Mr. WILSON. This part of the report was well consideredby the committee and he did not think it could be changed for the better. It was dificult to form any unif m rule of qualifications for all the States. Unnet ssnry innovations. he thought. too. should be avoi ed. It would be very hard and disa grccuble for the same persons. at the same time, to vote for Representative sin theState Legislature, and to be excluded from a vote for these in the national Legislature. Mr. Gonvsurrsciihionnis. such a hardship would be neither great nor novel. The people are accustomed o it and not dissatisfiedWit it, in severalof the States. In some. the qualifications are different for the choice of Governor and of the Representa.tives in others, for different houses of thoLegislaturc. Anal or oluecliotno the clauseas it am is.” makes the qualificatioaa of the national Legislature depend on 1 will of the Slater. which he thought not proper.” Then we have Mr. Ellsworth, afterward the 2nd Chief Justice of the SCOTUS: Mr. Ennswonrn thought the qualifications of the electors stood on the most proper footing. of suffrage was a tender point and strongly Tghuemhetd by most of the State constitution s. The people will pot readily subscribe to the national Censtitnton, if it should subject them to be disfranchised. The States are the best Judges of the circumstances and temperof their own people.” Some remarks were made by Colonel Mason, who was a distinguished member of the convention from Virginia. After several other distinguished members had expressed their views, an all in entire harmon With the views of Story and Hamilton, which have quoted, James Madison, as reported by himself, used the followmg language: “The right of suffrage is certainly one of the fundamental urticlcs of republican Government, and onght not to be lettto be regulated by the Legislature" of the Union.] The illustrious Dr. Franklin, a member of the Convention, in some characteristic remarks, opposed the motion of Mr. Morris, and gave the weight of his great influence to retain the provision as reported by the committee and as explained in the preceding discussion. In the same connection, I refer to the remarks of George Nicholas in the convention of Virginia. They are to be found in the 3rd volume of Elliotts Debates, page 41: "I will consider it firs then. as to the qualifications ef the electors. The est writers on government rec that in a republic these laws which x the right of suffrage are fundamental; if, therefore. by the proposed plan it is left uncertain inwhoin the right of suffrage is to rest or itit has placed that right in improper hands. I shall admit that it is a radical defect; t in this plan there is a fixedBil for determming the qualifications of electors and that rule the most judicious that could possibly have been deVised. be causeit refersto a criterion which cannot be changed. A qualification thnt giyes a right to elect Representatives for the State Legislatures gives also by this constitution a right to choose Representatives for the General Government. A) the qualifications of electors are different in the different States. no particular qualifications. Uniform through theStates. would have been politic. as it would have caused a great inequality in the electors. resulting from the situation and circumstancesof the respective States. Uniformity of qualifications Would greatly affect the yeomanr in the States. as it would either exclude from this in c rent right somewho are entitled to it by the laws of some Statesat present or be extended so universally as to defeat the admirable end of the institution of representation.” On a subsequent day. when the some provision was under consuleration, Mr. Madison again expressed his views. I should not be disposed to refer to him again, but the honor able Gentfrom Pennsylvania, [Mr. KELLEY, j in his reply to the points so we i made by the honorable Gentfrom Iowa [Mr. KASson] the other day, noted in defense of his own theory the reinar s of Mr. Madison on the latter occasion. In order to show the entire consistencv of those views with Mr. Madisons more deliberately expressed opinion in the Federalist, I will incorporate a part of them into my arment. ” Mr. Madison reports himself as saying: The necessity of a General Government supposes that the State legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the common interest at the expepse of their local convenience or preiudiccs. The policy of referring the appointment of the HoRep to the peoplo, and not to the Legislatures of the States. an posesthat the result will be somewhat in illicnced y the mode. This view of the question seems to decide that the Legislatures of the States ought not to have the uncontrolled right of regulating the times, places and manner of holding elections. These were words of great latitude. It was impossible to foreseeall the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power.” Now I invite attention at this point to the obvious construction that was put y Mr. Madison upon these words, “the times, the places, and the manner of holding elections.” and it is clearly inferable, from what he says, that he understood these things to relate, not to the qualifications of electors, but to various circumstances connected with the holding of elections, not embracing the qualifications of electors at all. He says further: “Whether the electors should vote by ballot or viva, ooce, should assemble at this place or that place. should be divided into districts or all meet at one plape. should all vote for all the Be Representatives or all in a district vote for a member alotted to the district theseand many other points would dependon the Legislatures and might materially alleetthe appointments. Whenever the State legislatures ha a avorite measure to, carry. they won! take care so to meld their regulations as to favor the candidates th“e wished to succeed. Besides. the ineqpality of representation in the legislatures of particular States would produce a lLikeeg isinlaetquurea:lityin their representation in the national and it was presumable that the counties, having the power in the former case. would secureit to “themselves in the latter. What danger would there be in giving a controlling powerto the national Legislature I Of whom was it to consist? 