptional case of the slave. Certainly even the committee of 15 thought population a better basis than any other, for they do not suggest prop crty, electoral qualification, territory, or any other general basis as a substitute and if we pass from authority to reason, what can be more clear than the convenience and equality of the rule of population? Qur question concerns the representation of States as such and a rule which shall be perfectly uniform as to all, and operate equa y upon all, is the rule alike of justice and of wisdom. Your amendment strikes at the States with unequal hand;:1 art of them will be wholly unaffected by it; while upon others it will be, and was intende to be, an instrument to coerce their internal policy, or to punish them for the free and independent exercise of their own judgment. On the contrary. the rule of population presses no where and otfends nowhere. It offers no bribe ou the one hand, and inflicts no punishment on the other. It tends to harmony, because it produces no discontent. Besides, what better rule for the security of local interests than that of population can be conceived? That of voters is open to most w80 objections, some of which have been Well stated, both in this Senate and in the House. That of property is odious and antirepublican. One based on territorial divisions is out of the question. The only possibleone is that which already obtains for the Senate, and is inapplicable to the more popu lar branch of Congress. I conclude, therefore, that population is the simplest, most convenient, the most equal, and the safest of all rules which can be proposed for popular representation, and that it is necessary alike to particular interests in a State and to the common interests and welfare of all the States. I would leave the existing rule unchanved, with the expression of an earnest hope that it. may re main unchanged forever, or at least so long as our Republic continues to be one of the Powers of the earth. I would not exchange t for any other rule whatever, if opportunity O cred, but would maintain it and pass it on to those who come after us. I might agree to modify it in its particular application to some community or c pass of persons in the spirit which prom ted our fathers in the adoptionof the 3htths clause; but this would e a concession to particular circumstances, constituting an exeeption to tpfe rule and not an abandonment of the rule itse. For the present, in passing upon the Blaine amendment, we can have no dilhculty in deter minin that the exception which it proposes to the ru eof population is most offensive, unrea sonable, and unjust. I shall very willingl contribute one of the votes by which it shal be condemned. But there are general objections which stand opposed to any propositions of amendments at this time by congress—l mean the submission by Congress of amendments to the State! for their adoption. 1. 1st in order is the objection, and it is a great if not fatal one, that 11 States are unrepresented in the Senate and House. They are not heard in debates which mny affect their interests and welfaae in all future time. Nor can those who represent them vote here upon any question. I know it may be said that these States withdrew from our companionship in 1861, and that by their own fault they stand unrepresented here. This was the answer to the argument that they were absent when the amendment abolishing slavery was under consideration in Congress. But I insist that the case has wholly changed sincethat time. They were then voluntarily absent. They were destitute of State organizations which were in accord with us and submissive to our Constitution and laws, and majorities oftions were hostile to us and overbo 3 irtphoepuolayal parts. There was then total State incapacity, self produced, for any action whatever within this Government. They discharged here no duties and they could exercise no powers. But how stands the case now 3 What achange from that day of conflict to this of eacc; from rebellion to submission; from hostile State organizations to loyal ones! Those States are not now absent of choice, but by our own act, or our failure to act. Their representatives stand at our doors, competent and willing to take part in our proceedings, and to assist in the common wor of government. The reason which existed on a former occasion, or which was urged upon a former occasion, for our separate action in proposing an amendment to the Constitution wholly fails in the present case. There is no necessity now that we act alone; and if we do act alone it will be an act of choice and not of compulsion. Let the whole country be represented here before we enter non-the very grave work of changing the fundhmental law which is to extend to all and to bind all. 2. Another objection to immediate amendment is the probabilit that any amendment made at this time wili be a partisan amendment. The party in the majority for the time being will, naturally enoug, seek to perpet uate its power, to secure itself against future changes of public sentiment, in any amendment which it may propose. It is not obliged to consult or conciliate any opposing interest in proposing or passing a resolution through the 2 Houses of Congress. Possessing a 2/3rds vote in each House, it can do and per form its will in defiance of any opposition or remonstrance. The temptation to frame amendments in the interest of a party will be too strong for selfresistance by the majorit. Possessing uncontrolled, unchecked power lbr the immediate purpose in hand, it is idle to expect impar tial action from it. But God forbid that the Constitution should be made the subject of mere party amendment! The fact will be both bad in itself and of evil example in future times. The excesses and injustice of part, as exhib ited in ordinary legislation, can e speedily corrected. Laws can be modified or repealed with great facility whenever their imperfections become manifest; but the Constitution is a permanent instrument, and bad provisions once placed in it cannot be easily removed. 