Mr. BUCKALEW. It is, because at present the President may retain an improper officer in office, or, to speak to the precise point, he may retain him in office for political reasons when he ought to be removed. That is an existing inconvenience of our system. Now, what is the remedy proposed? Not that the President may not hereafter keep him in office in such a case; but that, besides that inconvenience and evil, there shall be another inconvenience and evil added to it, to wit: that the Senate shall act in the same way and for the same reason, and that instead of having a single inconven ience in the Government with regard to keeping improper officers in office for political reasons you shall have it doubled; there shall be interests distinct, independent from each other, acting in this direction, instead of one. That will be the state of the case when the President and the majority of the Senate disagree in potitical sentiment, the alternative to the other case, which Imentioned, the case when they will be agreed. o:sir, by this proposed system of Senatorial advice and consent to removals, the president is put in the attitude of a public prose cutor before the Senate against officers of the U.S. whose removal may be desired by him. He is put in the position of a prose cutor to be sustained by his political friends in the Senate when they are in a majority, and to be voted down by his political opponents when they are in a majority. He is to be strength ened and encouraged in the work of proscription at one time by his political friends in the Senate, and to be deterred from, or frustrated in, the performance of his duty at another time by his political enemies here. It must be admitted, then, that the value of this bill as a check upon political removals has been over stated and misconceived; and if the balance be struck between the good and evil to be expected from it in regard to political removals alone, it is not at all certain that the former will be in excess. But let us examine this senatorial “pretension” upon other grounds of expediency and policy. In the 1st place, it transfers power over removals to a body of men who are less responsible than the President, both to the people and to the law. The President (notwithstanding the formalities of electors and electoral colleges) is, in fact, chosen and appointed to his high office by a popular vote taken through out the States of the Union, and must return his trust to the people at the end of 4 years, to be renewed to him or the renewal withheld according to their sovereign pleasure. But the members of the Senate are chosen by the State Legislatures, and for 6 year terms. One 3rd only of its members go out biennially, and in its constitution and character it is a perpetual body. It is therefore less responsiblethan the President to the people. But it is also less responsible to the law, because its members cannot be impeached. It was determined in the case of Senator Blount that the HoRep cannot prefer articles of impeachment against a member of the Senate, and that is now an established doctrine or rule of constitutional law. But if the Senate is to be considered a popular body, though removed in the 2nd degree from the people, it is such upon a principle of gross inequality. 3 million of population east of the Hoon have 12 representatives in the Senate, while 7 millions in Pennsylvania and NewYork have but 4. And new States and small States in other sections of the Union have power, here grossly disproportioned to the populations they contain. Upon this point of State representation in the Senate I say let the Constitution stand as it is, at least let it stand until it shall be regularly amended. As a legislative body, the Senate stands intrenched in the Constitution. But it is now proposed to extend to it (and in part by its own vote) executive powers of the most extensive and dangerous character, never heretofore assumed or exercised by it during the 77 years since the government was organized. Will its compara tively irresponsible domination over all official atronaga and all executive action be satis actory to the people? Is it expedient by this measure to invite keen scrutiny into its character and conduct, and generally into its claims to the possession of additional, delicate, and dangefous powers? In the next place, what effect will be produced upon the Senate itself by the possession and exercise of this new power? Are the officers of the U.S. to be the clients of members of the Senate, as persons accused at one stage of Roman history were clients of the Senators; their retainers? What effect is to be produced upon the popular polities of the country, upon the selection of members of this body in the different State Legislatures; ay, sir, upon the purity of this body itself, when it comes to be connected, and connected inti mately, with the innumerable questions concerning the retention o, f officers in all parts of the U.S.; when power is lodged here with individual members to hold men in their offices, or to instigate and assent to their removal by the President? I beg gentlemen to consider what effect is to be produced upon the character of the Senate itself by this new, por tentious, unexampled jurisdiction upon which the Senate has never heretofore ventured to enter. The Senate has never set up this pretention, at least in any form of practical action, from the time when it was 1st denounced and branded by the father of the Constitution in the debate of 1789. Again, consider, sir, the effect of this executive power