Mr. WILLIAMS. I move to amend by striking out these words: Excepting the Secretariesof State, of the Treasury, of War. of the Navy, and of the interior, the PostMGenl, and the AttyGen. So that the 1st section will then read: That every person holding any civil office to which hehas been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafterbe appointed to any such office, and shall becomeduly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointedand duly qualified, exceptas herein otherwise provided. Mr. Speaker, having already spoken so much at large on the general principles involved in this projected measure of reform, I do not now propose to rehearse what I have said, but will endeavor to confine myself in what I have to offer to the amendment I have just submitted. That amendment seems to me to be essential to the symmetry of the bill, essential to its completeness, essential to its efficacy, essential to it as a remedial measure, which shall be coextensive with the evil which it proposes to correct, and essential, I think, to the satisfaction of the general demands of the American public. The principle of this bill, which comes to us from the Senate, like that I had the honor to report to this House, involves a negation, as I may say, of the doctrine of the right of removal at the mere will of the Executive, which has so generally prevailed in the practice of this nation. It recognizes it as an evil; it proposes to rectify that evil; but it.]: short in the exception which covers the heads of the several Depts of the Government, as indicated in the Constitution. In this I think the bill is defective. With the elimination of this exception, I think it will be of great prac tical value. Without it, we shall be only pruning off a little of the redundant foliage, instead of applying the ax to the root of Why the tree is it that these, the highest officers in the Government, are excepted, while the bill aims only at lower and inferior ones? The reason is, as I understand it, that the heads of Depts are the constitutional, perhaps I should not say constitutional, but at all events the confidential advisers of the Executive, and that unity in council is essential to a proper administration of the powers of that Dept; in other words, that so far as regards the executive branch of the public service there should be only one universal will per vading the whole vast domain of this Republic; that there is to be no reference to the will of the people; no responsibility in that direction whatever, but that all things are to be referred to the supreme pleasure of the Executive, who is to be in that respect all in all. I take leave just here to say, what I suppose no one in this House will question, that there is no advisory council known to our Constitu. on except the Senate of the U.S. True it is that the heads of Depts have ween generally recognized and characterized ever, and I am free to admit that their opinions as “the Cabinet, ” and equally true it is that from the foundation of the Government the Chief Executive Magistrate has applied to them for such advice as he might desire; but it does not follow that he may not with equal propriety seek it elsewhere. He may consult them, how are entitled to great weight so long as they are in the condition of independent officers; but when the idea of advice is combined with that of a compulsory unity, a unity constrained by the power of the Executive over the tenure of the officer, I do not know how these positions are to be reconciled with each other. To exercise the office of a counselor it is of the 1st necessity that the party who holds it should enjoy the most perfect freedom. If he subsists upon the breath of the Executive Magistrate and holds his place by his mere arbitrary will, is it likely that his opinions will be governed by any reference to the interests of the country? Why, sir, if these high functionaries are to depend solely upon that will, then they are in no different position, so far as regards the nation, from, and are of no more value to its executive head than are the minions and syc ophants who live on the breath of a despot and Wi. his ear by their mendacious flattery. hat man of sense, for example, would under take to say that with a Cabinet council composed of creatures standing inhabitual awe of the Executive and under the constant terror of the bow string, from the grand vizier down to the very lowest in the grade of service, that any honest or manly advice was likely to be obtained or even possible? Is this so much desiderated unity consistent then with the idea that the men conforming to it shall occupy the position of advisers when they are held under bonds like this? To treat them as such, if not very like a joke, is the very climax of absurdity. And now, Mr. Speaker, what is there in the relations of the Executive of the U.S. to these officers under the Constitution which should entitle him to control them? Does the Constitution intend it? Unguestionably not, but the very contrary. Have the heads of Depts no duties to perform except such as are assigned to them by the Executive himself? The Congress of the U.S. is exPressly authorized by the terms of the Constitution to lodge with them the power of appointing to all inferior offices. We do in vest them with other powers, and we impose upon them other duties in almost every day and hour of our legislative experiences. Are these men not officers of the Government, but the mere agents and servants of the Executive? Is there no responsibility to us? Is there none to the law? There may be, there now is; but under Present circumstances, and with this power of removal reserved to the Executive, and unfortunately recognized as belonging to him alone and exercisable without appeal ever since the year 1789, of what value to the nation is that constitutional provision which gives to us the power of lodging these appointments in the hands of hisjo one whatever. Its exercise by us has become in effect a mere farce, a cheat, and a delusion an empty and idle assertion of authority. Allow me to appeal to the practice, and to ask what is the experience of this nation on this subject? For if we are not to learn wisdom in that school we shall be a great many years in the process of growing wise. On this point it is only necessary to call the attention of this House to the case of the removal of the deposits in 1833. Mr. Duane, it will be recollected, was then SecyTreas: ury. The charter of the Bank of the U.S. provffled, if my recollection serves me, that the deposits of the public moneys should be made in that institution, and should remain with it unless the SecyTreasury at any time, upon information satisfactory to himself, should judge them to be insecure. general Jackson, who was then Chief Magistrate, iron one, too,) insisted their removal. Mr. Duane, the SecyTreasury, believing them to be safe, refused to obey the order, to his honor be it said. He did not look to the pregnant fact that he was holding his office by the precarious tenure of executive will. He was man enough and I am sorry, for the country's sake, that there are so few resembling him to overlook and despise that consideration, and peremptorily refused to do the work he was commanded. And what was the result? The answer of the President, as it has been generally