3. he members of this Congress were not chosen with any reference to the subject of constitutional amendment. Their action will be voluntary upon this subject, and quite unprompted by any public sentiment manifested in their election. It is but reasonable that some popular consideration should be given to questions of amendment before the are sanctioned or proposed by Congress. at no such consideration has been given by the people to anyone of the various amendments which are now proposed here. Besides, this is a war Congress, chosen when passions were warm and violence abroad in the land. It must necessarily partake of the passions of the time when its members were chosen, and be less suited to the calm duties of statesmanship involved in proposing amendments. 4. Whatever amendments are now proposed by Congress are to be submitted to Legislatures, and not to popular conventions in the States; and most of those Legislatures are to be the ones now in session. The people are not to act upon the amendments directly, nor to consider them in any way whatever; they are not even to be allowed the privilege of electing members of their Legislatures with reference to the question of ratification. So that, in point of act, the people are. not to consider amendments in electing the members of Congress who propose them, nor in selecting the Legislatures which are to ratify or adopt them. hey are to be excluded from any direct connection with the Whole proceeding, from bpginning to end. ow, sir, I am opposed to party amendments, propoaed suddenly here, in the absence of mcm era from nearly 1/3rd of the States, without any instigation or prior knowledge of the people, and to be adopted by Legislatures chosen Without any reference to the questions we thrust upon them. 5. Finally, in submitting amendments at this time, we invite a dis ate upon the question of the degree of legi ative assent necessary to their adoption. 1f ratified by the Legislatures of loss than 3 4ths of althe States, their validity will be denied, and their enforcement resisted. That denial must be made, not only by the unrepresented States, but by all men in the country who hold the views of the last and of the present executive Administrations and the fact of the attempt to force an amendment upon the country against so large a mass of opinion will only produce “ had blood” and increase the difficulties of our situation. You will not, probably, get your amendments as sented to the number of States which, in the opinion of the President and SecyState, are necessary to their adoption and then the question comes up, is it wise to raise this sub ect of difference to disturb our future counsels? asides, it is to be considered that the very manner, the spirit in which these amendments are proposed is well calculated to defeat their cor ial acceptance by the whole country. The whole proceeding looks like a piece of sharp management by a congressional majority to consolidate their own power, and to force amendments upon the people of the country, or at least upon a large art of them, without full consideration and t cir free assent. But if amendments are to be proposed at this time, I insist that the whole sugject of amendment shall be opened, and that we shall not be confined to the ae which have already emanated from the committee of 15, or been presented in the 2 Houses. There are others much more deserving of favor and adoption and much more likely to receive ultimately, that degree and extent of favor which should always support constitutional changes. The 1st is a change in senatorial representation to remove or mitigate existing inequality, which might assume the form sag ested by mein aformer part of my present remarglrs. I mean the division of the States into 3 classes, accord in to numbers of population, and assi ning a different representation to each class. 10 meet any large increase of population hereafter,with a consequent inconvenient increase in the number of Senators, it will be well also to provide that the numbers upon which the classification is based shall be raised hereafter, some rule of proportion between them being still retained. If it should be said that the concluding clause of the 5th article of the existing Constitution stands opposed to any improvement in the rule of senatorial representation, I answer that that clause itself may be rescinded. If it be alleged that such amendment would be revolutionar in character, or at least a violation of the faith pleded by the States to each other in forming the constitution, I answer, it would no more bear such imputation than would an amendment regulating suffrage in the States, or any other which would concern the internal policy of any State, which may be independent of, or remotely connected with, those general objects for which the Constitution was made; and such objection will apply with equal force to the amendment already adopted for the abolitionof slavery in the States. In fact, the abolition amendment, and amendments regulating State suffrage, or other question of exclusive State policy, would be much more obnoxious to the objection than one regulating representation in the Senate of the U.S. For the latter would relate to a Federal question wholly be ond separate State action, and capable of reguation only in a new form, by the amendment power of the Constitution. If, then, amendments of the Constitution are now to be proposed, this one must be considered, and its consideration will be pressed. If the hand of reform is to be laid upon ourfundamental law, it must not be permitted to strike inferior points where change is desired, and omit to strike this point of senatorial inequality. That inequality must be corrected, and it Wlll. be corrected. 