Mr. FOOT. The bill before us presents to our consideration the twofold question of constitutional power and of public expediency. The remarks I propose to submit on the present occasion will be c icfly confined to the consideration of the 1st branch of the proposition. The same question was before us at the last session, on was debated at some length; and if I mistake not, the last Congress adjourned while my honorable friendfrom Maine [Mr. Mon BILL] was upon the floor, addressing the senate in opposition to this bill, and no final action was taken upon it. I listened with some attention, and with something of interest, and, I will add, with something of instruction also, to that discussion, and have recently read a consider able portion of it. I have to say, however, that the limited examination I havegiven to the main question in hand inclines my judment to a different conclusion from that which has been expressed by some of my associates upon this floor most learned in questions of constitutional law, and from whose matured opinions upon questions of this character I have rarely found myself obliged to dissent; and never, without hesitation and without somewhat of distrust in the soundness or the accurac of the conclusions to which my own reflections had led me. I take leave, therefore, to state in brief, though it may be but crudely, the views I entertain, us, at the present moment, they may strike my own mind, upon the questioniy involved in the pending measure. The bill under consideration is entitled “An act to facilitate commercial postal, and Military communication among the several States.” The bill provides: That every railroad company in the U. S. whose road is operated by steam. its successors and assigns. be, and is hereby. authorized to carry upon and over its road. connections. boots. bridges and for ries, all freight, property. mails. passengers, troops and Government supplieson their wayfroni unyState to another State, and to receive compensation there or such is the bill; such are its provisions; plain, concise, yet comprehenswe, and of general application. The object and purpose of the hi 1 are sufficiently obvious. It is simply to carry out and to apply an express provismu of the constitution, to wit, in regard to the regulation of commerce among the States, in any and every proper case for its a lication which may arise. Vhy not pass the bilil What is the objection to its passage? Why not authorize the railroad companies of the L U.S. to carry pas sengers and freight, mails and munitions of war from one State to another State? That is the purpose, the chief ur ose, for which they were constructed; and or t ie most part, I suppose, the railroads of the country do new exercise and enjoy this right or privilege. I am not at present advised of but few, of but very few exceptions the most notable ofwhich is, doubt less, in the State of NewJerseyin which the full exercise and enjoyment of this right or privilege are, in any cgree, inhibited or restricte by the State legislation. That gallant and patriotic State, many years ago, deemed it expedient to confer upon a single coni any or corporation the privilege of carryingal freight and passengers, for a long term of years, between NewYork and Phila del hia, to the exclusion of any and of all other rai roads across her territory, which then were or which thereafter might be constructed. This is the provision in the charter of the Camden an“d Amboy Company: That it shall not be lawful. at any timeduring the said railroad charter. [to wit, the Camden and Am bqyJ to construct any other railroads in this State Without the consent of thesaitl companies, which shall be intended or used for the transportation of pnssengers or merchandise between the cities of NewYork and Pbiladelphiw or to competein business with the railroad authorised by the act to which this supplement is relative.” This company has now enjoyed the exclusive privilege of the vast amount of transportation of passengers and merchandise, over and, between NewYork and Philadelphia, for a full 3rd of a century, under a legislative prohibition of all competition from any other line of railroad, then or since constructed, and has claimed and still claims the exclusive benefit of this business under its chartered privilege, so that, when another railroad companythe Rar itan and Delaware under the orders orupon the application of the Federal Government, in 1862, carried a large amount of freight, consisting of troops, horses, arms, and munitions of war, and at cheaper rates and with greater dispatch than the camdeu and AmboyCompanyafforded, as I am informed, over its road. from NewYork to Philadelphia, it was immediately sum moned before the chancellor of NewJerscyto render an account of the sum total of the iro ceeds of this business, with a view to equal decree to payoverthis amount to the camden and Amboy Company, and was perpetually enjoined from carring assciigers and freight thereafter between NewYork and Philadelphia. The inquiry recurs, is it competent in a State, or a State Legislature, to grant exclusive privileges of this kind, and to continue them to the prejudice or restriction of commercial intercourse between or “amen the severalStates 1" Or, if it be cometent to o so, in the absence of congressiona action, is it not subject to the