Mr. JOHNSON: Well, the act of 1807, passed under that authority, gives the same power to use the Army and Navy of the U.S. that previous acts gave to use the militia, and we have legislated still more extensively by raisin troops for the purpose of putting it own. maintained in goo faith, as I am sure every Senatorwho knows me will believe, that the authority is to be found exclusively under that clause. I stated that under the war power (that is, the power conferred upon Congress to declare war) there was no authority to war against a State of the Union, and I so ported that opinion by reforrin to a part of the opinion given by Mr. Justice (girier, speakin in behalf of the majority of the Supreme cart, in the irize cases as reported in 2 Black, and in the issenting opinion of Mr. Justice Nelson, in each of which it is stated that there is no clause in the Constitution which, either by direct terms or by implication, can be construed to confer upon Congress the authority to declare war against a State; and they go on, each of them, to maintain that the power conferred upon Congress in regard to the southern rebellion is the power conferred by that clause of the Constitution which gives them authority to suppress insurrection, and is car ried out by the passage of the acts of 1792 and 1795; and yet they say, and say properly, as I think, (although in relation to that there was a difference of opinion, but only as to the time when that condition of things ex1sted) that an insurrection may be of such an extent as entirely to put a stop practically to the authority of the Government, that it may become a war according to the extent to which it may be carried on by the insurgents. What did they say it for? What was the question before the court? The President had blockaded the southern ports; prizes had been made for a violation of the blockade, and the question in each of those prize cases was whether the vessels captured were subject to forfeiture. The majority of the court held that. independent of our act ofJul 13, 1861, a state of war existe, out of which grew belligerent rights, and one of the belligerent rights is the right of capture for violation of a by ockade instituted by one belligerent as against the other belligerent. That is all. The minority of the court came to the same result in relation to captures made after the passage of the act of Jul;r 13, 1861. They denied that there was a war within the meaning of the Constitution existing antecedent to that period, because the whole war power was conferred upon Congress, and the resident had no right to initiate war, but when the war existed iin er the sanction of Congress it carried with it all the rights which belonged to belligerents, and theretore carried with it the right of the U.S. to blockade the enemys ports, that being a belligerent right, and to capture for violation of the blockade. My friendfrom Maine says virtually (he did not refer to the decision in terms) that there is no distinction between acivilWar and an international war, and with the clearness which belongs to all his speeches he got on pretty well until he came to consider what effect upon that condition of war would be the operation of our peculiar Government, and he seemed to be a little puzzled to reconcile his own mindto the conclusion that the Government of the U.S. could by war of any kind put an end to a State government.