6 States out of 30— 6 or out of the greater number which we will have hereafter, cannot successfully resist a proposition to deprive them of an unjust or ine rdinate power in the Government, in dero gation of the interests and against the opinions and will of the other States. I say, then, that if representation in this Government is to be changed at all by constitutional amendment the representation of the East must and will be reduced to an equality with that of other sections of the Union; and to this work the Representatives of the great States will devote themselves with a zeal and perseverance which will know no abatement until justice shall be secured. But there is another improvement in representation, infinitely more important than any yetmentioned, to which the attention of congross and of the American people should be earnestly directed. No other possible change relating to representation can compete with it in iipportance, or produce results equally ben efici. In elections of members of Congress, we apply or use a majority, or rather a plurality in e. The candidate receiving the greatest number of votes in any case is e ected; and all votes given to other candidates are dropped or lost. Our Government, therefore, instead of being a Government of the people, is in fact a Government of buts part of e people; and our fundamental principle, accepted in theory by all, is imperfectl a plied. I conceive that the political evils which afflict us, that most of the imperfections in the practical working of our system of government, flow from this cause. The people are to govern themselves; all authority is to rest upon the consent of the governed. this is what we proclaim as our fundamental doctrine, and yet we do not apply it, except Eartially, in our electoral arrangements. uizot, in his History of the Origin of Representative Government, well points out the in consistency of the claim of a majority to absolute power, with the other principle, which affirms a right in every individual to be governed only by those laws to which he has given his assent. The 2 things are utterly incom atible, and can never be made to harmonize. any persons talk loosely and foolishly about the sacred principle that the majority shall rule, and Mr. Jeffersons emphatic observation, in his 1st inaugural address, inculcating absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority, is frequently quoted, and as frequently misapplied. Now, that the majority shall govern, is not our fundamental principle, but a rule, and is used by us, along with other rules, to accomplish our purpose of government by the people. We use temajority rule, the plu rality rule, the 2/3rds rule, and the 3 4ths rule, according to circumstances, and upon considerations of convenience and expo diency. A majority rule for popular elections, when found to be inconvenient in practice, gives place to a plurality rule, as our experience shows. The science of government is progressive, and the discussion and illustration which princiolcs have undergone during 3 pausbthe century have enlarged the minds of men, and enabled them to obtain conceptions which were before impossible. We now understand that the majority rule for elections is a rude and imperfect contrivance; that it inevitably creates and inflames to the highest extent the passions of party; that it ostracizes from the public service many of the best and the ablest men of the country; and that it injects into popular elections very much of the corruption and violence by which they are degraded and disgraced. Ifh questionably if but a part of the people are to bear rule and to act. their pleasure in affairs of governmeut, it is better that the majority should hear such rule than that the minority should. But why should a part of the people monopolize all power; and is a rule which produces such resn t wise, salutary, and just? It is in conflict with our principle of government by the (people, while it is practically mischiev ous an evil. Impelled by these considerations, founded upon experience in the practicah worltin s of ree overument, men O great ability an Wisdom have scught for devices of various kinds By which the mischiefs of the majority rule ould be checked and reduced to their mini mum. From their reflections a doctrine of concurrent majorities has been deduced and vi or dusly and elaborately expounded by the e der Adams and by Mr. Calhoun. The views of the latter, as applied to, our ovm Government, led to the proposition of a dual Executive which, nst before the rebellion, was presented and depended in the Senate by Mr. unter, of Virginia, in an elaborate argument. That propposition was impracticable, fbr several reasons, and did not command an considerable amount of public favor. Lt was wolly inadmissible, asa ructical arrangement in this country, and may be dismissed to its place among things obsolete on earth. But minorit representailon, which it illustrated and a lied, is an idea which must be entertained in a? governments pretending to be free. It Was not ignored byt e men who made the Constitution of the U.S., nor hns it been ignored in State constitutions. All checks and balances, as they are called, in our American constitutions, tend to the protection of minorities, and were intended lor that purpose; find various constitutional provisions might be pointed out by which power and influence are securedto them in government. Iam ofopinion an opinion founde upon much independent an earnest reflection, that we require additional provisions in our constitutions, State and federal, for the protection of minorities in their interests and rights; and if time permitted, I should be gla to present the arguments by which this opinion would be vindicated and established. One form in which minority representation might be made to appear in the Constitution of the U.S., would he as aprovision that, in all elections for POTUS, the candidate 2nd highest in electoral votes, should become President of the Senate, with the power of objecting to bills, liable, however, to have his objections over ruled by a 2/3rds vote. Thus the minority of the people, who would, nevertheless, be a part of the people, and entitled to be heard in some way in the Government, would be rep presented here by their chosen chief or leader, who would be armed with a real power for defending them against new measures of hostility or aggression. Butimust here content myself with a bare suggestion, without producing the arguments in its support or referring to those most perti nent facts, scattered throughout our history, by which those arguments might be illustrated and confirmed. Nor shall [refer to objections to it which, however plausible or striking at 1st view, would, upon examination, wholly