exercise of the superior authority of Congress, by virtue of its power, under the Federal constitution, to “regulate commerce among the several States?” In other words, and for example, is it not competent for Congress, by Virtue of this constitutional power, to authorize the Raritaii and Delaware, or any other railroad company in NewJersey, to carry passengers and merchandise between NewYork and hiladelphia, and toreccivecompeusation there for, notwithstanding the inhibition of the State Legislature? Under this power, derived in terms from the constitution, giventure to express the opinion that it is competent for congress to set aside any such special and exclusive legislation, when it at all restricts, impedes, or impairs the facilities of travel and trade and commerce between or among the States; and of the fact itself, Congress, in the exercise of its discretion, must of necessity be the sole judge. In short, I hold it to be entircly competent for Congress to pass this bill, and to place all railroads upon the same footing in respect to the right and primes”; passengers and freight from anyone State to another State, notwithstandin any inhibition which may have been impose by local State enactment. I say inhibition, for the exclusive grant of a privilege to one party is a virtual in ibition to all other parties of the exercise of the same privilege. Congress may, as indeed it has done, declare all railroads to be post routes. It may as indeed it has done, as in the case of the Illinois Central and other railroads, declare all railroads to be public high ways and with equalauthority it may declare all railroads to be awful structures, and having equal privileges to carry passengers and merchandise “from one State to another State.” This whole question of the extent of the power of Congress to “ regulate commerce among the several States” was fully considered by the SCOTUS, and upon an argument on either side of conceded and consummate ability by Mr. Webster and Mr. Wirt on the one side and by Mr. Emmett and Mr. Oakley on the other some 40 years ago in the famous and familiar case of Gibbons and Ogden, and which has heretofore and often been cited in debate upon this bill. This case grew out of an act of the Legislature of NewYork: granting to Livingston and Fulton the exclusiive privilege of navigating by steam vessels, for a term of years, the navigable waters within the Jurisdiction of the State. Though this was a case of navigation, yet the court considered t“he general question of the power of Congress to regulate commerce amonfithe several States, ” however carried on, whether by water or by land; whether by navigation or by land conveyance; whether by steamships or by steam cars. The court in that case considered and determined the question of the extent of the power of Conwess over the subject of commerce among the States without regard to any particular mode or agency by which it might be conducted. The judgment of the court was in so port of the power o Congress Over the whole subJect of commerce among the States, and against the validity of the State at. In this connection I will take eave to read, from the elaborate and masterly opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, who pronounced the judgment of the court a few paragraphs, as having a direct, and, as I think, a decisive, hearing upon the immediate question before us: "To what commerce does this power extend? The constitution informs us. to commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes. It. has. wc believe, been universally admitted that itnhteesreewouorrsdescboemtwpereenhe the U.S. facnodmmfoerercigianl nations. No sort cftrude can be carried on betwcen this country and any other to which this power does not extend“ It has been truly said that commerce. as the word is usedin the constitution. isaunit. every pa"rtIfof which is indicated by the term. this be the admittedmcaningof the word. in its application to foreign nations it mustcarry the same meani throughout the sentence and remain a unit. unless}t I arebe some plain. intelligible cauaewhich “CT?1. The subjectto which the power is next a plied is to commerce among the several States.” he word among meansiptoriningled with. A thing which is among others is intermingled with them. ommerce among the Statescannot stop at the external bound pry line of eachState. but may beintroduced into the n“cIrtior is not intendedto say that thesewords compro hend that commercewhich is comlctely internal. which is carried on betweenman and man in a State or between different parts of the same State and which does not extpnd toor affectother States. such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary. “Comprehensive asthe word among is. it may very properly be restricted to that commercewhic concernsmore States than one. The phrase is not ono which would probablyhave beenselectedto indicate the completelyinterior traflic of a State. because It 1! “M P“ am phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular classes of commerceto which the powerwpoto be exed would not have beenmadehad the intention beento extendthepower to everydescription. he enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something. if weregardthelanguageor thesubjoct of the sentence. must be the exclusively internal commerceof a State. The genius and character of the whole Government seemto be that its action is to be applied to all the external concernsof the nation and to those internal concernswhich affectthe Statesgenerally; but, not to thosewhich are completelywithin aparticular State. which do not affectother States and with which it is not necessaryto interfere forthopurpm of umtin: someof the generalpowersof the Government. The completelyinternal commerceof a State. then. may beconsidered as reserved for the State itself. ”9 W“henton Reports. 