lodged in the Senate in another point of view. It will give to this branch of the Government domination over the executive dept to an extent never contemplated heretofore, and of the effects of which we are incompetent to form a distinct opinion. It was well described, perhaps, by one member of the HoRep, in the debate to which I have referred, when he said that a provision of this sort I mean a provision conerring upon the Senate power over removals from office would establish it as a two headed monster, with a legislative and an executive head, planted here in the Government, domi nating over each of the other 2 great depts, the President and House, one of which is united with it in the enactment of laws, and the other in their enforcement. Upon every ground, then, upon which I have examined this measure, it is in my opinion open to insuperable objections. Instead of a measure of reform it is one of degeneracy. Instead of applying in practice a principle of the Constitution it invades that instrument. Instead of introducing purity into the Government it will be the source and parent of corruption and of evil. It treats with contempt the whole past history of this Government and the decision even of Congress itself upon a former occasion. It sets precedent at nought, while on grounds of reason it stands condemned, as I have attempted to show, by the most conclusive and indisputable arguments. It remains only in the execution of my task to state clearly the grounds of authority against this measure. I have stated those of reason already. The Congress of the U.S. assembled on the 4th of March, 1789. In the Senate a quorum appeared for the 1st time on the 1st of April, nearly a month afterward. On the 19th of May, early in the session, in the HoRep, in ComWhole House on the State of the Union, Mr. Madison moved de“pTahrtamt enthtere shall be established an executive to Foreign Affairs, be denominated the Dept of at the head of which shall be an officer to be called the Secretary to the Dept of Foreign Affairs, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the consent! of the Senate, and to be removable by the President.” On the same day, after protracted debate, Mr. Bland moved to add to the motion the words “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” The question on adding these words was put and lost. Afterward, on the same day, the question was taken and carried by a considerable majority in favor of declaring the power of removal to be in the President; that is, the motion I have already read was adopted. In debate at that time, Mr. MADison said: presindenthtieal contitutionality of the declaration of I have no manner of doubt.” Mr. BENSoN, another member who supported it, said: “This clause would be a mere legislative construction of the Constitution.” Mr. WINToN, another and a leading member of the House “Had no doubt but the Constitution gave this power to the President; but if doubt were entertained o thought it prudent to make a legislativedeclaration of the sentimentsof Congresson thispoint.” There were prolonged debates upon this subject. “Qn the 19th of June, on a motion to strikeoutthe words ‘to be removable by the President, the question being taken, the motion was rejected yeas 20, nays 34. “On the 22d, of June, Mr. BENson moved to by inserting amend the words ' whenever theo: officer shall be removed from office by of the U.S., or the president in any other case of vacan cy.’ This was carried yeas 30, nays18. “Then, the words ‘to be removable by the president, ’ were, on motion of Mr. BENson, struckout yeas 31, nays 19.” These latter motions were made for the pur. pose of avoiding an argument which had been made against the measure by its opponents, to wit: that by saying in the bill itself that this officer should be removed by the President, it would be inferred that Congress conferred the power upon him, and therefore the phraseolo was changed deliberately by the friends of the presidential power, and the bill was made simply to declare that when the President should remove the officer, or in any other case of vacancy, the office should be filled by the chief clerk; so that there should be upon the face of the statute an express recognition by Congress of the President's power of removal under the Constitution. The debate showsthat a new form was given to the measure for the express purpose of excluding in all futuretime and from any quarter any allegation that the President derived his power from the legislation of Congress. That bill finally passed the House on the 24th of June, by a vote of yeas 29, nays 22. Now, sir, I propose to read from the debates attending the passage of the measure, the his: tory of which I have traced, certain opinion; of prominent men upon t oint mentioned by me in the outset of my Yomarks. I mean the question of the right of the Legislature? confer upon the Senate and President jointly this power of removing from office. The point was suggested, and Mr. Madison replied as follows: “Several constructions, have been put upon ho Constitution reiative to the point in question., The Gentfrom Connecticut [Mr. Sherman] ho advanced a doctrine which was not touchedto before. He seems to think if I understood him rightli, that the power of displacing from office is subject to legislative discretion; because, it having a right to create, it may limit or modify as it thinksproper; shall not say but at 1st view this doctrine mayo: to have some plausibility. But whenIconsider th the Constitution clearly intended to marked distinction