Mr. BAKER, That mitigates, but does not remove the objection. "I do not suppose it would be a very difficult thing to provide for the end had in view by the gentleman without adopting the extraordinary and unheard of provision that robbers, thieves, murderers, and criminals in general may be empowered to exercise the elective franchise in faying anew the foundations of a State government. I really think that provisos and qualifications could be devised securing the object of the gentleman on the onehand, and guarding against such undesirable results on the other. But a more weighty objection, perhaps, than any I have stated grows out of the following portion of the 6th section of the bill: Abife:, That all personswho on the 4th day of March, 1861, were of. age, and who it any time held office, either civil or military, under the government called the “confederate States of America, ” or who swore allegiance to said government, are hereby declared to foforfeited their citizenship and to have renounced allegiance to the U.S., and shall not be entitled to exercise the elective franchise or hold office until 5 years after they shall have filed their intention or desire to be reinvested with the right, of citizenship, and shall swear allegiance to the U.S and ro nounce allegiance to all other Governments or pretendedgovernments; the said application to be filed and oath taken in the same courts that by law are authorized to naturalize foreigners. Now, sir, the objection which I take to this language is, that it assumes that the status of a portion of those who have been in revolt against the U.S. is such that they are not citizens of the U.S.; in fact, that they P. the position of aliens to the U.S. I maintain such is not the law of the case; and I desire to draw the attention of the House to some authorities on this important legal question, which appear to me to be entitled to. consideration. he decision of the Supreme Court in what are termed the prize cases I have never known called in question by any loyal man in America. On the contrary, it was everywhere hailed as a most admirable utterance of the court — sound in patriotism and sound in law. A portion of that decision has been cited, if I mistake not, by the Gentfrom Pennsylvania to help out the idea that the revolted States did in some way succeed in placing themselves in a position of legal independence of the U.S.; and this is the part: “Hence, in organizing this rebellion, they have acted as Statesclaiming to be sovereign over all persons and property within their respectivelimits, and asserting a right to, absolye their citizens from their allegiance to the Federal Government. Several of theseStates have combined to form a new confeder acy, claiming to boacknowledged by the world as a sovereign State. Their right to do so is now being decided by wager of battle. The ports and territory of eachof theseStates are being held in hostility to the General Government. It is no loose, unorganized insurrection, having no defined boundary or possession; it has a boundary marked by lines of E and which can be crossed only by force. South of this, line is enemies territory, because it is claimed and held in tile, possessionby an organized, hos and belligerent power.” Now, from that language it has been sought to make out some intendment in favor of the position that the rebellion succeeded in some way in placing itself beyond the legal sover eignty of the U.S. Plainly the words bear no such meaning. They are to the effect that confederate sovereignty was a thing asserted by the rebels, but not admitted by this Government, nor accomplished as a legal fact. But the court proceeded positively to exclude such an unwarranted intendment by saying in the same immediate connection — o“All;persons residing within this territory whose may be used to increase the revenues of F. the tle Power are, in this contest, liable to be treated as enemiesthough not foreigners.” Well, sir, I submit they must either be foreigners or citizens of the U.S.; and if they are not to be treated as foreigners, the reason is that they have not by their act of rebellion absolved themselves from allegiance to the supreme sovereignty of the Republic. But the court in the same decision say expressly: “Now, it is a proposition never, doubted that the belligerent Koi. claims to be sovereign, may exercise both belligerent and sovereign rights.” That is, the exercise of the powers of war, and the extension of belligerent rights to the rebels as public enemies, was, in law, no abdication of the sovereignty of the Government over these same rebels. And here the court refer to a decision in 4 Cranch, 272, to the material part of which, as bearing directly upon the question I am considering, I call the attention of the House. It is the case of Rose vs. Himely—the decision having been rendered by Chief Justice Marshall, in 1808, long before this iniquitous rebellion in behalf of slavery and against liberty and civilization threw its ugly and bloody front across the pathway of the Republic. In that decision the court say: “The colony of StDomingo, originally belonging to France, had broken the bond which connectedher with the parent State, had declared herself independent, and was endeavoring to support that independence by arms. France still asserted her claim of sovereignty, and had employed a military force in support of that claim. A war defacto then unquestionably existed betweenFrance and StDomingo. It has beenargued that the colony, having declared itself a sovereign State, and having thus far maintained its sovereignty by arms, must be considered and treated by other nations as sovereign in fact, and as being entitled to maintain the same intercoursewith the world that is maintained by other belligerent nations. In support of this argument the doctrines of Wattel have o particularly referred to. But the language of