1st. of a Senate. to be chosen by the State Legislatures. If the latter. therefore. cond be trusted their Representatives could not be danger ous. 2nd], of Representatives elected by the samepeoplew o electt e State Legislatures. surcly then, if confidenceis due to the latter. it must bedue to e though former. It seems as improper in principle. it might be less inconvenient in practice. to give to the State legislatures this great authority over the election of this Representativesof the people in the general Legislature, as it would be to give to the latter a like power over the election of their Representatives in the State Legislature.” It should be borne in mind that the qualifications of electors for members of congress and State officers were, at the time of the formation of our constitution, fixed in every State, in the constitution of the State, and were not subject to control or modification by the State Legislatures. All the State Legislatures could do could only consist in laws regulating the times, places and manner of holding the elections. Lest they shouldin any contingency, or for any purpose or causes, fail to regulate these matters with reference to the election of Congress men, it was thought necessary to give to congress the power to regulate them, so that it might prevent an entire failure of representation from any State. It is, therefore, no doubt competent for Congress to prescribe by law when the congressional elections shall be held in all the States, and at what places they shall be held, and in what manner they shall be held; that is, whether the people of a whole State shall all vote for the number of Congressmen to which that State is entitled, or “the State be divided into districts, and the people of each district vote for one member only. But congress has no power to 11prescribe by law who shall vote, or what she constitute the qualiffeations of a voter for a member of Congress. NOr has it any power to dictate when or where or how elections shall be held for officers of the State government, or who shall vote at them. Now, I have cited or referred to every known expression of opinion on this subject by any American statesman, publicist, or jurist of distinction, and shown that they all, with a unan imity almost unparalleled, concur in the same interpretationp the power of Congress under the provision in question. The practice of the Government, without a single example to the contrary, sustains the same construction. such an extent of power on this subject over the Statesas is now claimed for Congress if it had been asserted by any party riorto outlate most deplorable rebellion, would have convulsed the nation to its extremest boundaries with excitement and apprehension. It would have been more than sufficient, if avowed in the constitutional Convention to have defeated forever the adoption of the constitution by the pee le of the States. It will be suilicient now, i conceded to exist, to subvert the great principle of local selfgovernment, which is the chic bul wark of our liberties. Against the array of authorities to which I have referred in vindication of this cat principle, against the absorbing powero Congress, what authority is produce? Not one clear, direct, or unequivocal authority in the whole range of American statesmanship or history can be found to the contrary. The honorable Gentfrom Pennsylvania, Mr. KELLEY] with the aid of his great legal an general learning, can sustain his position by nothing better than the following from 8 Elliotts Debates, page 344, which is attributed to Mr. Madison: “With res t to the other point. it was thought that the reguation of the time lacc and manner of electng Representatives should a uniform through out the continent. Some States mght regulate the elect. onson the principles of cape ty and others might regulate them otherwise. His diversity would be obviously unjust. Elections are regulated now unequally in someStates. particularly in SCarolina. with respectto Char oston. which has a rere sentation of 30 members. Should the people of an State by any means be deprived of the right of suffrage. it wasiud edproperty at it should be remedied by the Genera Government. It was found impossible to fix the time. place and manner of the election of Representatives in the constitution. It was found necessary to leave the regulation of this, in the 1st place. to the State governments. As being best acquainted with the situation of the people, subject to the control of the General Government. in order to enable it to produce uniformity and preventits own dissolution and consider in the State government and General Government as istiuct bodies. acting in different and independent capacities for the people, it was bought the particular regulations lhoul be submitted to the former and the general regulations to the latter. Were they exclusively under the control of the State governments the general Government might easily be dissolved. But if they be regulated properly by the State Legislatures. the congressional control will very probably never be exercised. The power appearsto me satisfactory and as unlikely to he abuse as any part of the constitution.” This language is said to have been used by Mr. Madison in the Virginia convention of 1788, for the ratification of the constitution of the U.S., at a time when the provision in question was under consideration in that body. But let it be remembered that this extract is not the language of Mr. Madison, was not reported by him, and has never had his approval. tis merely an attempt by some one to give the substance of what he said on the occasion referred to. It was not taken down by aii official reporter. In the laneliege of Mr. lliott himself, “it was collected and revised from contemporaneous publications, ” long years after it was spoken, perhaps from some oose newspaper report made at the time, and was uh lished, I believe, in 1827. It bears mtrinsie evidence of inexactness and want of authen ticity. It makes Mr. Madison, whose ideas, when expressed by himself, are alwavs in words must carefully and fill chosen. sayt mt “ it was thought that the regulation of the time, and manner of electing Representatives 5piloauceld, be uniform throughout the continent.” Every expression in it is consistent with the revailingidea through all the iroceedings oft ie convention that Congress should have no power to fix unlifimtzons of voters in the States, either for State officers or for Representatives in congress. It might regulate the mode of holding the elections for Representatives, so as to prevent a failure of renesentation. As to this mode of mlling elections, as Mr. Madison said, some States might regulate it on principles of equality, and others, by various regulations as to the times and places where the elections should be held, might make them affect unequally the people of certain