between the maintain.” otive, and judicial powers. i of Government; and when, consider that if the Legislature has a power, such contendedfor, they may subject and transfer at. cretion powers from one dept of our‘.ment to another; they may on that principle exciti the President aitogether from exercisinganyo!.ity in the removal of officers; they maygive it to Senate aione, ed; or the President and Senatecombine ; they may vest it in the whole Congress, or: reserve it to be exercised by this.House. A: consider the consequence, of this doctrine and pare them with the true principles of tion, Iown the coho that I cannot subscribe to it." of Congress, vol. i. p. 496. t Mr. Gerry, of Massachusetts, one of the o distinguished men of that age, said up” same subject: be “This has been supposed by some gentlemen" an omitted case” That is, this power of removal ing th “ and that Congress have the powerofsup o: defect, Let gentlemen consider the ground o they tread. tim If it is an omitted case; on the Legislature to supply the defect willo o attempt au to amend the Constitution. But only be done in the way pointed out by the article of that instrument, and an attempt to o: e in any other way may be a high crime 503. misdemeanor, or perhaps something worse. T oin And he goes on with a further argum. in support of the same view., Again, he said, a subsequent stage of “If the debate: val the Legislature have not the powerfo it they too confer it upon$o o:o is a legislative power, an, so yiew transfortio exerosofit to any other body: Sovie lease, this question in whatever point of lightyou id.D. it is clotho words ought to be struckout." hop 576. Mr. Smith, of SCarolina, said: "it is contended that the Legislature" the? power of supplying the defect if this is an omitted scaarsye. I cannot be of that opinion. But it isunneces urged to by extend this argument after what has been the Gentfrom Massachusetts, [Mr. GERRY.] If the Legislature can supply defects, they may virtually repeal the Coustitution.”–1bid., p.508. Mr. White, of Virginia, said: “Some gentlemen have supposed that the Constitution has made no provision for the removal of officers: and they have called it an omitted case or defect. They ask if we may not supply that defect? Irigshay tionf sguepnpelryainl wgedmefaeyctnsaontdfmoraikfinwgecaaltnearastsiuomnse, twhee may go on and make the Constitution just what we please.” Ibid., p. 517. Finally, I will read the opinion of Mr. Boudine t. He said: “For my part, I conceive it is impossible to carry into execution the powers of the President in a sal utary manner unless he has the power of removal vested in him. I do not mean that if it was not yested in him by the Constitution, it would be proper for Congress to confer it; though I do believe the Government would otherwise be very defective, yet we would have to bear this inconvenience until it was rectified by an amendment of the Constitution. For my part, I would adhere to every principle contained in it, however defective, and not infringe it for any purpose whatever." Ibid., p. 529. So much for that question. From the same debates I propose to read so much as will show the grounds upon which the majority acted at that time. In the 1st place I read the opinion of George Clymer, a Representative from Pennsylvania, who said on the 19th of May, 1789: “The power of removal was an executive power, and as such belonged to the President, alone by express, the words of the Constitution: the executive power shall be vested in a POTUS.’ The Senate were not thaen Uneited excutive body; they were a legislative one. It was true, in some instances, they held a qualified check over the executive power, but that was in consequence of an express declaration in the Constitution; without suupeohn declaration they would not have been called for advice and consent in the caseof appointment., Why, then, shall, we extend their power to control the removal which is naturally in tive, the Execu unless it is likewise expressly declared in Constitution?” Ibid., the p. 382. I will conclude these extracts by reading what Mr. Madison said in the debate on the 17th of June, and at other times, in vindication of his own position and in answer to the argument in favor of senatorial power: “But let us not consider the question on oneside only; there are dangers to be contemplated on the other. Westthis power in the Senate jo.with the President, and you abolish at once that great principle of unity and responsibility in the dept the czecutive which was intended for the security of erty and the public good. lib If the President should possessalone the power of removal from office, those who are employed in the execution of the law, will be in their proper situation, and the chain of dependence preserved; the lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highestwill depend, as they ought, on the President, and the President on the community. The chain of dependence threrefore terminates in supreme body; namely, the in the people, who will possess, besides, in aid of engine their original power, the decisive of impeachment. Take the other supposition; that the power should be vested in the Senate, on principle, the that the power to displace is necessarily connected with the power to appoint. It is by declared the Constitution that we may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of Depts: the power of removal oincidental as stated by some gentlemen. Where does this terminate? If you beginwith thesubordinate officers, they are dependent on their "So. he on