194. CommerceamongtheStatesmust. of neccssity. be commercewith the States. In the regulation of trude with the Indian tribes the action of the law, especially when the constitution was made. was cluelly within it State. The power of Congress, then. whatever it maybe, must be exercisedwithin the territorial Jurisdiction of the several States. The senseof the nation o n tbissubjectis uno uivoeally manifested by the proVisionsmade in we laws for transporting goods by land between Baltimore and Providence. ctween NewYork and Philadelphia and between Ph“iladelphia and Baltimore. we? are now arrived at the inquiry. whatis this po“wIetris the power to regulate. that is. to prescribe the rule by which commerceis to be governed. This power. like all others vestedin Congress is complete in itself. may be exercised to its utmost extent and acknowledgesnoliinitutions other than are ircscribed in the constitution. These are expressedin plain terms and do not infectthe questionswhich arise in this case or which have beendiscussedat the bar. If as has always been understood. the sovereignty of Congress. though limited to specified objects is plo iiury asto thoseobieets. the powerovercomniereewith foreign nationsand among the several Statesis vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in asingle Government. having in its constitution the some prostrictions on the exerciseof the poweras are found in the constitution of the U.S. ”Ibiil. p. 196. In this connection I take leave also to read several extracts from the argument of Mr. Webster in this case. Although it is the argument of counsel in behalf of his client, it is nevertheless the argument of a master mind; the argument of a master of the subject; the argument of the great expositor of the Constitution, addressed to the reason and the understanding, upon the points raised of constitutional law and construction: “In regard to these acts he should contend. in the 1st place. that they exceeded the power of the Legislature: i tnd. 2ndly. t hat if they could be considered valid for any purpose they were void. still as againstany right eno edunder the laws of the U.S. w1thwhic they came in collision; and that. i nthis case, they were found interfering with such rights. "He should contend that the power of Congress to regulate commercewas complete and entire. and, to apertam extent. necessarily exclusive; that the acts in question were regulations of commerce. in a most important particular and affecting it in those respectsin which it was under the exclusive authority of Congress and as some powers have been holden exclusive and others not so. under the same form of expression. from the nature of the different powers respectively. so. where the power. on anyone subject is given in general words. like the power to regulate commerce, the truc methodof construction would beto consider of what parts the grant is composed and which of those, from the nature of the thing, ought to be considered exclusive. Therightsetu in this case under the lawsof NewYork. isa monopoly. Now. hethought it very reasonableto say that the constitution never intended to leave with the States the power of granting monopolies, either of trade or of no nation; and therefore. that as to this the commercia power was exclusive in Congress.” “Few thingswere better known than the immediate causeswhich led to the adoption of the present constitution; and he thought nothing clearer than the prevailing motive was to regulate commerce; to resone it from the embarrassingand destructive consequence s resulting from the legislation of so many ifferent States and to place it under the protection of a uniform law.” “ By the Confederation divers restrictions had been imgosedon the States; but thesehad not been found sufficient The States could still. eachfor itself. regulate commerce and the consequence was a perpetual jarring and hostility of commercial regulations. In the historyof the times. it was accordingly found that the great topic urgedon all occasions. as showing the necessit of n. new and differentgovernment. was the state o trade and commerce?Theleading state papersof the times are full of this topic. The NewJorsey resolutions complain that the regulations of trado wero in the power of the several States. within their separate iurisdiction in such a degrec as to involve many difficulties apdem arrassments: and they expressan earnest opinion that the sole and exclusive powerof reulating trade With foreign States ought to he in congress. Mr. Wither spoons motion in Congress. in 1781 is of the same generalcharacter; and the report of a committee of that body, In 1785i, s still moreemphatic. It declares that Congress ought to possessthesole and exclusive power of regulating trade. as well with foreign naetions as between the States.” “ Over whatever