Mr. FESSENDEN. Then it. has been cited by others. Suppose we made it, and an pose it is binding upon us. Binding with whom? Was that a compact with the confederate States? It was a compact with our own people. We told them and they told us that the war was not waged for any such purpose. It was not a promise made for the benefit of the confederate tales it was not a promise made for the benefit of Sthers, but for our own benefit, and the honorable Senator is perfectly thmiliarwith the legal principle that unless the consideration comes from A, he cannot avail himself of a promise made by B to C. That, then, is simply the case here; that is the law. Nobody will dispute it. Those are the consequences of war generally. Now, is there any more dispute as to the next proposition, that the consequences of civilWar are precisely the same? Is there any writer who does not lay it down distinctly that where a civilWar in thoproper sense of the term, has existed, the consequences of that civilWar, so far as the rights of the parties are concerned, are precisely the some that they are in other cases? If compelled to carry on the contest on the same principles—as we are by the law oi nations—and to treat it in all respects as a war between 2 independentnations until the war is closed, is there a dispute that precisely the same consequences follow, precisely the same rights are obtained as would be the case in an international war? If not, let the Senator show me where he finds a distinction drawn between the consequences in the 2 cases. I take it these 2 propositions are beyond dis pute; there can be. no difficulty about them. Then the question arises, and it is only a natural one, does our form of government change in any way the nature an incvitable legal consequences of a civilWar? Is a civilWar waged among us, living as we do under a written Constitution, different in any way so far as the consequences are concerned, on account of that written Constitution, from a civilWar in any other nation in the world? Thatis a ques tiol upon which men may pause. It is very manifest to methat there can be no difference at all and here I come to consider for amoment the argument of the honorable Senfrom Maryland, because that is what I wanted to address myself to. He says that Congress can do no more than quell an insurrection; our Constitution speaks only of insurrections; and when an insurrection has existed in a State, the moment that insurrection is over the State returns to its former position; and he roads, I believe, from that clause of the Constitution which says that Congress may provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union. suppress insurrections, and repel invasion. Now, does the Senator undertake to say in any way that that is all our Constitution gives power to do? If I understand the argument of the honorable Senator, it is this: here are State governments, and as there are State governments, and as we are living under a written Constitution, and Congress by the particular terms of that Constitution has power to provide for calling out the militia to suppress insurrections and repel invasions, therefore everything that takes place in the way of a fight in this count, no matter what its extent, is to be consideredyan insurrection within the mean.ing of that clause. Do I understand the Senator to take that ground?