Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. President, I am very much gratified that the Senfrom Vermont has felt it to be his duty to submits. motion to reconsider the action of the Senate upon this amendment, and I think that We ought to discuss the matter without the slightest political feeling. It is a question which may become important, far mere important than it a ipeared to be at the time it was 1st introduce by the Senfrom Missouri. This amendment is attached to an appropriation bill; it is a condition precedent to the nyment of any money for the support of the 0st Office Dept during the next fiscal year. Unless the President is willing to assent to this proposition affecting his power to remove and appoint to office this appropriation bill cannot pass. If he approves the ill, be approves it with all the conditions and qualifications at tIached to the appro printions. It is therefore condition to an ordinary appropriation bill, and unless he does approve it, it must receive the sanction of 2/3rds of both branches of Congress or it cannot becOmea law; and in the event of his disapproval we shall either be called upon to pass the bill by a 2/3rds vote of both branches, or we shall be compelled to abandon it and to lose the appropriations for the next fiscal year for the Post O ice Dept. During the short period of my service in congress I have passed through 3 or 4 scenes of this kind. Once the arbitrary will of one man in this body defeated the postoffice appropriation bill to the serious detriment of the public service and to the severe loss of the Treasury. That was the case of the defeat of the postoffice appropriation bill in 18.39by Robert Toombs in the Senate. On another occasion last year, by a political amendment attache by the HoRep to the mise el laneous appropriation bill under the lead of a prominentgentleman in that House, an amendment which the Senate disapproved of and which the House sought to force upon the senate, the result was the defeat of the mise ella neous appropriation bill to the very serious loss of the 1reasury and very great inconvenience to the different Depts of the Government. There is another case where a condition proposed to be appended to an appropriation ill caused great injury to the public credit. In view of these circumstances I always hes itate when conditionsare proposed to appropriation bills. I do not doubt the power of congress to attach these conditions. We have the unlimited power over the public Treasury. No money can be drawn from the lrcasury without an appropriation made by law, to which each House must assent; and therefore the Senate may, as a conditionrecedent, impose terms upon the HoRep, or that I House may impose upon the Senate, or both, Houses may upon the President. the constitution gives us that power; but I say it is a power which ought never to be exercised, and these political conditions ought never to be attached to appropriation bills unless it is to accomplish some great overriding good which is greater and higher than the evil of the defeat of an appropriation bill. That principle cannot be varied. We cannot attach qualifications or conditions to these bills unless we seek to accomplish some overriding good that cannot be accomplished in any other way, and to accomplish which we are willing to risk the defeat of the ordinary appropriations of the Government. That is a principle which cannot be departed from; and therefore, as a general rule, it is never wise to attach to these hills which are intended for the support of the Government any conditions or qualifications of a political character. What is the consequence of it? The Executive may differ from Congress. It has been so in the past. Many times Congress has differed from the President. Suppose that Congress exercising its power over the public money should attach conditions to n propriotion bills which are not agreed to by the President, what is the result? Revolution; either the President will then be compelled in violationof the Constitution to seize upon the public Treasury and pay the expenses of your Government, contrary to law and contrary to his oath of office, or else hewill have to suspend the operations of the Government. Suppose this amendment should lead to an open breach between Congress and the President, what can he do? There is the postoffice Dept which affects every mans house and home, which carries his letters from his wife, from his children, which transects all his business of that character, which affects all the intimate relations of life are we to endanger the ordinary appropriations for this great branch of the public service by a more political controversy between Congress and the President as to his power of removing public officers 1 I say that now is the time for us to consider this question before it goes further and before any such breach is made. It may be said that the President will sign this bill with this condition in it. I hope he will if it asses; but suppose he should not do so, we she I then have the question before us, and I prefer to meet it now. As a general rule to be applied in all cases, both in this and all other Administrations, I am opposed to attaching conditions to the appropriation bills. When Mr. Buchanan was in power, when Mr. Pierce was in power we had similar. questions up and I alwaysop posed any such efforts. I say, then, that we ought to meet at the out set every effort to attach these political or disputed problems to an appropriation bill. There is no excuse, let me say to my fellow Senators, for this proposition at this particular time, because we in Congress, representing the great Union party of the U.S., supported, asI believe we are, by the great mass of the people, probably 99 out of every 100 of those who sent us here, have the power to pass the laws we think necessary, Without attachin them as qualifications to an appropriation ill. We can pass any law which meets the sanction of our political party, by the requisite vote, either of a majority, or, in case of a clear proposition, by a 2/3rds vote. There is, therefore, no occasion, in order to accomplish any political object, to attach this as a condition to an appropriation bill. If, however, only a majority of both Houses of Congress could agree upon any bill that might be proposed, that shows that we ought not to attach that opinion of a majority of each House to an appropriation bill, because we should not force upon the President any provision of law against his deliberate judgment unless we have the power to do it by the constitutional vote of 2/3rds of both Houses. We should not make the public necessities which demand that certain Depts of the Government be supplied with public funds a reason tdl forcing upon the President a provision that might not meet his sanction if it stood alone. It is impossible, seems to me, to combat this pain proposition. But, sir, boyoud that and upon this oiut alone I rested my argument before was willin to meet the object embraced by the amendment of the Senfrom Missouri; but upon an examination it was found, and I think very clearly proved, that the law of 1863 met all the difficulty that he proposed to meet, and that was anattempt on the part of the President to fillOffices the vacancies in which occur during the session of the Senate. The law of 1863 provides for that case. If the President after the adjournment of the Senate under takes to fill an office the vacancy in which occurred during the session of the Senate, he does it without the authority of the Constitution. He has no power to fill vacancies which occur during the session of the Senate, except by and with the adviceand consent of the Senate; and if he attempts in violation of the Constitution to exercise a power not conferred by the Constitution, we are then perfectly jus tified in withholding appropriations; indeed, we should not do our duty unless we did with hold the appropriations, because if we should pay officers thus illegally appointed we should Consent toa violation of the Constitution on his part. But now in the ease provided for by this amendment there is no enial of the power of removal, buta denial of the right of the officer to receive his money. The Contitution provides for 2 classes of appointments: one class where a vacancy occurs during the session of the Senate; it must be filled by and with the advice and consent. of the Senate; the other is the case of a vacancy which occurs during a recess of the Senate, and then the President from the nature of things and by the express provision of the Constitution has the power of nppointingu man to office to fill that vacancy, but the vacancy is only filled by such an appointment until the end. of the following session of the Senate. The officer thus appointed by the President is a legal officer. As said the otherdaythereisno power conferred by the Constitution upon the resident to remove anyone from office.That power is only inferential. That power may be regulated by law. That power 18not limited or restrained in the least by the amendment of the Senfrom Illinois. The amendment does not say that a Union man shall not be removed from office and a rebel put in. That seems to be the proposition be debated; but that is not the proposition he has submitted to us. He says that no man shall be removed from Office except for such and such causes; that is, a man who during this whole war has enjoyed the honors an emoluments of office shall not be turned out and a loyal Union soldier put in. That is one effect of his amendment.