other interestsof the country this Government may diffuse its benefitsa nd its blessings. it will always be true, as a matter of historical fact“ that it had its immediate origin in the necessitiesof commerce. and, for its 1mm iate object. the relicfof those necessitiesby removing their causesand by establishing a uniform and steady system. We do not find. in the history of the formation and adoptionof the CODSlllUUOPth, at any mans peaks ofa general concurrentpower. m the regulation of foreign and domestic trads. As still residingin the States. the very obycct intended. morethan any other. wasto take awaysuch power. If it had not so provided. the consti“tution would not have beenworth accepting. Ho contended. therefore, that the people intended, in establishing the constitution. to transfer from the several States to a General Government those high and important powers over commerce which. in their exercise. Were to maintain a uniform and general system. From the very nature of the case. t cse power: must vbe exclusive; that is. the highest branches of commercial regulation mustbe exelusively committed to a single band. What is it that is to be regulated? hot the commerceof the several States, respectivel. but the commerceof the U.S. Hence fort. the commerceof the States was to be a unit: and the systemby which it wasto exist and be governed must. necessarilybecomplete, entire and uiiilorm. Its character was tobedescribedin the flagwhich wavedover it. "plurilnu unum. "how. how could indivnlual States assertnright of Concurrent legislation. in a caseof this sort. without manifest eneroachment and confusionI Itshould be repeated. that the words usedin the constitution. to regulatecoininerce. are so very general and extensive. that they might be construedto cover a vast field of legislation. part of which has always beenoc cupied by State laws; and therefore. the word must. have a reasonableconstruction and the power should be considered as exclusively vested in Congress so far, and so far only. as the nature of the powerre quires and he insisted that the nature of the case and of the powerndid imperiously require that such important authority as that of granting monopolies of trade pnd navigation should not be consideredas still retained by the States.” f, “But. although much had been said. in the discussion on former occasions. about this supposedeoncur rant power n the States, he found great diffieultyin understanding whatwinsmeantbyit. It was generally gualilied by snyiii that it was a power by which the States could pass laws on thesubiccts of commercial regulationm ieh would bevnliduntil Congress should puss other lawscontrolling them, or inconsistentwith them and that then the State laws must yield. What sort of concurrent powers were these which could not exist togcthor? Indeed. The very reading of the clause in the constitution must. put to flight this notion of a general concurrent. power. The constitution was formed for all the States; and Congresswas to have powerto regulatecommerce.” “ A road. indeed, might be a matter of general coin rnercial concern. In many case sit is so; and, when it is so. he thought them was no doubt of the power of Congressto make it.” “ ow. itniust be remembered that thisgrantisinado as an exerciseof sovereignpolitical power. It is not an inspection law nor a health law. nor passedby any derivative authority; it is professedly n nact of sovereignpower. Of course thero is no limit to the power to be derived from the purpose for which it is exercised. If exercisedfor onepurposeit may bealso for another. If it can grant these exclusive privileges to a few. it may grant themto many; thatis. it muygrunt them to all its own citizens, to the exclusion of everybody else required little new to bes aid to prove that this exclusive grant is a law regulating commerce.al though in someof the discussions elsewhere it had been called a law of police. It it be not a regulation of commerce. then it follows. Against the constant admission on the other side, that Congress. even by an expressact. could not uiiniil or control it for. if it be not arelation of commerce. Congress as no coricern witfiilit. But the granting at monopolies of this Iktind is always referredto the power over commerce. was as arbiter of cciiiinerce that the king formerly granted such monopolics.” The judgment of the court was in accordance with the views here expressed by Mr. ebster upon the several points which were raised in the discussion of the case, and so far forth sanctions and adopts the argument as the opinion of the court ugon these points. lhis case of Gibbons and gden the or meat of the eminent counsel; the rial Jll gment of the court, and the reasoning of the illustrious Chief Justiee in pronouncing the opinion of the court, would seem to be conclusive upon the main question now before us. But it is insisted With a view, of course, to avoid the force of the decision, that the euse 0t Gibbons and Ogden, being one of navigation, is not analogous to the case we have under consideration; that the question in that case was in reference to the right or authority of a State to grant an exclusive privilege of nawgating, by steam vessels, the navigable waters Within the jurisdiction of the State, and therefore has no caring upon the question of the right or pu thority of