disappear. Imust pass on to consider what is more appropriate to my present or ument, an improvement in the present mo e of securing representation in the lowor House of Congress. Lord John Russell, in his reform bill of 1854, proposed that in cities and boroughs returnin 3 members to Parliament, no elector should vote for more than 2, which would have the etle ct of permitting a minority of 2/5ths of the constituency to return one member and in our country by constituting plural districts, that is, districts electing more than one member, an arrangement securing minority along with majority representation might be made. But the course of recent thought and inquiry upon this subject in GreatBritain, and to some extent also in this country, has been toward what is called personal representation—the most jnst, equal, complete, and erlect plan of repreaentation ever proposed oralree State. The elaborate and a mirable work of Mr. Hare, of England, upon this subject deserves the care ful study of every American statesman, and will produce perfect conviction, both as to the merit and necessity of the change proposed by him in electoral systems and it has the hearty and emphatic indorsement of John Stuart Mill, the greatest living authority upon questions of political economy and constitutional law. He describes it as— "A scheme which has the almost unparalleled merit of carrying out a great principle of governmentnt HI I. mannorh approuchlng to ideal perfection, fa regards the ObJULiln. vlew whilc tultains incidental y several other ends of scarcely inferior importance. Assigningto Pennsylvania, NewYork, Ohio, or any other State where more than one Representative is to be chosen, a number of members proportioned to population under the constitutional rule of distribution, the manner of their selection may be regulated to secure, in fact as well as in t cory, t 10 representation of the voters of such State. Takinginto account the number of voters in the State, an electoral ratio or number may be fixed as necessary to the election of any candidate. Any citizen of the State obtaining that number of votes shall be considered elected, and his votes may be derived from any of the qualified citizens of the State wherever they may reside within its limits. The regulation of details, the time, place, and manner of voting, the formal returns of voting and verification of results, and the provisions by which surplus votes to a candidate will be avoided, and by which the filling of every seat in congress which belongs to a State shall be secure, must, of course, follow, and must be made clear and convenient of execution. Thus any number of voters in a State equal to the number required for the election of a member to Congress can unite their sufirages upon the candidate of their choice and elect him, not as the antagonist of another candidate, but simply as the recipient of their votes and the prac tical resultvwill be that votes will be cast only for candidates who will be elected, and who will represent truly and full the people of the State. Each interest in the State, whether political, local, economical, or social, if it be of any considerable magnitude, can have its appropriate representation by having its votes counted effectually for the purpose for which they were given. Modes for concentrating the necessary number of votes upon a candidate can be established by State laws, and by the volunta action of the people themselves. I do not at This time propose to go through the inquiry of the a,plication of the plan in the States, but simply to indicate its general character and its immense superiority over the existing plan, by which partial representation only is secured. The advantages of personal representation are too obvious for denial or question when they come to be understood. Among them I shall select but 2 or 3 for present notice. 1. Personal representation would continue men of ability and distinction for long pe riods of time in Congress. such men would not hold their seats subject to the changes of party majorities in their own neighborhood, or to the uncertainties and intrigues of nominating conventions, as at present. So long as a number of men in a State requisite to the election of a member desired a members continuance in public service he would be continued, and no intrigue or combination of hostile interests could deleathim. the consequencewould be,in stead oftwoyear and four year men in the HoRep—always just beginning to learn and never fully instructed in public business—we would have ten, 20, and 30 year men, trained and disciplined to public service, who would confer character upon the House, and give stability, consistency, and wisdom to the laws. At the same time, the expi ration of membership at the end of every 2 years would retain fully the power of popular control over the House. 2. Personal representation would give to each important interest in the country a weight or power in the House, exactly proportioned to its number of electors. In short, the opinions of the country would be thoroughly and truly represented by the House, resulting in wise legislation and more general contentment and acquiescence in the proceedings of Government than we now have. 3. A still more notable advantage would be the abatement of party violence, and consequently of corruption in congressional elections. This will become evident to anyone familiar with our present electoral system who will carefully consider the proposed plan and trace out its inevitable results. A fierce struggle for a small majority of votes for one candidate over another, new so familiar a case, would rarely, if ever, be known. You would get real. just, entire, and complete representation of the people, without turbulence and with little of contest, and the evils which now flow from partisan contests would be greatly checked and reduced. For the introduction of personal representation into our system of government no amendment of the Constitution of the U.S. would be necessary. So far as I can perceive it can be established, or authorized, by an act of Congress, the existinw statute relating to State re rosentation in the pHouse being repealed.