sections of a State, and be, thereforc, unjust. But Congress, having no motive to so regulate these times and places as to make them bear unequally on different sections in a State, could properly be entrusted with their control as to congressional elections. But with all its manifest looseness and inexactness of form, every sentence in this extract is readily reconcilable with the more deliberate and selfwritten judgments of Mr. Madison and all the other fathers and sages to whom I have referred. I unhesitatingly allirm, therefore, that it wholly fails to justify in any degree the structure erected upon it by the honorable gentleman. On the contrary, taken in connection with all I have shown, it stamps the whole theory of the honorable gentleman as most dangerous and revolutionary. But admit for a moment that all the framers, the fathers. the exounders of the constitution, and President Jolinson, are wrong, and that the honorable gentleman is right, then what follows? If you concede the power to be in Congress, as claimed, then the discretion of Convrcss in its exercise cannot be limited. It can legislate to enlarge or abridge the right of suffrage in the States, both in the choice of members of Congress and of Representatives in the State Legislatures. It can impose a property qualification. It can give suffrage to lack men and take it from white men where it pleases. It can prohibit every white man in the South from votin for such officeis unless he was born in New "ngland, or owns a certain number of Federal bonds that are exempt from taxation, or willtake some newfangled ironclad oath. It can aunul State statutes and State constitutions on the subject of suffrage at its own leasurc. It may es Congress, in many respects, as absolutely supreme in its control over the local affairs and interests of the people of the States as the British Parliament is over the affairs and interests of the people of GreatBritain. It can go into SCarolina and take suffrage from the Intel disloyal whites and give it to the negroes. t can go into Missouri and enfranchise the now disfraneliised participants in the late rebellion in that State. It can go into Indiana and set aside our constitutional bar riers in its way, and giveequal suffrage to the negroes and white men. I? this power be conceded, then I. may inquire, what, in Gods name, cannot Congress do? We have indeed fallen upon evil times. The war in the field is ended. But the war upon the most cherished principles and safeguards of our institutions is yet fla rant. Mr. Speaker, I now submit in all confidence that the position assumed by the Executive upon this important question is sustained alike and most triumphantly by the history of the constitution, the solemn and deliberately recorded Opinions of its framers, and the uniform practice of the Government hitherto. The issue the honorable gentleman has chosen to make with him on this subject seems equally untenable and unhappy. Now, on the subject more directly engaging the attention of the House, the proposed amendment of the constitution, I desire to submit but a few remarks. I am not in favor of its adoption. It fails to commend itself to my judgment for many reasons. It is ine pportune to attempt such vital changes in our Constitution now. The times are not auspicious for such important work to be well or wisely done. It is not justitiedb the circumstances of the country. this not emanded by the highest interests of the whole country. this not commended to my judgmenthy the motives which are avQWed here y its friends and promted its introduction. such radical changes should be made, if made at all, by the nation, by all the States in full council, and not by a iart only. It should be submitted to the most iill, unrestricted, and searchin examination here by the Representatives of; all the States, who will have to sit in judgment upon its ratification before it can become the law of the land. Honorable gentlemen propose so to change the constitution as that Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned amen the several States which maybe inclu ded within this Union according to their respective numbers, countinl the whole number of persons in each State. excluding Indiansnot taxed: Provided That wheneverthe elective franchiseshall bedenie or abridged in any State on accountofrucc or color. all persons therein of such race or color shall be excluted from the basis of representation. Now, I invite attention for a very short time to an examination of the words I have quoted: “Representatives are to be apportioned. Representatives of what? In the State Legislatures? No; but Representatives in Congress; and “ dircct taxes are to be apportioned.” Direct taxes to be im osed by whom? Not by the States or the people of the States, but by congress. In other words, everything connected with the subject of this proposed amendment relates to the powers of congress, to the representation of the States in Congress. Now, I desire to put this case to gentlemen on the other side of the Chamber: suppose the people of the State of Ohio, in which State there may he say a half a million of colored people, declare in their fundamental law that those negroes may vote, who are qualified by age, for members of Congress, but shall not vote for members of the State Legislature, or for Governor, or for any State officer or for any municipal Officers in the State of Ohio. What, then, Wlll Congress do? Could you say that by reason of this amendment the negro population of Ohio shall not be counted in the asis of rerescutation of that State in Congress? I ta c it you cannot say that, because by the very language of this amendment the people of the States retain the power to regulate the right of suffrage within the States as they please, and having extended equal suffrage to negroes in elections for members of Congress, the object of this amendment is answered. It. does not require that there shall be no discrimination on account of class or color in the adjustment of the franchise for State purposes. It has been suggested here, by the honorable Gentfrom Ohio, [Mr. BINGHAM] that the position assumed on this subjectby his colleague [Mr. Sunrinmuoian] is not correct, because the position of the latter gentleman assumes that this amendment, if adopted by the States of this Union, would confer upon the States a grant of power, by express terms, to deny to a certain class, or any class of the people within the State, the right oi suffrage, if the people of the State should see fit to do so. Here the hammer fell.] Mr. RAYMOND obtained the floor.