Mr. SUMNER. Before I sit down I shall try to answer the remark of the Senfrom Delaware. There are 2 ways, I believe, if there are not 3, but there are certainly 2 ways of meeting the question which is presented to us by the vote of Mr. Stockton. use his name directly because it will be plainer and I shall he more easil understood. I say there are 2 ways in which the case may be met: one is by a motion to disallow the vote; the other by a motion such as I have now made to amend the Journal. Perhaps a 3rd way, though not 80 satisfactory to my mind, would be by a motion to reconsider; but I am not in a on dition to make this motion, as I did not ote with the apparent majority. I call your attention, however, at the outset, to 2 ways: one by disallowing the vote, and the other by amending the ournal; but behind both those ways, or all 3 ways, arises the simple question, had Mr. Stockton a right to vote? To this I understand it is replied that his name was on the roll of the Senate, and accordingly was called at the desk by our Secretary. [0 which I repl, and tomy mind the reply cannot be answeredv, the rule of the Senate is to be construed always in subordination to the principles of natural law and parliamentary law, and therefore you are brought again to the question with which I began, had Mr. Stock ton a right to vote? Had hea right to vote, 1st, according to the Principles of natural law, or, in other words, the principles of universal law? Itake it. there is no lawyer, there is no man even of the most moderate reading, who is not familiar with the principle of jurisprudence recognized in all countries and in all ages, that no man can be ajudge in his own case. That principle has been reduced to form among the maxinis of our common law as follows: nemodebel csse judex in proria sua causa. As such it has been hande down from the earliest days of the mother country. It was brought here by our fathers and has been cherished sacredly by us as a cardinal rule in every court of justice. No judge, no tribunal, high or low, can undertake to set aside this rule. I have in my hand the most recent work on the maxims of law, which is called Brooms Legal Maxims, where, after quoting this rule, the writer says: “It is a fundamental rule in the administration of justice, that a person cannot be judge in a cause wherein ho is interested.” He then goes on in another place to say: " It is then. a rule always observed in practice and of the application of which instances not unfrequently occur, that where a judzo is interested in the result of apit 519h8e cannot. either personally or by deputy, sit in Judgment upon it.” This rule had its earliest and most authoritative judicial statement in an opinion given by an eminent judge of England, who has a ways been quoted for his integrity in times when integrity was rare:I mean Chief Justice Hobart of the Court of Common Pleas. In his own reports, cited as Hobarts Reports, I call attention to the case of Day vs. Savadgc, where this learned magistrate expressed himself as fo“llows: It was against right and justice and against natural equrty to allow them" That is, “ certain magistrates their certificate. wherein they are to try and judge their own cause." and then he goes on to say, in memorable language, which has made his name famous: “ Even an act of Parliament made against natural equity, as to make a man judge in his own case is void in itself. for fun: nature um! mimulabilm, and they are (we: Imam." Thus strong was the language of this emi nent magistrate. According to him, even an act of Parliament making a man judge in his own case was VOlCl. But, sir, he was not alone. His great contem orary and our teacher to this day, Sir Edward oke, in a very famous case, which [have not before me now, but which is referred to in other cases, known as Bonhams case,lays down the same rule, that a court of justice Wlll not even recognize an act of Parliament itself if it undertakes to make a man judge in his own case. But another jndge, who as a lawyer and as an authority in courts down to this ay, perhaps, excels even those 2 that I have already cited I mean Lord Chief Justice Holt has explained and developed this principle in masterly language. I refer to what is known as Modern Reports, volume 12, the case of The City of London vs. Wood, page 688, where he expresses himself as follows: "Ingroc.where the city of London claims any freedom or franchise toitse l, thera none of Loridon shall be judge or Jury for there they cliupi an interest to themselves against the rest of mankind." I He then goes on to explain that principle, as follows: " It is against alllaws that the snmo person should be party and judge in the samecause, or it is manifest contradiction: for the party is he that is to complain to tho judgc and the iudgeisto hear the party; the party endeavors to have his Will. the jiidgo determines against the Will of the party and has authority to enforce him to obey his sentence and an any man not against