reported and I have no doubt, from the internal evidence, that it is true was, that if Mr. Duane would not do his will and defer to his authority in the premises he would find another man who would. And he did find that compliant man in the person of Roger B. Taney, then AttyGen, who was transferred to the Treasury for that object, and faithfully and submissively performed the work that he was put upon. Here, then, was the case of a power lodged with and a duty imposed by an act of Congress on the SecyTreasury, and that power and the performance of the duty overridden and overruled by the arbitrary fiat of the Chief Magistrate, and his purpose accomplished and his will enforced by turning out the officer for no other reason than because he proved to be conscientious and felt that he owed duties to the law which were superior to those he owed to the Magistrate from whom he derived and under whom he held his commission as the head of one of the Depts of the Government. But this is not all. The Constitution of the U.S., as I have already remarked, authorizes Congress to vest the appointing power either in the Chief Magistrate alone or in the heads of Depts or in the courts, so far as regards the appointing of inferior officers, who comprise, I suppose and this is in accordance with the opinion of Judge Story at least 99 out of every 100 of the valuable and paying offices of this nation. Well, sir, we have exercised that power in sundry instances. It was not intended, as the terms of this provision show, that the Executive should appoint in all cases, although all these are to be regarded as executive officers. It did intend that this power should be parceled out and divided. It was its obvious spirit and purpose that Congress should lodge it with high functionaries, who it was reasonably supposed would be sufficiently independent for its safe, judicious exercise. We have exercised that power in some instances. We have vested the PostMGenl with the faculty of appointing to all postoffices where the salary is less than one lo dollars per annum. We have vested the SecyInterior with the power of appointing foagents and perhaps other officers; and yet it is a transparent fact, well known to every man conver sant with the business of these offices, that appointments are made every day by the President himself, in cases where the power is lodged with the head of the Dept, without consulting and even without the knowledge of the head of the Dept himself! And here, in the way of illustration, I am reminded of a very recent case in the person of a pension agent who received a notice of removal without any previous complaint that he was aware of against him; and upon application to the SecyInterior, to whom the appointment belonged under the law, was in formed by that functionary that he knew nothing about the case, and was not even aware of the fact of his supersedure. The resultis, therefore, as practically shown no doubt in 100s of instances, that under Present circumtances, with the heads of Depts depending for their official life on the arbitrary pleasure of the Executive, this important provision of the Constitution is practically blotted out and our power over the subject substantially abdicated. I know that my very worthy friend who sits beforeme, [Mr. HALE] with his strong conserv (with, as we know, a will of his own, and anative leanings in favor of old abuses, will dissent from me on this question. The bill from the Senate now before us is, I believe, the same reported here by himself from the JtCom on Retrenchment, which is now depending as an amendment, or rather substitute for the bill reported by me from the ComJudiciary of this House. There may be some slight differences, but they are, I think, substantially the same. And now, with a view of showing to the House that i have the failindorsment on the part of that committee, through one of its accredited organs on this floor, of the very opinions and views I have been exPressing, I will take the liberty of referring to the very a b.le.s peech made by the Gentfrom Rhode [Mr. JENCREs] a few days ago in the consideration of the bill in relation to appointment to the civil service, in which I take it that he exPresses the opinions of the committee. I shall be pardoned of course for reading a paragraph from that speech which is so much to the purpose as the following: “TENDENCY TOWARD CENTRALIZATION. “Another evil, and one which may becomeofgreater magnitude and threaten greaterdanger to the republic than any other, is that already suggested, of athpepdoiinretmcte interference of the Chief Executive in the of officerswhich by law is vestedin the heads of Depts, claiming to exercise over these chiefs the power of removal without the assent of the Senate, as well as exercisingthe power of apointment with the Senate's advice and consent is will controls the headsof Depts, in whose discretionthe Qongresshas by law under the Constitution yested the selection, of these inferior officers. Thus the whole public civil service, in the language ionfgthe resolution appointing this committee, is be used as an instrument, of political or party patronage;’ and with the leader, of the political party in power, or of one that seeksto be in power, in the executive Mansion, one of the greatestevils which can endanger. the existence of a republic springs into existencein the very heart of ours that of the centralization of all appointing aswell asexecutive power in one person; The framers of the Constitution wisely guarded against this centralizing tendency by the clause already quoted, but under the Presentsystemthat guard is a nullity.” This is well and conclusively put, and fully authorizes me, I think, to say that if my wor thy friendfrom NewYork dissents from my argument here he dissents equally from the logic of the paragraph from ‘. colleague's speech to which I have referred. I think I have understood from him, however, that he indorses the whole of that speech. If then, I have not misapprehended him, I shall have a right to expect him to join hands and stand shoulder to shoulder with me in this endeaver to make the heads of the Executive Depts independent of the Executive j. I expect him, therefore, to unite with me in lifting these men from their abject and slavish posture at the footstool of imperial power. I want him to unite with me in so or dering our affairs that there shall at no time hereafter be a recurrence of such scandalous exhibitions as the country has been compelled to witness at Philadelphia, where a political convention was manipulated and engineered by high functionaries of this Government in form iIng a part of the very Cabinet of the President. want him to vote with me so as to make it impossible hereafter that the world shall witness another royal progress like the last, graced the attendance of Cabinet ministers, and illustrated, too, by sometimes maudlin public utterances from them. And now, Mr. Speaker, I have only to say, in addition to what I have already remarked, Ithat there are other objections to this bill, which will endeavor to correct if I am allowed the privilege by such amendments as have suggested themselves to me. I trust the Gentfrom NewYork will allow me this opportunity. I take his silence for consent,; with that understanding I will not detain the House any longer.