that writer is obviously addressed to sovereigns, not to courts. It is for Governments to decide whether they will considerSt. Domingo as an independent nation, and until such decision shall be made, or France shall relinquish her claim, courts of justice must consider the ancient state of things as remaining unaltered, and the sovereign, power of France over her colony as still subsisting.” Now, the court here very properly say that the language of Wattel is obviously addressed to sovereigns, not to courts. If France had recognized the independence of StDomingo that would have constituted her a new sovereign State, and put her at once in a position beyond the sovereignty of the mother country. So in our case: if the U.S. had recognized the independence of the rebel power, that would have placed the revolted States in a position of independence, and all solved their people from all allegiance to their late sovereign Power. But, on the contrary thereof, this Government through every one of its depts, legislative, executive, and judicial, and through a military force of 2 millions of men, continually disputed the assumption that there was any sovereignty to be recognized in the revolted States. And so with all the nations of the civilized world: not one of them at any time recognized the socalled confederate States as a sovereign Power. I will next draw the attention of the House to a particular passage from Wattel, which I ana sure—at least I strongly believe—I have heard cited T. this floor on more than one occasion by the Gentfrom Pennsylvania [Mr. Stevens] in support of his very peculiar ideas upon this great subject. Before doing so I will remind the House that in ascertaining the real meaning of a writer it is best to quote him by context and not by isolated passages. Wattel says: “A civilWar breaks the bands of society and government, or at least suspendstheir force and effect; it produces in the nation 2 independent parties, whoconsider eachother asenemies, andacknowledge nnoecceosmsamriolynjudge. These 2 parties, therefore, musting, be considered as thence forward constitut at least for a time, 2 separatebodies, 2 distinct societies. Though one of the parties may have rbeeseisnttiongblame in breaking the unity of the State and the lawful authority they are not the less divided in fact. Besides, who shall judge them2 who shnii pronounce on which side the right or the wrong lies’ On earth they have no commonsuperior. They stand, therefore, in precisely the same predicament as 2 nations who engage in a contest, and being unable to come to an agreement have recourse to arms.” But a little further along, in the same chap ter, on the same subject, Wattel adds: “When the sovereign has subdued the opposite party, and reduced them tosubmit and such for peace, e may except from the amnestythe authors of the disturbances — the heads of the party: he may bring them to a legal trial, and punish them if they be foundguilty.” Now, could that be done if they had attained a position of independence, or if they had succeeded in placing themselves beyond the su. preme sovereignty of the State against which they were contending? Of course not. So that the opinion of Vattel upon the subject is 3. in harmony with the opinion of the SCOTUS — as indeed with the very reason of the case, with the practice of all nations, and with the opinion of every respectable writer upon public law. I am unwilling to take any step or to cast any vote which assumes that in fundamental law there ever were, for anyone moment of time, twosovereign Powers inside of the territory of the Republic. The practical execution of this unbroken legal sovereignty of the Union was obstructed, it is true; but what of that, as affecting my present argument? Every legal authority, every legal right, is liable to be obstructed. If a man commits a crime, murder for example, he may put himself in defiance of the law, and resist or evade its officers for weeks, months, or years. Can it be maintained that in consequence of such an interruption of its execution there is any suspension of the authority of the law—any loss of.jurisdiction over the person of the offender? Certainly not; and the principle is the same in the great case as in the small. Here was a gigantic treasonable combination, large enough to require 2 millions of men, 1st and last, to put it down; but yet, from the stand. point of the Constitution of the U.S., there was no moment at which every one of those parties in revolt did not in very law owe allegiance to the Government of the U.S. And if so, if the sovereign power of the U.S. was, all through the rebel. lion, a subsisting fact in law, how can it be " aintained that these men succeeded in pla ing themselves in the position of alien ene ics, beyond the sovereign jurisdiction of the U.S., as we are invited by the 6thtion of this bill to assume they did? As to the power of this Government to de$oenize rebels by its own act and in due { m of law I say nothing. No such question 18 raised by the 6th section of this bill, as I inderstand it. It contains no words operating oand accomplishing such a purpose a8Su part of the Government. It i. simply that a certain class of those lately in Succ o have, heretofore, by their own action, i. ded in cutting the thread of their alle. to the Government, and in placing 0. o: b their own volition, in the status they. r foreigners; and it provides that ers. one naturalized as other foreign;. This assumption, as I have endeavored i..". receives no countenance from the war, none from the solemn and approved adjudications of our highest court, and is, besides all this, a flat stultification of the entire previous action of every dept of the Government. But, sir, if I should possibly be mistaken in my construction of the language of this section of the bill—if it should be construed as a present legislative declaration, decitizenizing