the next supe rior, and he on whom? Qn the Senate, a permanent ody; a body, by its particular mode of election, in reality existing forever; a body possessingthat proportion of aristocratic power which the Constitution no doubt thought wise to be established in the system, but which some have strongly excepted against. And let me ask, gentlemen, is there equal security in this case as in the other?, Shall we trust the Senate, responsible to individual Legislatures, rather than the person who is, responsible to Inity?. the whole commu It is true the Senate do not hold their offices for life, like aristocracies recorded in the historic page; yet the fact is, they will not possessthat responsibility for the exercise of executive powerswhich would ren dor it safe for us to yest such powers in them, But what an aspect will this give to the Executive? In stead of keeping the depts of Government distinct, you make an executive out of onebranch of Legislature; you the make the Executive a monster, two headed to use the expression of the Gentfrom NewHampshire, [Mr. Livermore, you destroy the great principle of responsibility, and perhaps have the creature divided in its will, defeating. very purposes for which a unity in the executive was in stituted. These objections do not lie against such an arrangement as the bill establishes. I conceive that the President is sufficiently accountable to munity; the comand if this power is vested in him, it will be yested where its nature requires it should be yested; if anything in its nature is executiye, it power must be that which is employed in superintending and sceing that the laws are faithfully czecuted. The laws cannot be exccuted but by officersappointed for that purpose: therefore, thosewho are over such officers naturally possessthe executive power. If any other doctrine beadmitted, what is may the consequence? Youset the Senate at the head of the executive dept, or you may require that the officers hold their places during the pleasure of this branch of Legislature, the if you cannot go so far as to say we shall appoint them; and by this meansyou link together 2 branches of the Government which the preservoation of liberty requires to be conso separated.” [Ibid., pp. 499, 500. Again he said: “The Constitution affirmsthat the executive power shall be vested in the President. Are these exceptions to this proposition? Yes, there are. The constitution says that in appointing to office the Senate shall be associated with the President unless in the case of inferior officerswhen the law shall otherwise direct. Have we a right to extend this exception? I believe not. If the Constitution has invested all the executive power in the President. I venture to assert that the Legislature has no right to diminish or modify his executive authority. The question then resolves itself into this:, is the power of placing an executive power disI conceive that if any power whatsoever is in its nature executive it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.”–10 id., p. 463. Mr. President, I have but one additional citation to make, and I shall then relieve the Senate from these copious extracts in which I have indulged. I read from the protest of Andrew Jackson, dated April 15, 1834, and directed to the Senate of the U.S., the extract being upon the very question in volved in this debate, the very question raised by this bill. He says: “The executive power vested in the Senate is neither that of nominating' nor ‘appointing.” It is merely a check upon the executive power of appointment. If individuals proposed for appointment by the President are by the in deernedincoln petent or unworthy, they may withhold their consent, and the appointment cannot be made. They check the action of the Executive, but cannot, in relation to thosevery subjects, act themselves, nor direct him. Selections are still made by the President, and the negative given toity furnish the esSaennaatdedwititiohnoault dgiumarinainstheineg responsibil to the country that the subordinate executive as well as the judicial offices shall be filled with worthy and competent lanell. “The whole executive power being vested in President, the who is responsible for its exercise, it is a necessaryconsequence that he should have a right to employ agents of his own choice to aid him in performance the of his duties and to discharge them when he is no longer willing to be responsible for their acts. In strict accordance with this principle the power of removal, which, like that of appointment, is an original executive power, is left unchecked by the Constitution in relation to all executive officers, for whose conduct, the President is responsible, while it is taken from him in relation to "officers, for whoseacts he is not responsible. n the government from which many of the fundamental principles of our system are derived, the head of the executive dept originally had power to appoint, and remove at will all officers, executive and judicial. It was to take the judges out of i. this power of removal, and thus Inake them, in ependent of the Executive, that the tenure of their officeswas changed to good behavior. Nor is it conceivable why they are placed in our Constitution upon a tenure different from that of appointed by all other officers the Executive unless it purpose. be for the same “But if therewereany just ground for doubt on the face of the Constitution, whether all executive officers are removable at the will of the President, it is ob yiated by the contemporaneous construction of the instrument