Mr. LAWRENCE, of Ohio. Treason or other capital offenses. There is in the States as a general rule no limitation at all upon the prosecution ofcapital offenses. There ought not to be in relation to the crime of treason; and the only questions, I suppose, which will arise on the passage of this bil will be as to the expediency of passing it, and our power to pass it. As to the expediency, I have only to say I suppose this House have determined for themselves that they are not in favor of a general amnesty of all those who were guilty of treason during the rebellion. On the 1st day of this session we passed a bill to repeal so much of existing laws as authorize the President to grant general amnesty or pardon, yet the limitation contained in the law of 1790, if it shall continue in force, will very soon be equivalent to general amnesty and pardon, As to the other branch of the question, our right to pass this bill, I have this to say: the right of a nation to prosecute for a violation of its laws is analogous to the right of a citizen to sue for a wrong to his person or property, or for the violation of a contract. In all these cases the courts administering the law distinguish between the right and the remedy. The “right” growing out of the “obligation” of a contract cannot be divested, for it is by the Constitution. The right of redress for a wrong to the person or property is equally a vested right which cannot be impaired. But the remedy is a very different affair. The Legislature may not only preseribe a limitation for future contracts and rights of action, but in the language of the Note to section 22 of Angel on Limitations “A statute of limitations may well apply to equal tracts in existence at the time of its passage, provided a reasonable time be allowed beforethe statute takes effect, or the debt barred, within which creditorsmay institute their actions.” And again the same note says: “But a statute extending the time of limitation will not revive stactuatuesses, of action ready barred under.: If, however, the cause of action be not already barred, the statute extending the time will apply.” These principles apply as well to criminal prosecutions as to civil actions, for in either case the law which regulates the time of prose cuting or sueing affects only the remedy and not the right, whether the time for prosecuting or sueing is enlarged or abridged. This bill is not objectionable upon the ground will be expostfacto. An expostfacto W 18– “One which renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed.” 6 Cranch, 138. If an act is not punishable when committed, it cannot by subsequent law be made so. The test of an expostfacto law is the criminality or innocence of an act at the time of its commission. The mode of prosecution, the time when or within which it shall be ecuted, or the tribunals which shall try it are all subject to regulation by law.