the class of persons therein defined—still I find yery great difficulty in giving it my approval. To say nothing of such a policy as an original and open question, I invite the attention of the House to 2 important considerations already briefly alluded to 1st, that such action would contravene the civil rights bill; and 2ndly, that it would be in violation of the proposed amendment of the Constitution. The 1st section of the civil rights bill enacts: That all persons born in the U.S and not subject to any foreign Power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the U.S., &c These words, sir, beyond all question, include the very persons whom the bill before us proposes to treat as foreigners. Are we prepared to take back what we have said in that bill; to mar at so early a day that great statute of liberty? I for one shall be slow, very slow, to aid in the mutilation of so noble a Statute. But, sir, there is a still more formidable obstruction barring up the way along which the Gentfrom Pennsylvania would lead us. The 1st section of the proposed constitutional amendment, as already cited in my opening remarks, provides that All persons born or naturalized in the U.S and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the U.S., &c. These words again, beyond all cavil, embrace the class of persons whom the Gentfrom Pennsylvania proposes to treat as in the cate gory of foreigners. Now, sir, did we propose this amendment of the Constitution in good faith? I certainly so understood it. The Congress proposing it so understood it, of course. The States that are ratifying it, one after another, so understand it; and yet we are now invited to thrust it aside, to ignore its existence as a fact worthy of no consideration, and to enact a statute in flat violation of its provisions. Sir, is it fit, is it becoming in this great Legislature of the nation, to work 8 months in the elaboration of a constitutional amendment—a wise, useful, and in dispensable amendment, as I regard it—and then, immediately after it is sent to the States, and while the States are rapidly ratifying it, to turn square around and propose to override by statute exactly what we projected by way of constitutional amendment? such a line of policy as coming from the Gentfrom Pennsylvania becomes the more strange and unaccountable when we remember that it is his opinion, stoutly and often expressed, that it only requires i. 4ths of the loyal States to ratify the amendment—a number certain to be obtained. Sir, in my judgment there is no proper consistency, no solidity or cogency of action in such a course. It appears to me like a species of trifling, quite out of place in an American Congress, to propose an amendment to the Constitution in one breath, and to proceed at once to disregard the policy it |. emin the next—especially in view of the all but certain prospect of its early ratification. I next draw the attention of the House to a similar difficulty which it appears to me will grow out of the 7th section of the bill, which is as follows: SEC. 7. Abife:, That no constitution shall be presented to or acted on by Congress which denies to any citizen any right, privileges, or immunities which are granted toocitizen in the State. All laws shall be impartial without regard to language, race, or former condition. If the provisions of this section should ever be altered, re nealed, expunged, or in any way abrogated, this act shall becomevoid and said State lose its right to represented be in Congress. Sir, I regard the concluding sentence of that section as embodying an utterly untenable provision. We have proposed, as I have stated, an amendment to the Constitution, which few ofusquestion will be adopted. Within a very few months it may be a part of the Constitution of the U.S. The 2nd section of that proposed amendment leaves it to the States of the Union to determine who shall be qualified electors. Now, sir, the States upon which this bill is intended to act might conform to the provisions of this 7th section, and thus resume their full practical relations with the Government of the Union. Meantime, the amendment having been ratified and become part of the Constitution, these States might so modify their constitutions and laws as to be at the same time in conflict with this section of the bill and in palpable harmony with the Constitution of the Union—in which case the bill enacts its own abrogation, and provides that the States so offending shall lose their right of representation in Congress! Sir, such a provision is not only untenable, it is nugatory and monstrous. It is no part of American statesmanship or American policy to dismiss from these Halls the representatives of a State whose constitution and laws are in har mony with the fundamental law of the Republic! Mr. Speaker, I have now said all I intended to say in the way of criticism upon the provisions of this bill. I think it ought by all means to be referred to the ComReconstruction. That committee was constituted for the very purpose of considering this sort of work in the 1st instance, and in my judgment we shall be all the forwarder by so referring the bill. An ill considered and untenable step will retard rather than advance our progress. I hear much said about vigor of action. Well, sir, I certainly go for viger; but I also go for something in addition thereto. I want to put some consistency, some law, some common sense into our vigor. I go for hooping our tub before putting water in it. To pour in at the top that which will run out at the bottom is not vigor, but disconcerted weakness. Let this whole business be referred to the appropriate committee; let the committee go to work in earnest; and we shall then be in a train promising a better harmony of the House—better results in the way of may tured, sound legislation, than I can at present hope for from any other course of action.