and the uniform practice under it. “The power of removal was a topic of solemndebate in the Congress of 1789while organizing the administrative depts of the Government, and it finally was decided that the President derived from the Constitution the power of removal, so far as it regards that dept for whose acts he is responsible. Although the debatecovered the whole ground, eul bracing the Treasury as well as all the other executive depts, it arose on a motion to strike 9ut of the bill to establish a Dept of Foreign Affairs, since called the Dept of State, a clause declaring the Secretary, to be by removable from office the POTUS ’” And then proceeds in oof the n subsequent proceedings on that bill as I have already read them from the original record. He proceeds: “This change having been made for the express purpose of declaring the sense of. Congress that the derived the power of Constitution, removal from the the act as it passed has always been considered as a full expression of the sense of the Legislature on this important part of Constitution. the American “Here, then, we have the concurrent authority of President Washington, of the Senate, and the HoRep, numbers of whom had taken an active part in the Convention which framed the Con; stitution, and in theState conventions which adopted it, that the President derived an unqualified, power of removal from that instrument itself, which is “beyond the reach of legislative authority.” Upon this principle the Government has now been stoli administered for about 45 years, during which there have been numerous removals made by the President or by his direction, embracing every grade of executive officers, from the heads of Depts to the messengers of bureaus.” The argument is then carried on and applied to the particular case upon which disagreement had arisen between himself and the Senate, to wit: the case of the head of the Treasury dept, the incumbent of which had been dismissed by him in the recess in connection with the well known question regarding the removal of the deposits. I have thus gone over, in the 1st place, the leading points of the argument from the point of view in which the subject has presented itself to my mind; and next, I have shown by the authorities cited how those views and opinions supported by me are rooted and founded in the strongest authority which our political history can furnish; that this authority begins with the organization of the Government, and that along with it is to be taken the uniform practice of the Government for a period of 77 years. President Jackson ex: pressed his surprise in 1834 that, after a period of 45 years, in which the practice of the Government had been in a certain direction, it should be called in question. How much more reason have we in 1867 to express surprise that a question which has stood determined for 77 years, and the determination of which is sustained by uniform practice and by the highest authorities, should now be involved in debate! Why is this? Has there been any demand of public opinion brought to bear upon us on this particular point?. Has any new light from any quarter been shed upon the Constitution? W is this bill introduced, and why is it pressed? There is but one explanation. The reason is avowed. It is not concealed; it is not held back. It is, that the POTUS is not in complete political accord with the majority of the Senate, and therefore this bill is to be passed to put a bit into his mouth to curb and to check him, to prevent him from exercising a power which has been exercised almost unquestioned by all his predecessors. Sir, if I am correct in my argument, and if the great men of former times were correct in their views on this subject, you have no power to pass this, bill even for the high object avowed of curbing, limiting, and restraining the POTUS in the exercise of his powers. But is there such pressing necessity that we ought to overleap all practice and set aside the past construction of the Constitution 3 Why, sir, after all that has happened, after all that has been said, there can be no question that 2/3rds of the offices of the U.S., even in the adhering States the States which did not rebel are held by persons who are in accord with the political majority in the Senate. This thing of removals has not been carried to such lengths that it is necessary to resort to extreme and doubtful measures of legislation in order to find security and relief to an oppressed majority in this Chamber; and there is no such necessity impending. As was well said by the Senfrom Wisconsin [Mr. Howe] in this very debate, the exercise of this power of removal by the present President has not been carried to such an extent as it was by former ones. No political proscription of officers in this country was ever carried to greater lengths than it was carried by. presiLincoln and those associated with him in the executive branch of this Government. This power I acknowledge it to be a fearful, ater rible power in the hands of one disposed to abuse it was wielded by him and his political associates with an absence of all consideration for opposing opinion and private interests which had no example in our previous political history. It was wielded strongly and with power by that man of iron from whose protest read to you, and by other Presidents. I repeat there is less reason now, upon the ground alleged by the advocates of this bill for its enactment, than there was for such a meas: ure upon many former occasions, some of them recent and others more remote. Why, then,, is