Mr. JOHNSON. The subsequent nomination; but the question came before the Supreme Court, did that remove from office the original incumbent? That raised the question whether the President had power to remove; and as well as I recollect I have not got the book by me there was no member of the bench that suggested a doubt that as the Constitution was, in the judgment of that tribunal the power to remove was vested in the President, and pretty much for the reasons given by Chancellor Kent. If the Constitution had not provided that the appointment should be made in conjunction with the Senate, if it had merely created the office and created the executive Dept, the power to appoint would have been vested in the President, because in its nature it was an executive power, and therefore the provision of the constitution which required the appointment to be made in, that ground. conjunction with the Senate was an exception from what would otherwise be the power of the President; and as the power of appointment in that view of it would have been an executive power, not requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, the power to remove, which was not provided for in the Constitution, was a power resting in the President because that also was an executive power. My learned friend and that, as I think, if there be an error in the argument, is the ground of the error says there is nothing in the constitution which gives to the President the power to remove. Certainly not; nor is there anything in the Constitution which gives to the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. the power to remove. There are no such wortls, to be found in the instrument. The power to remove, if it is to be exerted by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, is a power incidental to the power to appoint, and can only be placed upon the Convention did not think it necessary to provide an express power by which an incompetentofficer was to be removed. They left it to be inferred; and Mr. Madison and those who coincided with him (and the Government has been conducted ever since upon the hypothesis of the correctness of that decision) considered the power to remove as an executive power, not dependent upon the power to appoint with the consent of the senate. because that looked to one object and the other looked to adifferent object. The one looked to the power to fill an office; the other looked to the power to remove an incompetent incumbent. I have not time, nor would I fatigue the Senate if I had. by referring to Story for the purpose of showing that he coincides with the view of Chancellor Kent. As an original question hedoubted the existence of the power, not upon the ground of its supposed corrupt or dangerous tendency, as it was questioned by a good many respectable and able men, but he came to the cone usion, in the words I have already read to the Senate, that it is incidental to the executive function, and is necessary to enable the Executive to discharge his duty of providing for the faithful execution of the aws. Now, Mr. President, whatever may be the opinion of the Senate on this question. I submit to my friendfrom Missouri, and those who concur with him on the question of power, whether it is advisable to put the proposition in this appropriation bill. I do not know what view the President will entertain upon the question. I know what Andrew Jackson would have thought of it and how he would have acted. He would have considered its direct infringement upon his constitutional rights, and he would have vetoed the bill. Now, suppose the President comes to that determination, and you are unable to over ride that veto of an nppropriation bill, the whole appropriation will be ost. We lost an appropriation, bill here at the last session, and a very important one, the mise ellaneous appropriation ill, because there was tacked to it a provision that was offensive to the then POTUS