Mr. WADE. They can provide for an election whenever they please, and they can limit it when the contingency falls out in that way. Therefore they do not fall within the same rule as those who come in under the Constitution for fixed terms, beyond the reach of Conress. g Now, one word as to the length of this term. I know that a great many, and perhaps a majority of the people believe the Presidential term too short; that the great agitation and excitement coming around once in 4 years, distracting business and exciting the public mind, is too often. That reasoning is very lausible, and if there was nothing more in it F. be clearly of that opinion myself. But who does not know that in the vast and growing powers that devolve upon this great officer there is danger in a long period of his drawing such influences to himself as will be dangerous to the public weal? 6 years is a very long term for a man to be in the position of a dic tator; for really the POTUS under our Constitution is scarcely less powerful than a Roman dictator. His word is law; his will is the rule of action of the whole body; and he rides over Congress at his will, as a general thing. In time of war the whole Government is in his hands to such an extent that I can hardly see how you could give him any more power than he legitimately has under the Constitution. When our Constitution was framed origin ally there was not so much power and influence devolving upon the POTUS as there is now upon the governors of some of the States. It was not thought to be dangerous. The framers of the Constitution hardly contemplated the immense growth of the nation, and as it grows and progresses in power, wealth, and influence, the Presidential office becomes more and more important every year. If the excitement is fo upon electing this great magistrate for our years, how much more intense will it be if you lengthen out the period! It will make the Presidential election much more important than it is now. And suppose the people make a mistake, as they are always liable to make a mistake, in the selection of this great officer and get a man there who is false to all they wanted of him, all they expected of him, who thwarts all their ideas, j. overthrows all their " and there he sits, clothed with a power that you cannot get rid of; when such a thing happens every man would wish that his term, at all events, was not more than 4 years. On the other hand, when you elect a magistrate by the power of the majority of the people, of their own who honestly stands by them and endeavors to carry them out to the advantage of the people and for the welfare of the Government, it is natural for them to wish that the term should be extended. I have no very settled convictions on this subject myself; but I have reflected upon it much, and I know no rule by which we can measure the time that we ought to fix. Our fathers adopted 4 years when the Government was exceedingly small, when the influence of the Chief .was not 100th part of what it is today in the selection of the officer, in wielding all the great powers that properly devolve upon him. If they thought then that 4 years was long enough, I think the great importance of the office, the ambition with which men aspire to all its honors and emoluments, are such that we should not rashly devolve it upon any man for a great length of time. Suppose you were to fix it at ten or 20 years, do you suppose you would ever get it out of his hands? If you make the term too long it would be apt to become hered itary, perhaps, in his family. As a republican I fear to invest any man with the great and growing powers of this high office for any great length of time. I think it is better and safer that it should frequently come back into the hands of the people, and again be submitted to their judgment to select another man as good as he is; for it is idle to suppose that there is but one man in the U.S. who is perfectly fit for this great office. We shall always find men enough, and if we look with an honest heart and with sagacity of mind we shall have no trouble in finding honest and honorable men to fill the office; but let us not tempt them with too long a period. On the whole I have come to the conclusion, though not I will say very satisfactorily to myself, when I balance the evils of frequent elections with the dangers that attach to a longer period of office my republican ideas bring me, after all, to circumscribe it to the time fixed by the old fathers of the Constitution. I hardly think we can make it better; and I fear that in attempting to rid ourselves of the trouble and excitement and real difficulty of frequent elections we shall run into the other extreme, which is more dangerous and more fatal if we are wrong than the ordinary fixed term of this office. I therefore shall vote to keep it as it is; but if I am out voted in that, I shall not be entirely satisfied that the majority are wrong, and shall cheerfully go with the Senate upon that subject, however they may fix it, wishing, however, that they would not extend the term.