a State to grant an exclusive privilege of transporting passengers and freight across its territory, from one State to another State, by land conveyance, or, it you please, by railroad. With all due deference, I think otherwise. I respectfully submit that the 2 eases are closely analogous; that the general principle involved is the same in both; that the judicial decision of the one is the rule of law and the rule of action in the other. I have already said that, in consideringand deciding upon the question of the application and extent of the power of Congress to “regulate commerce among the several States” the court considered an determined the extent of the power in its application to the regulation of commerce among the States without reference to the mere mode and manner of its transportation, whether by land or by water. It was even made a question in the Ogden case whether the term or phrase in the constitution, ” commerce among the several States, ” comprehended navigation. It was not made a question whether it comprehended convevance or transportation by land. n respect to the power of congress “ to reg ulate commerce among the severa States, ” that power is neither enlarged nor abridged by any mere mode or manner by which it is carried on. Will anyone contend that the power of Congress “to regulate commerce among the several States” is limited to that commerce alone which is carried on upon the navigable waters within the jurisdiction of the several States; and that it has no relation to, and nothing to do with, and does not reach that far more extended and diversified commerce which is carried on among the several States by land? Is not the exercise of the power quite as impertant to the regulation of commerce by land y railroad, if It you pleaseas by navigation? is true, nothing was said in the consideration and discussion of that case about railroads as a means of commercial intercourse among the States. In fact, railroads at that time were unknown in the country. But now the whole surface of the country is interwoven and overspread as by a grand net work of railroads, connected together, runnin through and uniting the several States, far an near, in more intimate commercial, as well as social and political, relations, than everbefore, Iafnd forming one great national railway system. I may be allowed the simile, our railroads now constitute the cat national arteries of the Republic, throng whichruns the lifeblood of the bodypolitic; and an hing which ob structs or impairs its full an free circulation at anyone pointaffects and disorders the whole system. I(oubt notthat today more than one halfperhaps 3/4ths, possibl 7 8th sof the domestic commerce of the country among the several States is carried on by means of our railroads over the territories of the several States, and among the several States, and from one State to another State. I recat the question, then, is not the exercise of the power of Congress to “regulate commerce among the several States " quite as important to the regulation of commerce by railroad transportation as by river or coastwise navigation “I and is it not quite as important that the one should be free and exempt from State restrictions as the other? Why shall the power be appliedin the one case and notiu the other? Why this distinction? There is no reason for itnone whatever. The public roads and high ways of a State are open and common to the use of all the citizens of the U.S., as are its navigable streams; and it is but sheer inconsistencyto assert that Congress mayregulate the commerce over the one and not over the other. The power of Congress “to regulate commerce among the several States” necessarily reaches it an where and everywhere among the Statesnot ess upon the railroad car than upon the steamboat. The main purpose of conferring this power upon Congress was to secure a uniform system of commercial regulations, emanating from a single authority, instead of being subject to various and conflicting rules and regulations which must unavoidably follow if each state were to prescribe its own rules and regulations. It was for the very purpose of securing this unity, this harmon, o action that the States consented to yield this power to the Federal Government; and among the fore most and most persistent of all the States in favor of surrendering this power in the several States to the Federal authority for the purpose of securing unity and uniformity in the regulations of commerce was NewJersey herself, be it said to her high credit. What, then, is the measure or extent of this powerthis power to “regulate commerce among the several States?" The obvious an swer is, that it is as full and complete as is the power to remlate commerce with foreign nations. Manifestly, it is as full and complete as is the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. Most clearly it is as full and complete as the several States themselves possessed before the formation of the constitution. In other words, it is the same power which the respective. States themselves possessed when under the Confederation. In short, the States severally surrendered to the Federal Government, and consequently divested themselves of whatever power they possessed over the subject. The power of Congress, therefore, to “regulate commerce among the several States” is plenary, it is exclusive, it is coextensive with the subject upon which it o crates, and, in the language of Chief Justice larshall, “it operates uponthatsubjectwhereverit exists.” and what is this power to regulate? to “regulate commerce among the several States?” Manifestly it is something more than a mere powsr to issue registers to merchant and trading vessels, or to grant licenses, or to give permits, or to establish ports of entry. 