this measure introduced to revolutionize the practice of the Government and to unsettle the fixed and declared opinions of the American people and of their authorities upon this question? Is it because gentle: men suppose that the public mind is so unfixed by revolution, by war, and by the passions of war that it will assent to anything demanded by party interests or instigated by party passion? Is it under the inspiration of popular elections held and determined upon other considerations than this that we are to see the inauguration of a new system in our Government with reference to the patronage of the Government, which changes altogether the relations of the legislative and executive depts with each other; which puts this Senate at the head of the executive dept to dominate it; which makes it the 2 headed monster which was spoken of in the debate of 1789? I beg Senators to reflect upon the several points elaborated by me against the deposition of this power in the Senate, independent of the question of power. I beg them to consider the irresponsibility of this body; an appropriate fact enough when you consider the Senate in its legislative capacity as a check upon the popular House, as a sort of breakwater against the popular passions of any particular year. It is to stand here and perform in this Government the same function which is performed in the British Government by the House of Lords. It is to check and to hold in restraint popular impulses when they 1st appear, and when they may carry the Government out of its course and establish injustice or mischief in its administration. That is the great function of the Senate. It is a check upon the hot and heady passions which may hold sway over the other branch of the legislative dept. But, sir, never in theory or in practice was it intended that this Senate should dominate the executive dept. You have a complete veto upon the House. No bill or resolution passed by that branch can take effect or have oree as a public law or regulation until you assent to it. The House cannot overrule your dissent to a measure as Congress can overrule a presidential veto. You hold by a fast grip that popular branch which speaks the heart. } the people and speaks the passions of the people whenever their rashness or injustice require a check. It may be said that the Senate is the aristocratic feature of the Constitution, and it may be said, as it was said in the Convention of 1787, that it is objectionable for this reason, and that it ought not to be admitted into the Constitution. On the contrary, I think the provisions creating it were among the wisest provisions of the Constitution, that the Senate should be constituted as it is, that here calm thought and just action should take refuge against the passions of the time. But to have a Senate performing its appropriate, constitutional functions, holding this Government steady in its course, protecting it against impulse and passion and violence, you must have it as the Constitution made it, and as it has heretofore existed, a body substantially separated from questions of private emolument, from questions of official patronage and man agement. As can be shown, your action upon appointments does not constitute efficient control of or active participation in executive power. You must not have the officers of this country tied to the skirts of Senators and pulling upon them, You must not run the risk of a corrupt influence upon this body. You must not make it an interested participant in the hot, ardent discussions of the country with reference to these questions of patronage.: ". hen, sir, keeping it separate, as it has been he retofore, allowing it only when important coicers are to be selected by the executive dept to express its opinion, not to go into investigations such as would be necessary in cases of removal, it will perform its appropriate functions and preserve its just influence. Selected as its members are from every State of the Union, they have a general knowl edge of character and of competency in men who are to be selected for public stations, and when the President asks their opinion or advice they can give it in a summary manner. This power of advice gives dignity to the proceedings of Government; but the Senate does not select these officers. Ordinarily, it does not reject them. It is a power not odious; it is a power which does not connect the Senate too in timately with questions of money and office, but leaves its dignity intact and its influence unbroken. I desire it to maintain its character, to be what it was intended to be, the great House of the States, where their voice shall be spoken and their will and their opinions upon public affairs maintained; that it shall not be an active instrument in the scrambles for office in the country; that it shall not be tied to the interests of men who hold lucrative positions under the Government; that it shall not attempt to dictate to the President whom he shall select for office, because that will be the effect of. giiving new power over removals; that men not come here and through Senators dic State appointments and removals to the executive dept; that you shall not render that dept contemptible; and finally, that you shall not extend to this branch of the Legislature a jurisdiction which it cannot exercise without public odium, without a loss of its own dignity, nor without injury to that system of government which we are all bound, so far as our efforts will go, to maintain in its orig. inal integrity and in its former luster.