his own Will or enforce himself to obey I The judge is agent, the party is patient, and thesame person cannot be both ugent and patient in thesome thing: but it is the same thing to say that the sn.nie manmay be patient and agent in the same thing as to say thathp maybe judge and party: and it is mani fest contradiction. nd whatmy Lord Coke saysin Dr. Bonhams case in his 8 Co is far from any extravagancy. for it is a very reasonableand triio saying, that if an act of Parliament should ordain that the samepersonshould be party and judge. or which is the samething, iudgein is o wn cause, it would be a void actpi Parliament; for it is impossiblethat one should heiudeu and party. for the judge is to determine betweenparty and party or between the governmentand the nflrty; and an act of Parliainentenn do no wron, though it may do several things that look very o d. tor it may discharge one from his allegiance to the Government lic livps under and restore him to the state of nature, hlltlt cannot make one that lives under a Governmentindgo and parts." These are the words of Chief Justice Holt. It will be observed that 3 eminent judges, Hobart. Coke and Holt, all found the inevitable conclusion on the immutable principles of natural law, that law which is common to all countries. It is the very law of which Cicero spoke in the concluding sentence of his treatise on the Republic, when he said that there was but one law for all countries now and in all times the same at Athens as in Home. It is also that universal law to which the great English writer, Hooker, alluded. when he said that her seat is the bosom of God: all things on earth do her reverence; the least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempt from her power. To this universal law all your legislation must be brought as to a touch stone, and all your conduct in this Chamber and all your rules must be construed in subordination to it; and therefore I say as I began, the practice in this Chamber of calling the names on the roll of the Senate must be interpreted in subordination to this commanding rule of universal law. But that is not all. I said that it was for bidden not only by natural law, but also by arliamentary law. Of course parliamentary law in itself must be in harmony with natural law; but parliamentary law has undertaken in advance to deal with this very question. There is no rule of the Senate on the subject, but there is a rule in the other House, as follows: “No member shall vote on anything in the event of which he is immediately interested." This is but an expression in parliamentary language of what I have announced as the rule of universal jurisprudence. But, sir, this rule of the other House was borrowed from the rules of the British House of Commons, one of which is as follows: “If anything shall comein question touching the return or election of any member he is to withdraw during the time the matter is in debate." I quote from Mays Parliamentary Law, page 450. I now quote from another work oi authority, Dwarris on the Statutes, art 1st, page 281, who expresses himselfas follows: “ No memberof the House may be present when a bill or another businesse oncerning himself is do bstinjz. hile the bill is but reading or opening, he may. Then, after citing 2 different cases, the learned writer proceeds as follows: “ This rule was always attended to in questionsrelative to the seat of a member on “184116811o1f1 controverted elections and has beenstrictly observedin casesof very great moment." Again the same writer says, on page 304: “ Where amember appearedtobe somewhat concorned" That is the phrase, only “ somewhat" “in interest, his voice has been disallowed after a division." Then, again, Cushing, who was quoted so frequently the other day, in his elaborate book on the Law and Practice of Legislative Assem blies, pages 711 and 713, expresses himself as follows: " Casesare frequent in which votes received have beendisallowed. “Again he says: Votes have also beendisallowed, after the numbers have been declared, on the ground that the members voting were interested in the question; and, in referenceto this proceeding, there is no time lim ited within which it must take place." Thus, sir, you will see, as I have already said, that parliamentary law is completely in harmony with natural law. Indeed, if it were not, it would be your dot to correct it to the end that it should be broug tinto such harmony and now, after this statement of the law, which I believe is completely applicable to the case of Mr. Stockton, am brought to consider the remedy. I said at the outset that there were 2 modes: one was by disallowing the vote on motion to that effec, and the otherb amending the Journal. But 1st let me cal your attention to the practice in disallowing a vote on motion. I have already read from Dwarris, where the vote was disallowed, and I will read it again: “ embera ear d in be somewhat concerpdtiieding rest, his giiioo hasbeendisallow“! In" adivilion.