57mm its very nature and purpose, it is a power to create, or rather to preserve and to protect, and not to destroy. It is a power to improve, and not to impair. It is a power to facilitate, and not to retard or to embarrass; and more than all, and essential to all, and comprehending all these, it is a power to interpose and to remove whateverof obstructions or restrictions may have been imposed upon commercial intercourse with and between the several States by local State legislation, taking care always to distinguish between that legislation and that commerce which are strictly local and internal, and which affect only the citizens of the particular State, and that legislation and that commerce which are more general, and which affect the citizens of other States. To illustrate: Congress may inte ose and annul the restrictions of a grant from iiie State of NewYork for the exclusive navigation of the Hudson river. Congress may not interpose and annul the restrictions of a grant for the navigation of Cayiigalake; the reason being thatin the one case it is strictly local and internal, and nffects only the interests of citizens of the particular State, while in the other case the exclusive grant affects the commercial rights and interests of citizens of other States. ior the same reason, Congress may not interfere with the local municipal railroads in the city of NewYork, or Brooklyn, or Buffalo, while it may interfere to remove the restrictions of an exclusive grant to anyone of the great railroad lines across the State, to the exclusion of all her other lines of road, in the conveying of passengers and freivht from one State to another State, by authorizm the other railroad companies to exercise an enjoy the same privilege. This distinction is recognized in all our courts. This distinction is reasserted and reaflirmed in the argument of counsel and in the opinion of the court in the case ofOgden. But the inquiryis made, what is commerce? and by way of criticism or of sarcasm, rather than of answer to the inquiry, it is said that a railroad is not commercethe railroad ears are not commerce which Congress may regulate. True, railroad cars nor the tree upon which they run are commerce, nor is asi commerce, nor the river or the bay upon which it floats; but they are all agencies of commerce. It is said that passengers are not commerce, thatfreight is not commerce. All true enough. Nor are cotton, or wool, or wheat, or corn, or sugar, or coffee, or salt, or silks, or hardware, of the mselves commerce. But they are all elements of commerce and when the cotton, or wool, or wheat, or corn, are placed upon the train of cars and transported from one part of the countryfrom the great West for example to another part of the country, say to Bos ton, or NewYork, or Philadelphia, or Balli more, and there exchanged for other commodities sugar, tea, coffee, and other articles of merchandiseand these, in turn, are placed upon the railroad train, and carried back for distribution and consumption among the people, this roccss the combined operation of all these c ements and agenciesconstitutes or producesthat result, that idea, which we denom inate commerce. It is commerce; it is domes tic commerce; it is commerce among the several States; it IS commerce in which the citizens of more than one State are interestediii which the citizens of the whole country are interested; it is commerce in the sense an meaning oftha constitution and this is commerce, which Congress has power to “ regulate" in its transit over intervening States to other States, and to remove any obstructions which may be imposed upon its transportation by local State legislation. Commerce, though a complex idea, is nevertheless a unit, a one integral interest, and not several and separate. It is an interest; an important interest; a vital interest; general, ervading, and common to the whole country. 1: is an interest which belongsz not to the States severally, but to the States united; as much so as your Army and Navy. It is therefore a national and not a local interest; an interest to be regulated by national and not by local authority. Again, ll Mr. President, it is said, as though the assertion was pgrtinent to the present inquiry, thata State ewJerscy, for instanceis under no obligation to build a railroad at all; and the question is asked, can we compel her to build a railroad or any other kind of road across her territory? No, sir; I do not contend that we can compel a State to build a road of any kind, otherwise than by what may be called moral comulsion. Nor do [contend that a State is under oblition to build a road of any description across or territory other than the obligation which every State owes to itself as a member of the Union; other than the obligation which every State owes to the community at large; other than the obligation which every State owes to the