Mr. HOWARD. That is not the question. I am speaking of regular acts of war performed by inferiors in obedience to the orders of their superiors. I am not speaking of willful and wanton trespasses committed by soldiers or officers without warrant and without order, because the bill contemplates no such cases, affords protection in no such cases. I am speaking of acts done under regular orders. Do those acts present cases coming under any law of the U.S.? That involves the question whether the war itself existed in pursuance of any law of the U.S. If the war itself was waged in iirsuance. of law, if the Congress of the U.S., in providing for its prosecution, did not transe end the Constitution itself, all these acts of war were committed under a law of the U.S.; and the acts themselves, taken in connection with the party plaintiff and the party defendant in the State court constitute a case at law. A case at law must have parties; there must be a fact connected with it, there must be an allegation on one side by one party against the other in respect to which the plaintiff asks for relief or asks for judgment. That I understand to be in very brief terms a definition of a case at law. The judicial power of the U.S. extends to just such cases; that is to say, it reaches them, it covers them. The judicial power of the U.S. ma, if Congress so choose, take these cases and colwith them in any way it sees fit. If the case exists in a State court, being covered by and subject to the judicial power of the U.S. under the Constitution, it is competent undoubtedly for congress to provide or the prosecution, trial, and decision of these cases in their own way. That, in brief, is all that is contemplated in this stat ute. But, sir, if according to the doctrine of some, if according to the teachings of a class of doctors who have been too numerous and whose teachings have been too fatal in this country, it is not competent for the Congress of the U.S. to wage war, as they say, against a State; if the acts of the U.S. in the prosecution of this war were accordin to the doctrines of those teachers, all void an of no effect; if a State ordinance of secession is to be the paramount law of the land, the Constitution of the U.S. to the contrary notwithstanding, then, sir, I agree that all these cases are not cases arising under any law of the U.S., and therefore the cannot be removed from a State court in which they may happen to be brought. But, sir, I do not belong to that school of politics. I reject the whole theory of Mr. Ca houn and all his followers from beginning to end upon the question of the right of a State to secede, or the right of the Government of the U.S. to we e war for the purpose of utting down a robe lien or an insurrection. hold all our acts to be perfectly valid and as valid as they were necessary. Now, sir, as to the other amendment it is suggested that the word “judges” should be stricken out of the section. It is alleged that it is a cruel proceeding against a judge to hold him responSible in damages for acts which he may do or assume to do in his judicial capa city. The bill has been much misunderstood; certainly it has been greatly misrepresented during this discussion. Gentlemen have imuted to it the principle that it assumes to unish ajudge who proceeds afier the case has icen removed from him by inflicting a penalty upon him and treating him as a criminal. hot so, sir. The section speaks for itself, and speaks plainly, that if the State court shall, notwithstanding the performance of all things required for the removal of the case to the circuit court of the U.S. proceed further before the certificate of removal is reduced, then, and in that case, “ all such furt ier proceedings shall be void and of none effect; and all parties, judges, officers, and other persons thencefoith proceeding thereunder, orby color thereof, shall be liable in damages therefor to the party aggrieved. ” N ow, what is the theory of the hill? That it is the right of the party sued, the right of the defendant in that particular case, to present his petition to the court, and upon the presentation of such petition showing that the not complained of was done by him under a military order, it shall be the duty of the State court to snrcease all its proceedings and pass the case from its own jurisdiction into the hands of the circuit court of the U.S. It is in the nature of an injunction against the State court, or more properly speaking, it is in the nature ofu writ of prohibition, which forbids and prohibits the court to which it is addressed ruin proceeding further in the case. What has the judge to complain of? It is said if he proceeds urther in the case after the removal papers are presented to him or filed with him he is acting in his judicial capacity, and that it is hard and cruel and disgraceful to punish a man even in damn when he is acting in good faith as ajudge an deciding a question of law that has come before him. That is not this case. The State judge who had the 1st jurisdiction of the case as before him (and he alone knows the fact) all the papers to perfect this removal of the case from the State court into the circuit court of the U.S. The paper itself is to him an admenition a perfect y full notice that from the moment e receives it he ceases to have any further jurisdiction or power over the case, and that he must not proceed further with it. It is a plain, distinct, and unmis takable notice O rating upon him to divest him completely from that moment of all his jurisdiction over the case and will Senators say that with this paperbefore him he can be deceived or misled as to what his duty is? Can it be said that notwithstanding the provision of the Constitution which I have quoted, notwithstanding the existence of the law, notwithstanding the petition which is to be verified by the oath of the applicant settin forth the facts which divest him of the jiiris iction, he may still go on and act in good faith and without guilt and pronounce judgment against the defendant in that case? No, sir. He has no more right in law or e nity or in good morals to proceed another inc with that case than has the party who is served with an injunction in a court of equity where the writ has been properly delivered to him and the seal of the court shown him; and we all know how heavy the penalty is, or may be, against a party in a court of equit who isobeys an injunction of the court. The injunction here is the injunction of a law of the U.S., which says to the State court, “ Sto; go no further; the supreme power of the U.S. bids you to pause; it interposes its strong arm to protect the soldier or the officer whom you have before you from any judgment which you may see fit to pass upon him, and it transfershim and his case to another and a more imartial and a safer tribunal.” Sir, I think there is no ground whatever for the complaints which are made in this Chamber against inflicting punishment upon the judge who persists in his guilty course after this notice has been served upon him and does these acts against his own light and knowledge. But it is said by the Senfrom Wise on sin, spare the judge; let him proceed, not withstanding the removal of the cause, and adjudicate the case, and send the soldier to jail, and let the soldier in order to seek redress sue, not tbejudge who has commanded him to go to jail, but the sheriff or the constable whom the process for his confinement to jail has been delivered. It strikes me that that is aver singular proposition indeed. that Senator is wel enouh acquainted witH the principle of law that where a court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter, but still persists in proceed into judgment against the rty, the law hohfs that judge responsible in amuges, as well as. the officer who executes the void process, and a ministerial officer of the court has no protection whatever, unless in cases where the court issuing the process had jurisdiction of the subject matter and how in this case, let me inquire of the honorable Senfrom Wisconsin, is the ministerial officer to know whether the case has been removed or not? He does not keep the records. He does not inspect the papers. He has no right to look into the question whether or not the party comlaine against has removed the cause; an although the cause may have been removed in utter ignorance of the fact on the part of the ministerial Officer, the tender iner cies of the Senfrom Wisconsin would go.lo far as to exempt the guilty judge who had imued the process in that case and punish the innocent ministerial officer for that as to which he had no knowledge and was entirely innocent. Sir, I cannot agree to any such absurdity as that. I hope that this section will not be amended in any respect.