Mr. RAYMOND. I am obliged to the gentleman for his forbearance. I ascertain from his admission that he does not hold that the passage of ordinances of secession effected a severance of these States from the U.S. I proceed then, to inquire what was it that did effect it]? Was it the fact that they made war? Why, sir the fact of making war is nothing in itself. They may make war, but that is a game that 2 can play at, and unless they make successful war, the fact of their making war has no relevancy at all, and can work no change in their constitutional relations. They became members of the Union by their ratification of the constitution and by the acceptance of that ratification, and they cannot annul either of those acts by the fact of making war. Is it the length of the war, its duration? Would they have been out of the Union if they had made 3 months war, or 6 months war, or one years war, or 2 years war? If it was the whlength of the war that accomplished the result, pray what is the length essential to its accomplishment? Was it the mode of making war? Vas it the fact that they “carved the bones of our martyred heroes into ornaments” that took them out of the Union? Of course no one will pretend that. If, then, it was neither the fact of their making war, nor the duration of the war, nor the mode in which they carried it on, what is there left but a successful result of the war which could possibly accomplish the object at which they aimed? If the war had been success ful, then, and then only, would they have accomplished their purpose of departing from the Union. Now, I wish to refer for a moment, and I will be very brief, to the prize cases so often quoted to sustain the position that the citizens of the rebel States were enemies during the war, and are vanquished enemies now, in a political sense, for in another sense it has no relevancy whatever to e questions now at issue. I under stood the Gentfrom Connecticut, [Mr. Dsiiixo] and various other gentlemen who have spoken on this subject, to take the ground that inasmuch as the Supreme Court has decided them to be public enemies, therefore they have no rights under the constitution of the U.S., but are subject to our absolute will and disposal. Now, wish to repeat what I said when [spoke before, that the point which was decided by the Supreme Court in the prize cases was simply this: that, during the war, for the purposes of the war, to define the mode in which and the law by which the war could and should be carried on, all the inhabitants of the southern States werepublic enemies, in this, that property belongin to persons living within the enemys lines might be seized as enemys property. It was not held that they would continue public enemies after the war closed, or that they were enemies in any political sense whatever. Now, sir, there is one single sentence, and it is a brief one, in the decision of the Supreme Court which will show that I make that distinction not without warrant. The court distinctly cautions us against falling into the error of supposin that the term “enemy” was used in a politica sense, or in the sense of the comm“on law. Justice Grier in his opinion says: But in defining the term enemysproperty we will be led into error if we refer to Field and Iiord Coke for their definition of the woifl enemy. It is a technical phrase couliar to prize courts and depends upon principles of, public policy as distinguished from common law ” Now, in every art of that decision this distinction must be ornc in mind, else we shall fall into the precise error against which we are warned by the very decision of the court itself. Irepeat there is not one sentence, not one word, not one syllable, in that decision which will give the slightest countenance to the idea that the court ecided that the people of those States are still enemies, now the war is closed, or that they have ever been political enemies in the sense in which that term is used upon this floor. The object, and the only object of the court was to decide what was the status of property be longing to public enemies, so far as the right of capture was concerned and the decision on that point was that we had the right to ca ture property found at sea belonging to men iving within the encmies lines; not because it belong edto disloyal persons, but because it was within reach of the enemy and might be used against us by them in the war and that is the reason, as I understand it, which controls the whole law upon that technical subject. I hold in my hand a summary of the decision of the court, prepared by Richard H. Dana, jr., of Boston, who is known there and elsewhere as one of the ablest lawyers, and one of the soundest publicists in that State, which abounds in both. He was counsel in one of these cases, and I may add here, because with some it might give the greater weight to his authority, that he is toda one of the most strenuous advocates of the a option of stringent measures in regard to the southern States. [Here the hammer fell.]