advancing civilization of the age, to keep ste with the progress of the improvements oft ic times; and it is hardly to be conceived that any stronger or more cogent in centive, in addition to the motiveof selfiuterest, can be presented or urged upon the consideration of a State as an inducement to the fulfillment of a high public duty. But suppose, what is hardlya supposable case, that a triteNewJersey, for illustration blindl and obstinately refuses or neglects to fulfill this high duty to itself and to the country, and constructs no road, and will not construct any road, and will open no way, nor provide any means of intercommunication over her territory with other States. What then? Is there no relief? Is there no rem edy? Must we submit to be forever barred from all intercourse between other and contiguous States across her territory? Is there no way of opening communication over her territory between NewYork and Philadelphia? Is your Federal Government so feebleand so powerless that it cannot open a way of communication over the territory of an intervening State so delinquent in this regard? No, sir, your Federal Government has ample powerto provide the full measure of relief in such a case; and under its unquestioned authority to establish post roads, or military roads, or commercial roads, if you please, it may construct one or more roads across the territory of the delinquent State, as the public necessities or the public convenience may require. If the State, however, shall build one road and but one road over its territory, so long as that road shall meet the full measure of the public demand and furnish the requisite and adequate facilities for commercial intercourse between the several States, so far forth that State fulfills its obligation to itself and to the public in that be lial; but the one road failing to meet the public wants, and to furnish adequate means of commercial intercourse With and between other States, it presents the occasion for the Federal Government to exert its power and to construct another road across the intervening State, in order to meet the public wants. But if the State itself shall build 2 or more roads over its territory, connecting with adjacent States, and especially ifthe State itself shall inhibit the use of either or an one of these roads to all assengers and freight from one State to another , Congress may establish either or all of themas post roads, or as Military roads; or, if the interests of commerce shall require it, congress may declare them to be lawful structures or the carrying on of trade and commerce among the several States, any inhibition or restriction of the State Legislature to the contrary In the more recent case notwithstanding of the Vheeling bridge the general doctrine for which we are contending was recognized and reaffirmed by the SCOUTS The bridge over the Ohio river at Wheeling, Virginia, was complained of by Pennsvlvania as an obstruction to the navigation of the river. This complaint was brought before the court, which, upon full hearing and examination, adjudged the bridge an obstruction to the navigation of the river, and issued an order upon the bridge company to abatethe nuisance by elevating the bridge or removing it altogether. The action of Congress was subsequently invoked upon this subject, and Congress, by virtue of its power “to regulate commerce among the several States, ” and to establish post roads, passed an act declaring the bridge to be alaw ul structure and post road, “anything in any law or laws of the U.S. to the contra notwithstanding.” The SCOTUS sustained this action of Congress, and dismissed an application for process against the bridge company to compel it to comply with the previous order of the court to elevate or remove the bridge. The court in this case ully recognized the power of Congress to interpose in this, and in all like cases, when the general interests of commerce are impaired or restricted by local State legislation; and while the court concedes the right of State sovereignt, within its own limits, and by its own acts Oly legislation, to impose such restrictions as it may deem properupon its own citizens, in the use of its own territory, it also holds all such legislation subject and subordinate to the power of Congress to “regulate commerce among the several States, ” and that when Congress exercises that power the State laws must give way. Congress, in the exercise of its paramount power in this case, declared the bridge a lawful) structure, though admitted to be an obstruction, more or less, to the navigation of the river: a river, too, which by compact between Virginia and Kentucky, and with the assent of Congress, at the time of the admission of Kentucky into the Union, was to be forever open to commerce to the use of all the citizens of the U.S. Congress, in the exercise of its discretion, declared the bridge a lawful structure, on the ground that the general interests of commerce would suffer more from the removal and want of the bridge than from its obstruction to the navigation of the river. Hence Congress declared that the bridge should be continuedfor that was the effect of the act for the reason that the greater interests of commerce required its continuance, notwithstanding its a mitted degree of obstruction to the navigation of the river.